THE HISTORY OF THE Government OF VENICE.

WHEREIN

The *Policies*, *Councils*, *Magistrates*, and *Laws* of that *STATE* are fully related; and the use of the *Balloting Box* exactly described.

Written in the year 1675, by the *Sieur Amelott de la Houssaie*, Secretary to the *French Ambassador* at *VENICE*.

LONDON,
Printed by *H. C.* for *John Starkey* at the *Miter* in *Fleetstreet*, near *Temple-Bar*, 1677.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

TO

Monſeigneur le Marquis de

LOUVOIS

ET DE

COURTENVAUX.

Commander and Chancellor of the

KING'S ORDERS,

Secretary and Miniſter of State.

Monſeigneur,

THough the State of Venice is at this day in its declenſion, yet in the condition it is, it retains ſomthing of Majeſty; It is venerable for an Antiquity of above Twelve hundred years; Illuſtrious for Chriſtianity which it has profeſſed from its Cradle; Famous for the Kingdoms it poſſeſs'd in the Levant, and for the Wars it has maintain'd againſt the Turks; Famous for the form of its Government, which is a Maſterpiece of Policy; and Famous for its ancient Allyance with the Crown of France, which has had it ſomtimes for its Companion both in Arms and Victories. I have thought, Sir, theſe Reaſons a ſufficient recommendation to your Lordſhip, of this Hiſtory which I now preſent. I am ſenſible notwithſtanding, I ought not to expoſe ſo poor a Work to the Eyes of ſo great a Miniſter, and that a perſon reſpected by all

France, *conſecrated to the Publick, ought not to be interrupted by particular Affairs; and indeed I could not but ballance betwixt my deſire of doing ſomthing that might teſtify my Zeal to your Lordſhips ſervice, and my fear of committing that which might be interpreted boldneſs. But when I conſider'd your Goodneſs, as great as your Power, I could not but hope your Lordſhip would extend the effects of it to me, who along time have been a ſilent Admirer of your Vertues: Vertues that your Lordſhip has inherited from your Father by way of advance; Vertues, that have render'd you like him, a compleat Miniſter.*

I could not but admire in your Lordſhip, that pregnancy and force of Spirit that makes you ſufficient alone for ſo many different affairs, whilſt neither their difficulty diſturbs you, nor their multitude confounds you. That faithful and unintereſted Devotion you carry for your Prince, (whom you honor more for his Perſon than his Crown) That reſpectful liberty wherewith you addreſs to himſelf, not to his fortune; preſerving by a great and unuſual ſecret, the Dignity of your Office, and the Reputation of his Favour; That Heroick Conſtancy that places you above the reach of Envy or Hatred, things wherewith you fear not to incumber your ſelf, when the ſervice of your Prince and Countrey requires it; And laſt of all, That incomparable Vigilance that keeps you always in action, which carries you to all

places

places where your presence is necessary, and which inables you to see, to understand, and to penetrate into all things. For, if we may trust what is said and known of your Lordship upon the Frontiers, and in our Armies, There it is Sir, that you are observ'd to pass whole nights on Horseback, to expose your Person to danger, perform all the most laborious offices of a Soldier, to give example to others, and necessitate them to the execution of their Duty. So that Sir, 'tis not without good reason his Majesty loves you, and heaps upon you his favours and benefits. He does honor to his own Justice in advancing of you, and you are the Workman-ship rather of his Wisdom, than Kindness. He wanted a sagacious, exact, active, indefatigable Minister, and such a one as was fit to succeed in the place of your inimitable Father: He has found all those qualifications in such perfection in you, that he has put your industry upon tryal in several difficult Imployments. His choice discovers your worth, and your actions, that you are worthy of his Choice: He is happy in a Minister, your Lordship in a Master; and betwixt His Majesty and your Lordship, we may see the excellent Concert that was formerly betwixt Augustus *and* Mecenas, *that is, a perpetual Conflict betwixt Generosity in the Prince, and Gratitude in the Subject. I perceive I am flown out insensibly in your praises, which flow in upon my Pen without any labour or study; but*

though they proceed from a true Sentiment, and Flattery has no ſhare in them, nevertheleſs becauſe I would not offend your Lordſhip's modeſty too much, I forbear to purſue them.

It remains then, that I only beſeech your Lordſhip to vouchſafe your protection to this Work, in which you will ſee as in a Glaſs, the fineſt and moſt delicate Maxims *of the* Venetians. *I could wiſh it had been more perfect, but I hope you will excuſe its defects, and perhaps commend the deſign, which was the more difficult, becauſe* Venice *is a place where Secrets are impenetrable to Strangers, eſpecially to Embaſſadors and other Miniſters, to whom they never ſpeak but by geſtures and ſigns. Beſides, ſcarce any thing is to be ſeen in their Government, but clouded with variety of appearances and pretences far enough from the Truth. For my part, I have endeavour'd to tell truth quite through my Book, and your Lordſhip will eaſily diſcern it; Your Lordſhip who your ſelf uſe it ſo much, and can ſo readily diſtinguiſh it from Falſhood. In the mean time, I ſhall eſteem my ſelf tranſcendently happy, if this Work (which is the firſt product of my thought and my ſolitude) may aſſiſt to perſwade Your Lordſhip that I am with all poſſible Reverence and Devotion.*

My LORD,

Your moſt humble and moſt obedient Servant

AMELOT de la HOUSSAIE.

THE

THE PREFACE.

READER,

I Suppoſe by the very Title of my Book, my deſign will be ſo clear, that I need not ſay it was not to write a compleat Hiſtory of *Venice*, which would have been ſuperfluous after ſo many as we have already, and from ſuch eminent Authors; My intention is only to give a ſhort and faithful Relation of their *Policy*, *Counſels*, *Magiſtrates*, and *Laws*, a thing that few have hitherto attempted, and thoſe that have, have done it but ſuperficially. So that if the Subject be not, I may ſay without Arrogance, the manner of my Deſcription is new; And yet that is not the only thing I pretend ſhall recommend it, the goodneſs of my Materials and Authority may do as well, which were the *Letters*, *Memoires*, and Relation of *Embaſſadors* communicated to me; The ancient *Annals* of this *Republick* out of which I have extracted all the Examples and Actions that I report, eſpecially the inſtructions which I had opportunity to take from the Fountain it ſelf, having had the honor to be imploy'd

in the *French Embaſſy* to *Venice*, which is the true reaſon why I undertook this Work, that otherwiſe would not have fallen into my thoughts. I do not doubt but *Criticks* will find many faults, ſome in my Deſign, ſome in my Language, ſome in my Judgment, and ſome in my Arguments. Let them judg of it as they pleaſe, I ſhould have enough to do to anſwer them, and be ſure to loſe my Cauſe, ſhould I contend with a people who profeſs to deſpiſe and decry every thing that they write not themſelves. I ſhall only ſay to them as *Quintilian* did of *Calvus*, That my mind was to have done better, but my parts and faculties would not anſwer to the greatneſs of my Deſire; My comfort is, That being the firſt *Frenchman* who has writ of this *Government*, I may hope that reaſonable perſons will excuſe my Work the more readily, becauſe the firſt of every thing is imperfect, and it holds in the operations of the mind, as well as the productions of Nature. Beſides, who knows but the roughneſs and unevenneſs of this Book, may provoke ſome more able and dextrous Pen, to exhibit what ſhall be more regular and exact.

Calvum in tellexiſſe quid melius eſſet, nec voluntatem quin ſublimeus & Cultius deceret, ſed ingenium ac vires deſuiſſe.

However, the chief object of my Pains, and the only recompence I expect, being your Approbation, I hope you will allow me ſome little time to recount the order and connexion of this *Hiſtory* which I preſent to your peruſal.

I have begun my Deſcription with the *Grand Council*, which in my own opinion is the unpleaſanteſt part of the Book. This Method will make ſome people ſay (and methinks I hear them already) that I am ill skill'd in the Art of Writing, to bring the Reader at firſt daſh among Briars and Thorns, whereas I ſhould rather have diſplay'd my Roſes and Flowers, to have invited him farther, and inveigled him into an eſteem of it. To this I anſwer, The *Grand Council* being the ſource of all the other *Councils* and *Magiſtrates*, I could not proceed otherwiſe without being prepoſterous, and perverting the natural order of my Subject.

Beſides, if the matter be thorny in it ſelf, it ought not to be imputed to me, who had not the liberty of my choice. And if it be objected, that I might have omitted the perplexities of their *Elections* and *Ballotings* in the *Grand Council*: I reply, what I have done was no more than neceſſary to make my VVork compleat, and to ſatisfie the curioſity of the Reader. For as *Frenchmen* have in their paſſage through *Venice*, many times deſir'd to be admitted into the *Grand Council*, to ſee their way of *Balloting*, ſo I doubt not but there are ſome of them will be glad to read, what they have ſeen but confus'dly, and perhaps will commend the pains I have taken to clear them. In which I have imitated ſeveral great Authors, who have vouchſaf'd

us

us whole volumes for explication of the *Comitia* in the Commonwealth of *Rome*; whereas I have comprehended all *Venetian* Courts in three or four pages, that to read them might not be troubleſom. But in ſhort, if that place diſpleaſes any one, he may without much trouble skip it over, and paſs to that which is more delightful.

I have treated at large of the *Senat*, becauſe being the Nobleſt, and moſt excellent part of the *State*, I thought it but reaſonable to proportion it to its Subject, and make it the chief part of my Book: On the contrary, I have not detain'd my ſelf long upon the *Colledg*, becauſe I look'd upon it as it were an Antichamber to the *Senat*.

Having ſpoken of their *Councils* in General, I proceed to the *Magiſtrates* of which it is Compos'd, beginning with the *Duke* as chief, and continuing with the reſt according to the dignity and importance of their imployments. I have given ſome little particular touches of the *Doge*, the *Procurators* of *Saint Mark*, and the *Decemviri*, called by them the *Council of Ten*. Not ſo much becauſe they are the Chief *Magiſtrates* of the *Town*, as becauſe the Matter, however curious and delightful, has not hitherto been well handled.

All that have given us Relations of *Venice*, tell us, that the *Duke* has no more Authority than another *Senator*, and that he is ſubject

to

to the Laws. That the *Council of Ten* is a great *Tribunal*, where all the *Nobility*, and Malefactors againſt the State, are judged in an extraordinary way: This every body knows before, and there needs no more Books to convince us. But to ſhow how the *Venetians* comport with their *Duke*; in what his Grandeur, his Office, his Obligations conſiſt; of what Age, of what Humour, of what Genius he ought to be, are things which in my judgment deſerve to be writ, as compleating our knowledg of their *Government.* For the ſame reaſon I have endeavoured to draw the *Council of Ten* to the life, ſuppoſing my draft may be the more grateful, becauſe in it you may ſee all the fine ſtrokes, all the ſubtil Maxims, all the cloſe and conceal'd Myſteries of their *Government.* And I do not fear that any will accuſe me of animoſity or bitterneſs againſt the *Venetians* (whom I have no reaſon to hate) ſeeing I have ſaid nothing on them but from every good *Memoires*, their own proper *Hiſtory*, ſeveral *Embaſſadors*, and the Publick reputation, which certainty will be enough to juſtifie mine. Moreover the *Commonwealth of Venice*, like other Nations, being made up of good and bad, I have not ſuppreſs'd or leſſen'd the honour of their Actions where they accur'd in my Diſcourſe.

Dominationis Arcana. Tac. Ar.

If I have compar'd ſomtimes the Magiſtrates of *Venice* to the Magiſtrates of *Sparta*, and

and *Rome*, it was not by the way of Ornament to my Hiſtory (which perhaps may be wanting) but to ſhow what the *Republick* of *Venice* has taken from two other eminent *Commonwealths*, and with what good ſucceſs they have uſued it; an Argument of their profound Wiſdom and Prudence: Beſides, theſe ſort of compariſons inſtruct, and entertain the mind of the Reader, eſpecially if he be *French*, whoſe humour it is to learn many things at a time. Moreover in
Polybius. that I have imitated an excellent Hiſtorian, who in the ſame manner has made Parallels betwixt the *Carthaginians* and the *Romans*, and betwixt theſe and other Nations, but with this difference, that his Deſcription contains whole Pages, and mine (except my compariſon of the *Doge* with the *King of Sparta*, and the *Ephori* with the *Council of Ten*) is compriz'd in three words.

† My language is neither affected, nor careleſs, but betwixt both, neither great conſtraint on the one ſide, nor great liberty on the other. And if I have not pick'd my words in ſome places, it has been to preſerve the efficacy of the Senſe, which elegant and modiſh Phraſes would not have render'd ſo entire; for I have more reſpect to a good thought, than a good word, to the elegancy of things than the elegance of phraſes, which is the proper work of a Grammarian. Again, A ſubject like mine, requires more gravity and ſolidity,

ſolidity, than polliſh and ſmartneſs; And therefore the *Venetians* deride thoſe who affect to ſpeak in their *Senat*, either in the *Roman* or *Tuſcan* Dialect. Moreover I ſhould be very glad, and think I came off very well, if nothing be laid to my charge but ill Choice, or ill placing of my words.

This is all, kind Reader, I have to ſay for my ſelf, and my hope is, your Moderation will make it more effectual, than it would otherwiſe be.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THere is lately Printed that Excellent *Hiſtory* of the *Republick* of *VENICE*; wherein is related the moſt conſiderable *Affairs* of *Europe* from the year 1612 to 1644. Written in *Italian* by the Eminent *Battiſta Nani*, *Procurator* of St. *Mark*, and Faithfully Engliſhed by Sir *Robert Honywood*. In Folio, Price bound 14 s. Printed for *John Starkey* at the *Miter* in *Fleetſtreet*, near *Temple-Bar*.

THE HISTORY OF The Government OF VENICE.

I Write the *History* of the *Government* of *Venice*, without contradiction, in its kind, the beſt in all *Europe*; as being a true Copy of the ancient *Republicks* in *Greece*, and as it were an Amaſs, or Collection of all their moſt excellent Laws. Some Authors have handled this Subject before me, among which Cardinal *Contarin*, *Sanſovin*, and *Jannotti* were the chief. But all three of them have given us no more than a bare deſcription of the *Magiſtrates* and *Tribunals* in *Venice*; and ſo far have they been from ſounding the myſtery of that *Government*, that they would not ſo much as touch it by the by, in reſpect of ſome private intereſts of their own. Wherefore I undertake this Relation, out of an opinion it may ſatisfy ſober men by the importance and variety of its matter, in which ſomething poſſibly may be found, that being new will have at leaſt its novelty to recommend it.

To begin with Order, It ſeems to me convenient to premiſe ſomething about the ſeveral States and Conditions through which this *Republick* has paſt ſince its Foundation; which will be, as it were, an *Epitome* of the whole *Hiſtory*, and ſerve as a Scheme or Ground-plot to my Work.

Venice has often chang'd the form of her *Government*. Her firſt *Government* was by *Conſuls*, but that laſted not long: Her next was by *Tribunes*, annually choſen by the people of each *Iſle*, which in thoſe days made a ſeparate *Commonwealth*, not much unlike the *Cantons* in *Switzerland*, or the *United Provinces* in the *Low-Countreys*; and to thoſe *Tribunes* it is that *Caſſiodorus* addreſſes his Letters with this Superſcription, *Tribunis Maritimorum*. But becauſe their *Magiſtrates* many times diſagreed, and the *Lombards** took advantage of their diſſentions, whilſt they loſt their time in conteſting among themſelves: The people wearied with their delays, took a fancy to make experiment of a ſingle perſon; and to that end, creating a *Duke*, they transferr'd upon him their Soveraign Authority, which they had enjoyed for 270 years. Nevertheleſs, being quickly weary of their *Dukes*, they aboliſhed the very name and dignity in the perſon of the third *Duke*, who abuſed his Power; and in their place ſubſtituted a Military *Tribune*, called in their ancient Annals *Magiſter Militum*, by corruption *Maſtromiles*, whoſe Office was annual. This form was laid aſide in the fifth year after its inſtitution, *Fabricio Ziani*, the laſt of that quality, having made himſelf odious to the People, who at that time were very hard to be pleaſed; inſomuch that theſe *Iſlanders* regrating the depoſal of their firſt *Dukes*, by comparing them with their preſent *Tribunes*; by common conſent reviv'd the *Ducal* Authority, and advanc'd *Theodate*, Son of their laſt *Prince*, to the Throne.

* *Cum Tribuni inſularum ſibi ad invicem deferre nolent*, Longobardi *abſq; reſiſtentia eorum fines pluries invaſerunt.* Dandol. *Ann.*

From this Election in the year 742, to the year 1173, there were 34 *Dukes* ſucceſſively; who govern'd the *Iſles* with an Authority ſo abſolute, that it is not to be admired if there were ſo many Revolts

volts and Conſpiracies againſt them; ſome of them having been expuls'd, ſome having had their eyes put out, and others moſt cruelly maſſacred.

After the death of *Vital Michieli* the ſecond of that name, ſlain upon *Eaſter-day*, 1173, the People being weary of the long Dominion of their *Dukes*, reaſſum'd the *Government*; * yet for more reputation to their affairs, they continued to elect a *Prince*, but with ſuch manacles and reſtrictions, that they left him ſcarce any thing but the Title and Precedence. All was managed by the *Grand Council*, which was compoſed of 470 *Citizens* nam'd by 12 Electors, ſelected out of the ſix Quarters of the Town, called by them *Seſtieri*: Theſe 470 were changed annually every *Michaelmas-day*, that all perſons might have their ſhare in their turns. This method continued to the time of *Duke Peter Grandenique* the Second, who reform'd the *Grand Council* in the year 1298, by impoſing upon the *Quarenty* * *Criminal* a new Law to this purpoſe: That all thoſe who were of the *Grand Council* that year, or had been of it in the four precedent years, ſhould continue ſo, and their children after them *in perpetuum*, if they were able to obtain twelve voices in the *Quarenty*; and that all the reſt of what quality ſoever, whether of the *Populace* or *Nobles*, (for they call thoſe *Nobles* which were deſcended from the ancient *Tribunes*) ſhould be for ever excluded from the Civil adminiſtration. Inſomuch that the ſaid Decree having been propoſed in the *Grand Council* by *Leonard Bembe*, and *Mark Badoer*, in the name of the *Quarenty*, and received by plurality of voices, the Soveraignty was transferr'd from the People to the *Nobles*. This change (as is common in all revolutions of State,) produc'd the famous Conſpiracy of the *Quirins*, the *Tiepoles*, and other ancient and

* *Ab unius dominatione ad omnes.* Bodin.

† † *Principi orbum potentiæ nomen relinquitur.* J.B. Contarin *Hiſt. Venet. l. 7.*

* See *Quarenty* in the Remarks.

conſiderable Families, who were excluded either totally or in part; for ſeveral of them were divided betwixt ſervitude and liberty: witneſs the *Nani*, the *Navagiers*, the *Treviſans*, and the *Paſqualiques*, who in conſequence of this Decree found their Families mingled with the People and the *Nobles*, with Maſters and Servants; upon which the *Quirins* did eagerly complain, That this Reformation cut the knot of Amity and Concord betwixt all the great Families in *Venice*, and would endanger the kindling a Civil War. But their murmurs were in vain; and the enterprize of *Marin Bocconi* to break open the doors of the *Grand Council*, and there to aſſaſinate the *Duke*, had no other ſucceſs but his own Execution, and the ruine of his party.

In the mean time the new Government, that was as yet but an *Oligarchy*, grew up by degrees to an abſolute * *Ariſtocracy*, by addition of ſeveral Illuſtrious Families that had been excluded by lot, and by eſtabliſhing the *Council of Ten* to imprint reſpect and obedience in the hearts of the People; who, when they are in no awe themſelves, are ever to be fear'd. So that it may juſtly be ſaid, the *Common-wealth* of *Venice* began by Prince *Peter Grandenique*, becauſe it was he who in ſpight of all difficulties, by his own courage and addreſs, wreſted it out of the hands of the common People, to give it that excellent form which it retains to this day.

* See *Ariſtocracy* in the Remarks.

Tanta molis erat Venetorum *condere gentem.*

So then *Venice* was governed by *Conſuls* and *Tribunes* in its *Infancy*, which laſted 270 years, during which time ſhe kept her ſelf within her *Iſlands*, as within her Cradle. She paſt her *Childhood* under 37 Soveraign *Dukes*, that is to ſay, from *Lucius Anaſe-*

Anaſeſtus, to *Sebaſtian Ziani*. This comprehended 470 years, part of which time ſhe employed in Wars againſt her neighbours, and part in extending her Conqueſts to greater diſtance, as ſhe found her Power increaſe. The *Populace* having reſcued themſelves from the Tutelage of their *Dukes*, undertook the Conduct of her *Youth*, from 1173 to 1298; which was effectually robuſt and vigorous, but diſturb'd and agitated (as happens frequently in that age) with many dangerous paroxiſms both of Wars and Revolts. Her *Virility* began under the *Nobles* 1298, and laſted from the reformation of the *Government*, which they called, *Il ſerrar di Conſiglio*, where the *Democracy* ended, till the war of the League of *Cambray* 1509, which, to ſpeak properly, was the beginning of her *Old-age*. Be it how it will, *Venice* has this advantage, ſhe has maintain'd her ſelf longer than all the famous *Republicks* of the *Ancients*. The *Commonwealth* of *Sparta* laſted but 700 years: *Athens*, *Thebes*, and *Rhodes* loſt their liberty ſeveral times: *Corinth* continued not long in that form: and *Rome*, the moſt illuſtrious of them all, had much ado to preſerve it ſelf free 500 years together; a ſtrong preſumption of the excellence of the *Venetian Common-wealth*, whoſe preſent State and Condition is the only thing I deſign to repreſent in this Book.

There are *three* principal *Councils* in *Venice*; that is to ſay, the *Grand Council*, which comprehends the whole body of the *Nobles*: the *Pregadi*, which is the *Senate*; and the *Colledg* where *Embaſſadors* have their audience. I do not reckon among them the *Council of Ten*, becauſe it is only a Tribunal inſtituted for the trial of matters againſt the State. In all theſe Councils the *Seigniory* (which is a kind of *Septemvirate*, conſiſting of the *Duke* and ſix *Councellors*, and called *il Conſiglietto*, being an

abridgment of the reſt) preſides: ſo that the *Seigniory* is as it were the *Head* of that *Republick* of which the *Duke* is the *Mouth*, becauſe it is his office to give anſwer to the *Embaſſadors*. The *Councellors* are the *Eyes* and the *Ears*, it being their buſineſs to peruſe all Letters directed to the *Senat*; all Memorials, or Requeſts, preſented to the *Colledg*; and to hear all forreign Miniſters, all Deputies of Towns, or whatever other perſons are employed in any negotiations with the publick. The *Colledg* is as it were the *neck* of this body Politick, by which, as by a Pipe, all affairs paſs to the *Pregadi*, which may be called the *Stomack*, or *Belly*, as containing all the parts of that Government, and deriving all its nouriſhment to it. The private *Magiſtrates* are as it were the *Nerves* and *Bones* that move and ſuſtain it; and the *Council of Ten* are the *ligaments*, hindring the parts from unknitting, and preventing any violent motion from putting them out of their natural place.

But the *Grand Council* being the *baſis* and foundation of this *Republick*; it ſeems to me moſt proper to begin my deſcription with a particular of that, its Juriſdiction, and all its Eſſential parts: which I ſhall endeavour to do with as much method, clearneſs and brevity, as is poſſible.

THE

THE FIRST PART.

Of the Grand Council

THE *Grand Council* is a General Assembly of the *Nobles*, which meets on *Sundays* and *Holydays* for the Election of *Magistrates*. It is called the *Grand Council*, because it comprehends all the rest; and therefore when that is held, the rest do cease on course, as formerly all the Courts in *Rome* did during their *Comitia*: and the reason why *Sundays* and *Holy-days* are chosen for the meeting of the *Grand Council*, is, that other days might be left free for other Courts, without interruption to the course of affairs.

In *Summer-time* the *Grand Council* meets in the morning, and sits from eight of the clock till noon. In *Winter* they meet after dinner, and sit till Sunset. Their Session in the morning begins in *April*, and ends at *All-Saints*; at which time begins their meeting in the after-noon.

Their Election of *Magistrates* is in this manner. The Chancellor having read in the Assembly a Memorial of what Offices are vacant; and the *Avogadors*, * the chief of the *Council of Ten*, and the *Censors*, having sworn to observe the Orders of the Council; the *Nobles* draw lots to become Electors. The Electors (who are always 36, and make four *Mains* as they call them; or separate Bands)

The form of their Election of Magistrates.

* See the Remarks.

Bands) do each of them name a Competitor, which is baloted afterwards by one *Main* of the Electors.

To understand it the better, you must know there are three *Urns* raised above the ordinary height of a man, to the end that no body might look into them. One of these *Urns* is placed before the *Duke*, the other two at the ends of the Table; and three Councellors are appointed to look to each of them.

Into the *Urns* on the right and left hand are put as many little white Bouls as there are *Nobles* in the Council; that is to say, sixty all gilt, thirty for each *Urn*. Into the *Urn* in the middle are put sixty, 36 gilt, and 24 white. The *Nobles* come up two by two, one on each side, and draw by turns: If the Boul be white, they throw it into a little box under the *Urn*, and return to their place as nothing had been done. If the Bowl be gilt, it is presented to the Councellors belonging to the *Urn* out of which it was taken. From thence they proceed to the *Urn* in the middle, out of which, if they draw a white Bowl, they are *ipso facto* excluded; but if it be their fortune to light upon a gilt Bowl, they are received for Electors of the first *Main*: after which they remove to a Bench placed before the *Duke*'s Throne, where they sit down with their faces towards the *Duke*, that no man may have opportunity by making signs to recommend himself to them; and having done this, they are proclaim'd aloud by one of the Secretaries of the Council. If in the first *Main* the lot falls to two *Nobles* of the same Family, the second is reserv'd for the second *Main*; and all the Gentlemen of that House retire out of the Council, the Law excluding them that day, because there cannot be in the thirty six above two Electors of one Family; So that every *Main* consists of nine Gentlemen of indifferent Families.

The

The first *Main* being fix'd, a Secretary delivers to the youngest of them a Note of what Offices are to be supplied, and conducts them out of the Council into a Chamber on purpose; where he causes them to draw by turns out of a Vessel which contains nine Bowls, mark'd each of them with a figure from 1 to 9, which answers to the Magistrates to be nam'd: so that the Nobleman who draws the figure 1, names a Competitor for the first Office, and so of the rest. Every Competitor is baloted, or chosen by lots afterwards by this *Main*; and if he has two thirds of the Suffrages, he carries the place: whereas if he has not two thirds, he who nam'd him must propose another, till he pitches upon one who passes; and then the Secretary writes the name and quality of the person so nam'd, under the note of the vacant Office for which he is Competitor. And the same is observ'd in the other *Mains*: but here it is to be observ'd, that all four of the *Mains* do name persons for every Office, and so to each Office there are four several pretenders.

After the Competitors are concluded, the Electors withdraw, unless they be *Councellors*, *Sagegrands*, Members of the *Council of Ten*, *Avogadors*, or *Censors*, who have priviledg to return again into the Council to justify their Election. The four Secretaries of the respective *Mains* deliver the Note of Competitors to the Chancellor, who reads them aloud to the Table; to the end it may appear, if among them there be any *in divieto*, that is, excluded by the Law. After this he exhorts them in a short speech to postpone their private animosities to the good of their Countrey, and not prefer their passions to their duty. In the mean time the Competitors for the first Office depart the Council, with all their kindred, who are not

not allowed their ſuffrages by reaſon of their relation. This done, certain children called *Balotins* are appointed to receive the Balls in two *Boſſols* or boxes; one white to ſignify excluſion, the other red to ſignify admiſſion, by pronouncing the name of the Competitor.

The balls made of white ſtuff very ſmall, are put into the white or the green box thorow a common mouth; ſo that no man need fear the eyes of another, becauſe no man can ſee where they are put; and thoſe who have given excluſion may ſwear truly according to their uſual oath, *Caro Signor l'ho ſerviſa, ſi da ſervitor vero.* The balls being taken out, are carried to the Councellors to be counted; and the Competitor who has moſt of them carries the Office.

After this the Chancellor mentions the next Vacancy; and the perſons propos'd, who immediately retire out of the Council with all their relations, the firſt being admitted into the Council to elect theſe; and this is called *Render il partito*, becauſe they render what was borrowed: and 'tis the ſame with the reſt.

If it happens that none of the Competitors for any of the Offices has more than half the balls, the place is to remain void till another Seſſion: but the Competitors ſhall not be the ſame again, becauſe the lots will hardly give them the ſame Electors. Again, if any of the Competitors ſhould be left to be drawn after Sun-ſet, he loſes abſolutely his right; for as it is not permitted to draw, nor indeed any thing elſe in the *Grand Council* at *Venice* (no more than it was formerly at *Rome* to deliberate * in the Senat) after Sun-ſet; ſo whatever is then done being thereby actually void, the nomination of that perſon becomes utterly uſeleſs. And if of the four Competitors three be *in divieto*, the

* *Ante exortum ſolem, aut poſt ejus occaſum, Senatus-conſultum irritum eſt.* Varro.

the fourth who remains cannot be choſen for want of a Competitor. But on the contrary, if all the *Mains* concur in the Election of one perſon, (as it falls out ſometimes,) he muſt be choſen, becauſe he was Competitor to himſelf. And the ſame rule holds for thoſe who are nam'd by two *Mains*, which is intimated by the Chancellor in his proclaiming the Competitors.

In the Election of the *Doge*, their form is quite different; and I ſhall give it in as few words as are poſſible.

All the *Nobles* paſt 30 years of age being met in the *Palace of St. Mark*, as many little bowls are put into an *Urn* as there are Gentlemen preſent; 30 of which bowls are gilt. Thoſe to whoſe lot they fall, preſent nine of the gilt bowls before the *Seigniory*, among 24 of the white; and the nine Gentlemen to whom the gilt bowls come, are Electors for 40 others, all of different Families, among whom they have liberty to comprehend themſelves. By lot they are reduced to twelve, which twelve chooſe 25 others; the firſt chooſes three, the other eleven two a-piece. Theſe 25 drawing by lot as the 12, are reduc'd to 9, who have the nomination of 45; that is to ſay, each of them names five. The 45 are by lot reduc'd to eleven, and they again chooſe 41, which are the laſt and principal Electors of the *Duke*, after they have been confirm'd by the *Grand Council*. Nor is it without reaſon the *Venetians* have eſtabliſhed this unuſual form of Election; for by theſe variations, and diverſity of Electors, it is, that all private ambitions are defeated: becauſe all depending upon the choice of thoſe who are favoured by lot, (which no man can force) all their plots and ſtratagems are ineffectual. Beſides, it is a way of contenting moſt of the chief

The form of Electing their *Doge*.

chief Families by the ſhare they have in the Election.

Anciently the *Dukes* of *Venice* were choſen by the acclamation of the * People; but that way of Election being confus'd and tumultuous, they eſtabliſh'd another after the death of *Vital Michieli* the ſecond; whoſe ſucceſſor was nam'd by eleven † Electors, whoſe number was advanc'd to 40 in the following *interregnum*, and 60 years after fix'd in 41, to avoid the difficulty which ſometimes happened of having their voices equal. Which cuſtom has been obſerv'd ſince the time of *Duke Marine Moroſin* to this day; only with this difference, that in his days it was ſufficient to have 21 voices to be elected *Duke*; and at preſent there are 25 required at the leaſt.

* *Duces primum populi acclamationibus deligebantur.* Bern. Juſtin.

† *Primus Sebaſt. Zianus ab xi Electoribus eſt creatus.* Idem.

In the Election of Magiſtrates there are no doubtful voices, becauſe they have too much choice among the Competitors, to be in doubt what is to be done: but yet in their Balotings certain rules are obſerved, as alſo in their Criminal Judgments, where the doubtful voices are allowed to the weaker party. For example, If one of the *Nobles*, againſt whom proceſs is form'd, has fewer voices in the Baloting than his accuſers; the *Non-ſincere* (for ſo it is they call the doubtful voices) are reckon'd to him, with which adddition, if yet his number be found inferior to his adverſary, the Noble is condemn'd: On the contrary, he is diſcharg'd, if the adverſe party, with the addition of the *Non-ſincere* voices, has fewer than he. But if he be not clear'd without the addition of the *Non-ſincere* voices, the Baloting begins again, and continues till either the one or the other has more than a moiety of the Yea's or the No's: for the *Non-ſincere* voices ſerve only to ſuſpend Judgment, as the Code of *Venice* tells us; *Non faciunt Judicium, ſed illud impediunt*

Further-

Furthermore, there are great abuſes in the Elections and Judgments of this Council, in which all things are carried according to the caprice or ignorance of the young Gentlemen, of which it is full. Hence it was, that the Senator *John Sagrede* ſaid well in his Oration for *General Moroſini*; that it was not to be admir'd if the plurality of voices went at firſt for the *Avogador Correr* the accuſer, among ſuch a number of young men, who receive blindly the firſt impreſſions, and ſuffer themſelves to be carried away like the Tide: 'tis the very word he uſed after he had compared the *Grand Council* to a tempeſtuous Sea. From whence we may judg, whether the *Government* has done wiſely to allow the *Nobles* deliberative voices from the firſt day of their entrance into the Council; whereas formerly they were novices for two years before they were admitted to the lots.

Selling of voices is another great miſchief, the rich buying the ſuffrages of the poor, whereby they make themſelves ſlaves to their equals. 'Tis true, it may be objected that kind of trade keeps up the correſpondence and concord betwixt the one and the other; but whether that be ſo or not, it is an abuſe that draws many inconveniences along with it. Anciently this bartering and ambition of Office was forbidden; now there is nothing more frequent among them, and the * *Broglio* is a publick Fair licenſed by the corruption of the times, where all Offices are to be ſold.

* See the Remarks.

The Law permits not any of the *Nobles* to ſit in the *Grand Council* before they be 25 years of age; but the *Seigniory* admits every year a certain number which they call the *Barberins*: and this they do by lots, to avoid the envy and diſcontent of the pretenders, who thereby have no reaſon to complain, or be diſſatisfied, when fortune

is

is not ſo favourable to them as to the reſt. Their method is thus.

On the third of *December* the pretenders preſent themſelves to the *Avogadors* to certify their age, which muſt be full twenty years; as alſo that they are legitimately deſcended from Noble *Venetians*. Having ſatisfied them in that, the Clerk of the *Avogadory* gives them Atteſtations ſign'd by that Office, which Atteſtation they carry to the Secretary of the *Quarenty Criminal*, who all put their names to ſo many ſeveral Notes.

The next morning the ſaid Secretary preſents the Notes to the *Colledg*, where there are two *Urns* plac'd before the *Duke*; in one of which ſo many Copper-bowls are put, as there are pretenders: but let their number be what it will, there are never more of the bowls gilt than 31. In the other *Urn* are put the Notes, which the Duke draws out one by one; and delivering them to the Secretary, cauſes him to read the name publickly; and then the *Balotin*, who is a child, takes a bowl out of the other *Urn* for the Gentleman whoſe name is proclaim'd; and if he lights upon a gilt-bowl he is admitted of the *Grand Council*; but if his bowl be white he is excluded: and ſo with the reſt.

Sometimes the *Seigniory* diſpences with the age of their *Nobles*, in recompence of the ſervice of their Fathers, Brothers, or other Relations. Sometimes they ſell thoſe Diſpenſations, (as they did during the war in *Candy*,) and the money they receive for them is called *il depoſito del Conſiglio*, the *depoſitum* of the Council.

And here it is to be obſerved, The *Nobles* are not of the body of the Republick but from the day of their admiſſion into the *Grand Council* which for them is a kind of ſecond Nativity, ſeeing

ing it gives them poſſeſſion of a Civil life, and makes them members of the State; whereas before they were members only of their own Families. *

Thoſe who are pretenders to the dignity of the *Nobles*, preſent a Petition, in which they ſet forth their reaſons; and then go ſeven or eight times to the gate of *Palais St. Mark*, as Clients do to the Gates of their Judges, to recommend themſelves to the Gentlemen in their paſſage to the Council. If theſe pretenders have more than a moiety of ſuffrages in their Baloting, they are received as *Nobles*, otherwiſe they are excluded. But if the voices be divided, (which is called at *Venice*, *Impattar*,) the buſineſs is put off to another Seſſion: or if there happens a *Patta*, or any other difficulty in reſpect of the *Non-ſincere*, (which are uſed likewiſe in theſe Balotings,) all is referr'd to a third and laſt Council; for one and the ſame buſineſs cannot be protracted above three Seſſions.

The *Procurators of St. Mark* are excluded the *Grand Council* by reaſon of their dignity, which being the moſt eminent in that State next to the *Ducal*, is the cauſe they have no paſſive voice in the Council; that is to ſay, there is no Office to which they can pretend, till the *Interregnum*, in which they are in election to be *Dukes*. It is the Law in *Venice*, that the *Nobles* which have no paſſive voice in the Councils, can have no active voice there. But when the *Procurators* are *Sage-Grands*, which is a dignity in the nomination of the Senat, they are admitted to the *Grand Council* as *Sage-Grands*, not as *Procurators*.

Some are of opinion the reaſon of this excluſion is, becauſe theſe Lords are oblig'd to watch as Guards of the Palace, and of the place *St. Mark*, during the Seſſion of the *Grand Council*; that if in

* *Ante hoc domus pars videntur, mox Reipublicæ.* Tac. Ger.

Jannot. *de Rep. Ven.* & Sanſor. *in deſer. di Ven.*

in the mean time any popular Commotion ſhould ariſe, there might be perſons of Authority ready to ſuppreſs it.

But though the *Grand Council* comprehends the whole body of the *Nobles*, it has not the whole authority of the State; for the rights of Majeſty are divided betwixt the Council and the Senat. The firſt has Authority to make Laws, or aboliſh them, to elect Magiſtrates, and other inferior Councils; as formerly that in *Rome* was inferior to the People, according to that ancient ſaying, *Auctoritas in Senatu, poteſtas in Populo.* The ſecond has power of making War and Peace, Leagues and Truces; to lay Impoſts and Taxes upon the People: to put the value upon money, with the abſolute diſpoſition of the Treaſury. It diſpoſes of all military Commands both at Land and Sea; and all temporary Offices, called by them *Cariche a tempo*, created only upon emergency. It ſends Succors to their Allies, names Embaſſadors, Reſidents, Secretaries of their Embaſſies, who depend wholly upon it, and are recall'd, continued, corrected, or rewarded as it pleaſes. So that the rights of Majeſty being equally divided betwixt the *Grand Council*, which conſiſts of all the *Nobles*, and the Senat, which is a ſelect party; the *Republick* of *Venice* may be ſaid to be almoſt an *Ariſto-Democracy*, like that in *Sparta* after the inſtitution of the *Ephori*; and that in *Rome*, when the Authority was divided betwixt the People and the Senate, who made diſtinct and ſeparate Laws; the firſt the *Plebiſcita*, the ſecond the *Senatus-conſulta*; though to take it in ſtrictneſs, it is a pure *Ariſtocracy*, ſeeing the Duke has no abſolute power, and the People no part in the publick adminiſtration. Sometimes there have been conteſts about Juriſdiction betwixt the *Grand*

Coun-

Council and the *Senat*; as it hapned in the affair of General *Moroſini*, where the *Senat* nam'd an Inquiſitor to inform againſt the ſaid Gentleman, though the *Grand Council* pretended to name him: But beſides that theſe differences are rare, they end always without noiſe or confuſion.

It is in the *Grand Council* the *Nobles* play all their pranks, and exerciſe all their private animoſities, to exclude their adverſaries from Office, without the leaſt regard to their merit. There it is they pretend to do all by Lots; but it is not with little balls of white ſtuff, but with large preſents quite contrary to their promiſes.

In a Monarchy 'tis ſufficient if we pleaſe our Prince; in a Republick we muſt pleaſe every body, which is the more difficult, if not impoſſible; becauſe Birth, Fortune, Honour, and even Vertue it ſelf is enough to create a man enemies, unleſs he manage with more than ordinary prudence. *Nobilitas, opes, omiſſi, geſtiq; honores pro crimine, & ob virtutes certiſſimum exitium.* Tacit. Hiſt. 1. So that Nobleman was not ill-vers'd in their Policies, who ſaid, that he made no difference betwixt the Noble *Venetians*; that to him all the Families ſeemed equal, and that there was not one of which he would not be a member. For by pretending to know no ſuch odious diſtinction of *Caſe* * *Vecchie*, and *Caſe Naoie*, they aſſured themſelves of the affection and favour of two thirds of the Nobility, and were certain of their ſuffrages upon any occaſion. * See the Remarks.

Furthermore, becauſe it is the *Grand Council* which makes the Laws; in my judgment it is not unneceſſary to take notice of ſuch of the principal of them as do more particularly concern the Nobles, as the predominant part of that State.

Principal Laws *of the Government of* Venice.

I. THE Eccleſiaſticks as well of the *Nobles* as *Populace*, are excluded from all Office, and uncapable of being of any publick Council, though the *Biſhop* and Curats of that City were admitted into the Councils before the Reformation 1298. *But* this Regulation ſhuts the door upon all Enterprizes from the Court of *Rome* in temporal matters. For the *Pope* having the nomination of the Biſhops, and the diſpoſing of almoſt all the Benefices in that State, it would be no hard thing for him to get a party in the *Senate* that might carry moſt of their deliberations, by the aſſiſtance of ſuch of the *Nobles*, as, like the Eccleſiaſticks, depend upon, and expect recompence from him. The Law excludes alſo ſuch of the *Nobles* as have Cardinals to their Brother, Unckle or Nephew, from all deliberations touching Eccleſiaſtick affairs. It excludes likewiſe out of that ſacred Office thoſe who are pretenders to the Cardinalſhip, or any other dignity at *Rome*, leſt their private intereſt ſhould diſpoſe them to compliance with that Court to promote their deſigns.

II. No Nobleman is permitted to trade, leſt his private affairs ſhould obſtruct or delay the proceedings of the Publick. Beſides, Traffick and Merchandize agree not with the majeſty of Govern-

vernment: Upon which consideration it was that Commerce was forbidden to the Senators of *Rome*.

** Quæstus omnis patribus indecorus visus est.* Livius.

III. All the Noblemen are subject to rules in respect of their age; not one of them but must attend the just number of years, and begin by inferior Offices, rising by degrees, *Sin dalle ultime mosse*, as they say: that is, they must begin at one end of the course, and from thence advance gradually to the other; so that before one can arrive at the great Offices, he must be of a considerable age: as it was anciently in *Lacedemon*, where they were to be old men before they could be capable of great houours, *In sola Sparta expedit seniscere.* And the same thing is imply'd by the two baskets of Medlars covered with straw, which is painted at the foot of the great Stair-case of St. *Mark*, (by which we ascend to the *Grand Council*, and to the *Pregadi*.) and shews, that as the Medlars ripen in straw, so the minds of young men must ripen with expectation, till they have gain'd experience and qualification that may recommend them to the Government. It is moreover no ill policy to conduct their Nobles by degrees, and as it were from Tribunal to Tribunal, if it were only to keep them in perpetual practice and emulation, and to encourage them in the service of their Countrey, by the hopes of arriving one day at the highest dignity and preferment. Whereas if the young Noblemen should jump into the great Offices at *Venice*, where there is nothing perpetual, they would refuse the rest, and there would be no body to execute them. This has already hapned too often; and those who have exercised great Offices, thought it beneath them to accept of inferior. For this reason the *Seig-*

niory has done wiſely to preſcribe bounds to the acquiſition of Honour, to prevent the inſolence and elation of their young men, who are naturally ambitious, by calling them gravely, and in good time, to thoſe preferments; as *Tiberius* ſaid to the *Senat* of *Rome* *.

* *Ne quis mobiles adoleſcentium animos, præmaturis honoribus ad ſuperbiam extolleret.* Tacit. *An.* 4.

IV. The Noblemen cannot hold many Offices at a time, how ſmall or inconſiderable ſoever they be: by which means the Publick is better ſerv'd, and more of them are employed. But it is lawful to quit one Office for a better, if he be choſen to it, though in his firſt Office his time be not expir'd.

V. Thoſe Noblemen who refuſe any Office to which they are choſen, are obliged to pay a Fine of 2000 Ducats to the Publick; ſo that even their diſobedience in ſome meaſure turns to accompt; after which they are to abſent themſelves for two years from the *Graud Council*, and the *Broglio*, which is little better than an Exile.

VI. 'Tis forbidden to joy a new Officer upon his Election, to prevent flattery, which is too frequent in thoſe occaſions, and to keep the Noblemen in ſuch a modeſty as is convenient for Citizens of that Common-wealth. But in this Law there is an exception for the *Duke* and *Procurators of St. Mark*, in reſpect of the great merit of ſuch as are advanc'd to thoſe eminent Dignities.

VII. The Magiſtrates in *Venice*, and upon the Continent, cannot lay down their Authority, though their time be expir'd, till the *Grand Council* has appointed their Succeſſors. They cannot be

be abſent from their Charges, without permiſſion from the *Seigniory*, which will hardly be granted but upon very good cauſe; ſo that the Publick ſervice is ſeldom interrupted: but in caſe of the ſickneſs of an Officer 'tis otherwiſe; for if they ſee 'tis like to be chronical, others are immediately ſubſtituted in their place. * And if it happens to any of the *Rettori* of the Towns, the Captain executes for the *Podeſta*, or the *Podeſta* for the Captain; and in caſe both be ſick, ſome other Noble *Venetian* in Office upon the place, till upon notice the *Seigniory* ſupplies them: by which means there happens no delay in their Affairs, and no contradiction of Orders.

* See the Remarks.

VIII. The Noblemen who are Knights of *Malta*, have no more part of the *Government* than if they were no Noblemen, becauſe that Dignity ſubjects them to the Laws and Statutes of a Forreign Prince: ſo that ordinarily there are but two Gentlemen *Venetians* of that Order, one of the Houſe of *Carnarro*, and the other of the Houſe of the *Lippomade*; and that to preſerve two conſiderable Commands, the firſt, the Government of *Treviſa*, with the Title of *Grand Commander of Cyprus*, and the other of *Conillan* in the Marches of *Treviſan*.

IX. It is forbidden to the *Nobles* to receive Preſents or Penſions from Forreign Princes; as alſo to purchaſe Lands under their Dominions, upon penalty of degradation from their Nobility, confiſcation of their Eſtates, and Baniſhment; which is the true way of obliging them to the common Defence of their Countrey, where all their Eſtates, and all their Hopes do lie: whereas if they were ſuffered to have their ſolid Eſtabliſhment elſewhere, they would many times betray the Publick

Intereſt, in Complacency to thoſe Princes in whoſe Territories their Eſtates lay; which in time might be a prejudice, if not ſubverſion to the whole *Government*. And it was by this means the *Republick* of *Genoa* ſubjected it ſelf to the King of *Spain*; who knew well enough to make his advantage of the fooliſh ambition thoſe Nobles had for Authority and Juriſdiction in the Kingdom of *Naples*, not ſuffering them to diſpoſe of them but to others of their own Countrey, to the end that they might preſerve their Dominion over them, and oblige them in perpetual Servitude.

X. The *Nobles* are not permitted to purchaſe *Fiefs* or *Lordſhips* upon the *Terra-firma*, that there might be neither ſuperiority nor dependance to deſtroy the Equality among them. Beſides, it would occaſion jealouſie and diſorder betwixt the ancient Nobility that are poor, and the new, who being generally rich, would in time buy the whole *Terra-firma*. Formerly they were not allowed Houſes of Pleaſure upon the *Continent*, but of late that has been indulg'd: ſo that in *Venice* 'tis quite otherwiſe than in *Genoa*, where particular Perſons are rich, but the *Government* poor; but here private Perſons are poor, and the Publick wealthy, having the Propriety of all the Lands, as in the *Republick* of *Rome*.

Privatus illis Cenſus erat brevis, Commune magnum. Hor.

XI. The Noblemen are not ſuffered to marry with Strangers, nor their Daughters to the Subjects of another Prince, though they be Gentlemen: and the deſign thereby is to preſerve their Riches among themſelves, which otherwiſe would be inſenſibly tranſported by thoſe Marriages; and to ſtop the ambitious carreer of the ancient Nobility, who by Marrying with Forreign Princes, would

would by degrees come to deſpiſe all Matches at home; and laſtly, to deprive thoſe Families of a retreat to thoſe Princes with whom they are allied; which would render them more bold in Enterprizing againſt their Country, as being not eaſily contented with the Parity there. Moreover, it would be almoſt impoſſible to keep any thing ſecret in a *Senat* Conſtituted of ſuch *Nobles* as were under forreign Alliance, which would beget new factions and diviſions at home. But they may marry their Daughters to ſuch Gentlemen of the *Terra-firma*, as thereby become better-affected to the *Venetian* Nobility, whoſe protection they are willing to purchaſe. The Law ſuffers the Nobility to marry with Citizens, to fortify their Party againſt the *Populace*, in caſe they ſhould mutiny againſt them; thereby not ſo much communicating, as corroborating their Power by uniting with the Citizens, as with a Body capable with the Nobility to reſiſt any Effort of the multitude. By this means likewiſe the *Nobles* that are poor do ſometimes marry advantageouſly, there being no rich Citizen but is very ready to embrace an Alliance with a Noble *Venetian*, it being an honour and protection to his whole Family: And in this the *Seigniory* is not without a peculiar intereſt; for theſe ſorts of Marriages do put the *Nobles* into a condition of ſerving the Publick in Embaſſies and other expenſive employments: Not, but that ſometimes the *Nobles*, who marry theſe Citizens Daughters, grow contemptible to the People, who do frequently call their Children *Amphibia*. And yet 'tis every day to be ſeen in *Venice*, Noblemen of the laſt impreſſion do marry Ladies of the firſt; the firſt purchaſing their Wives, the latter their Husbands. But when a Nobleman marries a Citizen, his Contract muſt paſs the approbation of

the *Grand Council*, otherwiſe their Children cannot paſs for Noble *Venetians*.

By Citizens are meant the *Secretaries of State*, *Advocates*, *Notaries*, *Phyſicians*, *Mercers*, *Drapers*, *Glaſs-makers*, *&c.* And if a Nobleman marries out of this *Category*, his Children are ignoble, and degenerate into Citizens. As appear'd in the Caſe of the Procurator *John Baptiſto Cornero Piſcopia*; who, during the War in *Candia*, was glad to purchaſe Nobility for two of his Children, becauſe their Mother was Daughter to a *Gondolier*.

XII. There is no Elderſhip or *Seniority* among the *Nobles*; which Law agrees very well with the Form of that *Government*, and prevents diſorders that quickly would happen. If younger Brothers, who have equal ſhare in the Civil Adminiſtration, ſhould find themſelves inferior to their Elder Brothers in reſpect of their Eſtates, many of them would turn Enemies to their Country; and, as occaſion offer'd, ſtir up and agitate ill humours in the State. Beſides that, particular perſons would in time become too conſiderable and potent. For this Cauſe the *Seigniory* at one time obliged three Brothers of the Houſe of *Cornaro* to marry, under penalty of Baniſhment, and confiſcation of their Eſtates, which was computed at more than 100000 Crowns *per ann.* which in thoſe days was a prodigious Revenue. And laſt of all, this Equality of diviſion renders them all capable of ſerving the Publick; whereas if the Eldeſt went away with the whole, the State would be depriv'd of the ſervice of the Nobility, who being Younger Brothers, would be uſeleſs by reaſon of their poverty. Nor does this way of partage or diviſion hinder the Greatneſs of their Families, ſeeing for the moſt part all the Brothers

live

live together, and but one of them marries, and that is commonly the youngeſt; for whom the other are contented to ſcrape, and to ſpare, eſpecially if he be a man of Compliance.

XIII. All the Noblemen, without excepting the *Duke* himſelf, are liable to Publick Charge during the War, and each of them pays according to his Revenue; as anciently in *Sparta*, where the *Kings* and *Senat* were tax'd as the People, who thereby were made more obedient to the Nobility, and the Nobility more moderate and juſt.

XIV. The Magiſtrates who judg in Civil Cauſes, are not allow'd to receive Viſits from either of the Parties, nor any Recommendation from their Friends, under penalty of Degradation, and a Fine. But in Criminal Affairs ſolicitations are allow'd, unleſs in matters of State. Their reaſon is, becauſe in Civil Affairs it would endanger the juſtice of a Cauſe, to allow ſuch application to the Judges: But in Criminal Cauſes all ways are left open for the defence of the Accuſed, and for the compaſſion of their Friends, ſo that at *Venice*, if a man's Cauſe be not bad indeed, he may eaſily get off.

XV. A Nobleman may Plead at the Bar like an Advocate, without diminution to his Quality. About 200 years ſince, all their Advocates were Noblemen, appointed by the *Grand Council* to the number of 24; and had all of them allowance from the Publick, being forbidden to take Preſents or Mony, that the nobleneſs of the Profeſſion might not be ſullied by ſo ignoble a Cuſtom, and that in all Proceſſes it might be their intereſt to give a diſpatch. But this is now quite laid aſide, there being ſcarce any of the Nobility that will

give

give themselves that trouble, any more than to read Law publickly at *Padua*, as formerly was done by the *Patricians*; who were so far from thinking it derogatory, that they made it their principal glory. But since this virtuous Emulation ceased among them, we have found debauchery and ignorance succeed, to the great prejudice of that State.

XVI. The Noblemen are oblig'd in the Councils to make use of the *Venetian* Language, to avoid the envy of such of the Nobility, as understanding no other, cannot endure a better; and therefore there has many times been clapping of hands, and crying out to hold, in full Council, when any of them has but begun to speak *Latin*; so wild are they in *Commonwealths*, and so odious is Novelty. 'Tis true, in *Venice* it is necessary all Gentlemen speak the same Language, especially in Council, lest otherwise many of them might be discouraged from speaking their minds, out of a modest diffidence they should not deliver themselves as well as others. But if a man be Eloquent, his best way is to dissemble it, as * a *Swiss* Deputy did when sent to *Cecinna*; otherwise the aversion of his Auditors will work more upon them, than the Orator's Arguments.

*Costus unus ex Legatis notæ facundiæ, sed dicendi artem apta trepidatione occultavit. Tac. Hist.

XVII. All sort of Correspondence with Embassadors or Forreign Ministers is forbidden to the Noblemen upon pain of Death; by which means the transactions of the *Senat* are conceal'd, which otherwise would be no hard matter among so many Gentlemen to pick out by Conversation and Presents: witness the Example of *Cornaro*, whose fidelity was corrupted by the *Marquess de la Fuente*'s Bills of Exchange. For this reason the Emperor

peror *Claudius* forbid such of the *Patricians* to enter the *Senat*, as had not whetewithal to maintain their Dignity.

But the form of an *Aristocracy* suffers not such an Exclusion, which would destroy the Equality of the *Nobles*; and by the poorer sort (who are always in greater number) be look'd upon as Contempt, a thing absolutely insupportable among *Republicans*, and which would certainly * make the *Government* odious. For this reason the *Seigniory* has been forc'd to take other Measures, and prohibit in the Nobility all manner of Commerce either by Letters, or Converse with forreign Ministers, or any of their Retinue. And this is so rigorously observ'd, that if a Nobleman should be discovered in discourse with any Person in relation to any forreign Agent or Embassador, and it should come to the knowledg of the Inquisitors of State before he discovered it himself, he would not be suffered to live two hours. One day a Senator of the House of *Tron* finding me at the House of the Curate *de Santa Maria Mater Domini*, started and ran away as if the Plague had been there. Twice I was met by one of the Procurators, who with an hardiness that would have been fatal to many others, staid some time with me in a *Stationer's-shop*; and though I offer'd it, would not let me depart.

* *Cum enim multitudo inopum est in Civitate, eademq; ab honoribus excluſa, necesse est eam Civitatem esse plenam hostium Reip.* Arist. 3. Pol. 7.

This Prohibition beginning to be neglected, was reviv'd in the year 1618, upon the discovery of the Conspiracy by the *Spanish* † *Triumvirate* against their *Commonwealth*; from which time they have look'd upon forreign Embassadors as so many conceal'd Enemies; and to make them the more dreadful to the Nobility, the *Senat* very cunningly gave it out, that the *Marquess*

† The *Duke* of *Ossuna*, Viceroy of *Naples*, *Don Pedro de Toledo* Governor of *Milan*, and *Don Alfide la Queva* the *Spanish* Embassador at *Venice*.

de la Fuentes himſelf had betrayed *Cornaro*, that the Sum he had conſign'd for him might be ſtop'd.

But though all ſort of Communication with forreign Embaſſadors be forbidden to the Noblemen, nevertheleſs there are Priviledg'd places where they may meet in diſguiſe, as at their ordinary Gaming-houſes, which they call *Ridotti*, in Balls, in particular Houſes during the *Carneval*, at Weddings, and ſeveral other Feaſts and Solemnities: But here they are not ſuffered to converſe, eſpecially at the *Ordinaries*, where ſilence is kept as ſtrict as at a Sermon; and men are ſeen ſometimes to loſe their whole ſtock, without looſening their teeth: upon which ſcore the *Venetians* are counted very good Gameſters.

As to the Rules the State of *Venice* has preſcrib'd for its own Embaſſadors in the Forreign Courts, they are well worth our knowledg, and I will give you ſome of them here.

XVIII. The *Venetian* Embaſſadors cannot depart from the place of their Reſidence till their Succeſſor be arrived, and by them preſented to the Prince; if they do, they are look'd upon as Deſertors of their Embaſſy: * which is to be deliver'd over by his own hand, and the new Comer put into poſſeſſion of his Charge, and inſtructed *viva voce* in whatever is requiſite for him to know towards the diſcharging himſelf worthily of his Employment. And this they do with great formality one to the other, not only in obedience to the expreſs Orders of the *Senat*, but in honour to themſelves, by cauſing their Succeſſors to take the ſame Meaſures, and follow the ſame Methods as they had done before.

* *Redire præpropere, eſt legationem deſerere.*

They are obliged to Preſent the *Senat* with a Relation, in writing, of their Embaſſies at their return;

turn: for though 'tis to be ſuppos'd they gave Account in retail before, in their weekly Diſpatches; yet it is eſteem'd for the intereſt of the Publick to have a *Breviate* of them, that may ſave them the labour of rummaging among their Letters and Memorials, to find out a thing that this way may be found in a moment. Beſides, all thoſe ſeveral pieces, which aſunder are like ſo many ſhreds, being ſtitch'd together, and compacted by the Author himſelf, give a better Proſpect of the Affairs, and of the Miniſter who manages them. And by theſe Relations it is, the *Senat* underſtands the whole Strength of their Neighbours, the Condition of their Territories, their Armies, their Revenues, and their Expence: and this Manuſcript is a kind of a Journal, like that *Auguſtus* made of the Affairs of his Empire; and 'tis according to that Model the *Seigniory* regulates, and the Noblemen that go Embaſſadors do draw their beſt Leſſons, and their moſt refin'd Policies.

Quæ cuncta ſua manu perſcripſerat Auguſtus. Tac. *Ann.* 1.

They are obliged likewiſe to produce the common Preſents that are made them, at the end of their Embaſſaries, to be diſpoſed of as the *Senat* thinks fit; teſtifying thereby, that they are content with the Honour of having ſerv'd their Country faithfully, † and that if they have merited any thing, they will not receive it from any but the *Senat*. But yet they are never defeated of thoſe marks of Honour, unleſs they have done ſomething diſhonourable, and contrary to their duty.

† *Ne quicquam ex publico Miniſterio præter laudem bene adminiſtrati officii ad ipſos accederet.* Zonar.

If a Nobleman carries his Wife along with him, he is anſwerable for her faults, according to the practice in *Rome* * with the Governors, or other Magiſtrates in their Provinces.

* *P. Cavendum Senatus-conſulto ut quanquam inſontes Magiſtratus Provincialibus uxorum criminibus perinde quam ſuis plecterentur.* Tac. *Ann.* 4.

The

The Sons of the *Duke* cannot be Embaſſadors whilſt their Fathers are living, not ſo much to ſpare their purſes, but for fear the *Duke* ſhould employ them with private Inſtructions for the particular intereſt of their Family.

XIX. No man can be made a Nobleman of *Venice*, but he muſt be a Catholick; not ſo much to prevent that the body of the Nobility be divided in Religion, but that their Honour might be continued Eminent and Illuſtrious to that *Commonwealth*, which has the advantage of all States and Princes of *Europe*, to have been born and continued conſtantly in that Church. Upon which ſcore ſhe has been honoured, like *France*, with the glorious Title of *Moſt Chriſtian* * by ſeveral Popes, and ſeveral Councils.

* See the Remarks.

XX. Forreign Gentlemen that are Noble *Venetians* either by merit or favour, as the Pope's Nephews and others, being perſonally in *Venice*, have liberty of coming into the *Grand Council*, and Baloting as the reſt: But they cannot execute any Office in the State, unleſs their conſtant Reſidence be there; and to enter into the Council they muſt put on the *Robe*, the *Stole*, and the *Woollen Bonnet*. Nevertheleſs, in my time Prince *Borgia* was admitted by particular favour with his Sword, yet not without great difficulty.

I ſhall not mention the other Laws which relate to the particular Magiſtrates, becauſe I ſhall have occaſion to touch upon ſome of them in my *Second Part*.

Furthermore, in *Venice* new Laws are created every day; but being too frequent, they are ſeldom obſerv'd: From whence proceeds that ſaying among them; *Parte Venetiana dura una ſettimana.*

mana. But the *Seigniory* ſwallows this abuſe to cajole the People with a falſe appearance of liberty, and to render their *Government* more gentle.

In ſhort, the *Grand Council* has made all Offices annual, or for ſixteen months, to keep their *Nobles* in expectation, and to enure them to Moderation by the continual viciſſitude of Obedience and Command. For if they grow proud and inſolent in annual employments, what would they do were they to enjoy them for life? * And if thoſe excluded in the Balotation be diſcontent, (though they have hopes of ſucceeding in the next,) how would they be diſpleaſed at a refuſal that ſhould make them deſperate during the whole life of the Poſſeſſor? By this changing it is, the induſtry of their *Nobles* is exerciſed. *Plato* would have his Officers perpetual, that long uſe and converſation in their places might make them more dextrous, and beget more eſteem and reſpect from the † People. But the *Venetians* find this change to be a better way of continuing them in their duty, by keeping them in conſtant *decorum*, in order to their Election to greater Offices afterward. Beſides, thereby their Dependance is greater, and their Authority leſs, eſpecially among the Provincial Officers; who are but tranſient, (as I may ſay) being ſcarce ſuffered to ſettle before they are called back to *Venice* to give an account of their Adminiſtration; and therefore the Towns endure their Governors the more patiently, becauſe the advantages of the one does many times recompence the defects of the other; and if any of them be ill, they are not troubled with them long. So much for the *Grand Council*. We will come next to the *Colledg*.

* *Superbire homines etiam annum deſignatione, quid ſi honorem per quinquennium unum tenerent?* Tac. an. 2.

† *Quo major prudentia ipſis, major Reverentia populariibus ſit.*

Of

Of the Colledg.

THE *Colledg* is compoſed of 26 *Nobles*, that is to ſay, of the *Duke* and ſix Councellors, (called the *Moſt Serene Seigniory*, becauſe when together, they repreſent the Publick Majeſty of the State,) of three Deputies from the *Quarantie Criminelle*, who are chang'd every two months; of ſix *Sages-Grans*, who repreſent the *Senat*; of five *Sages* from the *Terra-firma*, whoſe Affairs paſs through their hands: and laſt of all, of five *Sages des Orders*, who formerly had abſolute direction in all things relating to the Sea.

For theſe reaſons this Chamber is called the *Colledg*, that is to ſay, an Aſſembly of all the Principal Members of State, whoſe *Hand* it may be call'd; becauſe by it all Affairs are handed and diſtributed to the reſt of the Councils, eſpecially to the *Senat*, to which all diſorders are addreſſed.

In the *Colledg* it is that all Embaſſadors of Princes, all Deputies of Towns, Generals of Armies, and all other Officers have Audience; there it is all Requeſts, all Memorials are preſented that are brought firſt to the *Pregadi*; after which the *Colledg* returns them the Anſwer of the *Senat* in Writing, which Anſwer is called by them * *Parte*.

* See the Remarks.

At their Audiences Embaſſadors do uſe this *Apoſtrophe*, *Sereniſſime Prince*; *Tres Illuſtres & tres Excellens Seigneurs*. Whereas in former times their Addreſſes was only to the *Duke*, as they had been ſpeaking to him alone; which Cuſtom, in jealouſy, the *Senat* has reform'd, to ſhew that their *Republick*

lick depends not upon the *Duke*, who is but a ſingle Member as the reſt: and therefore in his abſence Forreign Miniſters uſe the ſame Title of *Sereniſſime Prince*; and, *May it pleaſe your Serenity*; becauſe the Prince is ſuppoſed to be where-ever the *Seigniory* is.

The *Colledg* riſes, and uncovers, for the Pope's *Nuntio*, and the Embaſſadors of *Crown'd-Heads*, as ſoon as they appear at the door of the Chamber, and make their firſt Reverence; but the *Duke* pulls not off his Hat, a thing he never does but to Soveraign Princes, Princes of the Blood in *France*, or Cardinals. The Embaſſadors introduced are plac'd on the *Duke*'s right-hand, if they be ſent from Kings; and if from a *Duke*, they have the ſame place: but the *Colledg* riſes not till their ſecond Reverence in the middle of the Chamber; neither do they riſe at their going out, till their ſecond Salutation. Forreign Generals are plac'd as the Embaſſadors, whereas the Generals that are Noble *Venetians* are ſet below the Councellors, but the *Seigniory* riſes not either when they come in, or go forth. The *Receiver of Malta* (who is always one of the Commanders of the Orders) ſits next under the Deputy from the *Quarantie Criminelle*, by which he is diſtinguiſhed from all Reſidents, without exception to the Emperors; who for that cauſe negotiates with them by an *Agent*, with the Character of Secretary, for he is ſeldom known to have any Embaſſador there. The Ceremonies of the *Colledg*.

The *Nuntio*, and the Royal Embaſſadors are receiv'd at their Publick Entrances by ſixty of the Senators, and Complemented by a Knight of *the Golden Stool*, which is the mark of a Nobleman that has been an Embaſſador. But for the Embaſſador of a *Duke*, the *Colledg* orders them to be received by forty *Nobles* of the *Sons-Pregadi*, who

are no better than bare assistants to the *Senat*; and no person is sent to receive a Resident, but he is of the number of the *Publici Representanti*.

For the Deputies of Towns and Corporations under the obedience of the *Seigniory*, they are never admitted to Audience from the *Colledg* but upon three Conditions; that they have Credentials from the Governor or *Podesta* of the place from whence they are sent; that they have a Memorial of their Demands under the hand of their Governor; and another seal'd Letter from him, in which he gives his judgment of their Affair to the *Senat*, that the Prince may not be surpriz'd. But if these Deputies come with complaints against their Superiors, (which is but rare) it suffices for their admission, if their Letters be only from the Commonalty, or Corporation.

In a word, it belongs to the *Colledg* to call the *Senat*, but by mutual dependance it obeys it when met, and receives and executes its Resolutions and Orders: One proposes, the other disposes, and these two Councils act always by agreement. When the *Senat* has taken any thing ill from a Prince, and is willing to shew a Resentment, it causes the *Colledg* to refuse Audience to his Embassador or Minister. In the time of *Urban* the VIII, Audience was refus'd to his *Nuntio* upon the affront offered to the *Seigniory* in exunging the Elogy of the *Venetians* *, relating to the Restauration of Pope *Alexander* III, the Memory of which his Holiness had a mind to abolish.

1535.

* Set up by *Pius* IV in the *Royal Hall* of the *Vatican.*

In the *interregnum* no Forreign Minister enters the *Colledg*, unless with the usual Complements of Condolence upon the *Duke*'s Death: For nothing of business is transacted till another be chosen.

I shall not speak here of the Function of such Magistrates as make up the *Colledg*, as belonging more

more properly to my Second Part: I ſhall paſss therefore to the *Senat* immediately, as to the chiefeſt and moſt important Councils of this State.

Of the Senat.

THE *Senat* is the Soul of the *Commonwealth*, as the *Grand Council* is the Body. It is the Fountain of Peace and War, the Balance that keeps an Harmony and Exactneſs in all the parts of the State. It is called *Pregadi*, becauſe that formerly there being no ſet-days for the meeting of the ſaid Council, the principal Members of the City were *invited* upon extraordinary Emergency, and it therefore retains the Name of *Pregadi*, or *Invited Aſſembly*; though the Cuſtom of calling them together in that manner is laid aſide.

At firſt the *Senat* conſiſted only of ſixty Senators, but upon any great occaſion they added 25 or 30 more by Commiſſion; but their Commiſſion ceas'd as ſoon as the Debate was reſolv'd. They proceeded in this manner in the time of *Johannes Delfinus*, in the Treaty of Peace with *Lodovic* King of *Hungary*, about the year 1360. Under the *Duke Laurence Celſus* during the Revolt of *Candia* 1363, and under Prince *Michael Sten*, upon occaſion of the War in *Ferrara* againſt the Marqueſs *Albert* of *Eſte* in the year 1410. But the War in *Lombardy* following ſome years after, the *Venetians* eſtabliſhed in the year 1435 a perpetual *Giunta* or ſupply of ſixty more Senators, to anſwer the multitude of Affairs that were then be-

fore them; and theſe are they which at this day are called the *Pregadi Extraordinare*. So that the Body of the *Senat* conſiſts of 120 Gentlemen, who have deliberative voices, without difference of Senators in Ordinary and Senators of the *Giunta*, unleſs in their Name and Quality.

There are in the *Pregadi* ſeveral Magiſtrates, ſome with voices by vertue of their Offices, as the Procurators, the *Ten*, and all the Judges of the *Quarenty Criminelle*; others are there only to hear, and learn, as the *Sous-Pregadi*: ſo that the *Venetian Senat* conſiſts of three Orders, as that of *Rome*, Senators in Ordinary, like the hundred *Patres* created by *Romulus*; Senators additional, like the *Patres conſcripti* of the *Sabins*, aſſociated by *Romulus* with the former; and ſimple Aſſiſtants, like thoſe in *Rome*, who were called *Pedarii*, who had no right of opinion: the whole amounting to 300 *Nobles*, among whom it is marvellous to conſider how ſecret their Affairs were kept, as if none of them were privy, or as if they had power to forget whatever they heard. *Non dicam unum ſed neminem audiſſe crederes, quod tam multorum auribus fuerat commiſſum*, Valer. l. 2. c. 2.

Titus Livius tells us, that King *Eumenes* having accuſed King *Perſius* in a full *Senat* at *Rome*, and propoſed ways of making War upon him, nothing was known of it more than his introduction to Audience.

Venice affords us Examples not at all inferior. In the year 1495, the Pope, the King of the *Romans*, the King of *Spain*, and the *Duke* of *Milan* Treated, and concluded a League with this *Republick* againſt *Charles* VIII ſo privately, that *Philip de Comines* his Embaſſador, who ſaw every day the Miniſters of the Confederate Princes enter into the *Colledg*, and conferr'd frequently with them, diſcovered

discovered nothing of that important Negotiation, which had been transacting several months, till he received the first advice from Duke *Augustine Barbarigue*. *Lewis Sforca* Duke of *Milan* knew nothing of the League Offensive entred into against him by *Lewis* XII and the *Senat*, till several months after it was concluded, though he was the most subtle and sagacious Prince of his time. Not long before their General *Carmignole* return'd to *Venice*, without the least foresight or suspition of what the *Senat* had resolved eight months before, that is, of taking away his Commission as soon as he came back, though it was not unknown to all the friends he had among the Nobility. So that at *Venice* Silence is in no less veneration than among the *Persians*, where it was esteemed a Deity.

Bemb. *Hist. Ven.*

Guiccardin lib. 4.

In the mean time the *Venetians* might reduce their *Senate* to a smaller number; and the more easily, because the *Pregadi* changing every year, all the Nobility might have hopes of being admitted in their turns. But they alledg, that the body of the *Nobles* being very great, the principal parts ought to bear a proportion, and the number of the *Nobles* amounting to full 2500, 'tis not too much to admit 300 into the *Senat*, as well to prevent the falling into an *Oligarchy*, (which is the first corruption of an *Aristocracy*) as to content more of them at a time, and to render the Deliberations of the *Senat* more plausible, and more inviolable to the People, which has always a greater Reverence for what is decreed in a greater Assembly. Besides, the publick wisdom has provided sufficiently for their secrets, by the severity of their Laws against their Nobility, from whom it has taken all ways of Communication and Converse with the Ministers of Forreign Princes *.

* *Adempto per inquisitiones & loquendi audiendique commercio.* Tac. Ag.

However, it is certain their Affairs are never the better managed, for having ſo many privy; at leaſt their Deliberations would not be ſo tedious as they are, if there were not ſo much Counſel to be taken, and ſo many Speeches to be made.

Some may find fault, that the *Senat* of *Venice* changes every year, the rather becauſe the affairs of State, which require long experience, are always tranſacted by new *Senators*, who ſometimes miſtake the Means and the Conſequence for want of due inſtruction in the beginning. For which cauſe *Lycurgus* ordain'd the *Senators* of *Sparta* ſhould hold their places for life, which was to be a recompence for the longeſt of their ſervices *. *Solon* of annual, made them perpetual at *Athens*; conceiving that the *Senat* of a Commonwealth ought to be fix'd, being the *Baſis*, or Pole, upon which their whole Government turn'd. But this defect, if it be one, is neither without cauſe, nor remedy in *Venice*. For as the *Senators* may be continued by new Election, there always remains a good part of the old. Beſides, there be ſo many Magiſtrates admitted into the *Pregadi*, that there are conſtantly ſome, who having aſſiſted, are well inform'd of the precedent negotiations. And for this reaſon it is, that ſo many of the *Nobles* are received into the *Senat*, that by hearing what paſſes, they bring themſelves by degrees to a notion of thoſe things which they are to manage in their turns. And if the Emperor *Soliman* ſaid, that a Prince to be well advis'd ought never to make uſe of one Miniſter above once, becauſe the deſire of gaining the eſteem and favour of the Prince, is a ſtrong motive to make him act as he ſhould; as * *Sejanus* did in the beginning of his riſe: It is more manifeſt and

* *Hic Magiſtratus præmium virtutis.* Ariſt. Pol. 2.

* Sejanus *incipiente adhuc potentia bonis conſiliis noteſcere volebat.* Tac. An. 4.

and visible in *Venice*, where the dignity of a *Senator* being only annual, every man endeavours to signalize his zeal and his industry, to render himself pleasing to the Publick, and facilitate his continuance in the next Election. In a word, by this yearly change a Gate is always open to desert; those who are found improper, may be rejected at the years end without offence, and more able persons substituted in their stead: Whereas, the *Senat* being perpetual, the unfit must be continued as well as the fit, which *Aristotle* observed as a great defect in the *Senat* of *Sparta*, because some there are whose minds are assoon superannuated as * their bodies, and who by consequence grow incapable of governing.

* *Est enim sua sicut corpori, sic & menti senectus.* Pol. 2.

Let us see now how the *Senat* proceeds in its Deliberations and Elections: After which I shall treat of their Politicks at home, and their Intelligences abroad; the two main points in which their Civil Government consists.

As to the Order observ'd by the *Pregadi*, or *Senat*, in the discussion of their Affairs, I have said before, that nothing is transacted there but what has first pass'd the *Colledg*, whose office in respect of this Council, is almost the same as the *Senat* of *Rome*'s was in regard of the People; that is to say, to propose to them such things as were to be debated by them. And because many times the *Colledg* is divided, one of the Secretaries sets down every mans opinion with his Name by it, and brings his Note to the *Pregadi*, where being read publickly, every man speaks *pro* or *con* as he thinks fit; and afterwards they proceed to Balotation, as follows.

For every recommendation there is a Secretary that gathers the voices, and goes from hand to hand naming the Author; as of old the *Rogatores Suffragiorum*

fragiorum did in *Rome*. Theſe Secretaries have each of them a white Box in their hand, and the *Nobles* give their Balls to which of them they pleaſe. There are two other Secretaries following the firſt, one of them with a green Box for the Balls of the Diſſenters, and the other with a red Box for the *Nonſinceri*, which anſwers to the *Non liquet* among the *Romans*. And he who hath moſt Voices (provided they exceed a moiety of the whole Court) is received by an Arreſt of the *Senat*, in the nature of the *Senatus-Conſultum* in *Rome*. But if none of them amount to the juſt Number, they begin their Balotation again, rejecting thoſe who have the feweſt voices, that the others may paſs with more eaſe. Otherwiſe new men are to be propoſed, as when in the firſt Balotation the *Nonſinceri* have more than half the Voices, which is a ſign they do not agree to any that are recommended.

But though the *Nobles* of the *Senat* have power to ſpeak for or againſt any one propos'd, as he thinks fit; yet none of them, unleſs it be the *Duke*, the higheſt Councellours, or the *Sage-Grands* can propoſe any to be Baloted in their own name. But if any of the ſaid Councellors, or *Sage-Grands* recommends him as one likely to be ſerviceable to the Commonwealth, he may be admitted to the Balot: Which is very wiſely contriv'd by the *Senat*, to avoid confuſion and delay in their Affairs, if it were permitted to each of the 300 Nobles to propoſe his own man.

As to the Magiſtrates choſen by the *Pregadi*, they are not beholding to lot, they are elected upon due knowledg and conſideration of their deſerts, which is a thing not to be found out by lot.

lot *. Besides the *Senat* being the Model and Image of a compleat *Aristocracy*, ought not to commit any thing to Fortune, that favours for the most part those who are most unfit, and is used no-where so properly as in a Popular State. *Sortitio Reip. Democraticæ propria est.* For which reason Lots are used in the *Grand Council*, which is as it were the people of the Nobility, and the form of the ancient *Democratical* Government in *Venice*.

* *Sorte & urna mores non discerni.* Tac. *Hist.* 4.

Sors deerrat ad parum idoneos, Ann. 13.

It remains now that I discourse of the Maxims, the Ends, and the Interests of the *Government* at this day, as also of the good or ill dispositions of its Subjects; this matter belonging of right to the *Senat*, as having the full direction of Affairs, and giving what motion it pleases to the whole *Machine* of the State.

The *Senat* cajoles the People by suffering them to live idly and debauch'd, having no better way to debase them, and to render them obedient, than to indulge them their pleasures, and licentiousness of life, which they call Liberty, though in effect it is the greatest occasion of their slavery. So the *Persians* called *Cyrus* their Father, because he allowed them in their softness and delicacy, when his design was really to enslave them. The *Romans* do still make use of this artifice, subjecting the People more by the Spectacles, Plays and Divertisements, than by their Arms. * The common People in *Venice* are astonished at the bounty and good nature of their Masters, when they behold the *Doge* come every year with the *Senat* upon the first of *February* to *Santa Maria Formosa*, to discharge a Promise made by their Predecessors; and not disdain a poor Straw-hat, and two Bottels of Wine presented him by the Artificers of that Parish, in consideration of his pains. As also when they

The Policy of the *Senat*.

* *Voluptatibus quibus* Romani *plus adversus subjectos quam armis valent.* Tac. Hist. 4.

they see the *Senat* assistant at the killing of a Bull on *Holy-Thursday*, and several other Festival-days; for nothing takes more with the multitude than to see their Prince accommodate to their Customs, and bear a part in their Recreations; by which method the Emperor *Augustus* affected to make himself Popular. †

† *Civile rebatur misceri voluptatibus vulgi.* Ann. 1.

Moreover, the People of *Venice* are the more pleased with their *Government*, because the Nobility of the *Terra-firma* having no share in it, they have the satisfaction of seeing Men of Parts and Qualification excluded as well as themselves. From whence we may judg the kindness those Gentlemen must needs have for the Noblemen in *Venice*; whereas were they under any other *Government*, their Birth would make them considerable, and their Industry prefer them to the highest Honours; which at *Venice* is utterly impossible, because there their Merit serves only to expose them to the jealousie of their Superiors, and their Patience produces nothing but ill usage, with greater impunity.

But the common People of the *Terra-firma* believe the *Seigniory* the gentlest and most just *Government* in the World, when they observe the Humanity and Popular Carriage of the *Podesta's*, whose Houses are as open to them as the Church; and set-days appointed to receive Informations against their Country *Nobles*, (which the common People do mortally hate;) whilst the Inquisitors of State hear their Complaints with such kindness and candor, that they believe all done out of inclination to do them right; whereas in truth it is for nothing, but with some form and appearance of Justice, to exterminate all the rich Families upon the Continent: so that these poor Gentlemen are betwixt the *Venetian* Nobility, and their own *Populace*;

pulace, like Fiſh betwixt the boyling Oil and the Fire. And to help forward with their misfortunes, their own private Animoſities contribute much, and makes them oftentimes accuſe one another. In the mean time their Governors cry up the felicity of the People, magnifying their Juſtice, their Plenty, and their Repoſe, *Pane in Piazza, Juſtitia in Palazzo.* After which it is not to be admir'd, if the People who judg always by appearance, have no mind to change their Maſters, eſpecially when Kings are deſcrib'd to them as ſo many Tyrants, and Woolfs, devouring their Subjects. The King of *Spain* is never mentioned to the *Breſſians* and *Bergameſſes*, but with horrible exaggeration of the Cruelty and Injuſtice of his Miniſters. And the *Breſſians* being naturally mutinous and bold, the *Senat* treats them gently, avoiding to provoke them, and ſending them Governors of ſuch temper and prudence as will invite them by fair remonſtrances to their duty; and when they tranſgreſs, reduce them by their Careſſes, as People capable of obedience, not of ſervitude. And this is an artifice uſed by the *Seigniory* to render their Dominion eaſy, by comparing it with the *Spaniſh* deportment towards the *Milanois* their Neighbours, and formerly their Companions. In a word, did the *Senat* take the ſame meaſures with the reſt of their Subjects, there would not be a better *Government* in the World: but if they have ſo much reſpect for the *Breſſians*, 'tis becauſe they fear them, and dare not command them abſolutely. For, on the contrary, the *Paduans*, the *Treviſans* and the *Vincentins* are uſed with greater ſeverity, becauſe they are in no apprehenſion of them. The *Breſſians* beſiege their *Podeſtates* ſometimes in their own Palaces, to obtain their demands. They break up their Priſons at Noon-day, laugh

Domiti ut pareant nondum ut ſervi-ant. In Agricola.

laugh at their Noble *Venetians*, affront their Courts when ſummon'd to them, oppoſe the Execution of their Decrees, and hold their *Bandi* or Meetings publickly; and yet the *Senat* connives, and pardons all, leſt rigour ſhould put their courage into a flame *. But if the *Paduans* or *Vincentins* commit the leaſt fault, or ſpeak the leaſt word that diſpleaſes, they are baniſhed immediately, and their Eſtates ſeiz'd: And this is ſo frequent in thoſe Towns, 'tis obvious to every body the *Senat* regards not ſo much Juſtice as Intereſt in the condemnation of thoſe unhappy creatures †, who, for the moſt part, are guilty of nothing but being too rich. 'Tis true, the Nobility upon the *Terra firma* ought to be purg'd now and then to evacuate the peccant humors wherewith many of them do abound: But the Remedy the *Senat* applies is worſe than the Diſeaſe, as may appear by this following Example, which evinces clearly the deſigns of the *Senat*, in relation to the Nobility upon the Continent.

* *Ne ſublata ſpe veniæ, pertinacia accenderentur.* Hiſt. 4.

† *Ne dubium haberetur magnitudinem pecuniæ malo vertiſſe.* Ann. 5.

Francis Erizza Lieutenant-General to *Udina*, afterwards *Duke*; ſeeing the *Nobles* of *Friul* live in Peace and good Correſpondence, reſolved to put diviſion amongſt them, thereby to force them upon imprudencies, that might turn to the advantage of the *Senat*. To that end he cauſed Commiſſion to be ſent to him, to confer the Titles of Earl and Marqueſs to ſuch as he thought fit. This begot jealouſie and animoſity in ſeveral Families which pretended to thoſe Honours, againſt ſuch as had received them; the new Counts and Marqueſſes taking place of thoſe to whom formerly they had given it: ſo that theſe who were rejected, to maintain their ancient Precedence, came frequently to blows with thoſe newly Ennobled, cutting one anothers throats when they met in the Streets;

Streets, where they march'd with a guard of twenty or thirty *Bravo's* well-arm'd, who for their own intereſt fomented the Quarrel betwixt them. This fury ſpread it ſelf among the neareſt Relations; many Younger Brothers violating the rights of Nature, and invading their Elder Brothers, who were no Counts like them. In the mean time the Exchequer grew rich by the confiſcations of theſe Gentlemen Murderers, and the *Senat* extinguiſhed by the continual effuſion of Blood, that Fire which they ſo lately had kindled.

But of all the Subjects of this *Commonwealth*, none were ſo ill-treated as the *Paduans*; for the *Senat* conſidering them as the ancient Maſters of *Venice*, ſuppoſed their ſubjection but forc'd; and that looking upon the felicity of the *Venetians* as their miſery, they held them for Tyrants *. And indeed in their private Conferences they ſpake of it with inexpreſſible reſentment: for they had diſpeopled the Town by ſubſtracting the beſt of their Families, ſome of which they had conſtrain'd to ſettle in *Venice* to ſecure their fidelity: and to encreaſe their miſery, ſo much liberty was given to the Students of that Univerſity, that the Townsmen were grown to be their Slaves; which made them inceſſantly regrate their Lords *de l'Eſcalle*, and the *Carrares*, under whoſe Authority the ſaid City had flouriſhed.

* *Pari dolore commoda aliena ac ſuas injurias metiuntur.* Hiſt. 1.

As to the People in *Venice*, the *Senat* apprehending their Unity and Power, by deſign have kept the City divided into two contrary Parties, one called the *Caſtellans*, the other the *Nicolates*; among whom the Emulation was ſo great, that they apply'd themſelves mutually to croſs one another; and the Animoſity was ſo high, the very Children of the reſpective Factions never met in the Streets (if they knew one another) without blows,

The *Caſtellans* and *Nicolates* in *Venice*.

nor

nor could they be parted till one had drawn blood, that the conquered might be provoked to revenge himself another time upon the Conqueror. The Youth in *Sparta* fought in the same sort, if you will believe that Excellent Historian. But the design of the *Lacedemonians* was to enure their Youth to the dangers of War, whereas the design of the *Venetians* was to divide and weaken the People, who would be very formidable, were they sensible of their Number and Power, as *Manlius* remonstrated to the *Senat* of *Rome*; *Quousq; ignorabitis vires vestras? Numerate saltem quot ipsi sitis, quot adversarios habeatis: Quot enim Clientes circa singulos fuistis Patronos, tot nunc adversus unum hostes eritis.* For this cause it is the *Venetians* suffer their Citizens to wear the same Vestment with their Nobility, for fear lest the distinction of habit might discover to the People the small number of their Governors; *Si separentur libertini, manifestam fore penuriam ingenuorum*; for which, new Families are frequently aggregated to the Body of the *Nobles*, in place of the Ancient, which are daily extinguisht.

Pugilata inter se ex æmulatione contendunt. Xenoph.

So it is not to be imagined the publick and familiar Conflicts betwixt the *Castellans* and the *Nicolates* are made for entertainment of the People, or Strangers, but to prevent the cooling of the Heat and Animosity in both Parties, which insensibly fortifies the Authority of the *Senat*, whom it would be no hard matter to ruine by their Union. And the *Nicolates* having a *Duke* of their own, ridiculous to the *Castellans*, it is a perpetual occasion of Quarrel betwixt them.

An Artificer of the Quarter of St. *Nicolas.*

But with the Citizens or *Burgoise*, the *Senat* proceeds in such a manner, as without that, they are, or at least seem very well contented: It distinguishes them from the *Plebs* by priviledges, exemp-

exemptions, and conſiderable employments, making uſe of them for Reſidents, and Secretaries of all their Councils and Embaſſies, by which they ſeem to be equal in ſome meaſure to the *Nobles*, and ſuperiour to the Gentlemen of the *Terra firma*, who are utterly excluded. Beſides they have their ſhare of the Biſhopricks belonging to this State, unleſs it be of ſeven or eight reſerved only for the Nobility; with whom they have this likewiſe in common, That they are never condemned to the Gallies whatever crime they commit.

The Merchant of *Venice* (who is alſo of the Body of Citizens) thinks his condition very happy, in reſpect the Nobility is contented to aſſociate with him in order to Trade: For though all kind of Traffick be prohibited to the *Nobles*, yet underhand they are many times ingaged in partnerſhip without being known, and the *Senat* ſwallows it diſcreetly, becauſe of the benefit it receives thereby, by ſending the ſaid Noblemen on Embaſſies, where they ſpend good part of what they gain'd; whereas there would otherwiſe be want of rich men to ſuſtain thoſe chargeable Employments, if their Nobility were reſtrain'd from that way of enriching themſelves; and by thoſe ways of entertaining their minds, they are hindered from contriving againſt the State.

And now one would think the Eccleſiaſticks had great ſubject to complain of this Government, in which at this day they have not the leaſt part; which cauſed Cardinal *Zapata* to ſay, that at *Venice* their condition was much worſe than the condition of the *Iſraelites* under *Pharaoh*. But the *Senat* makes them ample amends for their excluſion, by the liberty it gives them

to live as they pleaſe without any notice of their irregularities: Inſomuch, that they are ſo far from repining, that they believe themſelves in Paradiſe.

As to the Nobility, the *Senat* takes particular care to maintain them in unity, knowing well that Animoſity is dangerous in a free State; * and that diviſion among the Governours has been the ruine of many a Commonwealth; witneſs the Revolutions at *Florence* and *Verona*, which happened only upon the quarrels and factions betwixt their principal Citizens. To prevent theſe ill conſequences, the *Senat* takes notice of the leaſt difference betwixt the Nobility, and without expecting till the fire be kindled, it choaks it in its embers, and ſtops its progreſs by their vigilance and authority; for the *Nobles* are obliged to an immediate acquieſcence, otherwiſe they run themſelves into the diſpleaſure of the *Senat*, let their provocation be never ſo great. Some years ſince, the *Vidmans* being in ſuit with the Family of *Naue*, in which the *Vidmans* Grandfather had ſerved as a Packer, and being reproached by the means of their Extraction in a full Aſſembly, the *Senat* interpos'd, commanded them ſilence, and ordered the Judges to take up the buſineſs, as reflecting upon the whole body of their Nobility. A Gentleman of the Family *Da Ponte* threatning another call'd *Canale*, that he would prove the *Pontes* were above the *Canals*; the other replying, but the *Canals* were before the *Pontes*, and the *Pontes* had never been but for the *Canals*. The *Senat* ſent them word, That they could choak up the Canals, and pull down the Bridges when they pleas'd; and theſe ſort of reflections are the more odious, becauſe they grate upon their Equality, which is the very Soul of their Common-

* *Periculoſiores ſunt inimicitiæ juxta libertatem.* Tacit. Germ.

Commonwealth. And if in ſome things the new Nobility ſeem inferiour to the ancient, as not being ſo ſoon admitted into the great Offices, it is done only to improve them, to experiment their induſtry in ſmaller Employments, and, as *Sylla* ſays, to enure them to the Oar, before they be truſted with the Helm; without which gradation Preferment would but expoſe them to the contempt of the People, who commonly deſpiſe thoſe who have been formerly their equals *.

* *Inſita mortalibus Natura, recentem aliorum felicitatem agris Oculis introſpicer quos in æquo videre.* Hiſt. 2.

Moreover the *Senat* had never permitted the *Venetian* Ladies to follow the *French* Modes, but by a new luxury to prevent an old diſtinction which they affected in their habit; the Ladies of ancient Families dreſſing their heads *a la Guelfe*, and the other *a la Gibeline*, from whence grew a certain emulation that brake out ſome time into quarrels, and proceeded often to their Husbands, not only to the danger of the Nobility, but to the diſturbance of the State. For in all ſorts of Governments, nothing is more pernicious than jealouſie and miſunderſtanding betwixt the Governours; the offended party deſiring always innovation and change. So it was, that *Heracleodorus* in *Eubea* taking a pique againſt his Colleagues, ſet up a new form of Government, by which the Authority that was formerly in the hands of the Nobility, was transferr'd to the People; as on the contrary, *Duke Peter Gradenique* of *Venice*, transferr'd it from the People to the *Nobles*, to revenge himſelf of the People, who had refus'd to make him their *Duke*.

The *Senat* governing upon Maxims of Peace, will not endure diſſention either among the Nobility or People; for fear if once they came to Arms, they ſhould take a fancy to alter the Government. The *Senat* is ſenſible, Ambition and military Gallantry are inſeparable, and that great Courage cannot endure the obſcurity of a private life; of which we have a fair example in the *Roman* Commonwealth, who with all her power was not able to maſter her Generals. And this Maxim is ſo much the better, becauſe the *Venetians* not deſigning to aggrandize themſelves by new Acquiſition, but only contriving how they may defend what they have got, have no need of Generals among them, whoſe Ambition would keep them always in alarm; there being but too many of thoſe haughty ſpirits, who believe all things are lawful that conduce to Dominion, and that it is meer madneſs to refuſe it in a punctilio of Religion *.

*Si violandum eſt jus, regnandi cauſa violandum eſt. Eurip.

Beſides, the General for a Commonwealth, finding himſelf adored by his Souldiers, favoured by fortune, and happy in an opportunity, without more than ordinary moderation, can hardly bring himſelf to depoſe an Authority that he can ſo eaſily keep, and reduce himſelf to an Equality, when it is in his power to Command. Upon which conſideration, the *Senat* has laid it down for a Maxim of State, Never to put the Command of their Land-Armies into the hands of any of their *Nobles*; ſeeing that to arrive at any perfection in that Trade, they muſt paſs the beſt part of their time upon the *Terra-firma*, and ſeek their employment among forreign Princes, which would quickly make a breach among their Nobility, it being moſt certain, thoſe who had been long abſent from their Country, and taken up a way

way of living quite contrary to their old, would not accommodate very easily with their Companions brought up in Idleness and Peace; by which means it would not be long before their *Republick* would be perplex'd and embroil'd by its own Citizens.

Therefore when they have War at Land, they invite to their Service some Prince or Forreign Lord, to whom they allow a large Pension, with the Title of *Generalissimo at Land*: I say the Title, because he has neither Authority nor Power, the *Senat* appointing constantly as his Councel, or rather as Spies, two Senators, which they call *Proveditors General of the Army*; who never suffer him to be out of their sight, nor take any Resolution, or undertake any Enterprize without them. On the contrary, he is oblig'd to do as they direct; and let his Experience in Military Affairs be what it will, they seldom comply with his Sentiment, the Noblemen of *Venice* being naturally enemies to any Advice that is not their own, as if they design'd their Perverseness should shew their Dominion. And therefore they will not entertain Generals more brave, or of better Conduct than themselves; because commonly their Complaisance is but small, and that is a Quality with them equivalent to the greatest.

In the absence of the *Generalissimo*, the General of the Infantry (a Stranger too) has the Command, by a Custom quite different from other Princes; which is a great trouble to the General of the Horse, as appeared by the Prince of *Modena*, who quitted the *Venetian* Service upon that Score, during the War of *Mantua*.

The *Senat* not only entertains Forreign Generals, but all the Forreign Souldiers they can get, always retaining a special care of putting Arms into

the hands of their Subjects. Not that the *Senat* is ignorant how inconvenient the ſervice of Forreigners is, having had ſuch fatal experience many times, and particularly in the famous Battel of *Ghiarra d'Adda* *, where moſt part of their Troops deſerted them; but becauſe they had rather be ill-ſerv'd, than have their Liberty endangered.

* See the Remarks.

The pain they find to get Souldiers, by reaſon of the ſlavery in which they keep them, (which is ſuch, that many of them have choſe rather to revolt deſperately to the *Turk*,) conſtrains them to have recourſe to their Allies for ſuccour; but they never do it but in great extremity, being as fearful of the Troops which they employ in their defence, as of thoſe that invade them; and therefore it is they ſo frequently change the Poſts and Quarters of their Auxiliaries, ſeparating them with great care, and incorporating them with their other Troops, to prevent or defeat any deſign their Commanders may have. Sometimes they force their Officers to retire, tiring out their patience by a thouſand affronts; and if they happen to be obſtinate, and perſons that will not eaſily deſert their Party, they make no great ſcruple to remove them other ways; witneſs *Don Camillo de Gonzague*, who died not many years ſince at *Capo d'Iſtria*, of which they diſcharged themſelves by a ſolemn Service, and a Funeral Oration delivered in the *Senat*. Many times they chooſe rather to make a diſhonourable Peace, than to continue or entertain Auxiliaries in their Defence; ſo much do they abhor that kind of Cattel, which they look upon as little better than Profeſſed Enemies. For 'tis the Cuſtom of thoſe States who have over-reach'd their Neighbours and Allies, to apprehend being circumvented themſelves ſome time or other, judging of their enemies by what they

they themſelves would do in their places. Wherefore the *Senat* never engages in a War but upon neceſſity, and after they have tried all ways to prevent it, there being no act of Submiſſion that they will refuſe to deliver themſelves from that Plague; and the rather, becauſe their Affairs are ſupported more by their Reputation than Arms. Their bare averſion to War, if you will believe *Andr. Moccenicus belli Camer*, (who was one of their Senators) made them change their old Patron *St. Theodore*, becauſe he was a Souldier, and reſembled St. *George* too much, who is the Patron of *Genoua*. The Statue of St. *Theodore* to be ſeen upon one of the Pillars in the *Place of St. Mark*, Arm'd at all Points, but with his Lance in his Left-hand, and his Shield in his Right, does denote that it is not the *Venetians* Profeſſion to bear Arms; though it is ſaid by that Symbol the *Senat* intended to intimate, that they never made War willingly, and that when they did make it, it was for no other end but to maintain a good and ſafe Peace.

Magis fama quam vi ſtare res ſuas. Tac. Ann. 5.

And if in thirteen or fourteen Centuries they have grown ſo Potent in *Italy*, it is eaſily imaginable, it was not ſo much by their Arms, as by their Money and Addreſs, like *Philip* of *Macedon* in his Conqueſts in *Greece*. For Example, when any difference happened betwixt their Neighbours, the *Senat* found ſome way or other of interpoſing, under colour of accommodating their Quarrel; but in effect it was to embroil them more, by privately fomenting their Animoſity, exciting the moſt Potent to Revenge, and underhand giving Supplies to the weaker to continue the War, and inſenſibly to ruine them both: ſo that having tired and exhauſted both the one and the other, there was no great difficulty in diſpoſſeſſing them all, by the neceſſity that was upon them of putting

the Conteſted Places into their hands *in Depoſito*, or at leaſt of receiving a *Venetian* Garriſon. In the year 1404 they got poſſeſſion of *Vicenza* by means of Supplies, which they ſent to the ſaid Town to defend them againſt the *Paduans* their mortal enemies. They plundered moſt of the Great Perſons of *Romagna*, ſome they cajol'd by fair promiſes, others they ſurpriz'd, and others they betrayed under the ſacred name of Friendſhip, and pretended Protection. The ſame Practice they uſed with the Nobility of *Ravenna*, eſpecially of the Family of *Polenta*, with the *Manfredi* of *Faienza*, the *Malateſtes* of *Rimini*, and ſeveral others: for they always eſteem'd it more Honourable to vanquiſh their Enemy by Cunning, than Force of Arms. And what was ſaid of the *Romans*, *Sedendo Romanus vincit*, may be ſaid of them; for many Victories have they obtain'd ſitting in their Councils, and in their Cloſets: Yet when Princes have made War upon them, without troubling themſelves to Treat, (in which notwithſtanding their greateſt Talent and Felicity lies,) they never fail to bring them to reaſon. And if Pope *Paul* V, had done as *Sixtus* IV, and *Julius* II did, that is, joyn'd his ~~Spiritual~~ *Temporal* Arms with the ~~Temporal~~ *Spiritual*, he had certainly found the *Venetians* more obedient, though perhaps their Cauſe was the better. Of late years they no ſooner ſaw the *French* Army in their Territories, but they betook themſelves to ſuch groſs and mean ſubmiſſion, that their Confederate Princes were amaz'd to find ſo little Courage in thoſe perſons, who before flatter'd themſelves with hopes of chaſing *Lewis* XII out of *Milan*, and ſeizing the whole *Dutchy* for themſelves, to make their Dominion as abſolute all over *Italy*, as they had made it in *Romagna*: but the loſs of one Battel at *Vaila* made the *Senat* cry

See the Remarks.

peccavi,

peccavi, though before they had defied the Kings, and called them in deriſion, Sons of St. *Mark*, as if they had been already overcome.

And here I ſhall obſerve by the way, that upon ſeveral occaſions the *Venetians* have done themſelves injury, by diſcovering their weakneſs and puſillanimity to their Enemies. Their Prayers and Submiſſions to *Francis Carrare* Lord of *Padua*, during the War with *Genoa*, giving him in their Letters the Title of *Highneſs*, * which at that time was given only to Kings; and ſupplicating him to afford Audience to ſix Embaſſadors they had ſent to him (an Honour they had never before done to either Pope or King) theſe Condeſcentions, or rather Debaſements, I ſay, ſerv'd only to make him the more haughty, and deſirous of Revenge; inſomuch that all the anſwer they could get, was, *That he would not hear their Embaſſadors, till he had firſt cauſed the four Braſs Horſes in the* Portico *of St.* Mark *to be brought away*; which are four curious Horſes that *Marinzen*, the firſt *Podeſtate* from that *Commonwealth* at *Conſtantinople*, had ſent to *Venice* in the year 1205.

* The Letter from the *Senat* was written in *Italian*, in theſe terms: *Magnifico e Potente Signore* Franciſco da Carrara, *diſcreto Imperial Vicario General* Andrea Contarini *per Dio Gratia Doſe di Venegia.*

Noi pregamo l'Altezzo voſtra qualmente vi paccia mandar voſtre Lettere de ſalvo Condotto de venir alla preſenza dell'Altezza voſtra, audiendo liberamente li noſtri Ambaſſadori Piero Zuſtignan, Nicolo Moroſini P. Giacomo Priuli P. *e tre alteri del noſtro Conſiglio de Pregadi*, &c. *Annales* M. S. *de Veniſe. To the Magnificent and Potent Lord* Franciſco da Carrara, *the moſt Wiſe and Diſcreet Imperial Vicar, General* Andreas Contarini, *by the Grace of God Duke of* Venice, *Greeting. We beſeech Your Highneſs, in what manner you pleaſe, to ſend*

your Letter of Safe-Conduct, for the admitting into the Presence of Your Highness, and free Audience for our Embassadors, Peter Zustignan *Procurator,* Nicolo Morosini *P.* Giacomo Priuli *P. and three more of our Senators,* &c.

Their Neutrality, which is another of their Fundamental Maxims to keep themselves in Peace, has been very prejudicial to them, and sometimes pull'd War upon their Heads; as it happen'd when they endeavoured to have kept themselves *Neuter* betwixt *Lewis* XII, and *Maximilian* the Emperor, at that time engaged in War about the *Dutchy* of *Milan.* For these two great Princes being equally incens'd against this *Commonwealth,* (whose Friendship added nothing to their Affairs) united in spight, and form'd the Project of the League of *Cambray,* in which all the Princes of *Italy* were concern'd. In a word, the Juncture was such, that there was a necessity of declaring either for the one or the other: But the *Senat* having chosen the midway *, which in great dangers, and doubtful, is always the worst; in stead of preserving their Friendship, they disoblig'd both, and made them their Enemies. So that it may be said of the *Republick* of *Venice,* what was said by *Florus* of *Marseilles, That desiring Peace, she precipitated her self into the War she apprehended*: Or what *Alsonso* King of *Aragon* said of the *Sienois,* comparing them to those who are lodg'd in the second Story of an House, and incommoded with smoke from below, and water from above. And truly, if Neutrality be not very well managed, it not only conciliates no Friendship, nor prevents any Enemies *; but it expose's such States as have made it their Principle (as the *Venetians* have done) to the contempt and hatred of the Conquerors, who according to the prudent Remonstrance of the *Roman* Embassador

* *Quod inter ancipitia terrimum est.* Tac. *Hist.* 3.

* *Neutralitas neq; amicos parit, neq; inimicos tollit.* Poly. 6.

ſador to thoſe of *Achaia*, are accuſtomed to treat thoſe ill, and, if poſſible, to ruine them that will not publickly eſpouſe their Intereſts, and run their Fortune: witneſs the *Republick* of *Florence*, which deſir'd to remain *Neuter* betwixt Pope *Julius* II, the King of *France*, and the King of *Aragon*; and thereby not only diſoblig'd the Pope, offended the King of *France*, who expected Supplies from it as a friend, but depriv'd it ſelf of thoſe advantages which it might have expected before from the King of *Aragon* upon Honourable Conditions.

But as much averſion as the *Senat* has to Land-Forces, no leſs is its inclination to the Forces by Sea, upon which depends abſolutely the Conſervation of the *Government*, from whence it has had its riſe and encreaſe. In their Galleys are always diſpos'd a certain number of young Noblemen to inſtruct themſelves in Maritime Affairs, and good Penſions are allowed to ſuch as embrace that Profeſſion.

The *Senat* likewiſe obliges the rich Merchants who have Ships at Sea, to entertain at their own Charges two or three decayed Gentlemen permitted to carry a certain quantity of Goods without paying any Duty for Exportation; or if they have not Money to furniſh themſelves for Traffick during their Voyage, the ſaid Gentlemen have liberty to ſell their Priviledg to other People, and ſupply themſelves that way, which is a great relief to their miſery, and makes them in love with a Profeſſion that is ſo much to their advantage: beſides the hopes they have of arriving one day at the Chief Command of their Fleet, *Venice* conferring thoſe Commands like the *Senat* of *Sparta*, only to the *Nobles*, that they might not be wholly depriv'd of the Reputation of Military Conduct, the ſituation of their Town inviting them more-

over

over to that kind of Warfare. And in this it must be acknowledged the *Venetians* have succeeded so well, that they deserve to hold among all the *Italians* the Preheminence for Power and Experience at Sea, as the *Athenians* had formerly among the *Greeks*. But it must be confess'd likewise, it would have been more flourishing at this day, had their Predecessors contented themselves to be Masters of so many rich Islands in the *Archipelago*, without setting foot upon the *Terra-firma*, which has corrupted their ancient Manners, and put them upon ways of living quite contrary to what they had, and what was necessary to maintain them in their Grandeur: In which they were the more blameable, because to regulate them they had the Example of the *Lacedemonians*, who being the most fortunate of all the *Greeks* in their Wars at Land, subverted the *Government* of their Town, and ruin'd their State by making War by Sea against the *Athenians*; who by continual Conversation in that Element, were become the ablest and most experienc'd Nation of *Greece*. But it seems the *Venetians* had as much mind to imitate the Faults, as the Maxims and Laws of that famous *Commonwealth*.

I shall not enlarge farther upon their Sea-Affairs, because I shall hereafter have occasion to speak of them, when I treat upon their Generals at Sea. I shall only mention in this place the ordinary Forces, wherewith the *Commonwealth* of *Venice* keeps her Towns and Territories in obedience.

The *Venetian* Militia.

The *Senat* has always a body of Infantry call'd *Cernida*, which is to say, a People selected out of all their Territories, though in truth it be nothing but a Mass of miserable Pesants, and all the Rascality of the *Terra-firma*: But they cost them

them nothing in time of Peace, there being none but the Captains and Serjeants paid; the first at the rate of twenty-five Ducats, the other at ten Ducats a-month; all the rest contenting themselves with certain Exemptions, and some slender gratifications at their Musters. Nevertheless this *Militia* serves to keep the People in their duty, and the neighbouring Princes in awe. This outward appearance of War (the true way to preserve Peace both at home and a-broad) being only to shew their Forces are always ready to receive and repulse their Enemies. And because the *Bourgeviſie* or Citizens have rarely good intelligence with their *Militia*, (their humours and their interests being as opposite as their professions) the Governours of their Towns do always quarter their Souldiers separately by themselves; not so much to ease and secure the People against the insolence of the Souldiers, as to remove their *Militia* from the fury of the *Populace* (who would make their advantage if they were separated) and to secure themselves from all surprizes, by keeping their Land-Armies on foot, * and ready to obey the first Orders. Besides, this *Militia* is not much unlike that which the *Romans* call'd *Milites Subitarii*; which being sufficient to stop the first Career of a Sedition or Revolt, gives time to expect succours from the neighbouring Towns, which never fail them, and keeps the people of the said Towns in perpetual fear. Tac. An. 4

* *Ut simul imperia acciperent, numeroq; & robore, fiducia ipsis, in cæteros metus crederetur ---- si quid subitum ingruat, majore auxilio subvenire.*

Their *Cernida* is divided into ---Companies, amounting in the whole to about 14 or 15000 men, not much worth; so that in their Wars the *Venetians* use them only as the *Lacedemonians* did the *Helotes* their slaves, to keep their baggage *,

* *Ne hostibus viderentur ad paucos redacti in quodlibet stratum demortuorum Helotas restituerunt.* Athenæus.

and

and fill up the places of the dead, rather than to fight, which is not at all their buſineſs.

Their Infantry, call'd *Capelete*, is of another Nature. The *Senat* truſts them with the Guard of their beſt Towns upon the Continent, having always found them faithful to their Service, and inveterate againſt the *Turk*. Nevertheleſs it is thought convenient to ſeparate them into ſeveral Garriſons, becauſe together they might be be dangerous. There are conſtantly two Companies of them in *Venice*, one to keep the *Palace*, the other the *Place of St. Mark*.

As to their Cavalry, they have always fifteen Companies in pay upon the *Terra-firma*: ſome of them (call'd *groſs Companies*) conſiſt of 60 *Curiaſſiers*, which are beſtow'd partly upon the *Italians*, and partly upon the *Tramontani*, or Forreigners, in recompence of their long or extraordinary Service; for their Pay is conſiderable. The reſt are called *Capeletes*, or Light-horſe, made up of *Sclavonians*, *Albanians*, (which they call *Stradiots*) *Dalmatians*, and *Morlaiks*, all of them ſubjects to that Commonwealth. The *Curiaſſiers* ſerve principally to ſuſtain and cover the *Infantry* in time of Battel, the weight of their Arms making them unfit for Excurſions, which is the proper buſineſs of the *Capeletes*. The *Morlaiks* are a handful of men, who having quitted the *Turks* Service, ſubmitted freely to the dominion of this State, and have ſince ſignalized themſelves by their faith and their activity. They infeſt the *Turks* with their continual inroads, whatever is portable they carry away, what is not they ſpoil; and then ſave themſelves in the Mountains, where it is harder to find than overcome them *; ſo well are they acquainted with all the paſſages & turnings. Beſides their immortal reſentment of the

* *Quos difficilius invenire quam debellare.*

the barbarous uſage they received of late years from the *Baſhaw* of *Boſnia*; the conſideration of a *Sequin* which the *Senat* allows them for every *Turks* head they bring in, has ſo blooded them againſt thoſe Infidels, and carried them ſo far, that they have no hopes left of ever reconciling with the *Turks* *; which was all the *Senat* deſir'd to fix them in their Service; they looking upon them as fickle, and like birds of paſſage, held by the feathers, not the foot, their humour being as uncertain as their reſidence. They have no fix'd place of abode; they encamp in the Plains, and there ſet up their Cabanes, to avoid the licentiouſneſs of Towns, and the reſort of ſuch Citizens as teaching them delicacy, may corrupt their * Military Diſcipline.

Quo minore ſpe veniæ, creſceret vinculum ſceleris. Tac. Hiſt. 4.

* *Inter Paganos corruptior miles.* Hiſt. 1. *Severius acturos ſi vallum ſtatuatur procul urbis illecebris.*

In ſhort, The *Senat* entertains a certain number of *Ultramontane* Officers, with Penſions call'd *Conduites*. The number of theſe Officers is commonly 50, but they are augmented as occaſion requires. Theſe Gentlemen have ſometimes Governments in *Dalmatia*; ſometimes the command of *Groſs Companies*, as their Service recommends them; beſides other Priviledges, as not to be arreſted for debt, to have a ſeat in the Colledg when Affairs are in debate, and to take place in the Towns where their Commands lye, immediately next the *Podeſta* and the Captain at Arms.

But the *Venetians* chief Strength conſiſts in their Naval Force; and their thoughts are moſt employ'd upon that, in reſpect of the Scituation of their Town, which is wholly in the Sea, and for de-

defence of their *Golf*, and preſervation of thoſe Iſlands which they hold in the *Mediterranean*. In my time there were only 25 Galleys, and four Galleaſſes, with a few Barks and *Brigantins* Armed, to ſecure their Coaſts; but they were able to ſet out twice the number, were their *Arſenal* ſupplied with Slaves, Sea-men and Souldiers, as well as other neceſſaries. Their *Arſenal* is one of the fineſt things in *Europe*, and the beſt kept. It is a place of about three miles in compaſs, in the form of an Iſland. at one end of the Town, and on that ſide next the Main-Sea. It is wall'd about, and encloſed with Canals that ſerve for ſo many Ditches. Within it there are three great Fountains or Reſervatories which receive the water from the Sea, and communicate one with another upon occaſion. About them all three are an infinite number of little Houſes full of materials for Galleys, ſome made, ſome half made, others to be refitted, and all in their particular Magazins. For Example, one is full of Nails, another of all manner of Iron-work neceſſary for a Galley. Two are full of Small-ſhot, and Cannon-bullet; one of Planks, one with Rudders, one with Oars ready made, and two where they make them. There are two places for Cordage of 400 paces long, one for Hemp, another for Sailes, with a large Room full of Women to ſow them: one for Maſts, one for Pitch, one for Salt-Peter, and ſeveral for Powder. There are in it twelve Forges, or Smiths-ſhops, in which 100 men are continually working. Three *Fonderies*, or Rooms for running of their Lead. A great Hall for weighing their Cannon: a large Court full of Timber, Anchors, and Artillery, with about 800 Peeces of Cannon of all ſizes ranged in ſeveral Rooms. In a word, there are always Arms ready for 50000 men. The number of their conſtant

A Deſcription of the *Arſenal*.

ſtant Workmen is 1200; and all theſe Artificers have a Superior Officer called *Amiraglio*, who commands the * *Bucentaure* on Aſcenſion-day, when the *Duke* goes in State to marry the Sea: And here we cannot but take notice, that by a ridiculous Cuſtom this Admiral makes himſelf Reſponſible to the *Senat* for the inconſtancy of the Sea, and engages his Life there ſhall be no Tempeſt that day. 'Tis this Admiral who has the Guard of the *Palais, St. Mark* with his *Arſenalotti*, during the *interregnum*. He carries the Red-Standard before the Prince when he makes his Entry; by virtue of which Office he has his Cloak, and the two Baſons (out of which the *Duke* throws the Money to the People) for his fee. * See the Remarks.

This *Arſenal* contains all that is neceſſary for defence of their State, and had the *Spaniard* ſucceeded in his deſign to burn it, they had been loſt beyond all hopes of recovery. For as to the two *Armories* in the *Palais of St. Mark*, they are not conſiderable, being only to Arm part of the Nobility, if any Tumult ſhould happen during the Seſſion of the *Grand Council*. 'Tis ſaid the *Turk* would not be troubled with *Venice*, if it were not for the *Arſenal*; that he eſteems the *Arſenal* more than the Town, which, if it were in his Power, he would willingly reſtore upon payment of a Tribute: and this is reported by an *Engliſh* Author, who affirms he heard it from one of the Principal Miniſters in the *Grand Signior's* Court. *Ricault.* Hiſt.

The Charge of this *Arſenal* amounts to 500000 *Ducats*. The Workmen are paid every *ſaturday* without fail. No man is received to work there under 20 years of age; and no man can be a Maſter till he has ſerv'd eight years. 'Tis Governed by three Noblemen called *Padroni all Arſenale*, who are changed every three years; and by three *Prove-*

Proveditors, whoſe Office it is to chooſe the Workmen, and to ſee them paid.

But becauſe Money is the Nerves of all States, and gives motion to all its Members, it will not be amiſs to ſay ſomething in general of the ordinary Revenue of this *Commonwealth*, from whence we may better judg of their real Strength.

The *Dutchy* of *Venice*, that comprehends the City, and all the Iſlands and Ports about it, pays yearly three Millions of *Ducats*, beſides the Duty upon Salt, which amounts to more than another Million: all amounting by Computation to little leſs than a Million *Sterling*, if you reckon every Ducat at 50 *Sols French*; but I will not pretend to be too punctual in my Arithmetick.

The *Marquiſate* of *Treviſan* being a good Country, pays 28000 *Ducats*.

Padua and the Territory about it pays 40000 *Ducats*.

Vicenza and the Country about it, 200000 *Ducats*.

Verona and the *Veranois* 360000 *Ducats*.

Bergamo and its *Diſtrict*, 300000 *Ducats* at leaſt.

Crema 160000 *Ducats*, perhaps more.

Breſſia, and the Country belonging to it, 120000 half of which is aſſign'd to the payment of the *Arſenal* at *Venice*.

The *Poleſin*, called *il Contado di Rovigo*, a miſerable Country, pays 140000 *Ducats*.

Friul, a large Province, pays 400000 *Ducats*.

The Countreys upon the Sea, as *Iſtria*, *Dulmatia*, and part of *Albania*, with the Iſles of *Corfu*, *Zante*, *Zephalonica*, *Cerigo*, and others, pay by report 800000 *Ducats*, if not more.

All which amounts to more than two Millions *Sterling*, beſides new Impoſitions that multiply every

every day; the Tythes of the Clergy, the Sale of Offices, Confiscations, and several other Incomes very considerable. So that in time of Peace the *Senat* lays up vast Sums, their Form of *Government* exempting them from the Expences of Monarchies, where all things are more Noble and Magnificent. 'Tis true, the State of *Venice* has more reason to lay up in time of Peace than any other Prince; there being none of them to whom their Wars are so Chargeable as to it, who for the most part is serv'd altogether for Money, with little or no affection from those they employ. Besides, their ordinary Revenue is not sufficient to maintain their Wars; but when once they are Engaged, they find out ways to supply themselves by new Taxes, extraordinary Impositions upon the Nobility, Citizens, Ecclesiasticks, and Mechanicks, by selling *Nobility* to the *Populace*, the Vest of *Procurator*, the *Golden-Stole*, and all the great Offices to such Lords as are ambitious; which ways, during the Wars of *Cambray*, brought into the Exchequer 500000 *Ducats* in eight months time. The *Senat* sells likewise *la Cittadinanza*, or the Freedom of their City to Strangers, the Titles of *Marquess* and *Count* to the *Nobles* of the *Terra-firma*: Liberty to Prisoners, Mercy to Criminals, Permission to return to Banished Persons. Moreover it takes Money at the rate of two or three *per Cent.* out of the Banks for Pious Uses, as in that at *Trevisan* in the year 1669. It constrains the Rich to lend them, but especially the *Jews*, whom they squeeze like spunges when they please, threatning to send them packing upon the least hesitation. During the War of *Candia*, the *Jews* in *Venice* only, furnished the *Senat* with five or six Millions, and yet some few weeks before *Candia* was Surrendred, they made bold to draw

Bills upon them for a conſiderable Sum more.

At the end of that War, if we may believe what was commonly reported in *Venice*, that *Commonwealth* was indebted above ſixty millions of *Livres*; and it was true: Yet a few years Peace will eaſily recover them, and put their affairs again into good condition; there being no Prince that ſpends leſs ſuperfluouſly than they, which Parcimony is to them as good as a revenue *. Beſides, their Officers who manage the publick Treaſure, having ſo many eyes upon them, and being to give account of their adminiſtration to as many Judges as there are *Nobles*, 'tis impoſſible for them ſafely to imbezzle it; for the Multitude, as they cannot diſſemble, ſo they never forgive; for the *intacco di Caſſa*, or purloining the Publick Money, is unpardonable at *Venice*.

* *Parcimonia magnum eſt Vectigal.*

Furthermore, no payment is made, but it is firſt baloted, or authorized in the *Pregadi*; ſo that nothing paſſes out of the Coffers of their Exchequer, but upon good terms. When the ſum they owe is conſiderable, they pay it not all at one time, but by parcels and degrees, thereby to keep their Creditors in *Venice*, that before their ſecond receipt, their firſt may be ſpent among them; and this practice is ſo frequently obſerv'd, that many times their Creditors are forced to renounce all and be gone, leſt their attendance ſhould conſume them. Beſides this, all their payments are made in *Ducats*, a *Coin* that cannot be tranſported, it being of ſo baſe an allay, it would ſcarce give half the value out of that *State*; For this reaſon they are glad to change them at great loſs for Gold, or lay out their money in Commodities; ſo that it returns generally from whence it came, or at leaſt a great part of it.

Again

Again, the diſcovery of the *Eaſt Indies* by the *Portugals* in the year 1498, has been a great diminution to the Revenue of this *Republick*; for whereas all the Spices and Drugs from thoſe parts were brought by *Aleppo* and *Alexandria*, to which places they were convey'd upon Cammels backs, and from thence to *Venice* by Sea; as being at that time the Magazine for all *Europe*; *Vaſquez de Gama* found a way to bring them at much leſs charge by the *Cape of good Hope*; which has prejudiced the *Venetians* in their revenue to the value of 9 or 10 millions *per ann.* For then they ſet what price upon their goods they pleas'd; and they could do it, being the only people who ſupplied all *Europe*. And *Chriſtopher Columbus* did them as much miſchief alone, by his diſcovery of the *Weſt Indies*, as all the *Genois* together in their ſeveral Wars; for by his Navigations he opened a way to the *Spaniards* and *Portugais*, who ſince then have ſupplied themſelves plentifully by Sea with ſuch Merchandize as before they were forc'd to buy of the *Venetians* at their own rate. 1490.

Let us now ſee what is objected by ſome people againſt the Conduct and Oeconomy of this *State*. Some blame *their ſelling of Nobility as a diſhonourable thing*: Others condemn *the extravagant indulgence of the Senat towards their Prieſts, Monks, and Religious perſons*: And others declaim as much at *their Stews, and the publick protection of Courtiſans*.

As to the *ſale of Nobility*, 'tis abſolutely neceſſary, the ancient Families extinguiſhing every day; and if new ones ſhould not be ſubſtituted in their places, the Government would fall into an *Oligarchy*; by which it would be eaſie for the People to poſſeſs themſelves of the power,

and exclude the remainder of the *Nobles*. Beſides, the profit of this Sale is employed to the eaſe of the People, who would otherwiſe be over-laden with Impoſitions to ſupply the neceſſities of their Wars, did not the *Senat* rather chooſe this as a more mild and plauſible way to ſupply themſelves out of the Purſes of Rich men by a voluntary Contribution. Again, hereby the People have the ſatisfaction to ſee their Friends and Relations ſharers in the Civil Adminiſtration, and are thereby rendred better contented with what paſſes, and better inclin'd to the intereſt of their Country. Hence it follows that thoſe few Noblemen who are averſe to this new way of Creation, are not to be eſteem'd ſo good Citizens as they ought to be, in that they prefer their Paſſions and private Punctilios before the real Intereſt and Advantage of their State.

This was the Caſe of one of the *Priuli*, who profeſſed he had never, nor never would give his voice to any of thoſe Pretenders, it being, in his judgment, undecent to ſell their Nobility, which was to be conferr'd only upon Merit, and to put into * the *Golden-Book* the names of Artificers and Mechanicks. And it was wittily ſaid upon that occaſion by *John Sagrede*, *That mixing their Silver with ſuch mean Alloy, was no leſs Criminal than Coining.*

The Book in which the names of all the *Venetian* Noblemen are writ.

As to the *Senat*'s Indulgence to the *Church-men*, 'tis true it is too great, eſpecially to their *Monks*, who (as was well ſaid by *Cardinal Elci* during his *Nunciature* at *Venice*) *had great need to have their Hoods taken ſhorter.*) But by their kindneſs to them they ſecure themſelves againſt the effects of the Cenſures and Excommunications of *Rome*; for the *Monks* being ſenſible that no other Prince would allow them that liberty as they find in *Venice*,

nice, where they live happily and contented, they make no great ſcruple to diſobey either his *Holineſs*, or their *General*; againſt whoſe threats they oppoſe the favour and protection of that State, as the Shield of *Achilles*. Of this we have ſeen a fair Example in the *Interdiction* of *Paul* V, which was obſerved by no body but the *Jeſuites*, the *Theatins*, and a part of the *Capuchins*: for in ſpight of all the endeavours of the Pope's Party, who at *Ferrara*, *Bologna*, and *Mantua*, cried out againſt this *Commonwealth* as being *Lutheran*, ſpreading all over their State Seditious Libels, pronouncing all their Marriages void, their Children illegitimate, and thouſand other things of that Nature; yet the People went on, continued Obedient, and enjoyed their Repoſe. Whereas had not the *Monks* been oblig'd to the State by their own proper Intereſt, at a time when the *Pope* was ſupported by ſo many *Bouteſeux*, eſpecially by the *Spaniard*, the ſaid *Monks* might have diſpoſed the People to a Revolt, by declaiming againſt the *Government*, and ſeducing timerous Conſciences; which was a way whereby they have many times put *Italy* into a flame. So that the affection of their *Eccleſiaſticks* ſtands the *Senat* in good ſtead, together with their Right, which would otherwiſe be preſerved by the common Intereſt of all the Princes in *Europe*. And it was eaſily preſaged at the beginning of that Affair, that the Iſſue would not be happy for the *Pope*; it being a common ſaying, (alluding to the Coats of Arms belonging to his *Holineſs*, and the State of *Venice*) *That the* Borgian *Dragon would not be able to overpower the* Venetian *Lion; and that though the Dragon fought deſperately with its Wings, yet the Lion would find wherewithal to defend it ſelf.* To which they applied that Verſe of Scripture, *Sub umbra alarum tuarum,* See the Remarks.

tuarum, which the *Venetians* uſed then as their device, *Pax tibi Marce*, being their device only in time of Peace: and for this reaſon in time of War, or upon any vigorous preparation thereunto, the Book in their Eſcutcheon is ſhut.

The *Senat* draws another Advantage from the licentiouſneſs of their *Clergy*, and that is to diſcredit them with the People, who as blind, and as corrupt as they are, can yet ſee their ignorance, and abhor their Debauches. So that their ill-humors are not much to be feared, it being certain the People would never hearken to them, or willingly follow the perſwaſion of thoſe for whom they have ſo little reſpect, or opinion of their Conduct in any Conſiderable Enterprizes: beſides, the *Senat* knows ſo well how to Coax them in time of War, that they Wheedle them out of vaſt Sums without violence or diſcontent; for they do not oblige them to Contribution by any Edict or Poſitive Decree, as they do the reſt of their Subjects, but by ſuch Prayers and intimations of their Neceſſities, as they are not able to reſiſt *, as they did in the War in *Candia*. To which may be added, that upon extraordinary Exigence the *Senat* touches them with the ſpecious pretext of their ill-lives, and the ſcandal they give, thereby to obtain of the *Pope* ſuppreſſion of their Monaſteries, and Confiſcation of their Goods.

* *Preces erant, ſed quibus contradicere non poſſet.* Tac. *Hiſt.* 4.

And as to the irregularity of the *Nuns*, 'tis an Inconvenience muſt neceſſarily be diſſembled, leſt they ſhould make deſperate ſo many young Gentlewomen as the Nobility do daily force into their Covents, where they never would Profeſs, did they not find themſelves better accommodated than at home with their Parents. 'Tis true, none of them ought to be forc'd to that kind of Vocation; but if we conſider the inclination moſt young Women have

have to Liberty, their diſhonourable intrigues with their Servants, and their other impurities that would ſtain the Paper to deſcribe; we muſt excuſe the ſeverity of their Friends, who have not their hundreds of eyes to obſerve them; and thoſe poor Gentlewomen who never ſtir abroad, and who are depriv'd, by the Cuſtom of the Country, of all the Pleaſures and Divertiſement of their lives, ought in Equity to have ſome Entertainment in their Cloiſters, and at leaſt to be allowed the priviledg of ſeeing their Lovers at a Grate, when beſides what they ſee there, they ſee nothing but the walls of their Chamber.

In ſhort, their Protection of *Courteſans* is an evil from whence the *Senat* receives great Advantage, delivering themſelves thereby from the Care they muſt otherwiſe take of keeping their young Noblemen employed, who having nothing to do, would probably entertain themſelves in Deſigns againſt the State.

The *Courteſans* are a kind of Leeches applied to ſuch Members as have too much blood. They are Spunges that ſuck up Forreign Moiſture, and are ſqueezed by the Magiſtrate when he ſees occaſion: for if they dreſs themſelves like Perſons of Quality, or if they commit any other fault againſt the Law, the Officer *des Pompes* fines them ſo ſeverely, that they are many times forc'd to ſell all, and lie themſelves upon the ground. One time when the *Signores* (for ſo they call the *Courteſans*) were retir'd from *Venice*, they quickly found the inconvenience, young Gentlewomen being every day ſtollen, and raviſh'd from their Parents; and ſometimes the Gates of the moſt Eminent *Monaſteries* broke open, ſo as the *Seigniory* was forc'd to invite the Ladies of Pleaſure from all Parts, and to aſſign them certain Houſes, which they called *Caſe-*

Rampane, from whence comes that word of Obloquy, *Carampana*, at *Venice*. From whence we may gather, that there are ſome Ills that cannot be conveniently remedied; that the Maladies of State are incurable when they are old; and that a *Cacochimical* and ill-affected Body is better let alone in Repoſe, than to have the Humors ſtirr'd by Phyſick that cannot carry them off. Beſides, 'tis Prudence in a Prince to connive at what he cannot ſuppreſs, otherwiſe his Authority would be Expos'd, and grow Contemptible, when his Commands were not capable of being put in Execution. It would be more eaſy to Introduce a new *Government*, than to Reform Abuſes that have paſt into a Cuſtom *. And indeed no *Government* can be perfect †, becauſe there will be Exorbitances whilſt there are men.

* *Non minus negotii eſt* Remp. *emendare, quam ab initio conſtituere.* Ariſt. 4. Pol. c. 1.

† *Vitia erunt donec homines.* Tac. *Hiſt.* 4.

Therefore it was that *Cato* was reckon'd no wiſe-man, becauſe he knew not how to accommodate to the propenſity of the age. And *Tacitus* obſerves, that ‡ *Pompey*, who was choſen *Cenſor* for the reformation of Manners, was glad to aboliſh thoſe Laws that he himſelf had eſtabliſhed, becauſe he found them leſs ſupportable than the Evils againſt which they were made. This it was made the Great *Coſmo de Medicis* ſay, that *the City of* Florence *had better be Corrupted than Ruined*; implying that a Prince has more Honour *by preſerving his Country in what condition ſoever, than in loſing it quite.*

‡ Cn. Pompeius *corrigendis moribus delectus, & gravior remediis quam delicta erant, ſuarum legum autor idem, ac ſubverſor.* Ann. 3.

Having ſpoken at large of the Policy of the *Venetians* at home, it remains now that I touch upon their Correſpondencies abroad; and I ſhall do it according to the Information I received when I was reſident at *Venice*. And firſt *With*

With the Pope.

THE *Senat* endeavors to entertain good Correſpondence with the *Popes*; the *Senat* reſpects, and reverences, and complies with them in every thing, provided they be juſt, and keep themſelves within the bounds of their Juriſdiction, without intrenching upon the *Venetian*. For if once they encroach, they are ſure to meet with nothing but contradiction and reſiſtance. Witneſs the paſſages in the times of *Paul* V, and *Urban* VIII. When I was in *Venice*, there were great Diſputes betwixt the Court of *Rome* and that *State*, about the Priviledges of the *Religious*, who were oblig'd to aſſiſt at *Proceſſions*; and about a *Canal* the *Senat* made upon the *Po*, on the Confines of *Poleſin* and *Ferrara*, for the convenient tranſportation of their Merchants Goods, without carrying them thorough the Lands of the Church; which *Cardinal Altieri* endeavoured very earneſtly to have obſtructed, but was not able to prevail.

There is an ancient Emulation betwixt theſe two *States*, continued by the pretentions of the one, and the oppoſitions of the other: there being no *Prince* in all *Italy* that ſtands more upon their Dignity than the *Seigniory* of *Venice*. Nor is there any *State* but that in all *Europe*, which has excluded their *Clergy* from participation of the Civil *Government*, or neglected to have *Penſioners* in *Rome*, they having made it a Maxim to themſelves not to meddle in the *Election* of the *Popes*. To which may be added their detention of the *Poleſin*,

Poleſin, an ancient Member of the *Dutchy* of *Ferrara*, that is like to be a perpetual occaſion of Difference and Conteſtation betwixt them. In the mean time the *Venetian* courts and careſſes the *Pope* by the Magnificence of their *Embaſſies*, and by conferring their *Nobility* upon the *Nephews*, (a Cuſtom introduc'd ſince the time of *Alexander* VI Son of *Caſar Borgia*). In recompence the *Pope* has granted them *Tenths* upon the *Clergy*, and ſuppreſſion of *Abbeys* in caſe of War with the *Turk*; permits them ſometimes to ſupply themſelves with Corn out of the Eccleſiaſtical Lands, and always comprehends them in the Promotions made for the Crowns.

In ſhort, the vicinity of their Countries, (which are conterminous both by Land and by Sea,) and their mutual jealouſy of the *King* of *Spain* in *Italy*, unites them by the common ligament of Intereſt: and therefore the *Spaniard*, who well underſtood the importance of that Union, employed all his Cunning with *Paul* V, to engage him in a War againſt the *State* of *Venice* when he interdicted it, as knowing that they alone ſhould go away with the profit.

With

With Spain.

AND therefore the *Venetian* has no reaſon, and indeed do not heartily bear good-will to the *Spaniard*, whoſe ill Offices and Violence they have ſo often reſented. And though they ſeem to improve their Amity, and render it ſincere by continual Embaſſies one from the other, yet 'tis but a Copy of their Countenance; and nothing is more clear than that the Animoſity is immortal, and that the *Spaniards* can never forgive them the diſmembring of *Breſſia*, *Bergamo*, and *Crema*, from the *Dutchy* of *Milan*, and the *Venetians* are in continual fear they ſhould attempt to recover them. So that they hate not the *Spaniards* only by Habit and Cuſtom, (as the *Marqueſs de Caſtle-Roderiguo* told the *Venetian* Embaſſador *Peter Bazadonne*,) but from certain and experimental knowledg of their ill inclinations toward them. Furthermore, the *Senat* keeps conſtantly a *Reſident* in *Milan*, which is the Shop where all the *Spaniſh* deſigns againſt *Italy* are forged; and from whence they underſtand all their Negotiations with the *Princes*, the Poſture of their Affairs, and ſeveral other particularities, which being faithfully tranſmitted, are very Eſſential to the benefit and ſafety of their *Commonwealth*: and to ſucceed the more effectually, they do court and careſs the *Governor* of that *Province* with all poſſible Induſtry, in reſpect that their Amity and good Intelligence with the *King* of *Spain* depends much upon the favourable impreſſions

preſſions he receives of them from that Miniſter, as appeared by the tranſactions in the time of *Don Pedro de Toledo*, and the *Duke de Feria*, both Governors of *Milan*, and both holding the *State* of *Venice* in continual Agitation, as being their particular Enemies. And there wanted but little of falling into a dangerous War, for a ſmall Paſs called *Strada dello ſticcato*, that joyns the Territories of *Crema* and *Bergamo* together, by which Paſs the *Duke de Feria* pretended to march his Troops without permiſſion from the *Senat*. Again, the *Venetian* hates the *Spaniard*, as having found them more dangerous Enemies in time of Peace, than in War; as was manifeſt in the Excommunication of *Paul* V, and not many years after, in the Conſpiracy of *Don Alonſo la Queva* their Embaſſador: which occaſioned that ſaying of *Trajano Bocalini*, that *in time of War it was ſufficient only to lock their door; but in time of Peace, he who would be ſafe againſt them, muſt bolt, and double-lock, and barricado, and all little enough to keep them out.* And the *Venetians* had good reaſon to be alarm'd when the Princeſs, *Mary* of *Mantua* *, had thoughts of Marrying the Cardinal *Infant* of *Spain*, according to a ſecret Engagement ſhe had given the *Emperor* to that purpoſe; for if that Match had gone forward, the *Commonwealth* of *Venice* had been hedg'd in on all ſides by the Houſe of *Auſtria*.

Nani *Hiſt. Ven.* l. 4.

1618

* See the Remarks.

With

With the Emperor.

THE *Senat* of *Venice* is the better inclin'd to the *Emperor*, becauſe it fears nothing from him in *Italy*, where he has neither Reputation nor Eſtate. Their greateſt pique to him, is only for being deſcended from a Family whoſe Eldeſt Branch is their greateſt Enemy. Yet the *Emperor* has his pretences to *Friuli*, that his Predeceſſors engaged formerly to the State of *Venice* for 400000 *Crowns*: But there is Preſcription now in the caſe, and the *Senat* has fortify'd their Title of Forfeiture, by the Right of Conqueſt, having recovered that Province by their Arms, after they had been expuls'd by the *Emperor Maximilian* I. *Udina* the capital City having neither ground nor ſcituation proper to be fortify'd, they have fortify'd *Palma Nova* according to the new way of Fortification, with nine Bulwarks in a Circle, which has made it equally ſtrong on all ſides, and capable of reſiſting any enterprize, either from the Houſe of *Auſtria* or the *Turk*; which laſt has many times ravaged and over-run the whole Country, the poor Inhabitants being glad to leave all, and retire with their Families into this place, as their only Sanctuary and *Aſylum*.

Upon his pretenſion to *Friuli* it is, that the *Emperor* pretends to the Nomination of the *Patriarch* of *Aquilea*; which in truth remain'd in his Predeceſſors after the ſaid Province was engaged: But to prevent all manner of Controverſie,

verſie, the *Senat* has found out a way never to let it be vacant, by giving him who has the Title, power of chuſing a *Coadjutor*, which he never fails to do out of his own Family, and by that means keeping it conſtantly in being, the *Emperor* is defeated, and becomes utterly excluded from that Nomination.

But the *Emperor*, as he is *King* of *Hungary*, retains a right in *Dalmatia*, which *King Ladiſlaus* engaged to the *Venetians* for 100000 *Ducats*, though the *Venetians* pretend he ſold it out-right: However, that ſeems not probable, for *King Wincelaus* demanded reſtitution of it during the Wars of *Cambray*, threatning *Peter Paſqualigne* their *Embaſſador*, to do himſelf juſtice with his Sword, if they would not do it without. But he wanted Money, and loſt a favourable opportunity of entring that Province, whilſt the *Venetian* hands were full in defending themſelves againſt the *Emperor* and the *King* of *France*.

How the Venetians *ſtand with the* Electors *of the* Empire.

THis *Commonwealth* holds no Correſpondence with the *Electors* of the *Empire*, either becauſe they have no buſineſs with them, or by reaſon of an old Controverſie betwixt them about Precedence; which the *Electoral Colledg* has always diſputed, upon an Arreſt of the *Gol-*

den

den Bull in these words, *Sacri Rom. Imperii Electores digniores habentur cæteris Principibus præter Reges*; and the Example of one of the Embassadors of the *Palatinat*, who as they pretend had the precedence of *Vincent Grandenigue* the *Venetian* Embassador, in the Ceremonies at the Wedding of the *Emperor* with the Princess *Maria Anna de Bavaria*, celebrated at *Gratz* in the year 1600. As to the *Bull*, the *Venetian* replies, that he is comprehended under the exception *præter Reges*, being treated like *Kings* in all the Courts of *Europe*. And if the Count *d' Ognate*, the *Spanish* Embassador, refused it to *Peter Gritti* the *Venetian* Embassador at *Vienna* *, as was done since at *Madrid* by the *Emperors* Embassador the *Count de Chesniller*, to *Leonardo Moro* Embassador from that *Senat*; yet this Novelty which they would introduce, to revenge their quarrel about the *Valtoline*, could not prejudice the known Right of this *Republick*, nor strengthen the Right of the *Electors*. In a word, a *Cardinal* refusing Letters from the *Senat*, because they were writ with the Title of *Illustrissimo*, and not *Eminentissimo*, *Urban* VIII declared in the Sacred Colledg, that he comprehended the *State* of *Venice* in the clause *Exceptis Regibus*, and requir'd all the Cardinals to treat them as formerly. It is clear likewise, if the *Duke* of *Venice* should go to *Rome*, he would be received as a *King*, as *Christopherus Morus* was received at *Ancona* by the Sacred *Colledg*, during the vacancy of the *See*. For though he has but the Title of a *Duke*, that Title being personal would cease by representation of the Body of the *Commonwealth*, which is a kind of *Royalty* or *King*. And this is so true, that in the *Pontificat* of *Clem.* VIII. certain *Cardinals* advising with the *Master* of the *Cere-*

1622.

See the Remarks.

Ceremonies, how they ſhould treat *Duke Marin Grimani* if he came to *Ferrara*, as his *Holineſs* had invited him, it was told them by the ſaid *Maſter* of the *Ceremonies*, that they muſt treat him like a *King*, that *Commonwealth* having for a long time been poſſeſs'd of the Soveraignty.

Their Condition with France.

IF the *Senat* has an averſion to the *Spaniard*, it has no great kindneſs for the *French*, whoſe Power they look upon with an evil eye, as fearing their Neighbourhood, and retaining the the memory of their Wars with *Lewis* XII. The *French* acquiſition of *Pignerol*, increaſes their fear, though it be as a Port open'd to the Supplies ſent to the *Italian* Princes, againſt the oppreſſion of the *Spaniard*, who were grown inſupportable to them, ſince the Exchange for the *Marquiſat* of *Saluzzes*.

The *Venetian* makes it it his buſineſs to ſtand *Neuter* betwixt the *Spaniard* and the *French*, either to preſerve the Friendſhip of both, or ſo to balance their Power, as to keep both in an *Equilibrium*. And how great ſoever their jealouſie be againſt the *Spaniard*, they would never help to drive them out of *Italy* to bring the *French* in their places: For which cauſe the *Count de la Roque*, Embaſſador from *Spain* at *Venice*, found no great difficulty in gaining his cauſe againſt *Meſſieurs de Bellieure* and *de la Tuillerie*, the *French* Embaſſadors, who ſolicited the *Senat* to a League with their *King* againſt the *King* of

of *Spain*, that by a conjunction of their Forces they might wreſt the *Dutchy* of *Milan* out of his hand. And the *Marquis* of *Fuentes* prevail'd as eaſily with that *State*, not to ſuffer the *French* to paſs the River *Adda*, demanding that liberty for the *King* his Maſter; by that artifice to oblige the *Senat* to a refuſal of *France* that they ſhould not be able to excuſe; and by ſo doing, they ſav'd *Milan*, which otherwiſe had been certainly loſt, as the *Marquis* of *Caracene* confeſs'd, if the *French* had gain'd paſſage there.

Beſides, the *Spaniſh* humour is more agreeable to the *Venetians* than the *French*; and doubtleſs they would love the *Spaniards* much the better of the two, had they no Dominions in *Italy*; or if thoſe they have were in our poſſeſſion. But to ſay truth, the *Venetian* loves neither the one nor the other; and how great ſoever their outward appearance and correſpondence may be, they will never truſt either of them more than of neceſſity they are oblig'd. And 'tis a common ſaying, *That the Venetians know how to hate the Spaniard without favouring the French.*

However it muſt be confeſs'd, they are more inclinable to the *French* than the *Spaniard*, eſpecially in what relates to their *Embaſſadors*, who are more deſir'd there, and are more conſider'd than the *Spaniſh*. Beſides, the *Senat* upon particular occaſions, ſides always with the *French*; as in the vacancy of the Holy *See*, at which time they give Orders to ſuch *Cardinals* as depend upon them, to join with the *French* Faction in the *Conclave*; and to their Embaſſador at *Rome*, to act in that affair by conſent of the *French* Embaſſador: Which is a great advantage to the *French* when the *Venetian* Embaſſadors proceeds franckly according to Orders from his Maſters, who are

no leſs concern'd in point of intereſt to oppoſe the *Spaniards* than the *French*. Yet ſometimes they ſteer quite contrary, as *Sorance* betray'd the *French* party in the *Conclave*, in the year 1621, in hopes he ſhould have got a *Cap*. Moreover the *Venetian Cardinals* depend not abſolutely upon the *Senat*, which contributes nothing to their promotion, but their ſingle recommendation to the *Pope*; but they ſerve in their own way, without conſidering any thing but their own intereſt.

Their Condition with the Duke of Savoy.

THE *Venetians* and *Duke* of *Savoy* do not live in the ſame good intelligence as formerly. *Charles Emanuel* I. began the breach, by ſending home their Embaſſador *Vincent Guſſoni* upon occaſion of ſuccours they ſent to the *Cardinal* Duke of *Mantoua*, for the defenſe of *Montferrat*. *Victor Amideus* offended them likewiſe, by taking upon him the Title of *King* of *Cyprus*: And Duke *Charles Emanuel* II. has been all his time at a diſtance, or rather in diſpute with them upon the ſame ſubject, and the ſuperſcription of the Letters from the *Senat*. The *Count de Biglore* the *Duke* of *Savoys* Embaſſador, having caus'd the Arms of *Savoy* quartered with the Arms of *Cyprus* to be ſet up over his Gate, the *Senat* ſent him word, if he caus'd them not immediately to be taken down, he ſhould ſee them taken down for him, and torn before his face. And the Embaſſador

baſſador was glad to ſubmit. One day Count *Philip d'Aglie*, a Knight of the *Annonciade*, raking too far into that ingrateful Matter, drew upon himſelf an unhappy Anſwer from *Catarin Belegne* the *Venetian* Embaſſador; who told him, that *his Maſters, the State of* Venice, *would be very glad if the Kingdom of* Cyprus *were in the Hands of his Highneſs the* Duke *of* Savoy, *and not in the Hands of the* Turk; *becauſe, if in his Highneſs's Hands, he was ſure his Maſters would be able by Force of Arms to recover it in two Months.* Theſe alterations, and ſeveral others of a later date, by degrees broke all their Correſpondence; ſo that in the year 1670, the *Senat* called home their Embaſſador *Francis Michieli*, with which the *Duke* was offended, and more particularly with the ſaid Embaſſadors refuſal to ſend him one of his Pages, who had drawn his Sword againſt one of the *Duke's* Pages in his *Anti-Chamber*; and the ſaid *Duke* recalling in like manner his Embaſſador the *Count de Bigliore* from *Venice*, he departed the next morning after his Audience of *Congy*, that he might not receive the uſual Preſents of that *Republick*, and thereby ſignify his Reſentment.

Beſides all theſe Conſiderations, the *Duke* of *Savoy's* intimacy and adherence to the *French*, diſguſts the *Venetians* exceedingly, who without that could not conceal their diſpleaſure at the delivery of *Pignirol*. So jealous are they of the *King* of *France's* farther Progreſs in *Italy* *, *Temendo ugualimente* (ſays *Nani*) *il giogo, e il ſoccoroſo* †. *Fearing equally their Yoke, and their Aſſiſtance.*

* *Hiſt. Ven.* l. 8.

† See the Remarks in *Victor. Amedeus.*

Their Poſture with the Great Duke *of* Florence.

THis *Republick* on the other ſide maintains all poſſible Correſpondence with the *Great Duke* of *Tuſcany*, whom ſhe looks upon as a *Prince* of much Reputation in *Italy*, and one whoſe Predeceſſors have always ſhewed themſelves well-Affected to the intereſt of the *Venetians*. And their partiality appeared in the buſineſs betwixt the *Count de Bigliore*, and the *Marqueſs Ricardi*, both Embaſſadors of Obedience, one from the *Duke* of *Savoy*, the other from the *Duke* of *Florence*, ſpreading abroad Reports among the People to the advantage of the *Florentines*, and contriv'd on purpoſe to debaſe and tarniſh the glory of the *Savoyards*.

And it troubles the *Venetians* much to ſee the ſaid *Prince* as it were Beleaguer'd on all ſides by *Spaniards*, who are in poſſeſſion of *Piombino*, *Porto-longone*, *Orbitille*, and *Porto-Hercole*, with Garriſons in ſeveral places in his Territory.

However it is with an ill-eye they behold *Ligorn* enriching the whole Country, to the prejudice of the *Venetian* Trade; yet that does not hinder them from ſending Workmen from their *Arſenal* to build *Galleys* for the *Great Duke*: and the ſaid *Duke*, in Honour to the ſaid *State*, has given to the new Town of *Ligorn* the name of *Venetia-Nuova*.

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The Reſident of the *Duke* of *Florence* is admitted to his firſt Audience by the *Colledg*, with open doors as an Embaſſador, whereas the Reſidents of all other *Princes* of *Italy* are received with the doors ſhut, and without any Ceremony.

With the Duke *of* Mantua.

THE *Dukes* of *Mantua* have always held a ſtrict Correſpondence with the *Commonwealth* of *Venice*, whoſe Councels and Aſſiſtance have never been wanting to them upon occaſion. *Ferdinand*, Cardinal and *Duke* of *Mantua*, found the effects of their protection againſt *Duke Charles Emanael* of *Savoy*, who would have ſeized upon *Montiſerrat*, and againſt the Marqueſs of *Innoioſa* Governor of *Milan*, who favoured his deſigns. *Vincent* II, having ſucceeded his Brother *Ferdinand*, the *Senat* ſeeing the ſaid *Prince* without Children, or hopes of having any, or living long, by reaſon of his indiſpoſition, employed all their intereſt with him, to cauſe him to declare in favour of *Charles Duke* of *Nevers* ſet up by the *French*, but oppoſed as vigorouſly by the *Spaniard*, who prompted the intereſt of *Ferdinand de Gonrague* Prince of *Guaſtalle*, who, as deſcended from *Ferdinand* third Son of *Francis* the laſt Marqueſs of *Mantua*, was farther off in his Alliance from the Reigning Branch than *Charles* of *Nevers*, who was deſcended from *Lewis* third Son of *Frederick*, firſt *Duke* of *Mantua*. So that the Branch of *Nevers* is in a manner indebted for its advance-

ment to the *Venetian*, who not only procured them the *Dutchy* of *Milan* by their induſtry, and the Cooperation of the *French*, but have preſerv'd to him the Poſſeſſion by force of their Arms, in deſpight of the *Emperor*, the King of *Spain*, and the *Duke* of *Savoy*. *Charles* II had ſo great an inclination to the *Venetians*, that he came in perſon almoſt every year to keep his *Carnival*, and Aſcenſion at *Venice*. And this he did as well for his Intereſt as Recreation, thereby negotiating his own Affairs with the Principal Senators, who were as his Council of State. Yet this good Intelligence had like to have been interrupted under *Ferdinand*, *Charles* his Son, upon a Difference that aroſe betwixt them touching the Propriety of the River *Tartare* in
1669. the Territory of *Verona*; the *Venetians* pretending the ſaid *River* belonged to them, as being in their Dominions, and that the *Duke* of *Mantua* had uſurped his Fiſhing and Toll, which the ſaid *Prince* as peremptorily denied, affirming that he had been in peaceable poſſeſſion of it ſince the year 1404. That his Right had been often acknowledged by the *Venetians*, particularly in the year 1405, by an Act paſs'd betwixt the *Doge Michel Sten*, and the Marqueſs *Francis de Gonzague*: in the year 1517 by *Daniel Renier* Governor of *Verona* for the *Venetians*: and in the year 1598 the Magiſtracy of *Mantua* having cauſed a Verbal Proceſs to be form'd upon that occaſion, the *State* of *Venice* remained content with their Reaſons, and the *Veronois* continued to pay their uſual Du-
1447. ties at the Fort of *Ponte Molino*, built for that purpoſe by the Predeceſſors of the Marqueſs of *Mantua*. But the *Senat* not enduring this Expoſtulation from the *Duke*, threatned him with War inſtead of a Reply. The *Prince* unable to contend, ſubmitted to their Force, and ſent the Marqueſs *Horace*

The Title of the *Duke* of *Mantua* ſent to the *French* Embaſſador at *Venice*.

Horace Canoſſa incognito to *Venice*, who in three days time compos'd the difference privately, to the ſatisfaction of the *Venetian*, whoſe Subject he was born.

There are two Fortreſſes on the Confines of the Territory of *Verona*, which are as a Bridg to the ſaid *Duke*. One is call'd *Piſchicra* upon the *Menzo*, built by the Lords *della Scala*, and uſurp'd by the *Venetians* from the Marqueſs of *Mantua*. It was taken by the *French* after the Battel of *Aignadel*, contrary to the opinion of the *Senat*, who believ'd that ſingle place would have been able to have ſtop'd the Career of the Conquerour. The other is call'd *Legnago*, upon the Banks of the River *Adige*, a place of very great importance. Two places famous by the Exile of ſeveral Senatots, ſent thither for their Mortification.

The Intelligence betwixt the Dukes of *Mantua* and the *Emperor*, is very unpleaſing to the *Venetians*, who had much rather it had been with the *French*: But that which troubles them more, is to ſee him environed ſo cloſe by the *Spaniard*, without all hopes of extrication, whilſt they are Maſters of *Sabioneda*, and have a Garriſon in *Caſal*.

When the Duke of *Mantua* married, the *Senat* expected an Embaſſador, at leaſt an Envoy Extraordinary, according to the Cuſtom of Princes, but none coming, they interpreted it as a diſguſt.

With the Duke of Modena.

THE Duke of *Modena* is very ſolicitous of Friendſhip with the *Venetian*, and keeps commonly a Reſident in *Venice*. The *Senat* being reciprocally well-diſpoſed to the ſaid *Prince*, would willingly contribute to the reſtoring him to the Dutchy of *Ferrara* (ſo long in the poſſeſſion of his Anceſtors) if occaſion offer'd: For the *Senat* had much rather have the Duke of *Modena* their Neighbour than the *Pope*, who ſome time or other may have a fancy to reunite the *Poleſin* with the Demeaſns of *Ferrara*, from which it was diſmembred under the *Dukes* of that Name. And *Clement* VIII had a great deſire to have done it. When the Houſe of *Eſte* was in poſſeſſion of this Dutchy, the *Venetians* had in *Ferrara* a Magiſtrate call'd *Biſdomino*, or *Viſdomino*, who alone adminiſtred Juſtice to all Subjects of that *Republick*, with the interpoſition of any of the *Duke's* Officers, according to agreement betwixt the ſaid *State* and *Duke*.

By the ſaid agreement, the *Duke* was oblig'd to make no Fortifications upon the River *Po*, by reaſon of the *Poleſin*, which being an open Country betwixt the *Adige* and the *Po*, would be expoſed to inroads and devaſtation. The *Pope* has many times oppos'd it, and particularly in War of *Parma*, when he built Forts upon the Confines of this *Province*. For theſe reaſons the *Venetian* deſires ſeriouſly the *Dutchy* of *Ferrara* were

Nani Hiſt. Ven. l. 12.

were again in the hands of the Duke of *Modena*; and if during the ſaid War, they would not grant him permiſſion to make uſe of the Troops they had ſent him, to ſtop the *Barbarini* in their paſſage into that Country, and to make an irruption into the Country of *Ferrara*, to reprize himſelf for the loſſes of his Family; it was, becauſe they foreſaw it would beget a cruel and dangerous War in *Italy*, the blame of which would reſult upon them. And therefore the ſaid *Duke* could not prevail with the *Senat*, to procure that his pretenſions upon *Ferrara* and *Commachio* might be comprehended in the Treaty of Peace, becauſe that propoſition being inſiſted upon, muſt neceſſarily have interrupted the whole Negotiation about the buſineſs of *Parma*, upon the accommodation of which depended the quiet and tranquility of all *Italy*.

Furthermore, though the *Venetian* is not much troubled to ſee this *Prince* in the intereſts, and under the protection of the *King* of *France*, they would have been better content he had ſtood *Neuter*; as fearing his Ambition to be great, may ſome time or other involve all *Italy*, as it happen'd in the time of Duke *Francis*, who join'd his Forces with the King of *France* for the Conqueſt of the Dutchy of *Milan*, hoping that Crown would afterwards have given him all neceſſary aſſiſtance for the recovery of *Ferrara*: And this gives great Umbrage to the *Venetians*, for fear the *French* ſhould come to be their Neighbours.

With the Duke of Parma.

THough the Duke of *Parma* has no particular Alliance with the *Venetians*, yet he is well esteemed by the *Senat*, to whom he professes great obligation for their assistance to his Family in the *Barberine* War, which ended at length by the restitution of the *Dutchy* of 1644. *Castro* *. And 'tis thought the *Venetians* were not at all pleas'd to see that Country fall into the *Pope's* hands, after they had endeavoured so much to wrest it out of the Clutches of *Urban* VIII.

With the Republick of Genoa.

IF the *Republicks* of *Rome* and *Carthage*, of *Athens* and *Sparta*, made themselves famous by their Emulations and Wars: The *Commonwealths* of *Venice* and *Genoa* contending for dominion 300 years *, have made themselves as famous by their long animosities and conflicts: And though at present they be at Peace, yet they retain still the old heart-burning, which will last as long as the memory of the mischiefs that either of them has brought upon the other. The *Genoeses* cannot with patience behold the *Venetians* Masters

* *Certatum utrinque de dominationi est.* Salust.

Masters of the *Adriatick* Sea, having disputed it with them so long, and worsted them so often; and the *Venetian* looks upon *Genoa* as jealous of his glory and power.

Nine times have they been at Wars together, but the last so cruel, and lasted so long, that the memory of it is still fresh in *Venice*, and there are a sort of Noblemen call'd *Nobili della guerra di Genova*, as being taken into the Nobility at that time. Never was *Venice* so near ruine as then, when *Peter Doria* the *Genoa* General look'd upon it so sure, that when the *Venetian* Envoy presented him certain *Genoeses* Prisoners from the *Senat*, he told him, that *in a short time he would be in* Venice *himself, and deliver the rest.* Upon which Answer the *Senat* dispatch'd with all diligence * *Frier Benoist*, General of the *Cordeliers*, to the *King* of *Hungary* to beg Peace of him out of pure Commiseration, and to beseech him that he would employ his Interest with the *Genoeses* in their favour, and with the Lord of *Padua*. But though the importunity of this Minister was very great, and the humility of his Address had melted the *King*, delivering himself still upon the knee; yet the Embassador from *Genoa*, *Gaspar de l'Orbe*, and *Baltazar Spinola* being present at all his Audience, diverted the good inclinations of his Majesty, by perswading him *the time was now come when he might have all he desired, and that within a Month he would infallibly be Master of* Venice. Such was the miserable condition of the *Venetian*, when being deserted by all People, there was nothing left to them but a generous resolution to vanquish or die; and this they resolv'd with so good success, that advancing against the *Genoa* Navy, with the shattered remainders of their own Fleet, under the Conduct of *Andreas Contarini* their *Duke*, in a few

1379.

Annal. M. S. of *Venice.*

* See the Remarks.

a few days time they retook *Chiozza*, and return'd to *Venice* laden with good Prize; and ſeveral of the *Genoa* Nobility, who being Priſoners, paid the beſt part of the Charge of the War for their liberty: ſince which famous Victory the *Genoeſe* has been quiet, and given over Rivalling the *Venetian*. So that the *Genoeſe* are as much too blame for not having made an advantageous Peace when it was begg'd with ſuch ſubmiſſion, as *Aſilius Regulus* was of old, for not having done the ſame with the *Carthaginians* after he had defeated them, which omiſſion brought a long chain of inconveniences upon the *Romans*. But the *Venetians* were brought ſo low, the *Genoeſes* would have been rather reproach'd for not knowing how to have conquered them, had they made Peace with them at a time when their deſtruction, in the opinion of the whole World, was inevitable.

At the beginning of their War in *Candia*, the *Genoeſes* offered the *Venetians* a conſiderable ſupply of Men and Money, upon condition they might be treated as Equals, but their Offer was rejected with contempt: which netled the *Genoeſe* exceedingly, who cannot eaſily brook being thought their Inferiors, after they had ſo long contended for Precedence. Beſides, the *Venetian* fruſtrated the deſign the *Genoeſe* had upon *Sala Regia*, which *Donna Olimpia* had almoſt perſwaded *Pope Innocent* * to grant them. From whence it may be preſum'd the Animoſity betwixt theſe two Rival *States* is not yet extinguiſhed: on the contrary, both one ſide and the other do many times revive and exaſperate them by their Railleries and Sarcaſmes, which being many times true, leave a greater ſting upon their ſpirits.

* *Aſperis facetiis, ubi multum ex vero traxere, acrem ſui memoriam relinquunt* Tac. Ann. 15.

With

With the Republick *of* Lucca.

Venice has but little Correſpondence with the *Republick* of *Lucca*, but the Conformity of their *Government* (being *Ariſtocratical*) makes them reciprocally favourable one to the other; ſo that ſhould the *Great Duke* of *Tuſcany* deſign any thing againſt the liberty of that *State*, 'tis probable the *Venetians* would not refuſe their aſſiſtance.

With the Griſons.

THE *Senat* of *Venice* bear an Affection to the *Griſons*, as a People whoſe Intereſt it is equally to hinder the *Spaniards* from entring the *Valtolin*, and encreaſing their Power in *Italy*, where already they have ſeveral *Princes* under their dependance. And therefore the *Griſons* no ſooner underſtood the deſigns of the *Duke* of *Feria*, Governor of *Milan* upon the *Valtolin*, but they repair'd immediately to the *Venetian* for relief againſt the *Valtolins*, who were Revolted at the inſtigation of the *Spaniard*; and indeed that Affair alarm'd the *Republick* of *Venice* more than any other *Prince* of *Italy*, by reaſon of the ſituation

tion of that Valley, which bordering on one ſide upon *Tirol*, and on the other upon *Milan*, ſerv'd as a kind of Gallery to the *Spaniards*, to join their Dominions with the *Emperors*, and to ſtop up the paſſage for forreign ſupplies againſt all *Italy*, and particularly againſt their own Countrey, which the *Emperor* and his *Catholick Majeſty* kept block'd up as in a Circle. This was the deſign of the *Count de Fuentes* not long ſince, when he adviſed his Maſter to ſeize upon *Monaco* and *Final*, and the *Valtolin*; which was the ready way to reduce the *Princes* of *Italy* into ſervitude. But becauſe the execution of his deſign requir'd time, he laid the firſt Stone by building the Fort of his Name, at the mouth of the River *Adda*, which ſince has produc'd that long and miſchievous War to the *Griſons*. But were it not for their intereſt the *Venetian* regards them but little, as looking upon them as poor people, and ſavage.

With the Swiſſes.

THE *Senat* on the other ſide, courts the *Swiſs* very much, as knowing their fidelity and valour. It raiſes Soldiers among them in time of War, and takes of their Officers into their Armies, paying them Penſions for their lives. They have moreover a Reſident conſtantly either at *Zurick* or *Berne*, which are two of the beſt Towns in *Switzerland*, where all the chiefeſt of their Affairs are tranſacted.

With Holland.

THE *Commonwealth* of *Venice* and *Holland* are under a ſtrict obligation of Amity and Intereſt. They are both at the ſame defiance with the King of *Spain*. The *Hollander* withdrew himſelf from his obedience to that Crown; and the other favoured the Revolt by Councels, Money, and Solicitations with Queen *Elizabeth*; to engage her in the defence of their new Companion. And though they be ſeparated by a long tract of Land, yet upon occaſion they can eaſily unite by their communication at Sea, where both of them are very powerful.

With England.

THE *Senat* maintains a perfect Correſpondence with the King of *Great Britain*, conſidering him as a *Prince* whoſe Amity may much import that *State* in their neceſſities, by his great intereſt and reputation with other Kings. King *James* had a great reſpect for the *Commonwealth* of *Venice*; and in their difference with *Paul* V. he no ſooner underſtood the King of *Spain* had declar'd in favour of the *Pope*, but he

he declared for the *Venetian*, promiſing their Embaſſador *George Juſtiniani*, that he would not only aſſiſt him with all the force of his Kingdom, but oblige all his Allies in their defence: And if the quarrel had broke out into a War, 'tis believ'd he would have been as good as his word, as well as the *Hollander*, who upon his recommendation offer'd them a conſiderable number of Ships and of Men. King *Charles* I. continued the eſteem and affection of his Father; and by a juſt return, they preſerv'd for him in his misfortunes, and even after his death, all the Kindneſs and Veneration they ſhew'd to him during his life. For they were the laſt that ſent Embaſſadors to the *Protector*, and their forbearance was look'd upon by him as a ſilent reproach of his Government, and a contempt of his Authority; ſo many great *Princes* having as it were contended who by their Embaſſadors ſhould honour him firſt. And *Cromwell* having complain'd of their backwardneſs, the *Senat* (fearing his diſpleaſure at a time when they were at War with the *Turk*) was oblig'd to cauſe *John Sagrede* their Embaſſador in *France*, to paſs over to *London* to appeaſe him. At length *Charles* II. being reſtor'd, they renewed their ancient Alliance with him, which was anſwered by his Majeſty in the ſolemn Embaſſy of the Lord *Falconbridge*; who after he had ſtaid two months himſelf in *Venice*, left Mr. *Dorington* as Reſident for his Majeſty of *Great Britain*. But how great ſoever the Intelligence is betwixt *England* and this *State*, there is no probability that that King will ever ſend any Ships into the *Venetian* ſervice againſt the *Turk*, leſt the *Grand Seignior* ſhould ſeize upon the Goods and Effects of the *Turky*-Company of *London*; which amounts to more than five millions of money: Which would ruine the

beſt

best branch of the *English* Trade, and be a great diminution to his Revenue.

With Denmark.

THE *Senat* has no Correſpondence at all with the King of *Denmark*, their Countries lying ſo remote, that they can neither expect relief from one another upon occaſion, nor apprehend any detriment.

With the Swede *and the* Pole.

IF Reſemblance of Government, or Intereſt be one of the principal cauſes of Amity, there are no two *States* in all *Europe* obliged to ſtricter Alliance than *Venice* and *Poland*, they being the only two Crown'd *Commonwealths*; both of them govern'd by a *Senat*, and an *Elective Prince*; both Neighbours to the *Turk*, and both famous for their Wars againſt that cruel and formidable Enemy. For though *Poland* carries the name of a *Kingdom*, 'tis nothing but an *Ariſtocracy* mix'd with a *Monarchy*, according to the old Model of *Sparta*. Upon theſe conſiderations the *State* of *Venice* is much concern'd for all accidents in *Poland*, whether they be good or bad: And if the

Progreſs made by *Guſtavus Adolphus* in the Empire, pleas'd them very well, the Succeſs of *Charles Guſtavus* in *Poland* afflicted them as much; becauſe the impoveriſhment of that Kingdom would be an advantage to the *Turk*, as it prov'd afterward. 'Tis not to be doubted then, but the intereſt of the *Pole* is dearer to the *Venetian* than the intereſt of the *Swede*; whoſe prodigious increaſe both at Land and at Sea, it began to apprehend. That King having taken the Northern *Liconia* from the *Pole*, and all one ſide of the *Baltick* from the King of *Denmark*.

With the Great Duke of Muſcovy.

THough the *Senat* has no particular affair with the *Czar* of *Moſcovy*, yet it puts a great value upon his friendſhip; that King being very potent, and of great reputation with the King of *Perſia*, whoſe Alliance is neceſſary for the *Venetian*, thereby to give diverſion to the *Turk*: For whenever the *Sophy* of *Perſia* invades him on that ſide, the *Venetian* finds it no hard matter to repel him on the other; and theſe Negotiations with the *Perſian*, are managed by the Mediation of the *Czar*. So that if upon any *interregnum* in *Poland*, the *Senat* ſhould appear for the Election of any perſon, their intereſt would put them upon the Election of the *Czar*, upon condition he would turn *Catholick*, becauſe that Prince would be in a poſture, not only to oppoſe

poſe the *Turk*, but to carry the War home into his own Country, and force him to diſgorge all that he has ſwallowed from *Poland*: and if this ſhould once happen, the *Senat* might then confederate with the *Pole* againſt the *Turk*, either to attack them openly at the ſame time, and give them diverſion; or to defend one another reciprocally by an Auxiliary War, whenever either of them ſhould be invaded: After which, if the *Sophy* ſhould enter into the League, (which he would do, if he ſaw the *Czar* his ancient Ally made King of *Poland*) 'tis not to be doubted, but that Triple Alliance would bring the *Turk* to reaſon, or at leaſt keep him cloſer in the bounds of his Empire: But becauſe the Election of the *Moſcovite* to the Crown of *Poland* is like to meet with great difficulty, in reſpect that the Nobility would fear the ſubverſion of their Liberty by ſo powerful a Prince, the *Senat* of *Venice* deſires at leaſt to continue in good intelligence with him, by reaſon of the great advantages it may receive from him upon any extraordinary Exigence.

With the Ottoman Court.

TIS no fault in the *Republick* of *Venice*, that they are not always at Peace with the *Turk*, for there is ſcarce any thing they omit to procure it. They endeavour, or rather purchaſe his friendſhip by continual Preſents. They diſſemble the Injuries and Affronts that they receive, leſt they ſhould be oblig'd to revenge them. They ſuffer his Pyracies in the *Adriatick*-Sea, and yet pay him more Submiſſion and Ceremony than to the *Pope*, and all the *Princes* of *Europe*; which, if we may believe the teſtimony of a *Venetian* Embaſſador at *Conſtantinople*, ſerves but to enhance the inſolence of the *Turk*, whoſe nature it is to make advantage of every thing, where he finds himſelf dreadful. And though at Land he be incomparably ſtronger than the *Venetian*, yet at Sea the *Venetian* is too hard for him, in reſpect that the *Grand Signior* has neither good Pilots, good Rowers, nor good Mariners: nor is it ſo eaſy for him to recruit at Sea as at Land, not for want of Ships or Galleys, but for want of good Sea-men, and good Officers to Command them; for generally the *Ottoman* Fleet conſiſts principally of ſlaves who never were at Sea before, and by conſequence are unable to endure its Fatigue: by which diſadvantage the *Turks* have been often beaten at Sea by the *Venetian*, who underſtands that Trade very well, and makes it their continual Exerciſe. So that the *Turks* have a ſaying, *God has given the Sea to the* Chriſtians, *and the Land to the* Turk.

Never-

Nevertheleſs, the *Venetian* is in ſuch awe of the *Turk*, that they will renounce their Alliance with all the *Princes* of *Europe* to preſerve his; and their Complacency is ſo great, they care not to break with the beſt of their Friends, when the benefit they are to expect from them may give the leaſt jealouſy to the *Porte*. Upon this Conſideration they would not permit the *Pope* to hold the laſt Council in *Vicenza*; and therefore the *Italians* call the *Venetians Semiturchi*, and the *Spaniards*, *Venice l'Amancebada del Turco*, that is to ſay, the the *Concubine*, or Proſtitute of the Great *Turk*, who ſuffers him to do any thing. And, to ſpeak truth, 'tis but juſt they ſhould fear him, having ſuffered his Power to encreaſe to ſuch a pitch, that they are not able to deal with him with their ſingle Force, which at firſt they could do, at leaſt with as much eaſe as the four laſt *Paleologi* kept *Conſtantinople* a whole Age in the middle betwixt two Capital *Turkiſh* Cities, *Adrianople* and *Burſe*, that kept it as it were block'd up: as *Huniades* raiſed the Siege of *Belgrade* in 1442 in ſpight of *Amurath* II, and in 1456 in ſpight of *Mahomet* II. Or as a poor * *Prince* of *Albania* defended his chief City called *Coja* againſt the Efforts of both thoſe Emperors, *Amurath* dying of pure indignation that he could not carry the Town, and the other drawing off with ſhame, as he did from the Siege of *Rhodes*, where he loſt his time, and a great part of his Army. So that it may be concluded the *Venetians* loſt in that time the Iſle of *Negropont*, *Corinth*, and the beſt part of *Morea*, *Albania*, (which they had ſeized after the death of *Scanderbeg*) only for want of Courage; ſeeing they alone had more Money and Force than the *Kings* of *Hungary*, *Albania*, and the *Knights* of *Rhodes* all together.

* *Scanderbeg*, 1451, & 1457.

1480.

The Greatneſs and ancient Extent of this *Commonwealth* may be eſtimated by their loſſes ſince the *Turks* eſtabliſhed in *Europe*. *Amurath* II took from them *Salonica*, the richeſt Town in *Macedonia*, and demoliſhed that famous Wall called * *Hexamile*, that ſtop'd the progreſs of his Conqueſts, and ſecur'd that Country from his Invaſions. In the year 1470 *Mahomet* invaded *Negropont*, and ſeized upon part of *Moria* and *Albania*, after he had a ſecond time ruin'd that *Corinthian* Wall which the *Venetians* had repaired.

* A Wall 6000 paces long in the *Streights* of *Corinth*.

Bajazet II took from them *Lepanto*, *Modon*, *Coron*, and *Duras*, in the year 1500. *Selimus* II poſſeſſed himſelf of the Kingdom of *Cyprus* 1570. *Canea* and *Retimo* in *Candia* were taken by *Ibrahim*, and at length in the year 1669 *Candia* it ſelf was taken by *Ibrahim*'s Son, *Mahomet* V, the preſent *Grand Seignior*.

Fifteen months after the loſs of *Candia*, they were in danger of a new War about the limits of *Dalmatia*, but by good fortune they eſcaped that; the *Baſhaw* of *Boſnia*, with whom the Procurator *Nani* was to treat, being favourable towards them, it being concluded betwixt them, that *Salona*, *Novigrade*, *St. Daniel*, and all betwixt *Zebenigo* and *Spalatro* ſhould remain to the *Venetian*, with *Cliſſa*, and the Country five miles about. That *Scardona* ſhould return to the *Turks*, not having been conquered by force; and as to *Pizzano*, and other places in diſpute, they ſhould be kept in their ancient bounds. But this Treaty was not ratified *gratis*; for the *Senat* ſent his *Highneſs* a Preſent of 12000 *Sequins*, with a large quantity of Cloth of Gold for the *Sultaneſſes*.

So that the *Port* needs no more than to complain or threaten, to draw Money and Preſents from

from the *Venetian* *, who by his Gifts renders himself rather worthy than secure of the Amity of the *Turks*; and the reason is, because he knows not how to Comport with a firm generous Resolution.

They have constantly an Embassador at *Constantinople*, whom they call *Bailo*: this Embassy recompences all their other; for (as they say in *Venice*) in three years time they get above 100000 *Crowns*, all Charges born, the Embassador having considerable Duties upon all Merchants Ships that carry the *Standard* of *St. Mark*. They have two other *Bailos* or *Consuls* in the Dominion of the *Great Turk*, one at *Alppo*, the Center of all the *Asian* Trade; the other at *Alexandria*, the Magazin of all the richest Goods not only of *Ægypt*, but *Affrica*; thereby to preserve their Rights and their Priviledges granted to them by the *Emperors* of the *East*, the *Kings* of *Jerusalem*, and the *Sultans* of *Ægypt*. These two Consulships are commonly conferred upon two of the most indigent of the Nobility, because they are Places of great Profit, and little Expence; and sometimes the *Senat* permits them all their life long, that they may have more time to enrich themselves. But the Consulships of *Cyprus*, *Chio*, *Rosetta*, *Ancona*, and *Genoa*, are executed always by Citizens of *Venice*.

The Profit the *Venetian* draws from their Commerce with the *Turk* is very great; for the *Turks* alone, as I have heard from several Merchants, do receive more Silks and Cloth of Gold from *Venice* than from all *Europe* besides. And though the *English* and *Hollander* have made it their business to settle a Trade at *Constantinople* for Cloth, they could never effect it: the *Turks* finding them too fine, and of but little service, compare them to painted Ladies, which look very well, but cannot endure the water.

* *Amicitiam dum magnitudine munerum, non constantia morum continere putat, meruit magis quam habuit.* Tac. Hist. 3.

These are all the Correspondencies the *State* of *Venice* holds with the *Princes* of *Europe*; I have not mentioned *Portugal*, because there is nothing of Commerce betwixt them. But the *Senat* desires their friendship, as being a Balance to the Power of the *Spaniard*, whose diminution will always be good News to the *Venetian*, unless it be with advantage to the *French*.

With *Malta*. As for *Malta*, their Religion and *Government* has so great resemblance, by the quality of their Nobility that administer in both; by their Forces at Sea; by the Conformity of their Interests; by their opposition to the Power of the *Turk*, that they cannot but love like Sisters, and assist one the other against their common Enemy.

There is always at *Venice* one of the Commanders of *Malta*, called *Recevitori*, because he receives whatever accrews to the *Knights* in the Territories of the *Venetians*. The Nobility pretend to Exemption, but the Order would never allow it, because of the new Nobility; and in my time the Son of the *Procurator*, *Cornaro*, sirnamed *della Casa grande*, did his duty in the usual forms.

Venice is one of the seven *Priories* of *Italy*, and comprehends 23 Commanderies, *viz. Trevisa*, and *Conillan*, (Patronates of the Houses of *Cornaro* and *Lippomane*,) *Rovigue*, *Barbarana*, *Verona*, *Longara*, *St. Medard*, *Bologna*, *Faienza*, *Regia*, *Montecchio*, *San Giovanni in Bosco*, *St. Simon*, *St. Jude*, *Imola*, *Rimini* and *Cesene*, that are united, *Forli*, *Modena*, *Parma*, *Borgo-San-Domina*, *Cerro di Parma*, *Capo di Ponte*, *Ravenna*, *Pila*, and *Gradisque*, united.

The *Venetian* Correspondencies being maintain'd by their Embassies, it is not amiss in this place to say something of their Custom therein.

The *Senat* maintains constantly an Embassador in the

the *Pope*'s Court, and that place is commonly ſupplied by one of the Senators, cunning, eloquent, and well-vers'd in the Civil-Law, that in his Negotiations he may be able to defend himſelf, and elude all the Artifices of the Court of *Rome*, eſpecially when any thing is in Controverſy betwixt them. Upon extraordinary occaſion they ſend four Embaſſadors Extraordinary, either Procurators of St. *Mark*, or of the Principal Senators. The *Senat* did the ſame Honour to *Francis* I, after the Battel of *Marignan*, and the four Embaſſadors were, *Anthony Grimani*, afterwards *Duke*, *Dominick Treviſan*, *George Cornaro*, and *Andrew Gritti*, all of them Procurators of St. *Mark*, and Venerable for their years.

They have their Embaſſadors likewiſe in the Courts of *France*, *Vienna*, and *Spain*, which places are never vacant, leſt they ſhould prejudice their Affairs; and when any of the ſaid *Kings* come firſt to the Crown, they ſend two Embaſſadors Extraordinary to Congratulate. But ſometimes they are too careleſs in theſe ſort of Formalities. In the year 1670 it was reſolved to ſend the *Chevalier*, *Catarin Belegne*, and another, to the young *King* of *Spain*, who was already in the fifth year of his Reign, with Complements of Condolence for the death of his Father, and Complements of Congratulation for his Acceſs to the Crown; ſo that the ſaid *Prince* would have had occaſion to have laugh'd at ſo prepoſterous an Embaſſy, as *Tiberius* did at the Embaſſy of the *Trojans*, to condole the Death of his Son *Druſus*. *Reſpondit irridens, quaſi jam obliterata doloris memoria, ſe quoq; vicem eorum dolere, quod Egregium Virum* Hectorem *amiſiſſent*. Suet. *in* Tib. At the Election of *Michael Wiſnioweski* to the Crown of *Poland*, *Ange Moroſini* was named to have gone with their Congratulation, but the *King* died before the Embaſſador ſtirr'd. To

To the *Duke* of *Savoy* the *Seigniory* ſends no Embaſſadors but when they have need of him, as in time of War; where it is remarkable by the by, that the Embaſſador at his Audience gives him the Title of *Royal Highneſs*, by which that *Republick* ſeems to acknowledg his lawful Right to the *Kingdom* of *Cyprus*; which I objecting one day to the Secretary *Auguſtin Bianchi*, he told me, the Embaſſador gave him that Title out of his own civility, without any order from the *Senat*, who conniv'd at it for the benefit of their Affairs during the War; *E per queſto, ceſſante la Guerra, ceſſa l'Ambaſciaria, anzi la Corriſpondenza*; *And therefore*, ſaid he, *when the War ceaſes, their Embaſſies and Correſpondence ceaſe with it.* And indeed not long after the War at *Candia* was at an end, there was an end of their Correſpondence.

The neighbouring *Kings* do reciprocally honour this *Republick* with Embaſſadors from them, not for any need they have of the *Venetians* in their Affairs, their Alliance being uſeleſs to them, in reſpect of the Neutrality which they publickly profeſs, but to gratify them in a thing they ſo ardently deſire, becauſe the preſence of theſe Embaſſadors keeps up their Reputation in *Italy*, and holds thoſe *Princes* in reſpect; beſides, their own Subjects bear greater Veneration to their *Government*, ſeeing the deference paid them from the *Kings*.

Theſe Embaſſies to *Venice* are commonly of no great importance to the Affairs of thoſe *Princes* that ſend them, the *Senat* applying wholly to Peace; and yet of all their Embaſſies they are the moſt difficult, and require the moſt cunning and ſagacity, becauſe they treat as it were with dumb People, and are to underſtand every thing by ſigns. Therefore it is that *Venice* is called *the School and Touchſtone of Embaſſadors*: for thither do Princes

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ſend them to diſcover their Parts; and in this Embaſſy it was that *Monſiegnior d'Aligre*, the ſecond of that name, and preſent *Chancellor* of *France*, diſcovered to the late *King* his prudence and dexterity, having executed that Office at a time when things were very intricate and perplex'd, in reſpect of the differences about the *Valtoline*, which was then poſſeſſed by the *French*, the *Spaniard*, the *Italians*, but particularly by the *Venetian*, who had the greateſt intereſt therein.

THE

THE SECOND PART.

Of the Magiſtrates of Venice.

THE Magiſtrates of *Venice* are of three ſorts, the *Domeſticks*, whoſe Juriſdiction lies wholly in the Town, as thoſe in *Rome*, who were called *Magiſtratus Urbani*; the *Provincial Magiſtrates*, whoſe adminiſtration is abroad; and the *Military Officers*, as the *Generaliſſimo*, the *Proveditor General* of the Sea, the *General* of the *Gulf*, and others.

The firſt are of two ſorts, one manages the Affairs of *Government*, as the *Duke*, the ſix Councellors, the *Sage-Grands*, and the *Senators*, like thoſe in *Rome*, called the *Magiſtratus Majores*. The others meddle only in matters of Judicature, and are ſo numerous, a third part of them are ſufficient. But the *Seigniory* has thought fit it ſhould be ſo, that all their Nobility may be employed, eſpecially the young Gentlemen, who are much delighted with the very name of a Magiſtrate.

I do not pretend to ſet down the preciſe number of their Magiſtrates, which would be troubleſome and uſeleſs; I ſhall only ſpeak of thoſe who have the chiefeſt ſhare in the adminiſtration. And becauſe the *Doge* or *Duke* is the moſt conſiderable both

both for Dignity and Office, I shall begin with him, and his Predecessors, to make their condition the more perspicuous, by comparing it with what they were formerly.

Of the Doge.

THE *Isles* under the *Venetian* Jurisdiction were govern'd at first by *Consuls*, and then by *Tribunes* annually chosen, as I have hinted before. But the People growing weary of their delays, and particular quarrels, resolution was taken, to create a *Head*, to whom the *Tribunes* should be obliged to be accountable.

To this end all the *Isles* sent their Deputies to *Heraclea*, to proceed in the Election of a *Prince*; and it was *Lucius Anafestus* that was chosen, to whom the People transferr'd their Soveraign power: but the *Venetians* refused to agree, alledging, that since the Foundation of their *Republick* they had always preserv'd their Liberty, and never submitted to any Authority, but the Authority of their Laws. *Bodni*, *Jannoti*, *John Botetus*, and some other eminent Writers, have spoken of the old Soveraignty of the *Dukes* of *Venice*, as of an unquestionable thing. The Reader may judg of it by the following Arguments, which I have extracted out of their own proper Annals.

1. The Investiture that * all the *Prelates* and *Officers* chosen by the People, were obliged to demand

* *Ducis jussione Electiones Prælaturarum a Clero & Populo debeant inclavare, & Electi ab eo investitionem accipere & ejus mandato inthronizari.* Just. Duc.

demand of the *Duke* before they could have poſſeſſion, ſeems to me an Argument of the Soveraign Authority the *Dukes* exerciſed at that time. Beſides, it belonged to him to call the Clergy and the People together, to proceed to their Elections; and if at any time they aſſembled without his Convocation, all the Elections were actually void.

2. The *Princes* who ſent Embaſſadors to *Venice*, addreſs'd their Letters of Credence to the *Duke* only, as the *King* and *Patriarch* of *Jeruſalem*; and * *Pope Calixtus* did to Duke *Dominique Michieli*. So that it was the opinion of all the *Princes* of that time, that the *Dukes* of *Venice* were abſolute.

* *Ad ducem* Venetiæ Antiochenus, & Hieroſolymitanus *Patriarcha*, & Balduinus II *Rex* Jeruſalem *Legatos miſerunt*—— Calixtus *etiam per ſuos Nuntios Ducem ad hoc inducit.* Ann. Ven. M. S.

The ſaid *Dominick Michieli* refus'd the Crown of *Sicily* that was offered him, only becauſe being *Soveraign* of *Venice*, and of ſeveral *Provinces* in the *Levant*, he feared to loſe the poſſeſſion of a *State* at that time more conſiderable (almoſt as to Title) than *Sicily*: Whereas had his power been only precarious, and dependant upon the People, 'tis not probable he would have pretermitted ſo fair an occaſion of making himſelf a *King*. Beſides, what he did in *Syria* is a ſtrong Argument of his Soveraignty; for Money being ſhort, and his Soldiers mutining againſt him, he cauſed boiled Leather to be coined, called it by his own Name *Michielette*, commanded by a promulged Edict all the Sutlers and Victuallers of his Army to receive it upon pain of death, and promiſed to pay the value in Silver at his return, and they obey'd. From whence it may be well pre-

presum'd they owned him for their Sovereign, because they trusted to his promise, which they never would have done, had they not thought him able to have kept it; and how could he have been able, had he not been their *King?*

3. 'Tis a mark of Sovereignty to apply confiscated Goods to his own use; but this the *Dukes* of *Venice* did, as appears by an Edict of *Duke Peter Candian* in the year 972, by which he prohibits all the Subjects of that *State*, to carry or convey unto the *Turks* any sort of Arms offensive or defensive, under penalty of 100 *Livres* of Gold, to be applied to the use of him and his Successors.

4. The *Dukes* of *Venice* have associated in their *Dukeship* with their Children and Brothers, and by that means keeping it to their Families, have in a manner made it hereditary. Witness the three great Families of the *Badoers*, *Candiens*, and *Orseoles*, who kept the *Government* successively among them for more than 200 years, as it happens to several Royal Families in Elective Kingdoms. This it was that made *Dominick Flabanicus* (who in probability had neither Children nor Brothers) to publish an Edict, ordaining that the succeeding *Dukes* should not have any Colleagues in their *Dukeship* for the future; and thereby declaring the House of *Orseole* degraded and lapsed from all the Honours, Rights, Priviledges and Preheminences that formerly they enjoyed, and banished out of that State for ever: and this *Flabanicus* did, not upon any impulse or necessity from the People, but from an old Pique he bore to the *Orseoles*, with whom his Family had had great Quarrels.

5. The *Doges* marry with Forreign Princesses, as *Peter Candien*, the fourth of that Name, did with the Daughter of *Albert*, Lord of *Ravenna*: *Otho Orseole* with a Daughter of *Stephen* King of *Hun-*

Hungary; *Dominick Silvius* with a Sister of *Nicephorus*, Emperor of *Conſtantinople*: *Ordelaſe Falier* with the Princeſs *Matilda*, deſcended from the firſt Kings of *Jeruſalem*; and *Peter Ziani* with a Daughter of *Tancrede* King of *Sicily*. And in like manner they married their Daughters to Sovereign *Princes*, as *Peter Orſeole* married one of his Daughters to *Stephen*, Eldeſt Son to the King of *Croatia*: all which infer that the *Doges* in thoſe days paſſed for Sovereign Princes.

Though in the Archives of their Acts the *Clergy* and *People* are mentioned with the *Doge*, as in theſe, *Nos* Petrus Candianus, *&c. cum* Vitale *Patriarcha, Clero, & Populo* Venetiæ; *Nos Tribunus* Memus, *&c. hortantibus & conſentientibus nobis D.* Vitale *Patriarcha ſimul cum Epiſcopis noſtris, & cum Primatibus* Venetiæ; *Nos* Vitalis Michael, *&c. cum Judicibus & ſapientibus, atq; Populi* Veneti *collaudatione & confirmatione concedimus, &c.* Nothing can be concluded from thence, but that the *Doge* of *Venice* might have a particular Councel compoſed of perſons ſelected according to his fancy, to deliberate with him, as the *Kings* of *Rome* did anciently with their *Senat*: and this is ſo clear, that thoſe Aſſemblies in the Annals of *Venice* are called the *Duke*'s Councel expreſly, *Dux cum ſuo Conſilio armare decrevit*; *Ipſe cum ſuo Conſilio & ſuis Judicibus conſtituit*. From whence it follows, that theſe Councellors, which *Vitale Michaeli* calls *Conſiliorum ſuorum participes*, that is properly, his Confidents, depended upon the *Doge*, and were accomptable only to him. But now ſince the *Doges* are no more but Maſters, the Stile of their *Chancery* runs another way, and there is not a *Secretary* of *State* dares uſe this ancient form, *Dux cum ſuo Conſilio, & ſuis judicib.* For the *Magiſtrates* are not now the *Doges*, but the *Commonwealths* Officers; nor will

will any *Doge* be ſo bold either in ſpeaking or writing, to ſay, *My Council of State, My Magiſtrates*, becauſe it is the language of a Sovereign *Prince*, that now he cannot pretend. Beſides, I do not ſee that theſe words, *Cum Clero & Populo; cum Judicibus & Sapientibus; cum Populi Collaudatione & Confirmatione*, do at all prove the participation of the three Eſtates in the Civil *Government*. For by the ſame reaſon it may be argued the *Kings* of *France* are not Abſolute there, becauſe all Ordonnances concluded with this form, *By the King and his Council*, which only ſhews that that *King* takes the advice of his *Council* before he reſolves in any matter of *State*. As to the words *Collaudatione* and *Confirmatione*, they ſignify nothing but the manner in which the Edicts of their *Doges* were received by the *People*, that is to ſay, with univerſal Applauſe: for if the word *Confirmation* be taken literally, and in the ſame ſenſe it is ſaid, the *King* has *Confirm*'d the Priviledges granted by his Predeceſſors to ſome Abby or Family: or that the *Parliament* has Confirm'd the Sentence of a *Preſidial*; it would be no leſs than to ſay the Authority of the *People* was greater than the Authority of either *Doge*, *Clergy*, or *Nobility*, becauſe it belonged to them to confirm all Deliberations, which the *Venetians*, who pretend their *Government* was never *Popular*, will never allow.

From whence I conclude the *Collaudation* and *Confirmation* of the People was nothing but an outward approbation, and obedientiall Concurrence to the Edicts of their *Dukes*. without being required, or any neceſſity of them to the *Duke*, before he could execute any thing that was reſolved: and this is proved by the aforementioned words, *hortantibus & Conſentientibus nobis, &c.* For to exhort, is a kind of Prayer or Remonſtrance that

Subjects uſe towards their Sovereigns: and if the *Clergy* and *Noblemen* of *Venice* gave their conſent ſometimes, it is not to be ſaid the *Doge* could not act without them, but rather that the *Doge* doing them the Honour to communicate with them in ſome things, their gratitude prompted them to a ready obedience.

If the *Doges* at any time cauſed their Orders or Decrees to be ſubſcribed by the *Prelats* of the *Province*, and the *Judges* of the City of *Venice*, it was one of their Artifices to paſs with more eaſe ſuch Edicts as they thought would be offenſive to the *People*, whom by that means they deſired to perſwade, that thoſe who ſign'd the Edicts, were Authors of them; and by this means the *Doges* did now and then ſhift off the *Odium* upon others.

At this day the Authority of the *Duke* is ſo limited, that he can do nothing without the *Senat*. For this cauſe, in publick Ceremonies where the *Senat* marches, there is always following the *Doge* a Nobleman, who carries a *Sword* in the *Scabbard* before the *Senat*, to ſignify that the whole Power and Authority of the *State* is in the hands of the *Senat*. For as the *Conneſtable*, or *Grand Eſcuier* carries the *Sword* before the *French King* whenever he makes his Entry into any conſiderable Town, to ſhew the abſoluteneſs of his Power over his Subjects; ſo, on the contrary, 'tis an evident mark that the *Doge* is ſubject both to the *Laws* and the *Senat*, that the *Sword* is carried after him, and hangs as it were over his head, to admoniſh him that if he tranſgreſs his duty in the leaſt, he is not to expect better treatment than was uſed towards *Marin Falier**. And for the ſame reaſon, at the Ceremonies of his *Coronation*, this *Sword* is never put on, nor indeed at any time but his Funeral, with the Golden Spurs the Emperor *Baſile* ſent

*See the Remarks.

ſent to *Duke Orſo Participatio* † when he Created him *Grand Eſcuier* of *Conſtantinople*.

† See the Remarks.

When the Forreign Embaſſadors are received to Audience, the *Duke* replys only in general terms, that may keep them in hopes, according to the old direction of the *Senat*, *Dentur bona verba Florentinis*; and if he ſpeaks too much, he ſhall not only be diſowned, but receive a ſharp *reprimand*, and perhaps threats, as was given one day by the Senator *Baradonne*, ſince a Cardinal to *Duke Dominick Contarin*, in a full *Colledg* after the Embaſſador was gone out: His words were theſe, *Voſtra ſerenita parla da Principe Sovrano, ma ſi recordi che non chi mancheranno li mezzi di mortificarla quando traſcorrera dal dovere. Your Serenity ſpeaks like a Sovereign Prince; but you may remember that we ſhall not want ways of chaſtizing you, if you tranſgreſs your duty too much.* So that it may be ſaid of the *Doge* *, what a *Polander* ſaid once of his King, that *the King was the Mouth of the Commonwealth, but that the Mouth could not ſpeak any thing that the publick Judgment had not firſt prepared and reſolved.*

* *Rex Poloniæ nihil aliud eſt quam os quoddam Regni vobiſcum conjunctum libero ac legitimo veſtro ſuffragio, ut is prorſus nihil agat, ac ne loquatur quidem, niſi id quod ex intimo ſenſu veſtro publice ſit profectum.* Cromer.

If an Embaſſador makes any undecent propoſition, or ſpeaks diſhonourably of the *Commonwealth*, the *Duke* is concern'd to reply a little ſmartly, otherwiſe he will run himſelf into the contempt of the Nobility, and perhaps be depos'd, as puſillanimous, and unfit for the *Government*: and in that caſe the Propoſition paſſes not to the *Pregadi*, as a thing not fit to be received.

In the year 1671, the *Turks* having made a deſcent in the Coaſts of *Ancona*, not far from *Loretto*,

and carried ſeveral Families away with them, the *Nuntio Pompeius Vareſus* came to the *Colledg*, complaining in the name of the *Pope*, that the *Seigniory* had ſuffered thoſe *Corſairs* to paſs into the *Gulf* without fighting them, notwithſtanding their obligation to do it. The *Duke* replyed, *That he admired his Holineſs ſhould make any complaint of diſorders happening in any place under his obedience: for if thoſe Infidels entred ſo boldly into the Territories of the Church, it was becauſe they found them ill-guarded (not to ſay deſerted) whilſt the* Pope's *Galleys were employed upon particular ſervice, when they ſhould have been left in his Harbours for ſecurity of his Towns, and defence of his Subjects.* An anſwer that ſtop'd the *Nuntio*'s mouth.

Reflecting upon the Cardinal *Altieri*, who employed the Galleys in conveying Merchants Goods from place to place.

The ſame *Nuntio* received another Anſwer as unpleaſing, upon his interpoſition in behalf of the *Jeſuits*, the *Somaſques*, and the barefooted *Carmelites*, who refuſed obedience to an Order of the *Senat* relating to Proceſſions, againſt which they pretended priviledg from the *Pope*: for having repreſented to the *Colledg*, that *it was no leſs than laying violent hands upon the Sanctuary, and enterprizing againſt the Authority of the Holy See, for them to encroach, or ſo much as diſpute the Priviledges his Holineſs had given, by conſtraining the Religious to aſſiſt at Proceſſions.* The ſame *Duke* replyed immediately, that *So far were the* Senat *from Enterprizing any thing againſt the Eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction, that the* Pope *invaded theirs, by concerning himſelf, and diſguſting that the ſaid* Senat *ſhould Command their own Subjects as they pleaſed. That the* Senat *could not Revoke what they ſo juſtly had Ordained; that he did not think it an encroachment upon the Priviledges of the Religious (who were as much under the Protection of their* Government *as the reſt) to oblige them to publick Offices, as Proceſſions,*

ſions, &c. *in which Biſhops, Patriarchs, and Cardinals themſelves are every day aſſiſtant:* and at laſt he told him *the* Pope's *Orders for Priviledg were good in the Lands of the Church, but not at* Venice, *where his Holineſs had no more right to Command, than the* Senat *had at* Rome.

Theſe two Anſwers were generally lik'd, becauſe they were as they ought to be, and the ſecond ſeemed approv'd even at *Rome*, for the *Nuntio* not being with the *Senat* in the firſt Proceſſion of the Religious upon St. *Juſtin*'s-day, becauſe he would not countenance that Novelty with his preſence; not long after he received Orders to be preſent at all the reſt, to the aſtoniſhment of all the World, which rather expected from his *Holineſs* ſome demonſtration of diſpleaſure and reſentment againſt that *State*.

As to the Offices performed by Embaſſadors to the *Colledg*, to ſignify the joy or affection of their Maſters, the *Doge* in thoſe caſes has liberty to ſay as he pleaſes, thoſe ſort of Anſwers being only Complemental, and draw no ill conſequence after them.

The Anſwer of *Duke Andreas Gritti* to the Embaſſador of the Emperor *Charles* the Fifth, upon the taking *Francis* I. priſoner, is very remarkable. The Embaſſador coming to the *Colledg* full mouth with the news of his Maſter's Victory, juſt as the Biſhop of *Baieux*, the *French* Embaſſor, was gone out; the *Duke*, who before had to the ſaid *Prelate* been condoling the misfortune of the *King*, replyed with excellent temper, and ſuitable to a Prince who ſcorn'd to equivocate; That *the Republick of* Venice *being equally in Amity with both the ſaid Crowns, could not have an equal concernment for both their intereſts; and according to St.* Paul's *counſel, rejoyce with thoſe who rejoyce; and mourn with thoſe who mourn.* *Gaudete cum gaudentibus, flete cum flentibus,* Rom. 12.

The *Doge* being chief in all Councils, 'tis his right to propoſe every thing to all the Principal Magiſtrates; he propoſes all buſineſs of importance to the *Grand Council*, in which he has a double Voice; to the *Pregadi*; as the *Sages-Grans*; the *Council of Ten*; as the three *Capi-Dieci*; in which he is ſomething more than the Preſident of the *Senat* among the *Romans*, who never ſate but in the *Senat*.

The Credentials of all Embaſſadors ſent by this *State* to Forreign Courts, are writ in his Name*, the *Senat* allowing him that appearance of Sovereignty to render him the more Venerable abroad. Yet thoſe Letters are not ſign'd by his hand, becauſe 'tis not he who ſends the Embaſſadors, but the *Senat*, which for that reaſon cauſes them to be ſign'd by one of the Secretaries, and ſeal'd with the *Arms* of the *State*. And though theſe Embaſſadors when they are abroad, direct all their Letters and Diſpatches to the *Duke*, he cannot open them but in preſence of the *Council*, who quite contrary may open them without him.

* *Ejus nomen Epiſtolit Editiſq; proponebatur.* Tac. Hiſt. 4.

All Money is coined in his Name, (which ſeems another token of his Soveraignty) and they are call'd *Ducats*; as much as to ſay, *Money coined by the Duke*. Yet the Money cannot be properly his Coin, as bearing neither his Image nor Arms; which are the eſſential conditions of Coin. And if there be the picture of the *Duke* upon his knees before St. *Mark*, and putting a Standard into his hand; the humility of that poſture cannot be interpreted to ſignifie the Regency of the *Duke*; but that is not the *Duke*, only a man in Ducal Ornaments, repreſenting only the chief Magiſtrate of that *Commonwealth* in general. 'Tis true, Duke *Nicholas Iron* caus'd pieces of Silver to be ſtamped with his Image, and they were upon that ſcore

called

called *Irons*: But this can be no Preſident, for the ſaid *Duke* did it by conſent of the *Senat*, to ſtop the current of falſe Money, which was then too common in *Venice*; and this appeared by his Epitaph, *Fraudatam pecuniam viva illius Effigie* (Reſp.) *reſignavit*. And the Dukes *Nicolas Marcel*, and *Peter Moccenigo*, who next ſucceeded him, had not that priviledg, though there are pieces of Silver ſtill to be ſeen, inſcrib'd with their Names. And though Cardinal *Contarini*, and *Sannot*, ſeem to affirm the contrary in theſe words, *Nummi luduntur cum facie ac nomine Principis*; that may eaſily be underſtood a general picture; both the ſaid Authors correcting themſelves afterwards, by leaving out the word (*facie*) in every place elſe. I ſay, thoſe *Dukes* who otherwiſe have governed Monarchically, have not ſtamped any Money but according to the Coin of that Prince upon whom they depended; as appears by the *Medal* of *Lewis le Debonnaire*, that Monſieur *Retan*, Councellor in Parliament, caus'd to be graven, where on one ſide is to be ſeen *H. Ludovicus Imp.* and on the reverſe, *Venecia.*

The Name of the *Doge* is likewiſe upon all the Medals and Chains of Gold the *Senat* gives to their Embaſſadors, or chief Officers at War; but under his Name are always theſe two Letters, *S. C.* for *Senatus Conſulto*, importing, that it is not the *Duke*, but the *Senat* that gratifies them. Nor is it the *Duke*, who Publiſhes the Edicts, though they begin always with this form, *Il Sereniſſimo Principe fa ſapere*; for that belongs not to him; for if the Publication was by his Authority, it would be expreſly in his Name, as it is in the Name of all Soveraign Princes.

In ſhort, at his entrance into any of the Courts or Counſels, all the Magiſtrates riſe and ſalute

him; but he never riſes, nor pulls off his Hat to any man: In which he exceeded the Kings of *Sparta*, for whom the *Ephori* never ſtirred. *Omnes e ſedibus ſuis Regibus aſſuegunt. Exceptis Ephoris, qui e ſellis ſe Ephoricis non levant.* Xenoph. *de Rep.* Laced.

When forreign Embaſſadors are admitted to Audience, he riſes, but does not uncover; becauſe, ſay the *Venetians*, the * *Corne-Ducale* upon his head, is a Symbol of Soveraignty, and the abſolute Dominion of that *State*. And the *Duke* being no Soveraign, cannot pull it off as he pleaſes. But when he has nothing on but his Red-Gown, he may do as he thinks fit.

* See the Remarks.

The *Duke* has under his Ducal Bonnet a *Coyſe* of white Linnen, in faſhion of a *Diadem*, like the Headband which the *Conſervators* of their Laws wore at *Athens* during their Office. Becauſe 'tis the *Dukes* buſineſs to look the Laws be put in execution, by doing that firſt, which all the Nobles are obliged particularly to do. In this quality it is he goes every month to viſit the Courts of *S. Mark*, exhorting the Judges to adminiſter Juſtice; and receiving the Complaints of ſuch as have been wrong'd, in which caſe he rebukes the Judges ſeverely. Formerly this Viſitation was made every *Wedneſday*; and poſſibly the cuſtom may come from thence, of paying the *Duke* his 100 *Sequins* every *Wedneſday*, as an acknowledgment of his care: But now the day is uncertain, the better to ſurprize the Judges, and prevent their uſual preparation.

All the Eccleſiaſtical Benefices are in the *Dukes* Nomination; that is to ſay, 26 *Canons*, and a *Dean*; who is always a Noble *Venetian*, and called *Primocirio di S. Marco*. This *Dean* depends not upon the *Patriarch* of *Venice*, and enjoys Epiſcopal

piſcopal Prerogatives by vertue of a Bull from *Pope Innocent* IV. granted to Duke *Marin Moroſini* about the year 1250. This *Deanery* is worth 5000 Ducats *per ann.* beſides the Abbey of *S. Gal*, which commonly goes with it, and is valued at 4 or 5000 Livres *per ann.* more.

The *Church* of *S. Mark* acknowledges no Juriſdiction but the *Dukes*, who takes poſſeſſion of it, as the *Pope* does of that at *S. John de Latran.* The *Primicier*, or his *Grand Vicar*, taking a ſolemn Oath to preſerve the dignity of that Church, and the three old *Procurators* ſwearing likewiſe for the good management of the Treaſure.

The *Duke* is Patron and Protector of the Monaſtery *delle Vergini*, built and founded by *Duke Peter Ziani* and the Dutcheſs his Wife, for young Gentlemen of *Venice.* The Abbeſs calls him Father, and has no Judg but him, not ſo much as the *Patriarch* of *Venice*, much leſs the three *Sopra-Proveditori* of the *Monaſteries*; ſo that if any diſorder happens among the *Nuns*, the *Duke* alone rectifies, as if he were their Biſhop.

He diſpoſes of the little Offices about the Palace, as the Uſhers and others, who are call'd *Comandadori del Palazo*, lodging in the Palace, and being paid by the Publick.

He has juriſdiction over the *Gondeliers*, a ſort of people that ply upon the ſides of the *Canals* for the convenience of Paſſengers. He makes *Knights* at his promotion, and commonly they are Deputies of Towns ſent to him to congratulate; or *Virtuoſi*, and men of Learning.

He has a kind of Introducer of Embaſſadors, call'd, *il Cavalier del Doge*, who from him invites them to his Ceremonies, and conducts them to his Apartments in the Palace. This Officer is always in red. The *Duke* has another Officer called, *Il Caſtal-*

Gastaldo del Doge, who is always present in a Purple Robe at the Execution of Criminals; and gives the signal, by shaking his Handkerchief in the Air, which is as much as to say, No mercy is to be expected.

In short, his Family is not subject to the *Magistrat des Pompes*: His Children are suffered to have their Footmen, and *Gondeliers* in their own Livery, to attend them in the Town, and to wear Girdles with gold Buckles. So the Elder Sons of the Kings of *Sparta*, as Sons of *Lacedemon*, were excused from the common Discipline and Education *.

* *Hac necessitate soluit lex pueros qui ad regnum Educabantur.* Plut. *in* Agesil.

Thus have I shewn precisely, in what the Grandeur of the *Duke* of *Venice* consists. Let us now turn the Medal, and see where lies his Inferiority and Subjection. The *Duke* cannot stir out of *Venice*, but by permission of the Councel; otherwise he incurs the displeasure of the *Senat*, and exposes himself to a thousand insolencies, against which he can look for no reparation; there being an express Law that gives liberty to any one to throw stones at him in that case. Out of *Venice* he is no more than another *Senator*; he receives no publick honour; it not being with him as it was with *Pompey*, who said, *Ubi Pompeius, ibi Roma*; *where he was, there was the Commonwealth of Rome.* On the contrary, the *Doge* is always where the *Seigniory* is, but the *Seigniory* is not always with the *Doge*: If any disorder should happen where he was abroad, he could not take cognizance of it, nor apply any remedy; it would belong to the *Podesta*, as being a pub-

publick Officer inveſted with Authority to that purpoſe: whereas the *Duke* would be wholly deveſted, and as a member cut off from the body, quite incapable of any Function or Office. By this means they take from the *Duke* all deſire of abſenting from *Venice*, which being as it were the Helm of that *Government*, his Preſence is always neceſſary to manage it, and give Example to the reſt of the *Nobles*.

His *Children* and *Brothers* are excluded all the principal Offices of *State* during his life: they can neither be of the *Colledg*; of the *Council of Ten*; Chiefs of the *Quarenty Criminal*, *Avogadors*, *Generals*, *Proveditors General* at *Sea*, thereby making a juſt counterpoiſe of his Power, by debaſing his Family: they cannot make Addreſſes for any Biſhoprick, Abby, or other Benefice, to the *Court* of *Rome*, nor accept them, though freely offered by the *Pope*.

In the year 1622 Cardinal *Matthew Priuli* refuſed the Biſhoprick of *Bergamo*, to which he was named by *Gregory* XV, becauſe his Father *Duke Anthony* was living. Cardinal *Frederick Cornaro* did the ſame when the rich Biſhoprick of *Padua* was given him by *Urban* VIII, who was highly diſobliged thereby, and would have had him taken it, in ſpight of the Laws of his Countrey, and oppoſition of the *Senat*. For the *Cardinalſhip* there is particular exception, and the *Senat* declared it was not comprehended under the word Benefices, at the promotion of the ſaid *Cornaro*. So that the *Duke* of *Venice* may ſay with *Antonius Pius*, (though in a different ſenſe,) *Poſtquam ad imperium tranſivimus, etiam quæ prius habuimus, perdidimus.* Capit. *in* Anton.. Hence it is that many of the Nobility who have had *Dukes* of their Family, avoid nothing more than that Honour; and yet they

they are forced to accept it, unleſs they have a mind to be baniſhed, and forfeit their Eſtates. In this manner they forced the *Dukeſhip* upon *Andreas Contarini* during their Wars with *Genoa*, upon *Marc-Anthony Treviſan* in the laſt age, and upon *Francis Cornaro* ſince, who died of pure anger eight days after his Election. That which is more ſtrange is, that this *Republick* after the conſtant good ſervice of their *Dukes*, make no ſcruple to depoſe them upon any ſickneſs or infirmity, as if their age or indiſpoſitions were ſufficient to extinguiſh the memory of their former deportment, though never ſo good. With this ingratitude they recompenced the merits of *Francis Foſcaro*, to whom they would not allow him to die, though he was 84 years of age, and in his *Dukeſhip* had acquir'd to his Countrey the Towns of *Breſſia*, *Bergamo*, *Crema*, and *Ravenna*, as is to be ſeen in his Epitaph. Yet this ſeverity has one good effect upon the *Dukes*, that in ſtead of pretending themſelves ill, to avoid the fatigues of their Office, they will aſſiſt at all publick Ceremonies, though they be ready to die. And if he fails at certain Feaſts, and appears not with the *Senat*, 'tis immediately ſuppoſed he is dead, and many times they have no news of his death, till they hear of his Funeral.

Formerly ſeveral *Dukes* have reſign'd, and laid by their Dignity, to die in repoſe, as *John* and *Orſo Participatio*; *Peter Orſeole*; *Sebaſtian*, and *Peter Ziani*; one *Maliepiere*, and *James Contarin*: but now 'tis not permitted, the *Venetians* declaring, *That a man born in a Commonwealth, and having ſhare in the Affairs, ought never to be wanting to his Countrey, whilſt he is in a condition to ſerve it: that it belongs not to a particular man to quit his Country, but to his Country to quit him, if it finds him unſerviceable:*

*ſerviceable: that 'tis lazineſs and poltronery to retire from the Government to ſpend our age in eaſe, when either our tongue or our brain is able to aſſiſt it. That if it be diſhonourable for a General to repoſe himſelf whilſt his Army is engaged, it is no leſs for the chief Perſon in a State, to retire to take his eaſe whilſt the reſt of the members are agitated and buſy. If the General of an Army *, as* Veſpaſian *ſaid, was to die ſtanding, a* Duke, *who Preſides in ſeveral Councils, and has ſo many important Affairs to diſpatch, ought as little to repoſe, or die in any poſture but ſitttng in the* Senat: In a word, *That † the body of a Commonwealth was like a great Family, of which the* Duke *is the Father, and cannot with any Honour relinquiſh his relation. And in this manner they oppoſed the reſignation of* Duke John Cornaro *in the year* 1628.

* *Oportet Imperatorem ſtantem mori.* Suet. *in* Veſt.

† *Regia poteſtas eſt gentis unius quaſi domeſtica quædam gubernatio.* Ariſt. 3. Pol. 11.

The *Commonwealth* belongs not to the *Doge*, but the *Doge* to the *Commonwealth*. The *Commonwealth* may diſoblige him with impunity, but he cannot in the leaſt tranſgreſs againſt the *Commonwealth*, but he is ſeverely rebuk'd. The beſt of his actions are effac'd by the leaſt of his faults. He has nothing before his eyes but advertiſements and memorials of the duty of his Place, and the great danger he incurs, if he does not behave himſelf as he promiſed at his Election; *Exigis ut ſententiam ſuam mutent, ſi talis eſſe deſieris, qualis electus es.* Pli. *de* Trajan. Whatever he ſees, tell him ſilently, *Memento eſſe Rempublicam.* His Palace is a gilded Priſon, where he is watch'd only by Spies, and Inquiſitors of State who never are ſeen by him. The very Walls have mouths, and thoſe always open to accuſe him, The dreadful *Council of Ten* lies next to his Apartments, that he may never be without the wholſome remembrance of death that environs him on all ſides. And perhaps

Nec Rem. *tuam eſſe, ſed te Reipub. Sen. de* Clem.

See the Remarks.

haps 'tis for this reaſon, that in the Seſſion of the *Grand Council*, the Preſident of the *Council of Ten* is placed juſt over againſt the *Duke*.

The *Duke* is ſubject to the *Ten*, as the *Kings* of *Sparta* were to the *Ephori*, and the *Kings* of *Aragon* of old to the Sovereign Magiſtrate they called *El Juſticia*, who ſitting upon a Throne, delivered himſelf to the *King* in the Name of all the Subjects of that Kingdom, in theſe words, *Nos que valemos tanto come vos, y podemos mas que vos, os hazemos nueſtro Rey y Sennor, con tal chi guardeis nueſtros fueros y libertades: Sino no, intra vos y nos un que manda mas que vos. We, who are conſiderable, and have more power than you, do make you our King, with condition that you preſerve to us our Priviledges and Freedom: If not, we retract what we have done; for betwixt you and us there is a Perſon who Commands more than you*, viz. *El Juſticia.* If the *Venetians* uſe not the ſame words, they uſe the ſame way with their *Duke*, as he finds by the effects. The *Ephori* being Judges betwixt the *Kings* of *Sparta* and the *People*, *El Juſticia* betwixt the *Kings* of *Aragon* and his *People*, and the *Council of Ten* betwixt the *Doge* and the *Nobles*.

The *Lacedemonians* allowed their *Kings* no Guards, not thinking juſt and well-reſolved men as they ſuppoſed them to be, ſhould have need of thoſe kind of People, when by obſerving the Laws, they would be ſure of the hearts of their Subjects, who whilſt they feared nothing of ſervitude, would be always ſolicitous for them *. The *Republick* of *Venice* takes the ſame courſe with their *Dukes*, as knowing well enough their Perſons will be ſafe, whilſt their Adminiſtration is honeſt, and that it is the Intereſt of the *Nobles* to look to their preſervation, ſeeing with them they make but one body Politick, that conſiſts chiefly of *Noblemen*.

* *Qui magis pro me metuunt quam me.* Alf. Arag. l.

In

In short, the *Dukes* having no Sovereignty, and the Laws at *Venice* having the same Force as formerly in *Lacedemon*, (where they were of more value than the *King*,) there is no necessity they should be attended by Guards, for fear they should use them, upon occasion, to subvert the *Government*, and change it into a *Monarchy*, as *Pisistrates* did at *Athens*, and *Timophanes* at *Corinth*.

Apud Lacedæmonios plus veteret leges quam Reges. Herodot.

The *Kings* of *Sparta* had nothing more than the *Spartiates*, but Title, Precedence, and a double share of their Repasts. The *Dukes* of *Venice* have the Title of *Serenissimo*, Preside in all Councels; and have a moderate Revenue, but such as exceeds the allowance of any of the other Magistrates. The *Kings* of *Sparta* eat frequently in publick with the *Spartiates*, who were the *Nobles* of that City. The *Dukes* of *Venice* retain something of their Customs, making four Feasts a year, to which all the *Nobles* are invited, without distinction of poor or rich, ancient or new: for the *Duke* is the Father of the *Family*, and caresses all his Children alike, to keep them in a constant and brotherly Amity. These Feasts are made the next day after *Christmas*-day, on St. *Mark*'s-day, on *Ascension*-day, and on the *fifteenth* of *June*, upon which day a great Conspiracy was discovered in the year 1310.

Comparison betwixt the Kings of *Sparta*, and *Dukes* of *Venice*. Herodot. li. 6. Thucyd. lib. 5. Xenoph.

The Wives of the *Kings* of *Sparta* were not treated as *Queens*, nor allowed any thing for their support from the Publick. The *Senat* of *Venice* at this day takes no notice of their *Dutchess*, and if a *Duke* be married at the time of his Election, at his own peril, no Revenue is allowed for his Wife, she is only treated as the first Lady, but not as Princess. 'Tis true, not long since the *Venetians* Crown'd some of them, that is to say, *Julia Dandole* Wife to *Laurence Priuli*, in the year 1557; and *N. Morosini*

roſini Wife to *Marin Grimani* in the year 1595; for whoſe publick Entry they were at vaſt expence. But in the next *Interregnum*, the Inquiſitors and Correctors finding the neceſſity of moderating the Honours of their *Women*; eſpecially in a *Republick* where ambition and luxury are very dangerous, by Decree aboliſhed the Cuſtom of Crowning them, that they might not ſo much as fancy they could ever be *Queens*.

Moderandos fæminarum honores dictitans. Tac. Ann. 1. *de* Tiber.

In the mean time the difference is very great betwixt the *Dukes* of *Venice* and the *Kings* of *Sparta*. The *Kings* of *Sparta* had two ſorts of Command, one at home, which indeed was very ſtreight; the other abroad in their Wars, which was more large. The *Senat* of *Venice* clip'd the wings of their *Dukes* in the ſecond point in the year 1645 after the death of *Duke Francis Erizza*, ordaining *that no* Duke *ſhould be choſen General at Land nor at Sea, nor any of their Brothers or Children during their Dukeſhip.* Which ſerv'd to confirm the report at that time, that the *Senat* having found the danger they had pulled upon themſelves by the large Power they had given to *Duke Erizza*, had poiſoned him as he was ready to depart.

* *Legationes dimittere tum amicas, tum hoſtiles, id Regis eſt.* Zenoph. *de Rep.* Laced.

The *Kings* of *Sparta* had power * to diſmiſs the Embaſſadors of their Enemies or Allies with poſitive Anſwers. The *Doges* cannot reſolve any thing upon their own heads, nor anſwer any of the Propoſitions or Demands of Forreign Miniſters, as I have ſaid before. The *Kings* of *Sparta* could by their own Authority commence, continue, or determine a War, reſerving to themſelves the Soveraign Command whilſt it laſted. The *Doges* can neither begin, protract, nor conclude it. The *Kings* of *Sparta* could abrogate old Laws, and eſtabliſh new; but the *Doge* of *Venice* cannot alter

alter a ſyllable of what is decreed by the *Grand Council* and the *Senat*.

In a word, the *Republick* of *Venice* not only detains their *Dukes* Priſoners in their Palace, encompaſs'd with Spies and Informers, deſtitute of common divertiſements, and diveſted of all the Authority of *Princes*; but it daily retrenches their Priviledges, to vilifie them the more. Formerly, the Preſents ſent them from the *Levant*, or other Countries where it was the Cuſtom to ſend them by their Embaſſadors, belong'd to the *Dukes*. In the 1668, the *Muſcovite* Embaſſadors in their return from *France*, paſſing by *Venice*, where they had ſomething to negotiate for the intereſt of their Maſter, preſented the *Doge* to the value of Ten or Twelve Thouſand Crowns in Sables and other Furrs. The Procurator *Andreas Contarin*, a *Sage-Grand*, nearly related to the *Duke* of that Name, but a mortal Enemy to the Procurator his Son, who had made himſelf odious to all the Nobles by his abominable avarice; remonſtrated to the *Grand Council, That the Preſents of the* Muſcovites *ought not to be appropriated to the* Doge; *for he being no Soveraign, neither the Embaſſadors nor Preſents were ſent to him, any more than he ſent their Embaſſadors:* Adding, *That when their Embaſſadors carried Preſents to* Conſtantinople, *it was not at the charge of the* Doge, *and therefore it was not reaſonable that he ſhould have the profit of what belong'd in Juſtice to the Publick, which defrayed the charge of the Embaſſadors.* And the buſineſs coming to a debate, it was ſolemnly decreed, that for the future the *Doge* and his Succeſſors ſhould be deprived of that ancient advantage.

When the *Doge* appears in any publick Proceſſion or Ceremony, he is magnificently cloathed,

ſometimes in Cloth of Gold, ſometimes in Cloth of Silver, and ſometimes in Scarlet, with the *Ducal-Corne* upon his head, the uſhers of his houſhold marching before him, and two of them carrying his Train: The *Captain-Grand* marches likewiſe before him with his Officers, the Secretaries of the *Pregadi*, and *Grand-Chancellor* with the *Golden-Stole*, and after him follows the *Senat*. In this Equipage he draws the Eyes, and forces Veneration from the People, who are always taken with the outward tokens of Grandure. But it is to be obſerved, the *Senat* follows not in addition to his Honor, but to participate of what is given him where-ever he goes; believing that if the *Duke* ſhould receive it alone, he would appear a Soveraign to the People, and to ſuch ſtrangers as were preſent.

The *Venetians* like not that their *Duke* ſhould have too much parts, they believe that would make him leſs tractable, and give him a Confidence in himſelf. They had rather have a perſon of moderate qualifications *, who is capable of their affairs, but governable by them, and eaſily held to his duty. Beſides, the *Senat* (where he has but a ſingle voice like another Nobleman) † ſupplies the defects of his underſtanding. And therefore *Duke John Peſaro* was no proper man for them, becauſe he knew too much himſelf, to be perſwaded by other people, whom for the moſt part he drew to his opinion by the ſtrength of his arguments: as in the buſineſs for the reeſtabliſhment of the *Jeſuites*. Nor indeed is it neceſſary a Prince in a *Republick*, having nothing but the bare name, and being but the ſhadow of the *Senat*, ſhould have too large and capacious an Intellect, ſeeing he is to do nothing of himſelf; and therefore it was the

* *Par negotiis, neque ſupra.* Tac. Ann. 5.

† *Quod uni deeſt, ſuppletur ex aliis, & quod ab uno peccatur, ab aliis emendatur.*

Thebans

Thebans pictured their Prince with his Ears open and his Eyes ſhut, to ſignifie it was not his Office to ſee or determine what was to be done, but to hear, and execute blindly what was concluded by the *Senat*.

They make him *Duke* for his life, to render him more Majeſtick, and like to the Crowned Heads, among whom they are willing he ſhould be reckoned; as alſo to coax him for the little Power he has, by the Duration of his Dignity: but they chooſe him always antient, that other pretenders may have hopes to ſucceed. Beſides, old age wanting the Vigor of youth, is not ſo bold and undertaking.

They are very glad when their *Dukes* are rich, that they may adorn their dignity, and be an ornament to the Publick, which allows them not above 12000 Crowns *per annum*, half of which is ſpent in his four annual Feaſts: To which may be added the charge of his entrance, which is never well celebrated but by large Gifts to the people thrown among them in Silver in the Palace of St. *Mark*; a Cuſtom firſt introduced by Duke *Sebaſtian Ziani*. So that if they have any touch of Generoſity and Magnificence, they do often incommode, if not ruine their Families: And that is it the *Senat* deſires, having perhaps no other deſign in exempting their Children from the penalty of their Sumptuary Laws.

The Adminiſtration of their *Dukes* is looked into after their deaths by *three* Inquiſitors, and *five* Correctors created on purpoſe, who always find that either the *Duke* has abuſed his Authority, ſome more ſome leſs; or neglected the Publick affairs for the advancement of his Private; or elſe that he has not lived according to his quality. And this canvaſing of his Con-

duct is commonly followed by the condemnation of his Heir in ſome Pecuniary Mulct; ſo that their Children cannot enjoy their Inheritance, till they have obliged themſelves by Oath to pay what Impoſition ſhall be laid upon them. Thus was the Family of the *Duke Peter Loredan* charged with a Fine of 1500 *Sequins*, becauſe the Father had lived too narrowly in his *Dukeſhip*. In my time they found the like fault with their *Duke*, who beſides his own parſimony, had a Son who took whatſoever he could lay his hands upon, as if to make amends for the old age of his Father; which appeared the worſe, becauſe the people had been accuſtomed to the Magnificence of his Predeceſſors, the *Dukes Valier* and *Peſaro*. In a word, the fear of this Inſpection into their Management, makes the *Dukes* and their Children cautious what they do, and ſhuts the door againſt all their oppreſſion and violence.

Manus avidæ & tanquam apud ſenem feſtinantes. Tac. Hiſt. 1.

And yet this Cuſtom hinders not, but that great Honors are paid to them after their death. Their Funerals are ſolemnized with great Pomp at the charge of the *State*. Their Funeral Orations pronounced formally in the Church of St. *Mark*; an Honor the Law did not formerly allow, and which began but ſince the death of *Andreas Contarin*. They fix upon their Vaults a Scutcheon with their Armes, in memory of their *Dukeſhip*, which was introduced at the Obſequies of *Duke Marin Moroſini*. And laſt of all it is permitted to ſet up noble and rich Tombes for them. But that which is ſingular in their Funerals, is, that the *Senat* attends the Corps in their Robes of Scarlet, a colour far enough from mourning; but they do it to ſhew, that though their *Duke* be Mortal their *Commonwealth* is not: That the perpetuity of their Empire conſiſts in the Body

Principes mortales, Rempubl. æternam eſſe. Tac. Ann. 3.

of

of the *Senat*, upon which only depends the Safety of the People. *Æternitas rerum, & mea cum veſtra ſalus, incolumitate* Senatus *firmatur.* Tac. Hiſt. 1. And that it belongs to private, not publick perſons to lament, in which they chooſe rather to ſatisfy a punctilio of Honour, than to diſcharge the common duties of Piety and Compaſſion for the Dead.

And here it is remarkable, that the Hall where the *Dukes* Corps is expoſed, is the ſame where he receives his firſt Complements of Congratulation from the Forreign Ambaſſadors the day he was Crown'd; that the joy of his Advancement, might be tempered by conſiderations of Death; and that he might look upon the Magnificence and * Ornaments of his *Dukeſhip*, as the beginning of his Funeral Pomp, and as if like a Victim he was Crown'd but for a Sacrifice. To this end the *Grand Chancellor* alwayes reflects upon Death, in his Complement when he is put the firſt day into poſſeſſion of the Palace of St. *Mark*: Admoniſhing, *That his Government is not over Subjects, but Fellow-Citizens and* † *Companions, to be Commanded only by his Example. That the Nobility have made him* Duke, *not to do as he pleaſes, but to labour, and charge himſelf with all the Cares and Troubles of the* State. *That his Dignity is but an Honourable Servitude* ‡, *as* Antigonus *ſaid formerly to his Son. And that his Crown was not a thing of* Parade, *and Authority, but of Obligation to his Countrey, and Obedience to their Laws.*

When the *Doge* is ſick, or abſent, he is repreſented by one of the *Council* called the *Vice-Doge*, that the *Council* might never be without a Head. But this *Vice-Doge* ſits not in the Ducal Chair, wears not the Bonnet, nor is treated

* *Conſulares faſces, Curulemque ſellam, nihil aliud quam Pompam Funeris putent.*

claris inſignibus velut inſules votatos ad mortem deſtinari. Liv. Hiſt. 2.

† *Ut non dominationem, & Servos, ſed Rectorem, & Cives cogitaret.* Ann. 12.

‡ *Eſſ. Nobilem ſervitutem.* Trog.

with the Title of *Sereniſſimo*: yet Embaſſadors directing their ſpeech to him in the *Colledg*, do give him that Title, but 'tis interpreted to the Table. This Repreſentative replies, like the *Duke*, to Forreign Miniſters; but puts not off his Bonnet, and keeps the middle-place when he walks.

The *Grand Council* in the year 1553 made a Decree, that in the Audience of Embaſſadors the *Vice-Doge* ſhould take his place betwixt the *Dean* of the *Council* and the *Embaſſador*, who accordingly was removed from the firſt place on the right hand of the Throne, to a third; which was an injury to the Embaſſadors, it being clear that the Repreſentative of a Prince ought in Juſtice to pay them more reſpects than the Prince himſelf. But this Decree was rectified the next year, gave the Embaſſadors their ancient place, and put the *Vice-Doge* beneath them; yet he was not allowed to ſalute them with his Bonnet.

The Councellors *of the* Seigniory.

THE preſent *Councellors* of *State* in *Venice*, are thoſe who formerly were *Tribunes* of the *Iſles:* and as every *Iſle* had then its *Tribune* to adminiſter Juſtice, ſo now the ſix Quarters of the City *, called *Contrade* or *Seſtieri*, have each their *Councellor*, who, according to an Ordinance of *Duke Orie Malipierre*, is to reſide perſonally in his Quarter. So that a Nobleman whoſe common Reſidence is in the Country of St. *Mark*, cannot

* *Caſtello San Marco Lana Regio. San-Paolo. Santa-Croce. Dorſo duro.*

cannot be choſen *Councellor* of the Caſtle, St. *Paul*, &c.

Theſe Lords are called *Councellors* of the *Seigniory*, becauſe with the *Doge* they repreſent the Body of the *Commonwealth*. They are called likewiſe *Conſiglieri di Sopra*, to diſtinguiſh them from the *Conſiglieri d'Abaſſo*, who Preſide in the *Quaranty Criminel*, in ſtead of the *Seigniory* which ſate formerly there. And here it is to be underſtood, that the Office of *Councellor* that is annual, is differently exerciſed during that time, the *Councellors* ſitting only eight months in the *Colledg*; the other four, they go down into the *Quaranty Criminel*, and Preſide there: whereas, if they begin in the Chamber, as *Conſiglieri d'Abaſſo*, they are advanc'd *alla Banca di Sopra*, or the *Colledg*.

The *Councellors* of the *Seigniory* have two Offices, one publick, the other private. The laſt is, to Conſult with the *Duke* and three Heads of the *Quaranty Criminel* ſuch matters as are to be propoſed in the *Councils*. And this they do in the preſence of a Secretary called *alle Voci*, who marks their Votes. To open all Letters directed to the *Seigniory*, whether the *Duke* be preſent or not. To receive all Petitions *Cognoſcible* in the *Grand Council*; to examine them among themſelves, and to tear them in pieces if they do not like them. To grant Priviledges and Exemptions. To appoint Judges to both Parties, when the Controverſy is about Juriſdiction: and, in ſhort. to reſolve when the *Council* is to be called extraordinarily. The firſt, that is to ſay, their Publick Office, is to Preſide in all *Councils*; to diſpatch all neceſſary Orders (during the *Interregnum*) to the *Podeſtats*, *General* of their *Armies*, *Proveditors* at *Land* or at *Sea*; and, in a word, to all the Officers of *State*.

When Relations have any Conteſt among them, and deſire extraordinary Judges, 'tis in the power of the *Duke* and the *Councellors* of the *Seigniory* to appoint them; and the ſaid deputed Judges, by vertue of a Commiſſion confirmed by the *Grand Council*, determine definitively. This in *Venice* is called *dellegar una Cauſa*: but this favour that prevents a great deal of Charge, eſpecially *li Caratti*, or Fees, is not vouchſafed but to Perſons of principal Quality, and upon Cauſes of great importance to the *Publick*, ſuch remiſſions giving juſt occaſion to the Magiſtrates to complain. Theſe *Delegates* are commonly choſen out of the *Senat* for the better Authority of their Judgment, and are called *Savii del Corpo del Senato*.

The *Councellors* both *di Sopra* and *d'Abaſſo* are always habited in red, both ſitting in Council, and walking in the Streets, under penalty of 25 *Ducats* of Gold for every time they offend. In Winter they wear a Scarlet-Robe with Ducal-Sleeves; and in Summer a Red Watered-Camlet, with a Cloth-bonnet of the ſame colour, unleſs their Fathers or Brothers be lately dead, in which caſe they are permitted to mourn for a month, and during the Holy-week they are in Black alſo.

It is forbidden to the *Councellors*, Heads of the *Quarantz Criminel*, *Sages* of the *Colledg*, and *Avogadors*, to be preſent at any Weddings, unleſs it be of their Children, Brothers, Nephews, Unckles, Fathers in Law, *&c.* And this Law is founded upon two Reaſons, one is, leſt thoſe Magiſtrates ſhould ſeem to encourage by their preſence the luxury of the Table and Habits, which are expreſly forbidden by the Laws. The other is, becauſe theſe *Lords* having direction of the principal Affairs, and the whole care of the *Government* upon them, the publick Service would be retarded or neglected by

ſuch

ſuch kind of Feſtivities, and they hindred in their attendance at the Palace, which might be of dangerous conſequence.

When one of theſe *Councellors* time is expiring, he ſwears his Succeſſor (a month before he enters into his Charge) to the obſervation of his *Capitulair*, which he reads over to him for his inſtruction in the duties of his place, ſhewing him that all Decrees revokable ſince five years, or that paſt only for a certain time, are of no obligation: and if by any impediment the new *Councellor* has not taken his Oath from his Predeceſſor, he takes it before the *Seigniory*, in this form.

J. N..... *Councellor of* Venice, *of the Quarter of* N.... *do ſwear and engage in the preſence of God, that during the time of my Office, I ſhall councel and adviſe ſincerely, and without fraud, whatever I think, for the Honour and Intereſt of the Commonwealth. That I ſhall not be guilty of jugling or colluſion, either to revenge my ſelf upon my Enemies, or advantage my Friend. That when-ever it ſhall pleaſe the moſt Serene* Doge *to call me to the Palace, I ſhall obey him immediately, unleſs ſome lawful impediment hinders: and laſtly, that I ſhall obſerve punctually and faithfully all the Articles contained in my* Capitulair, *which I ſhall read, or cauſe to be read to me every month.*

In the Election of *Councellors* (who are choſen but three at a time) there are two ſort of Competitors; one propoſed by the *Senat*, the other by the *Mains* Electoral of the *Grand Council*. The firſt do commonly carry it againſt the ſecond, either out of the eſteem the *Nobles* have for the choice of the *Senat*, who do always recommend Perſons of worth; or elſe becauſe of the great number of *Senators*, who in the *Balotation* of the *Grand Council* do always maintain by their ſuffra-

ſuffrages, thoſe whom they have Elected in the *Scrutiny*.

The three Heads *of the* Quarantie Criminel.

THeſe *three* Gentlemen are preſent in the *Colledg* to ſee what is paſt, as the *three* Councellors *d'Abaſſo* are in the *Quarantie Criminel* to obſerve what is done in that Chamber. And this Order is kept, to keep the *Colledg* and *Quarantie* within the bounds preſcribed them by the Laws.

Theſe *Heads* are in the Office but two months, during which time they are called Excellence, and are habited in Purple.

The Authority of the *Councellors* is much greater than the Authority of theſe *Heads*. For any *one Councellor* may propoſe any thing to be debated by the *Grand Council* or *Senat*, which the *Heads* of the *Quarantie* cannot do, but all *three* together; ſo that if *two* of them be diſpoſed to preſent any buſineſs to the *Council*, and the *third* diſſents, it cannot be propoſed. Theſe *Heads* are obliged to accuſe and proſecute the *Avogadors*, if they find them negligent in holding the *Councellors* of the *Colledg* to the obſervation of their *Capitulair*, and the Decrees of the *Grand Council*.

If at the meeting of the *Council* theſe *three Heads* be all of them abſent, the buſineſs is to be put off till another day; for all the Deliberations and Elections of that day would be void, the Law requiring

requiring that nothing pass in the *Grand Council*, but with the participation and presence of one of those *Heads*.

When the *three* Chiefs of the *Council of Ten* enter into the *Colledg*, the *Heads* of the *Quarantie* retire, by reason of the Emulation betwixt those two Criminal Chambers.

In the *Grand Council* these *three Counsellors* have their place above the Knights of the *Golden-Stole*, upon another Bench.

Of the Sage-Grans.

THere are *six Sages* called *Grans*, because they manage the grand Affairs of the *State*, of which they are properly the Ministers, and as so ought to have more sagacity * and experience than the common sort of the Nobility. Besides, these *Sages* being much above those of the *Terra-firma*, or *Sea*, (who together with these do make up the *Colledg*) are called *Grans* by way of Excellence, and not without reason.

These *six* Noblemen do meet among themselves to consult and prepare such things as are to be presented to the *Senat*, which are delivered to the *Senat* when the *Sages* have framed and digested them. In this they resemble the Councellors called by *Aristotle*, *Præconsultores* †. But though they sit, and consult promiscuously together, there is one of them appointed every week, and called for that reason *Savio di Settimana*, who receives all the Memorials, Addresses and Requests presented to the *Colledg*, to be carried to the *Senat*.

* *Quos vulgus, propterea quod maxime omnium sapere videntur, sapientes appellant.* Contarin. *Resp.* Ven. l. 3.

† *Quia præconsultant illa de quibus consulendus est Senatus.*

'Tis

'Tis to this *Savio di Settimana* it belongs to propoſe to his Colleagues what is to be debated, and to be determined afterward by the *Senat*: to anſwer the Letters of Princes, and the Offices of all Embaſſadors and Forreign Miniſters, but not of his own head, but according as is reſolved in the *Pregadi*.

When an Embaſſador deſires a favour for himſelf or any of his friends, he addreſſes to theſe *Sages* either by his Secretary, or the *Conſul* of his Nation, without troubling himſelf to go in Perſon, which he never does, but about his Maſters Affairs; if theſe *Sages* approve his demand, they preſent it to the *Senat*, who commonly encline much to their opinion: but if the *Sages* think it unreaſonable, they excuſe themſelves for propoſing it to the *Senat*, in the beſt terms they can. Thus they proceeded with the *French* Embaſſador in favour of Count *Pirro Gratiani* Reſident of *Modena*, who had a Boat of Wine ſeized as it entred into the Town.

Though the opinion of theſe *Sages* is of as great weight in the *Senat*, as the opinion of the *Councellors* of the *Colledg* is in the *Grand Council*; yet 'tis very lawful not only for every *Senator*, but for every Nobleman preſent in the *Senat*, to ſpeak againſt their advice; for 'tis Reaſon, not Perſon, that is of Authority there.

Theſe *Sages* are in Office but ſix months, in which time each of them is four times *Savio di Settimana*, the Law not ſuffering them to hold it a month together, to moderate their Power by continual change, which interrupts all the meaſures they might take, if the Office *di Settimana* was continued for a month.

When their time is expired, they cannot be continued for the next ſix months; but after the next

ſix

ſix months they may be choſen again, and come in by a new Election, that is to ſay, a Nobleman may be a *Sage-Grand* once every year: yet that happens but ſeldom, though *Duke Francis Donatus* and *John Peſaro* have been *Sage-Grans* 24 times.

No man can be admitted to this Office till he be compleat 38 years of age, the importance of that Charge, upon which the whole Civil Adminiſtration depends, requiring that the Members be men of more than ordinary accompliſhment, and well-vers'd in the Myſteries of *Government*.

The *Procurators* of St. *Mark* deſire this Preferment with much earneſtneſs, thereby adding Authority to their Dignity, which has more of Title than Power.

Formerly the *Sage-Grans* managed and reported the Affairs of the *Terra-firma* as well as the *Sages* of the *Terra-firma*, but of late that Order has been changed, to leſſen the Authority of the firſt, and to advance the latter.

The Ordinary Embaſſadors ſent by this *State* to the *Emperor*, are always ſtiled *Sage-Grans* in their Credentials, though perhaps they have not gone thorough that Office, nor cannot before their return. And this is a diſtinction the *Senat* puts betwixt their Embaſſadors to the *Emperor*, and their Embaſſadors to *Kings*, which Embaſſadors have only the Title of *Sage-Grans de Terra-firma*.

The *Sage-Grans* are not choſen like the reſt of the Magiſtrates, by the *Grand Council*, but by the *Pregadi*, who elect three at a time, every three months. To theſe it belongs to convoke the *Senat*, as it does to the *Councellors* of the *Colledg* to aſſemble the *Grand Council*. In Winter their Habit is a *Purple-Robe* of Cloth: in Summer, a Watered-Camlet of the ſame colour, with Ducal-ſleeves.

The

The Sages de Terra firma.

THere are *five Sages* called Sages *de terra firma*, created firſt about the year 1340, after this *Republick* had acquir'd *là Marca Trevigiana*. One of them is call'd *Sanio alla Scrittura*; whoſe buſineſs it is to Liſt Soldiers, to Muſter them, and to Continue or Caſhier them. He is treated with upon all Levies of Men: He reports to his Colleagues, and with them deliberates what is to be propoſed to the *Colledg*: He is Judge in Appeal of all Sentences paſſed, either within the City of *Venice*, or without, againſt any Souldier belonging to that *Commonwealth*, and determines definitively both Civil and Criminal Matters relating to the Souldier.

There is another of theſe *Sages* called *Savio Caſſiere*, who orders the payment of the Souldiers, and all others who have money to receive of the *Commonwealth*, and nothing is paid without an Order ſigned by this *Sage*.

The three other have neither Title nor Buſineſs peculiar, only they conſult jointly with the ſaid two, whoſe places they ſupply in caſe of abſence or ſickneſs, but with the Title of *Vice-Sage Caſſiere*, *Vice-Sage Scrittura*: Their Office continues only for ſix months like the *Sages-Grans*. In Winter they wear their Robe of Purple Cloth, and in Summer a Black watered-Camlet, with wide Sleeves: They are choſen likewiſe by the *Pregadi*, but without deliberative voices, in which they are much inferior to the *Sages-Grans*, and yet they have the Title of Excellence given them.

The

The Sages des Orders.

THere are likewiſe *Five Sages* commonly called *Sages des Orders*, who are young Noblemen of Principal Quality, admitted into the *Colledg*, not to deliberate for they have no voices, but to hear, and adapt themſelves to the Government by the example of the other *Sages*, whom they reſpect as their Maſters; and therefore when they ſpeak to the *Colledg*, they are obliged to be ſtanding and uncovered. 'Tis probable upon that account they are called *Sages des Orders*, becauſe they are to obey the Orders of the *Sages Grans*, and *Sages de Terra Firma*, who have Power to exclude them from their reſpective Aſſemblies, when any affair of importance is before them that requires their Miniſtry: Whereas the *Sages des Orders* have no priviledg to exclude the other *Sages* from their Conſultations, nor to exclude them from their Maritime tranſactions which are all under their Cognizance, and therefore they are called moſt properly *Sages de Mer*.

When preſent at the Conſultations of the *Sages Grans*, and *Sages de Terra firma*, they may modeſtly give their advice; but their advice not being deliberative, nor propoſable to the *Senat*, the Secretary does not enter it, unleſs one of the *Sages-Grans* or *Terra firma* approving their motion, ownes it for his own, and then it is Regiſtred in the Secretaries Roll under the name of the ſaid *Sage*, to be Baloted in the *Pregadi*; according to the Cuſtom of the *Lacedemonians*, where

where the * *Ephori* cauſed to be pronounced by ſome perſon of authority and deſert, the Advice that another Citizen of leſs quality propoſed, when they thought the propoſition was for the advantage of their *State*, thereby preventing the rejection of good Counſel upon prejudice to the Author. But when Affairs of *Sea* are before them, theſe *Sages* have deliberative Voices, as the other *Sages* have.

* Lacedemone *quidam* Demoſthenes *homo impurus Autor fuit ſententiæ idoneæ: Ad quam repudiandam pro indignitate Authoris populus viſus eſt propenſior. Proinde* Ephori *alterum ex ſenioribus forte legere, cui negotium ejuſdem ſententiæ dicendæ demandaverunt.* Plutar.

This Office was formerly one of the higheſt and moſt important in the *Commonwealth*: But ſince the *Venetians* extended in *Lombardy*, and began to reliſh the delights of the *Terra firma*, they neglected their *Sea*-Affairs ſo much that the *Sages de Mer*, who before were reſpected according to the greatneſs of their Imployment, loſt all their Credit in a moment †: In ſo much that they put into thoſe Places only young Gentlemen, who having little experience are received into the *College* to be indoctrinated; and therefore they willingly give place to the *Sages de Terra firma*, whoſe ſhare in the Government is ſo great.

† *Re Maritima diminuta, noſtrorumque ſtudiis ad Continentis Imperium converſis, cœpit hic Magiſtratus in parvo precio haveri.* Cantar. 3. Reipub. Ven.

Theſe *Sages* are choſen likewiſe for ſix Moneths by the *Senat*, in which they have their places during their Office. Their Robe is Purple with ſtreight Sleeves.

Though this Office be of no great Power, it is mightily ſought after by the young Nobility, it being a ſtep to greater Preferment, if they know how to Conduct: Otherwiſe it is a Rock upon

upon which many miſcarry that have not that Aptitude, or Propenſity to Buſineſs, for there they are expoſed to the Obſervation of wiſe and penetrating people, who do them good or hurt afterwards, according to the Impreſſions they receiv'd of them: One *Alexander Contarin* a *Sage des Orders*, would needs ſpeak in the *Colledg* without ſtanding up, contrary to common practice in that caſe; deſiring to ſee the *Part*, or Law by which ſtanding was required; But he underſtood afterwards to his coſt, the Obedience he ought to his Superiours. And here let me add by the by, That in *Venice*, as well as antiently in *Lacedemon*, there are many Laws unwritten, unleſs it be in the Hearts and Memories of the Citizens, upon whom the example of their Anceſtors have more effect and influence than all the Writings in the World, good Manners being much better than good Laws *. Beſides, it is indecency and too much forwardneſs in young Men to enquire into the Inſtitution of their Laws †, and demand Reaſons for them. And in *Sparta* this Curioſity was expreſly forbid, leſt it ſhould be uſed as a pretence to their Diſobedience, *Si quærere ſingulis liceat, pereunte obſequio, etiam imperium intercidit.* Tac. Hiſt. 1.

* *Plus ibi boni mores, quam alibi bonæ Leges valent.* Tac. Ger.

† *Hæc una inter cæteras præſtantiſſima Lex, ne juvenum cuiquam fas ſit in Leges inquirere.* Plat. 1. de Leg.

Thus have I ſhewn all the *Magiſtrates* of which the *Colledg* ſubſiſts, and I have treated of them together, for that reaſon, without conſidering their reſpective Ranks in the *Commonwealth*. Let us now paſs to the *Procurators* of St. *Mark*, which is the ſecond Dignity in that *State*.

The Procurators of St. Mark.

THere was antiently but one *Procurator* of St. *Mark*, called *Procurator Operis B. Marci*, becauſe he had inſpection over the building of that Church; and this ſeems to ſupport the opinion of thoſe who believe that Office to have been Created by *Duke Peter Orſeole*, the firſt of that name, by reaſon he began to rebuild the *Ducal Chappel*, which had been burned under *Peter Candien* his Predeceſſor. Be it as it will, *Bartelemi Fiepole* Elected 1049, under Prince *Dominick Contarin* is the firſt to be found in the *Archives*, where it appears that there was but one *Procurator*, till the year 1231; at which time *Philip Memme* being ſent Embaſſador to the Emperor *Baldwin* II. at *Conſtantinople*, *Peter Dandole* was choſen, that the City might not be left without a *Procurator*: ſo that at the return of the ſaid *Memme* was the firſt time *two Procurators* are mentioned to be together: Some will have it, that *Duke Sebaſtian Ziani* having ordered by his Will, that the Revenue of the Lands he left to the Church of St. *Mark* ſhould be annually diſtributed to the Poor by the *Procurator*, it was thought unfit the diſpoſition of ſo much Money ſhould be intruſted to one man, leſt thereby he ſhould inſinuate with the people, and uſe them in ſome dangerous Deſigne; and therefore to prevent that inconvenience, the *Venetians* had choſen another *Procurator* to ſee the Will of *Ziani* executed: But it appears by ſeveral Manuſcripts in the Library of St. *Mark*, that

Donat. Jannot. Fra. Fulgent.

977.

Under Duke James Fiepoli.

that under the three *Dukes* who ſucceeded after *Sebaſtian Ziani*, there was but one *Procurator*, and that it was upon occaſion of the abſence of *Philip Memme*, a ſecond was created, as is mentioned before,

The Riches of St. *Mark* being well increaſed ſince that time, the *Councel* choſe in the year 1268, *Mark Sorance* for a third. *Procurator*, and divided the Buſineſs and Advantages betwixt them; charging the *Firſt* with the Care and Government of the *Ducal Church*: The *Second* with the diſpoſal of ſuch *Legacies* as were left to it by ſuch as lived on that ſide the *Grand Canal*: And the *Third*, with whatever was left to it by ſuch as lived on the other ſide of the ſaid *Canal*: which two Perſons were called likewiſe *Commiſſaries di qua, e di la.* And in the year 1261, a *Fourth Procurator* was made in the Perſon of *James Molin* who was *Colleague* to the *Firſt*, and writ thus, *Ego N. Procurator Operum B. Marci*, not *Operis*, for the building was grown too great and Magnificent.

But the *Republick* finding this Dignity much ſought after, and that it would furniſh them with a way of gratifying their Subjects without any Expence; In the year 1319 they Created *Nicholas Tailer*, and *Marin Foſcarin* a Fifth, and a Sixth *Procurator*, aſſociating them with the Second and Third, who had no *Colleagues*, and giving them the keeping of all their Charters and Records. Theſe Six *Procurators* were divided into three Chambers, called commonly *Ridotti di Supra, di Citra*, and *di Ultra.*

In the year 1442, Three more were made, *viz. Lewis Loredan, Paul Tron*, and *Francis Barbarigue*, aſſigning to the *Firſt* the Chamber *di Supra*, to the *Second* the Chamber *di Citra*, and

to the *Third* the Chamber *di Ultra:* ſo that each Chamber had three *Procurators*, all of them reteining the Title of *Procurators* of St. *Mark*, though only thoſe *di Sopra* were intruſted with the adminiſtration about the *Ducal-Chappel.*

This laſt Creation was attended with a Decree by which the *Grand Council* aſcertain'd the Number of *Procurators*, and confined them to Nine, declaring that no Perſon whatever ſhould be propoſed, nor admitted into that Order, till after the Death of ſome one of thoſe *Nine* who were at that time in poſſeſſion of the ſaid Dignity. That is to ſay,

James Treviſan
Mark Mobin } *Di Sopra,*
Lewis Loredan

Mark Foſcare
Andrew Contarin } *Di Citra.*
Paul Tron

Stephen Contarin
Paul Correr } *Di Ultra,*
Fran. Barbarigue

In thoſe dayes the *Procurators* were made only for their Merits, but the affairs of the *Commonwealth* changing their Face afterwards by the War of *Cambray* which exhauſted it, and coſt them Five Millions of Gold, the *Council* of *Ten* made two Decrees, one of the ninth of *May*, the other of the firſt of *June* 1516: by virtue of which, *Six* Noblemen, *viz. Lewis Piſani*, *George Eme*, *Franc. Foſſare*, *Laurence Loredan*, *Lewis Molin*, and *Jerome Juſtinian* were for a Sum

Sum of Money added to the reſt of the *Procurators* *. But with condition that no more ſhould be Created till the ſaid Company ſhould be reduced to the determinate number of *Nine*; from which notwithſtanding the ſaid *Council* thought fit to digreſs by another Decree of the 26 of *March* 1522, which Decree was preſently followed by the Election of *Three* other *Procurators* for their Money: ſo that the number of Extraordinaries was equal to the Ordinaries under *Anthony Grimani*, and under *Andrew Grimani* who ſucceeded him, they were increaſed to ſix or ſeven more.

* *Under* Leonard Loredan.

This exorbitant number of *Procurators* was afterwards by the death of ſeveral of them reduced to *Nine*, whom the *Council* declared *Procurators* in Ordinary, though of the *Nine Six* were Extraordinary. But in the year 1570, the *Republick* being at Wars with the *Turk*, was forced for want of Money to ſell that Dignity again to *Six* * ſeveral Gentlemen, which ſince they have continued to do in all neceſſities of their *State*, and particularly in their laſt War in *Candia*, which continued 25 years, for never was there ſeen ſo many *Procurators* as then. During the Siege of *Candia* there were no leſs than *Forty*, ſome of them being of the New Nobility paid 70000 *Ducats* for their Places, whereas the Antient paid not above 30000 at moſt: The *Commonwealth* making it a Maxim to favour the Antient Nobility, and to ſqueeze the New, as having more juice for the generality than the other.

* Frederic Contarin, Octavian Grimani, Lew. *and* Franc. Priuli, Lew. Tiepoli, *and* Alexand. Bon.

But of all theſe *Procurators* there are only *Nine* in Ordinary, called by the People *Procurators par meriti*, whoſe Places are filled up after their Deaths, according to the Decree in the

year 1572. For when any of these *Nine* are dead, the Bell called *la Trottiere* (designed only to assemble the *Grand Council*) is rung, and the Defunct is not Buried till his Successor be chosen; to prevent Disorders that may be caused by multitude of Competitors.

The new *Procurator* appoints a day for the Solemnity of his Entry, according to antient Custom, and all his Relations and Friends come home to his House to attend him, first to the Church of St. *Mark*, where he hears *Mass*, accompanied by the antient *Procurator*, who in Honour to him, gives him the Right-hand that day: He is followed by the rest, as also by the *Senators*, and other Gentlemen invited, who march two and two in their Scarlet Robes.

Mass being done, he swears upon the *Evangelists* to observe exactly his *Capitulaire*, to promote with all his power the Worship of God, and the Advancement of the Publick interest; after which he enters into the *Colledg*, where having saluted the *Seigniory* three times, he goes up to the *Councellors* Seat, and places himself next under the last of the three *Chiefs of the Quarantie Criminel*. The rest of the *Procurators* place themselves above the *Sages-Grans*; and the rest of the Nobility without Order, as they please themselves. There it is he acknowledges the great Honour done him by the *State*, in whose name the *Doge* replies, commending modestly his Parts, or his Services, wishing him long enjoyment of his new Dignity. After this, he receives the Keys of the Chamber designed for him, which are presented to him in a Purse of Crimson-Velvet by one of the *Gastaldes*, or Farmers of the Company: Then he takes another Oath upon an old Record the *Grand Chancellor* holds

holds in his hand to that purpoſe, and ſo departing from the *Colledg*, he takes poſſeſſion of his Charge.

Formerly theſe *Procurators* were in ſo great eſteem quite thorow *Italy*, that from all parts they ſent their young Gentlemen to *Venice*, to be brought up in puſillage under them: and ſeveral Princes and great Perſons falling ſuddenly ill in their paſſage that way, committed all that was moſt precious and valuable about them, to their cuſtody, as Perſons above all covetouſneſs or deceit. So that this *Magiſtrate* was inſtituted partly to undertake the tuition of *Orphans*; to ſettle the Affairs of thoſe who had no *Guardians*; to regulate the Eſtates of thoſe who died Inteſtate, or without Iſſue; to ſee the Wills of other Perſons performed; and, in ſhort, to keep good Order and *Decorum* betwixt Family and Family.

Upon this ſcore it was that all the *Procurators* were excommunicated by the two *Nuntio's* * ſent on purpoſe to *Venice* by *Pope John* XXII, in the year 1322, to recover ſuch Moneys as had been left to the Apoſtolick Chamber by certain Merchants Trading into the *Levant*; to the moſt part of whoſe Wills, the ſaid *Procurators* being left Executors, they had refuſed to pay the ſaid Money to the ſaid *Prelats*, upon pretence that they would keep it for the Children, whoſe Fathers had never left it to the *Pope*, but in fear of being damn'd if they reſtored not as much as the principal amounted to of all the Goods they had carried of their own into the *Levant*. For the *Monks* and the *Friers* had put it into their heads when they were dying, without ſo doing they were not capable of Abſolution. And if this Reſtitution ſhould accrew to the profit of the *Pope*, as by a Bull of *Clem.* V. 1307, it would manifeſtly redound

* *Ardenaro Larg.* & *Falcone Ceſaræi.*

T. at. dell. Inquiſit. di Ven. di Paolo *ſervita.*

dound to the deſtruction of their Families, and the ruine of the *Venetian* Trade, had not the *Senat* interpoſed for the prevention of ſo great an evil.

Theſe *Procurators* have the care and direction of the publick Alms, and can diſpoſe of them as they pleaſe, either to Hoſpitals, Monaſteries unendowed, poor Criminals, diſcharge of Debtors, or Redemption of ſuch as are Subjects of that *Commonwealth*, and in captivity to the *Turk*. So as properly theſe *Procurators* are the common Fathers of all People in diſtreſs.

The *Procurators* are never ſent Embaſſadors in Ordinary; in which thing the *Republick* receives conſiderable prejudice by the multitude of *Procurators* advanced to that Dignity for their Money, who might otherwiſe be uſeful to their Country, and appear with luſtre in the Courts of Forreign Princes, were they not adorned with a Robe that exempts them: for the *Senat* wanting many times Perſons that are rich and powerful (like the *Procurators*) to ſupply thoſe Embaſſies, are conſtrain'd to ſerve themſelves with ſuch Noblemen as being low in their Fortunes, would ruine themſelves abſolutely in the very neceſſary Expence, and diſhonour their Character if they ſhould not.

They have their Palace, as I ſaid before, in the Place of St. *Mark*; but becauſe there is room only for *ſix*, (their old Houſes being inhabited only by Citizens) the *Commonwealth* allows the reſt a Penſion of 60 *Sequins*, till there be a place vacant, to which each of them comes in his turn, as well the *Procurator* created for his Money, as he that is preferr'd for his merit, according to the Order of their reception.

They have likewiſe their *Council-Chamber* in St. *Mark*, where they meet every *Tueſday*, *Thurſday* and

and *Saturday*. And becauſe the *Library* is near thoſe Chambers, they have the direction thereof, and the nomination of the *Ducal-Chairs*, as they call them, eſtabliſhed for the publick teaching of *Philoſophy*, *Law*, and *Phyſick*. The *firſt* is always ſupplied by a Nobleman, with a Penſion of 500 *Ducats*; and in my time it was *John Babtiſto Contarini* a Senator. The other *two* are ſupplied by Citizens of *Venice*, with Penſions likewiſe from the Publick.

The Univerſity of *Padua* is under the direction of two *Procurators*, called *Reformatori dello ſtudio di Padua*, and their Office reſembles the Office of the *Provoſt* of *Sorbon*. It belongs to theſe *Reformatori* to take notice of all *Books* Printed in that *State*, and to take care they be not expoſed to ſale, till the *Stationers* have given ſuch Copies as are to be put into the publick *Libraries*.

The Dignity of *Procurator* is for life, yet ſometimes the *Senat* preſumes to degrade them: the laſt Age furniſhes us with two Examples, the one in *Anthony Grimani*, who was reſtored afterwards, and created *Doge*: the other two in *James Sorance*, who was deprived of that Honour, and baniſhed into *Iſtria*. And of late years *Francis Moroſini* was in a fair way of being treated in that manner, though the *Grand Council* had given him the Robe with exceſſive teſtimony of the ſatisfaction they received in his Services, creating in particular favour for him, a tenth place for the *Procurators by Merit*; which had never been known before.

The *Procurators* are habited in Black or Violet, with Ducal-ſleeves, and the *Stole* black: but if they be *Sages-Grans*, they wear them of Purple. Upon their grand Ceremonies, as on the day of their Entry, the Feaſt of St. *Mark*, and ſome

others

others, they put on a Robe of Crimson-Velvet, and their *Stole* of Gold, if they be Knights.

Next to the *Procurators* are the *Decemviri*, called commonly the *Council of Ten.*

Of the Council of Ten.

THis dreadful *Council* was at first only a Chamber of Justice erected for finding out the accomplices in the famous Conspiracy of *Bajamont Fiepole*, but not many years after it was continued and made perpetual to avoid the clamours of the People, who murmured, and were ready to Mutiny every time it was renewed.

In the first age of its establishment, its Authority extended not far; for the *Quarantie Criminel* which is much ancienter, judged in all Criminal matters, and in several other things. But by degrees the *Ten* rendred themselves so considerable, that by their address they got the cognisance of all *Crimes* against the *States*, as *Seditions*, *ill-Administrations*, *Coining* of false *Money*, *Assassinations* committed by Noblemen, *Sodomy*, and sometimes of *Heresy* it self. Nay, they stretched their Authority so far as to revoke and null the Decrees of the *Grand Council*; and to negotiate Leagues Offensive and Defensive with Forreign Princes unknown to the *Senat*, which they did upon certain Emergencies, and in a juncture of time * properer for Execution than Deliberation. And in this they resembled the *Roman Dictator*, who in time of publick calamity, had all the Power of the *State* in his hand, with Suspension to the Power of the *Senat*.

* *Ubi facto magis quam consulto opus est.* Tac. Ann. 1.

Nor

Nor do we want Instances of several Negotiations undertaken and perfected by the *Council of Ten*, in defiance of the whole *Pregadi*. Witness the Peace they concluded with *Antonio Soderini*, and *John Baptista Rodolfi*, *Florence* Embassadors, who could make no advance with the *Senat* of *Venice*. And this Peace was a *Coup d'Etat*, *Bajazet* the Second declared War against them not long after; which if the *Florentines* could have foreseen, or if the Conclusion had been protracted but for some few weeks, 'tis most certain the *Florentines* would never have complied, unless upon better Conditions, as knowing the *Venetians* would have been forced to their own terms, lest otherwise they should have been engaged in two Wars at one time. Jannot *de Rep. Ven.* Guichardin. Hist. l. 4.

But at present the Authority of the *Ten* is restrained to *Criminal Causes*, and as there is no Court in the World where the Judges proceed with more severity against Persons accused, it will not be amiss to say something of their Methods in this place.

After the three *Capi-Dieci*, who are the monthly *Presidents*, have received the Depositions of the Witnesses in Writing; and have perfectly instructed themselves in all the circumstances of the Fact, they cause the accused Person to be secured privately, and examined by the Chief for that Week; whose Answers are taken by a Clerk or Register, and by him communicated with his two Colleagues, and their advice taken thereupon; after which, the Cause is carried by them to the *Council*, where they all *three* do manage the Accusation against the Malefactor, urging his Confession against him; and this they do, whilst the poor Criminal is not allowed to plead his own Cause, nor to retain Counsel, nor to see any of his Friends or Relations,

or

or ſo much as to receive a Letter from them. He has only one remedy, and that is, one of his Judges ſometimes, touched with compaſſion for the Perſon accuſed, or perhaps convinced of his Innocence, will take his Cauſe into his protection, and defend it againſt the Accuſers, but though theſe kind of good Offices happen now and then, they are ſeldom effectual. For this *Council* is ſo inclinable to ſeverity, the leaſt offence in matter of *State* is unpardonable, and very appearance paſſes for a crime.

Tis ſaid that in *Athens*, *Draco* writ all his Laws in Blood; the ſame may be ſaid as juſtly of this *Council*, in which Clemency and Mercy are Virtues unknown; where jealouſy is incurable, diſtruſt eternal; where great reputation is dangerous; great ſervices odious, and commonly requited with either baniſhment, or death. The *Maxims* of this *Council* are theſe.

That not only Crimes againſt the State *are never to be pardoned, but even appearances are to be puniſhed, and that they muſt proceed to puniſhment before they examine the offence. That in thoſe things ſhadow is to be taken for ſubſtance, and poſſibility for matter of fact; that humane Prudence is not to be contented that things are not yet hapned, but muſt order things ſo as they never may happen; that the Publick is to prevent what it fears, at their Coſt who gave the apprehenſion, without expecting till the miſchief occur, there being no greater crime than to be ſuſpicious to ones Prince, and to diſturb his Tranquility. That if in other Affairs it be diſcretion to imagine the ill-conſequences leſs than they will be, in matters of* State, *and things relating to its quiet and repoſe, 'tis not only prudent but neceſſary to imagine them greater: that injuſtice to private Perſons is not to be conſidered where advantage accrews to the Publick;*

lick; *becauſe*, ſay they, *'tis impoſſible to Govern without injury to ſomebody.* To which we may add another of their *Maxims* no leſs pernicious, and that is; *That 'tis wiſdom to rid themſelves of any body they have diſobliged by their wrongful ſuſpicions, leſt his reſentment puts him upon revenge, and the fear of a ſecond injury tempts him to ſecure himſelf, though by the ſubverſion of the Government.*

By theſe *Principles* this *Council* is become ſo odious to the *Nobles*, that they have tried all ways imaginable to ſupplant them. In the year 1628 the Family of the *Cornari* and their Party puſh'd it ſo far in revenge of the Quarrel of *George Cornaro* the then *Duke*'s Son, who had been proſcribed and degraded by the *Ten*, that their Court would have been certainly ſuppreſſed, had it not been prevented by an old *Seignior*; who in the *Grand Council* remonſtrated, *That the ſafety of the* State *depended upon the continuation of that Council, which kept the Nobility in their duty, by fear of Correction, and the People in obedience by the goodneſs of their Example. That to ſuppreſs that Tribunal, which was the ſupport of their Laws; the knot of their Concord; the foundation of their Equality; their defence againſt Tyranny; and the true balance that kept all Parties in a poiſe, would be no leſs than to introduce Confuſion, Licentiouſneſs, and Impunity. That nothing rendred their* Government *more Excellent and Conſpicuous, than to ſee their Nobility obnoxious to the ſevereſt of their Courts, and their Authority check'd by their fear, whilſt thoſe in greater Power were in greateſt Awe, ſeeing them expoſed to the rigour of the Laws as well, if not more, than particular Perſons. That thoſe who endeavoured to aboliſh them, were People who deſigned to be Criminal, if they were not ſo already. That they were to be ſeparated frrm the body of the* State, *if they*

could

could not ſubmit to a civil life, or ſubject themſelves to the Laws, which put them upon a happy neceſſity of doing well; and, in ſhort, That it would be diſhonourable to ſuffer the clamours of a few Citizens to prevail for a Change ſo much to the prejudice of the State.

But however the ſaid *Council* is continued to this day, 'tis very diſpleaſing to the *Nobility*, who cannot hear it mentioned without trembling.

In the year 1670 the *Grand Council* proceeding to the Election of the *Ten*, (who are renewed every year in the Month of *Auguſt*) all thoſe that were propoſed, were rejected two Sundays together, and in the third there was only *Seignior Angelo Emo* who paſſed in the Balotation: nay the ill-humour was carried on ſo far, that ſome of the Electors named either in contempt or deſpight, ſome of the new Nobility, and among the reſt a *Portugal* called *Fonſeca*, of *Jewiſh* Extraction, knowing well thoſe kind of People would never get their juſt number of Voices. For that *Court*, which is as it were the Parliament and *la Fournelle* of the *Nobles*, has been always ſupplied by the worthieſt and beſt qualified Gentlemen.

Nevertheleſs this *Council* is it, upon which depends the whole Oeconomy of that *Government*: this *Council* is the Corner-ſtone of the *State*, not to be ſtirred without deſtruction to the whole Fabrick. It is the Copy of the famous Temple the *Ephori* of *Sparta* erected to *Fear*, as the only Deity, was able to reſtrain men, and keep them to their duty: In a word, 'tis a Virgin full of eyes, and all of them inceſſantly watching for preſervation of the common Liberty, inſomuch that it is obvious when-ever the *Council of Ten* is diſſolved, confuſion and diſorder will quickly follow in the

State;

State, as hapned to the *Commonwealth* of *Sparta* upon ſuppreſſion of the *Ephori*, who, as *Ariſtotle* tell us, were the very Nerves of that flouriſhing *Ariſtocracy*.

The *Quarantie Criminel* labours upon all occaſion for ſuppreſſion of the *Council of Ten*, as thoſe who have robbed them of their principal Authority; for before the Creation of theſe *Decemviri*, 'tis manifeſt the cogniſance of all Crimes belonged to that *Chamber*, and after that diſſolution it would return into the former Channel. For this reaſon *Francis Contarini* one of the Heads in the year 1628 ſpake with ſuch heat againſt them, that moſt of the Nobility cried out, *Via via li Dieci, away with the Dieci*, and others ſpared not to ſalute them with *Vaga in mal' hora quel Conſiglio de Dieci, li venga la rabbia. May the Council of Ten never proſper: the Devil them*, and many other imprecations, that ſhew well enough what kindneſs the Nobility had for that Court. In effect, the Rigour of the *Council of Ten* has been ſo great, there is ſcarce a Noble Family but produces inſtances of it, and many of them written in Blood. And if there be not often ſeen Noble Perſons hanging by the heels betwixt the Pillars of St. *Mark* *, 'tis not that they are grown more humane or compaſſionate, but they have found out new and more private ways, that the Nobility may not loſe their Veneration with the People, nor they think themſelves governed by Profligates, as they would do if they ſhould ſee thoſe objects too oft. Theſe ways are by drowning them in the night in the *Canal Orfano*, and others already too well known in the World.

* See the Remarks.

Theſe ſecret Executions are too frequent at *Venice*, and if People vaniſh in a moment, 'tis by the Conjuring of the *Council of Ten*: this is the ſilent way

way they take to prevent the Murmurs of the Nobles, who alwayes judg amiſs of the Decrees of the ſaid Court, from a conſtant averſion they bear to their Juriſdiction. This is the way they take to ſweeten and cajole the Parents and Relations of the Defunct, as if they did it to prevent the infamy that would adhere to the Family, if the Execution ſhould be publick: And yet for all their tenderneſs, this Caution is never uſed but where the buſineſs is doubtful, for if the Evidence be clear, and the Perſon accuſed, palpably Guilty, no ſuch Complement is uſed; but he runs through all the formes of Juſtice, and is attended to the Gibbet with all manner of Solemnity. There is no Appeal from the Judgment of the *Council of Ten*, no more than of old from the *Roman Decemviri*; nor can their Arreſt be modified, or altered, but by themſelves, or their Succeſſors: Only ſometimes the *Avogadors* might ſuſpend the Execution, provided it was not in matter of State, for in that Caſe no ſuſpenſion was endured.

'Tis a dangerous matter in this *Council* to intercede for any one queſtioned for practiſing againſt the *State*, 'tis no leſs than to bring a man into ſuſpition, and expoſing him to the Malefactors misfortunes. And therefore the Nobility are many times ſeen to forſake their neareſt Relations upon thoſe occaſions, and to Proſecute them ſeverely, to clear themſelves of being accomplices. Fear overpowers their humanity *, and the ſtronger the Accuſations are, and the more dangerous the Condition of the Party, the weaker

* *Intercideratſortis humanæ commercium, vis metus; quantumquè ſevitia liceret, miſeratio arcebatur.* Tac. Ann. 3.

is their Compaſſion, and the fainter their Interceſſion. Every Mans Tears, and Sighs are obſerved, and 'tis little leſs than being Criminal, to bewail the Condemnation of another.

All Magiſtrates imployed abroad, as *Generals, Proveditors, General at Sea, Podeſtates, Governours,* and all other Officers are reſponſible for their Conduct to this *Council,* where all Complaints are received readily againſt them. There it is their Actions are canvaſed, and controlled: There their Pride is humbled, their Extortion puniſhed, and their Miſdemeanors inevitably chaſtiſed. There *Generals of Armies* are handled like Slaves, and Baniſhment, Impriſonment, Degradation, and Death, common Rewards. For if they loſe but an handful of Ground, though they reſiſted never ſo well, they are ſure to be guilty, Innocence being never to be pleaded, where the *State* has received a loſs. And I remember I was told by a wiſe Man of that Countrey, that the *Bragadin* might as well have been Flea'd by the Turks, after the Surrender of *Famagoſta,* as by the *Council of Ten,* who would be ſure to Hang him,

No man's Conduct is ſo exact and regular, but theſe ſevere and ſcrutinous Judges will pick a hole in it, though it be but for faults of omiſſion: And thoſe Perſons who eſcape out of their clutches, and come off with a bare reprimand, paſs in the world for men of exemplary Probity, and incomparable Wiſdom. No mans Innocence is doubted that is acquitted by that bloody Tribunal: where Parents have been known to condemn their own Children to Death; and among the reſt, the *Doge Anthony Venier* *, who with great difficulty was prevailed upon to change the Sentence of Death that he had gi-

* See the Remarks.

ven againſt his Son, into perpetual Impriſonment.

Two of the three *Inquiſitors of State* are taken out of this *Council*, and the third out of the *Councellors* of the *Colledg*. The Lords of this *Council* are ſo abſolute in their Power, they can cauſe the *Duke* himſelf to be drowned, or ſtrangled without the knowledg of the *Senat*, that is to ſay, if all *Three* of the *Capi-Dieci* agree to the Execution; Otherwiſe all the *Ten* are to be called. They have Perſons in pay, who are obliged to keep a Regiſter of all the Words and Actions of the conſiderable Noblemen and Citizens, as was practiſed in the time of the Emperor *Tiberius*. And ſo far are they from diſcouraging Informers, that they invite them by Rewards. Many times honeſt men are treated at that rate, who are not ſenſible of their own guilt by any thing but their Impriſonment or Exile †. So that with them every thing is to be feared, every thing is to be ſuſpected: Silence, Diſcourſe, Company, Solitude, even the Walls themſelves. *Congreſſus, Colloquia, notæ, ignotæque aures vitari, etiam tectum & parietes circumſpectantur.* Ann. 4.

* *Reos fuiſſe ſe, tantum pœna experti.* Ann. 15.

If any man ſpeaks ill of the Government, he is pack'd away in the night, and drowned in the *Canal Orſano*. If it be a *Forreign* Nobleman, or Gentleman, he is commanded out of the *State* within 24 hours upon pain of Death. This they practiſed upon a *French* Officer for charging them publickly with Ingratitnde. *Tiberius* was of Opinion that People were not to be reſtrained in their Converſe at the Table, and moved the *Senat* upon ſeveral occaſions, that they would not be ſevere in matter of Words*. But in

* *Deprecabatur tam præcipites verborum pœnas.* ann. 3.

Ne Convivalium fabularum ſimplicitas, in Crimen duceretur, poſtulavit. Ann. 5.

Venice (though a *Republick*) they are not ſo favourable to the People; the *Council of Ten* having ſtretched their Law againſt Treaſon, to Verbal Expreſſions, betwixt which and matter of Fact they make very little difference.

The *Inquiſitors of State* have their Nocturnal acceſſes to the *Palace* of St. *Mark*, into which they enter as they pleaſe by private ways, to which they only have Keys; and the *Duke* is more afraid to ſee them, than to be ſeen by them: They can paſs if they pleaſe to the very Bed of the *Duke*; They can enter his Cloſſet, open his Cabinets, read his Letters, and take an Inventory of what they think fit, whilſt neither himſelf, nor any of his family, dare pretend to obſerve them: And his Children, Brothers, and Nephews are excluded the *Council of Ten*, only to give more liberty of Complaints and Information againſt him.

When a Gentleman is ſuſpected, and proof is wanting for his Condemnation in the uſual formes, to charge him with Treaſon, ſupplies all defects, and ſtops the mouths of his Relations *. (For Treaſon is always the Crime of thoſe that have no other †.) They diſpatched the *Senator Antonio Foſcarini* ‡, in half a days time, and his Death was ſooner known than his Impriſonment.

* *Majeſtatis Crimina ſubdebantur uniculum & neceſſitas ſilendi.* Ann. 3.

† *Majeſtatis ſingulare & unicum Crimen eorum qui Crimine vacarent.* Plin. Pan.

‡ See the Remarks.

A remarkable inſtance of the jealouſy of *Commonwealths*, where extraordinary reputation, is extraordinary danger: For that was all his Offence, though he was accuſed of Treaſon, which after his Death was known to be falſe. They do ſometimes

make uſe of a mans own Servants to rid themſelves of his Maſter; and afterwards to keep it the more ſecret, the Inſtrument comes to be drown'd, or ſtab'd *, whoſe preſence would ſeem to reproach them by what they had done. A fit recompence for a Treacherous Servant. And when an eminent Informer comes to be diſcover'd to the World, they not only uſe him no farther, but they Sacrifice him preſently to the publick diſcontent, as *Tiberius* did †, to ſhew that he was the cauſe of all their Injuſtice; by which means they pacify the indignation of the irritated Families.

* *Malorum faciorum Miniſtri quaſi exprobrantis aſpiciuntur.* Tac. Ann. 14.

† *Sceleris Miniſtros veteres, & prægraves afflixit.* Ann.

Piaculares publici odii victimas. Plin.

Thus did they proceed againſt *Foſcarini*'s Accuſers, though they decreed extraordinary Honours to his Memory, as willingly conſenting he ſhould be reckoned among the gods, whom they cannot endure among men: *Sit Deus modo non ſit vivus.* They have likewiſe another Maxim among them, to connive at many faults they might eaſily prevent, to render them more infamous whom they deſign to deſtroy.

All thoſe who are taken with *Fire-Arms* about them, are puniſhed with Death by the *Council of Ten*, without Mercy. In the year 1671, the fourth of *January*, *John Moccenigue*, a Nobleman, having fired two Pocket-Piſtols upon *Nicolas, and Sebaſtian Foſcarini*, two other Noblemen, at that time in a Lodging in the *Opera* of St. *Saviour*, was degraded of his Nobility, proſcribed, and condemned to have his Head chopped off betwixt two Pillars of St. *Mark*, when-ever he ſhould be taken, the ſaid *Council Promiſing*

2000 Ducats *to those who should should take him alive, or kill him within the Territory of that* State, *and* 4000 *if he were taken, or killed out of the* State: *Granting him moreover who should either kill, or apprehend him, Pardon for any Nobleman or Citizen that should be Guilty of Treason* (though it was never done before in *Venice*, where Crimes of that nature were always unpardonable) *all the Goods of the said* Moccenigue, *movable and immovable, present and to come,* (*not excepting his* Fiefs, *nor what was committed to him in trust*) *were Confiscated: All Contracts passed by him six Months before his Condemnation, were Cancelled and declared void; with strict charge to the* Avogadors *to make exact Inquisition according to their Consciences, that the Goods of the said Criminal might not be diverted nor imbezled, with prejudice to the Publick. Command was given to the Commonalty of all Villages, Towns, and Cities under the Jurisdiction of that Commonwealth, to sound the* Toxin *to take him living or dead, under penalty of the Gallies or Dungeon to such Officers as should be wanting in their duties. Forbidding likewise all Noblemen, his Relations, or Friends, to hold correspondence, or commerce with him by Letters or Discourse, or to give him any assistance either at home or abroad, upon pain of Confiscation of their Estates. Moreover, all Offenders against this Decree, who were not Noblemen, nor Citizens of* Venice, *should serve ten years together in the Gallies, with Irons on their Legs; and if they were incapable of working, they should lye as long in the Dungeon.* Nay the Arrest went farther, and declared, *That the said* John Moccenigue *should never be indemnifyed, not by discovering things of never so great importance to the* State; *not by ingaging to bear Armes per-*

The tenor of the Proclamation published by the *Council of Ten* against *John Moccenigue*.

petually in the States *ſervice. Not by promiſing to take or kill any other Offender, equal, or ſuperiour to himſelf. That he ſhould never obtain any favour, ſuſpention, alteration, modification, compenſation, or other diminution of the Tenor of this Decree, though Forreign Princes ſhould intercede with never ſo much earneſtneſs in his behalf. That no General either at Land or Sea, nor any other Magiſtrate whatever, veſted with priviledg of Indemniſying Baniſhed, or Proſcribed perſons, ſhould extend that Priviledg to him. That whoever ſhould but propoſe any thing in his favour, ſhould pay* 2000 Ducats *for his Offence, which ſhould be ſtrictly exacted by the* Councellors, *and* Avogadors, *to be put into the Coffers of the* Council of Ten. *And finally, the ſaid Maleſactor was Condemned to all other Pains expreſſed and ſpecified in any other Arreſt whatever.* By which the *Council of Ten* deſigned to give an eminent example of their Juſtice againſt the Perſon of a Nobleman, who reckoned in his Family four *Doges*, an infinite number of *Procurators*, *Senators*, and *Generals* of Armies, and allied to all the moſt conſiderable Families in *Venice*. Bearing no reſpect to his age (which was not above 22): To the Merit and Services of his Glorious Anceſtors: To the Tears and Sighs of his Wife; To the Innocence of his Son, at that time hanging at the Breaſts of his Mother; Nor even to the Pardon of the *Foſcarini* themſelves; the *Elder* of which begged it generouſly of the *Senat* ſome days before his Death: and the *Younger*, who was wounded letting the Proſecution fall. And to ſhew the efficacy and force of theſe ſort of Proclamations, it is to be conſidered that the ſaid *Moccenigue* having fled to *Rome*, where he hoped to have been Protected in the houſe of the *Venetian* Embaſſador *Michael*

Morc-

Moroſini his Father in Law; that prudent Miniſter underſtanding the duty of his Charge, and having been formerly of the *Council of Ten*, would not receive him into his Palace, nor violate the publick Majeſty wherewith his Character Inveſted him.

And here I ſhall take notice, that at *Venice* their *Opera's*, *Comedies*, and *Gaming-houſes* are inviolable places, Conſecrated (if I may ſo ſay) to publick Pleaſure, inſomuch as Baniſhed Perſons and Criminals reſort to them as ſafely as to the Sanctuaries of old, the *Council of Ten* not reſerving to themſelves the Cognizance of ſuch Offences as are committed there, and all to recommend their frankneſs to their Subjects, and their hoſpitality to Strangers,

Coining of Falſe *Money* is an unpardonable Offence, and the rather becauſe *Italy* is full of little *Princes*, who make uſe of that way to inrich themſelves to the prejudice of their Subjects, and Neighbours: But as to *Sodomy*, they ſeem either willing to connive at it, as a thing rather contrary to good Manners, than inconſiſtant with the Government; or elſe knowing the nature of the Sin, and their propenſity to it, they think it not convenient to attempt a Remedy, leſt they ſhould diſcover their own * Shame and Impotency, wherefore, when-ever this Sin is puniſhed, 'tis in the perſon of ſome poor Creature, who has neither Money nor Friends.

* *Omittere potius prævalida & adulta vitia, quam hoc aſſequi ut palam fieret quibus flagitiis impares eſſemus.* Tac. Ann. 3.

This *Council* is likewiſe very ſevere with *Stationers* who ſell Books reflecting upon the Government; and when any is found offending in

that kind, they are at leaſt condemned to the *Gallies*, and their Eſtates Confiſcated. Hence it is, that not one of them dares ſell *Guichardin's Hiſtory* of the *Geneva* Impreſſion, nor the *Squitirio della liberta Veneta*, which proves the ſubjection of the *Venetians* to the *Roman* and *Greek* Emperours.

The *Ten* do proceed likewiſe againſt ſuch *Eccleſiaſticks* as procure *Biſhopricks*, *Abbeys* or any other *Benefices* from *Rome*, by means contrary to the Laws of their Countrey; and when they have got Grants of them, the *Council of Ten* oppoſes their Poſſeſſion: thus they ſerved *Charles Quirini* who had obtained from Pope *Urban* VIII. the Biſhoprick of *Zebenigo* in *Dalmatia*, by the mediation of Forreign Embaſſadors in his *Holineſs* his Court.

The *Noblemen* compoſing the *Council of Ten*, ought to be of *Ten* ſeveral *Families*, without any Kindred or Proximity of Relation; that there may be no prejudice nor partiality in their Votes: For if two or three Gentlemen allied either by Birth or Marriage, ſhould be admitted into the ſaid *Council*, it might be the occaſion of a thouſand Iujuſtices, whilſt the corrupting of one Member would indanger the corruption of all his Relations: Beſides, three or four Families might eaſier unite in any enterprize againſt the *State*. In the mean time the *Venetians* think it not fit to have more than *Ten* of that *Council*, leſt it ſhould render their Authority leſs dreadful to have it divided among a greater number of Perſons: And yet their Court conſiſts commonly of ſeventeen, the *Duke* preſiding theſe, and the *Six Councellors* of the *Colledg* aſſiſting. Sometimes there is a *Giunta*, or acceſſion of certain *Senators*, who have equal ſuffrage in the ſaid *Council*, as the reſt,

in

in which caſe the *Procurators*, the *Sage-Grans*, and the three *Avogadors* have right to ſit among them by virtue of their Places, not as Judges, but Aſſiſtants, without any Votes *

* *Jus ſuffragii non habent, etſi omnibus negotiis*, &c. G. Contr. Ven. *Reipub.* lſ. 3.

Every Month three *Capi-Dieci* are choſen by Lots; Theſe *Capi-Dieci* have Power to open all Letters addreſſed to the *Council*, and to report them when they have done: They receive privately the Depoſitions of Informers, and give out Orders for the ſeizure of the Perſon accuſed: They viſit the Priſons, examine what Priſoners they pleaſe, and diſcharge what they think Innocent. They aſſemble the *Council*, not only every eight days according to Cuſtom, but as oft as they think fit, provided two of them concur in it. Each of theſe three *Capi-Dieci* has his Week, during which, he that is chief receives the Letters, Interrogates parties, and having communicated with his two *Colleagues*, concerts with them what is to be done: And he that is in Authority, is in the *Grand Council* with the *Avogador de Semaine*, placed right over againſt the *Doge*.

In ſhort, the *Dieci* of *Venice* have the ſame Power as the *Ephori* had in *Sparta*. The *Dieci* can Depoſe, Impriſon, and Condemn to Death all the Magiſtrates in the City, even the *Duke* himſelf: But the *Ephori* could not judg either of the *Kings* of *Sparta* without concurrence of the *Senat* and the other *King* (for in that *State* there were always *Two* Contemporary *Kings* *) and if the *Ephori* had Power to put all ſorts of People to Death without formal Proceſs (which gave

* See the Remarks.

gave * *Plato* occaſion to call their Authority Tyranical); The *Council of Ten* have often made it appear that they are abſolute, in Condemning their Fellow-Citizens upon bare ſuſpitions, yet in reality they are more moderate than the *Ephori*.

**Ephoris licet indicta cauſa tot occidere quot libitum eſt.* Iſocr. *Ephirorum imperium mirum in modum ibi Tyrannicum.* l. 4. de leg.

The *Ephori* had Cognizance of all affairs belonging to their *Commonwealth*, and a ſuperinſpection upon the Conduct of all Perſons who manage it, and therefore they were called *Ephori*. The *Dieci* of *Venice* have the ſame Power. The *Ephori* were inſtituted as a Balance to their *Kings*, and to keep them within the bounds of their Duty; the *Dieci* were inſtituted to curb and withſtand the ambition and inſolence of the *Nobles*: and as *Theopompus* rendered Kingſhip agreeable to the *Lacedemonians*, by the Creation of this Magiſtrate to reſtrain it from extravagance, ſo have the *Venetians* made their Government more plauſible to the People, by ſetting up the *Council of Ten*, as a check to the exorbitance of their Commanders; ſo that theſe *Ten* are the defenders of the People, as well as the *Ephori*, though their Government be not Popular. The *Ephori* had a care and ſuperintendency over their Sports, and publick Combats invented for the exerciſe of their Youth; The *Ten* have the ordering of publick Feaſts, and ſolemn Combats betwixt the *Caſtellans* and the *Nicolates*; and the direction of their * *Regates* or Sea-fights. The *Ephori* had the diſpoſing of the Publick Revenue; the *Dieci* have their Treaſury, where a third of the Publick Moneys is entred, with a ſuperintendency of all the Schools and Fraternities of the City, which are taxed

Ephoros vocarunt quod Reip. negotia inſpicerent. Suid.

* See the Remarks

taxed upon any publick neceſſity, as the *Dieci* think fit. In a word, the *Dieci* are annual like the *Ephori*, and cannot no more than they, be continued in their Office; but they may be choſen again two years after: And this is ſo exactly obſerved, that a Nobleman who has been but one day in Office, if the year be out, depoſits his *Decemviral* Robe, and is excluded the *Council* for two years, as much as if he had executed the Office his full time.

The new Nobility cannot pretend to this Charge, but after long and conſiderable ſervice, for they muſt be ſo many intermediate Offices, and gain the friendſhip of the Ancient Nobility, who will otherwiſe oppoſe their Elections: Beſides, the ancient Nobility will not equal them ſo ſoon by thoſe Honours, leſt having great Eſtates generally, the addition of ſuch great Dignity ſhould advance them above them.

The *Dieci* have place, and deliberative Voice in the *Senat*, wearing a Purple-Robe with Ducal-Sleeves.

This *Council* in their Orders and Proclamations do aſſume the Title of *Eccelſo*, to ſhew the Grandure and Puiſſance of their Dignity.

Of the Quaranties.

THere are *Three* Courts in *Venice* called *Quaranties*, becauſe each of them conſiſts of *Forty* Members. The firſt is the New *Quarentie*-Civil, to which an Appeal lies in all Civil

Civil Cauſes, from the Sentence of all Magiſtrates abroad. The *Second* is the old *Quarantie-Civil*, that Judges in all Appeals from the inferiour Magiſtrates in the City. The *Third* is the *Quarantie-Criminel*, which Judges in all Criminal matters except Treaſon, which belongs properly to the *Council of Ten*. Theſe *Three* Courts are each of them conſiderable, but the laſt is of greater reputation than the other two, becauſe all its Members have deliberative Voices in the *Senat*. Becauſe their *Capi* have place in the *Colledg* among the *Councellors di Sopra*, and becauſe it is called the *Sereniſſimo Seignoria*, like the Aſſembly of the *Colledg*, their three *Councellors* preſiding there in the name of the *Seigniory*. Beſides, this Court is the Parliament of all the Subjects of that *State*, as the *Council of Ten* is of the Nobles.

Eight Months is the time they remain in either of theſe *Quaranties*, and the firſt ſtep being to the *New Quarantie*, the next is to the *Old*, and the third to the *Criminel*.

The two *Quaranties-Civil* conſiſt only of the poorer Nobility, for the richer ſort will not have patience to attend ſixteen Months to gain a *Ducat* by their Place, and therefore they aſpire to enter at firſt into the *Quarantie-Criminel*, at leaſt into the *Old Quarantie*, one, or perhaps two Months before it concludes, to the end they may paſs preſently to the *Quarantie-Criminel*, and have Voices in the *Pregadi*.

To each of theſe Courts there being two *Contradictors* or *Advocates*, who undertake the Cauſes of the Defendants, and manage them againſt the *Avogadors*, eſpecially in Criminal matters, where all their Art and Rhetorick is ſhewn in the behalf of the Perſon accuſed.

And

And here it is to be obſerved, that inferior Judges cannot be called to the *Old Quarantie-Civil*, without the advice and conſent of three *Auditori Vecchi*, nor to the *New Quarantie-Civil* but by permiſſion of the *Auditori Novi*: For if theſe *Auditors* confirm the Sentence of the inferiour Magiſtrate, the buſineſs cannot be carried up into a higher Court, without depoſing a certain Sum of Money, beſides paying the Fees.

There have been admitted into the *Senat* forty of the Judges-*Criminel*, (who are commonly Gentlemen of the ſecond and third Form) to balance the ancient Nobility, againſt whom they uſually unite, by reaſon of the animoſity they bear them. But many times that is an impediment to their affairs.

The Chiefs of theſe *Quaranties* change every two Months: It belongs to them to appoint the time for hearing a Cauſe, which they call *dar il pendere*, or *dar il Conſiglio alle Cauſe*. But in the two *Quaranties-Civil*, Priviledg'd Cauſes are firſt to be diſpatched, and thoſe next who are brought in by the *Auditors* in order, according to the Roll. Thoſe Cauſes are called Priviledg'd which are betwixt Father and Son, Mother and Daughter, or Brother and Brother; as alſo the Cauſes of the *Avogadori*, which are called *Cauſe Avogadoreſche*: The Cauſes of Priſoners, and Pupils under the Tutilage of the *Procurators* of St. *Mark*.

'Tis not lawful to ſolicit theſe Judges either in Perſon, or by Proxy: All that can lawfully be done in the *Quaranties-Civil*, is to Petition thoſe Chiefs to bring the buſineſs to a ſpeedy Hearing. But in the *Quarantie-Criminel* it is lawful to employ all the intereſt, and importunity of ones Friends. Let us now paſs to the inferior Magiſtrates of the City.

Of

Of the three Avogadors.

THE *Avogadors* were inſtituted under *Duke Orie Malipierre* about the year 1180, and are in *France* called *Avocats* General, but with this difference; in *France* they ſpeak finally after the Counſel for the Plaintiff has ſpoken; and at *Venice* the *Avogadors* ſpeak firſt, and open the Accuſation *, after which the Counſel for the Defendant replies.

* *Conſilio coacto magiſtratus Advocatorius accuſatoris vice fungitur.* G. Contarin. Ven. *Reip.* l. 3.

The principal duty of an *Avogador* is to ſee the Laws obſerved, and to proceed rigorouſly againſt thoſe who tranſgreſs them; as alſo to oppoſe the Deliberations of all the other Magiſtrates. In which they reſemble the ancient *Tribunes* of the People in *Rome*, who, as *Aulus Gellius* reports †, had not the power of Judging, but of interpoſing their Authority in defence of the Rights and Priviledges of the People againſt the Authority of the Magiſtrates, not excepting even the *Dictators*. *Gaſpar Contarin* tells us they may be called *Tribunes* of the Law, becauſe they are the Conſervators of that, as the *Roman Tribunes* were of the Liberties of the People.

† *Tribuni pl. antiquitus creati videntur, non juri dicundo, nec cauſis, quereliſq; de abſentibus noſcendis, ſed interceſſionibus faciendis.* C. 12. l. 13.

The difference betwixt the *Tribunes* and the *Avogadors* is this, that the *Tribunes* were Creatures only

only of the People; the *Avogadors* of the *Commonwealth* in general, and are therefore called *Avogadori di Commune* *. They remove all Proceſs whether they pleaſe, thoſe which are of no great conſequence, to the *Quarantie Criminel*; others to the *Senat* or *Grand Conncil*, according to the quality of the Cauſe.

The *Quarantie Criminel* cannot refuſe them when they deſire to be heard, by reaſon of a peculiar Priviledg; and therefore when an *Avogador* preſſes, all other buſineſs muſt be laid aſide. Sometimes they carry their Civil Affairs before the *Colledg*, as when Controverſy is about *Fiefs*, or Lands depending upon any Manor, which they would reunite to the Demeaſns, as it hapned in the year 1670 about Lands which the *Avogadors* of *Breſcia* alledged belonged in Propriety to them.

In all Debates and Deliberations either of the *Grand Council* or *Senat*, it is neceſſary at leaſt one *Avogador* be preſent; if not, their Reſolutions are void, and of none effect.

The good or ill Adminiſtration of Juſtice depends upon theſe *Avogadors*, it being their work to frame and prepare all Proceſſes brought into Court, and if they be ill men, as happens too oft, 'tis in their power to do a great deal of miſchief.

There are always grave and auſtere men choſen into theſe Offices, to give the People greater awe and veneration for the Laws, and to oblige them to greater ſeverity, the Law gives theſe *Avogadors* a conſiderable ſhare in all Confiſcations. One *Theodore Balbi*, who had narrowly eſcaped the Accuſations of his enemies in the *Council of Ten*, was made an *Avogador* not long after his diſcharge, meerly out of an opinion that he would uſe the ſame

* *Advocatores Communis dicuntur, quaſi omnium advocati, & Interceſſores.* Contarin. Ven. *Reip.* l. 3.

ſame ſeverity towards other People, that he had experimented himſelf; and he anſwered their expectation.

When the *Quarantie-Criminel* judges a Perſon, the *Avogador* who brings in the Proceſs has no deliberative Voice, in reſpect that he is the Accuſer; but he has power to propoſe the ridgeſt puniſhment he pleaſes, after which, the three Preſidents of the Aſſembly propoſe another more moderate, and both opinions being put to the *Balot*, plurality of Voices carry it.

When the *Grand Council* makes any new Order that the *Avogadors* judg prejudicial to the Publick, or any ways incompatible with the Laws of the *State*, they can hinder the Regiſtring and publication of it till it be more deliberately debated in another Aſſembly, like the *Roman Tribunes*, who could ſtop the Decrees of all other Magiſtrates; and this is called in *Venice*, *Intromittero*, anſwering to *Intercederi* in *Latin*, which is as much as to Withſtand, or to Oppoſe, in *Engliſh* *; Upon this Conſideration it was that *Don Innego de Cardenas*, Embaſſador in Ordinary at *Venice* from the Court of *Spain*, endeavoured at the time of the Juriſdiction to have been made *Avogador*, though but for two hours, promiſing (without farther explaining himſelf) that in time he would accommodate the difference betwixt his *Holineſs* and that *Commonwealth*; which, in my judgment, he propoſed only for the ſuſpenſion of two Decrees of the *Senat*, which were then in diſpute: a thing the *Pope* did paſſionately deſire, that he might have honourable pretence for the revoking his Cenſures. But the *Seigniory* diſcerning the drift of his Propoſition, and of what conſequence it would be to ſuffer Suſpenſion of the Laws, they returned no Anſwer to the Embaſſadors motion, that they might not diſguſt him by a refuſal. They

* *Erat intercedere id quod vulgo dicimus ſe opponere.* N. Gr. *Com.* Rom. l. 1.

1. Touching building of Churches.
2. About Alienation of Secular Eſtates to the Clergy.

They have Power likewiſe to hinder their Poſſeſſion of thoſe places, or the Execution of them, if in, till they purge themſelves of the Accuſations againſt them. Thus the *Avogador Corrare* would have ſuſpended the Veſt of the *Procuratorſhip* from *Francis Moroſini*, who had been in poſſeſſion of the ſaid Dignity 14 months, which doubtleſs would have had its effect, had not *Corrare* abandoned his Accuſation.

'Tis the Office of the *Avogadors* to exact and receive all Fines and Mulcts charged upon any Magiſtrate for tranſgreſſing the Laws: and out of every Fine they have a certain allowance, which with their other Fees, and ordinary Aſſignments upon confiſcated Goods, amounts, and makes their Revenue very conſiderable.

Being Guardians of the *Laws*, they are obliged at certain times to read in the *Grand Council* the ancient Laws, to rub up the memory of the Noblemen, and keep them to a ſtricter obſervation of them. For good Laws are not ſufficient, without good Men to aſſert them, and ſee them put in execution *.

* *Non ſatis viſum eſt bonas leges habere, niſi Cuſtodes earum diligentiſſimos Cives Creaſſent quos Græci* νομὸ φυλακὰς *appellant.*

And as the *Nomophylaces* of the *Athenians* kept the Regiſter of their publick Deliberations, to which they had recourſe, when it was in queſtion what was to be done, or what had been formerly done in that caſe: in like manner the *Venetian Avogadors* keep the Originals of all *Orders* of the *Grand Council*, and all the *Decrees* of the *Senat*, as alſo a Regiſter of all *Noble* Families, in which they ſet down daily the Birth, Eſtate, Name, and Surname of every Gentleman and Gentlewoman, that

no falſe Nobility might be foiſted in among the true; which would be eaſily diſcerned by comparing their Notes with thoſe who preſent themſelves for Entrance into the *Council*, when their age requires.

Their Authority formerly was much greater, for they had the management of all ſorts of Affairs: but ſince the Power of the *Council of Ten* has been eſtabliſhed, the Power of the *Avogadors* has been leſſened: and yet they can ſuſpend the *Decrees* of the *Grand Council*, by producing new matter in favour of the Criminal, unleſs his Crime be againſt the *Government*, for in that Caſe there is no ſuſpenſion. It is always one of theſe *Avogadors* who pronounces Sentence in that Court againſt the Perſons condemned. They are Elected by the *Senat*, and *Grand Council*; the firſt propoſes, and the ſecond almoſt conſtantly accepts, but they may reject if they pleaſe: yet that falls out but ſeldom, by reaſon of the reſpect is born to the *Senat*, whoſe Judgment is reckoned as their Touch-ſtone for Vertue and Eſteem.

During the life of the *Doge*, neither his Children nor Brothers can be *Avogadors*, leſt they ſhould encline more to him than the *Commonwealth*, and relax ſomething of the ſeverity of the *Laws*, in favour to him.

The *Avogadors* are habited like the three *Capi-Dieci* in Purple-Robes with Ducal-Sleeves, and the Red-Bonnet in *Winter*: but in *Summer* their Robe is of Black Watered-Camlet, with a Bonnet of the ſame. Every *Grand Council*-day they are clothed in Scarlet; and their Office continues for 16 months.

The two Cenſors.

THE Juriſdiction of the *Cenſors* extends principally to the Manners of particular Perſons: to the Deſigns and Contrivances of the *Nobles* in the *Broglio* to obtain Preferment; to the Condemnation or Fining of thoſe who violate the Statutes of the *Grand Council.* To the payment of Wages; the pilfering of Servants; and laſtly, to the correction of the *Gondoliers* when they ſtop up the paſſage upon the *Canal,* towards the Palace of St. *Mark,* for which offence they have many times given them the *Eſtrapade* in ſome publick place.

When a Malefactor is interrogated by order of the *Quarantie Criminel,* one of theſe *Cenſors,* one of the *Judges* of the Night *al Criminal* are preſent, but always with the *Avogador* who brings in the Proceſs, and theſe three Noblemen aſſembled, are called *Il Colleggietto Criminale.*

Theſe *Cenſors* are 16 months in Office, during which time they have deliberative Voices in the *Pregadi,* and are habited in Purple-Cloth with Ducal-Sleeves in *Winter,* and in *Summer* with black Watered-Camlet, and Chaperons of the ſame.

The three Syndics.

THis *Magiſtrate* has Authority over all the inferior *Juſtices* of St. *Mark*, and the *Rialte*, with power to reviſe their Acts, and vacate their Decrees: He puniſhes the Notaries, Proctors, Serjeants, and *Copiſtes* or Clerks, who exact more than is required by the Tax. But this is not over-ſtrictly obſerved, for the *Syndics* do many times diſſemble and connive, in conſideration of the profit accrewing thereby.

But as the *Syndics* can null or reform the Sentences *delle Corti di San-Marco e Rialto*, ſo the *Avogadors* can correct or vacate the Decrees of the *Syndics*, and when they have done, carry the buſineſs before one of the *Quaranties*, or the *Colledg* of XX *Sages*, according to the quality of the Cauſe. There are three *Syndics* in Extraordinary, to eaſe the other, and ſupply their places when any of them are abſent.

The six Seigniors Criminal de Nuit.

THese Gentlemen have the Cognizance of all Thefts and Robberies by *night*. Receivers of ſtollen Goods; Incendiaries, ſuch as have two Wives, Raviſhers of Women, and *Jews* taken lying with *Chriſtian* Women, fall under their Juriſdiction; the *Jews* are many times condemned to death for that Crime, and if their Sentence be confirmed by the Magiſtrate *dell' Proprio*, (who notwithſtanding is but a Civil Officer) there lies no appeal, otherwiſe 'tis removable to one of the *Quaranties*-Civil.

Theſe Lords Criminal of the *Night* were inſtituted at firſt but *two* by *Duke Marin Moroſini*, one of them with Juriſdiction beyond the *Rialto*, and another on the other ſide: but in the *Dogeſhip* of *Renier Zen* his ſucceſſor, the *Grand Council* added *four* more to them. Their Office is like the Office of the *Chevalier du Guet* among the *Romans*. They are annual, and their Fee a *Ducat* every morning they ſit, and half a *Ducat* every Afternoon.

The six Lords-Civil *of the Night.*

THey are Judges in certain Nocturnal Affairs that are not altogether Criminal, as alſo in cheats and frauds betwixt private perſons; they lay the Damages, appoint the Coſts, and execute the Sentences of the Magiſtrate called *al Foriſterio*, for regulating and letting of Houſes.

They were inſtituted under *Duke Peter Lando* with the *Auditori Noviſſimi*, and created for the eaſe of the ſaid *Auditori*, who had too much buſineſs upon their hands; their judgment goes no higher than fifty *Ducats*.

The three Proveditors du Commun.

THE Office of this Magiſtrate (not unlike the *Ædils* in *Rome*) is to keep up the neatneſs and uniformity of the *City*; to ſee the *Pavements* and *Bridges* kept in repair: to look to the *Ships*, and ſee they be not over-laden: to preſerve the *Priviledges* of the *Citizens*; to ſet a Plate upon new-Printed Books; to inſpect the ſeveral Companies of *Artiſts*; and the *Gondoliers*. They have Vote in the *Pregadi*, and continue in Office ſixteen months.

The

The three Proveditori alle Ragione Vecchie.

THeir Office is in the name of the *Senat* to ſend the accuſtomed Preſents to Princes, Embaſſadors, or other great Lords as come to *Venice*, and to keep an account of all thoſe kind of expences. They are Judges of all damage done to the Demeaſns of the *Seigniory* without the Town, with Power to inſpect the Accounts of the Proveditors *alle Biave*. This Magiſtrate reſembles the *Queſtors* in *Rome*, who had the care of lodging ſuch Princes and Embaſſadors as came ſuddenly to Town, and to furniſh them with neceſſary conveniences in the Name of the Publick: they continue likewiſe 16 months, and have voice in the *Pregadi*.

There are alſo three *Proveditori alle Ragione nuove*, young Gentlemen appointed to look to the payment of ſuch as are concerned in the Publick Forms, and to ſeize their Eſtates upon any defect. It belongs to them likewiſe to cauſe to be coined ſeveral little pieces of Silver called *Oſelle*, which pieces the *Doge* preſents to all the Noblemen of the *Grand Council*, in lieu of certain River-fowl which were ſent them formerly to their Houſes, from whence the Medals are called *Oſelle*.

The four Proveditori alla Giuſtitia Vecchia.

THeir Office is to judg in caſes of falſe weights or meaſures, and they commonly puniſh thoſe Offenders ſeverely. They ſet the priſes upon *Fruit*, and *Sea-fiſh*, which the *Fiſhermen* are obliged to ſell ſtanding, with their Hats in their hands, by that inconvenience to humble them, and take from them the confidence of bartering too ſawcily with the Citizens. All *Mechannicks* are under the Juriſdiction of theſe *Proveditors*, ſo that if a Citizen has any controverſy with an *Artificer*, it belongs to theſe *Proveditors* to decide it.

Theſe kind of *Tradeſmen* cannot change their *Signs* for their Shops, but with permiſſion from them; nor take an *Apprentice* or other Perſon to work, without acquainting them with the Conditions, which they cauſe to be entred into a Regiſter, otherwiſe their Contracts are void.

There are three other *Proveditors* called *della Giuſtitia Nuova*, whoſe Authority is over *Inns* and *Cabaritts*, to prevent ſelling of ſophiſticated *Wines*. They take care likewiſe that Taxes be well paid, and they continue 16 months in their Office.

The

The three Sopra Proveditori alle Biave.

THeſe *Seigniors* like the *Ædiles Coreris* inſtituted by *Julius Cæſar*, have care of providing the City with *Corn* and all ſorts of *Grain*, that by keeping the People in plenty, they might keep them obedient and well-affected to the Government: upon apprehenſion of Famine, theſe Officers adviſe with the *Doge* and *Sages* of the *Colledg* how they may ſupply themſelves from the Neighbouring *Provinces*, and to this purpoſe they contract with certain wealthy *Merchants* who engage to bring them in, and deliver them at *Venice* the quantity agreed for, at a preciſe day upon certain Conditions, which are always made good by the *Seigniory*, and if the Merchant fails, he is condemned in a conſiderable penalty.

There are ſubſervient to theſe Magiſtrates *three* other Nobles called *Proveditori alle Biave* who do the ſame, and two *Seigniori al Formento*, who viſit the publick *Magazins*; ſee them filled up again every *year*, and when any thing waſts, or grows unfit to keep them, they ſee it ſold, and other bought in its place, by which means they are continually full.

The four Sopra Proveditori del Sal.

THeſe Officers ſee the *Salt* brought from the Publick *Salt-houſes*, into the *Granaries* of the *City*, where 'tis diſpoſed and ſold by their direction; they have Power to puniſh ſuch as imbezle it, or ſell it without permiſſion. This Office is of conſiderable profit, but it laſts but ten Months. The *Senat* Creates ſometimes three *Reviſori al Sal*, to look into the abuſes committed in the *Gabelle*, after which, their Office ceaſes.

The three Sopra Proveditori alla Sanita.

'TIS their Office to ſee that nothing contagious be brought into the *City*, and that nothing putrified or ſtinking be ſold in the Market. 'Tis their Office to ſend out of the Town all ſuch as are ill of any Peſtilential Diſeaſe; to hinder any Perſons, or Commodities from Landing till they know from whence they come, and the Captain of the Ship produces a formal Certificate

cate from the Magiſtrates of the place where he Laded. Otherwiſe they are ſent three miles off from *Venice* to the *Lazant* to make their *Quarantine*. And theſe *Proveditori* are aſſiſted with three more of the ſame Name.

There is no Town in the World where they are more careful of their health than this: and not without reaſon, for indeed the *Plague* has raged ſtrangely among them, and continues commonly a long time becauſe of the ſtreightneſs of the *Streets*, and drineſs of a great part of their *Canals*, in *Summer*, which ſends forth moſt unſufferable ſtinks: and therefore there are two Offices created expreſly for the *Water*, the one called *Savii alla Acque*, conſiſting of *Senators* or *Procurators*; the other, *Eſecutori alle Acque*, compoſed of *three* young *Noblemen*, whoſe buſineſs is to ſee the Regulations and Orders of the firſt duly executed; both of them have Power to puniſh ſuch as caſt any naſtineſs into the *Canals*, which the Laws require to be cleanſed every year to prevent their filling up. But the conſtant cleanſing them according to that Law, having been neglected during the War in *Candia*, produce great Inconvenience in many places, not only for ſtinks, but by making the paſſage difficult by the heaps of Mud and Sand; inſomuch that to clear their *Canals* and their *Ponds*, the Undertakers have asked no leſs than two Millions, whereas had it been taken in time, it could not have coſt above 100000 Crowns.

The

The three Sopra Proveditori alle Pompe.

THis Officer in *Venice*, is the ſame the *Gineconomo* were in *Athens*; The *Harmoſins* in *Sparta*; and the *Cenſors* in *Rome*. For like theirs, it is the buſineſs of theſe to reform extravagance both in Cloaths and Diet, which in the judgement of *Seneca* is the ſign of a declining *State**. And indeed Feaſting is ſo rare a thing in *Venice* (where the Nobility live generally ſordidly) that were it not for ſome Perſons who have brought from their Embaſſies abroad, a neater way of eating, the *Proveditori alle Pompe* would not have much trouble to bring them to Obedience: ſo as they might omit their frequently reiterated *Proclamations* againſt eating of *Fleſh* and *Fiſh* at the ſame Meal, ſeeing moſt of the Nobility content themſelves with *Pilchards*, and *Muſſles*, and ſuch cheap ſtuff, ſo that the Scandal of an *Ichliophagos* would agree with them more properly than with the *Greeks*, who eat *Fiſh* for Luxury, whereas the *Venetian* does it for Nearneſs.

* *Conviviorum luxuria, & veſtium, egræ Civitatis indicia ſunt.* Ep. 115.

The outward *Robe* of the *Nobility* (which is commonly a Cloath-Veſt, with a Bonnet of the ſame) has no difference, nor does at all diſtinguiſh the the poverty and richneſs of the Wearer, unleſs it be by the neatneſs of the making up; for their *Robes* are to be all of a certain Cloath made at *Padua*, and if any of them be ſo hardy

as to make it of *Spaniſh*, *Engliſh*, or *Dutch* Cloth, they muſt pay dear for the faſhion. But the young Noblemen that are rich, diſtinguiſh themſelves uſually by their under-Garments, which is for the moſt part of ſome rich flowered Silk, trim'd very thick with broad Lace. Sometimes their Doublet is of Cloth of Gold or Silver, which they ſhew at the opening of their Gowns. And when they go upon the Water, they pull off their Gowns on purpoſe: an abuſe that is ſuffered by the *Magiſtrate des Pompes*, as not knowing whether his Authority would be able to remedy it *, any more than ſeveral other faſhions which Licentiouſneſs and Ambition have introduced among the Women: which diverted *Lycurgus* from making Laws againſt the extravagance of the *Spartan Ladies*. So that theſe *Seigniors* choſe rather to let thoſe inconveniences reſt, than to make new Laws againſt them, which being deſpiſed as the former, would ſerve only to give more Head and Authority to their Luxury, and load the Reformers with the diſpleaſure of the moſt Illuſtrious Families †. For in *Venice* there are People of that *Roman Tribunes* opinion, who cried, *Quid opus Libertate, ſi voluntibus luxu perire, non licet? To what purpoſe is Liberty, if thoſe who have a mind to ruin themſelves by their Luxury, may not have leave.* Thoſe young Noblemen who have ſome 40, ſome 50000 *Ducats* a year, would think themſelves very unhappy to be obliged to live like their firſt Anceſtors, whoſe Dominion was only over one *Town*, and whoſe Paſtime and Subſiſtance was nothing but *Fiſhing*, and might argue as a *Senator* did formerly, That the *Grandure* of a rich *Citizen* ought to be ſuitable to the *Grandure* of the *State*, and that no mans

* *Indecorum eſt attrectare quod non obtinere-tur.* Tac. Ann. 3.

† *Tot leges contemptu abolitæ ſcuriorem luxum fecere.* ibid.

Ex-

Expence is extravagant that exceeds not his Revenue *.

* *Postquam eo magnificentiæ venerit, discere singulos, neque in Familia Nimirum aliquid, aut modicum, nisi ex fortuna possidentis.* Ann. 2.

All that the Laws can do, is to hinder the growth of that mischief by chastising those who presume too far: or by chargeable imployments, or fines: and to this end the *Venetian* Ladies are much restrained in their ordinary Gallantry of their Sex; they are not allowed to wear Necklaces of *Pearl*, Roses, Crosses, Bracelets or Lockets of *Diamonds*. They have not their *Gondoliers* in Livery, but the first year of their Marriage. Nor in all my time at *Venice* did I see above one Lady that transgressed these Laws, who being the Daughter of a *Gondolier*, and marrying with a *Procurator* of *St. Mark*, could not hold, but must needs be shewing her *Jewels*, as if she thought by their lustre to dazle the eyes of the People, and keep them from reflecting upon her Birth: or that she might be as remarkable for the richness of her dress, as for the adventures of her life.

As to the *Courtesans*, the Magistrate *des Pompes* has such authority over them, that in Fees, and in Fines he goes away with the greatest part of their gains, they being unable to contain themselves within the rules prescribed by the Law. They must have rich Clothes at any rate, to invite their Gallants, but 'tis not enough they pay for them in the Shops, they must pay for them again a second, and perhaps a third time to these *Proveditori*. The *Courtesans* are not allowed to wear the White Veil, to divert themselves upon the *Grand-Canal*; to meet in any assembly of great

great Ladies, or to pass in a *Gondole* with two Oars: but their humours could not be subjected to these rules; and were they not maintained or protected by persons of authority, they would rot most of them in Prison, or dye in an Hospital. The Laws of this nature relating to the regulation of exorbitancy in young Noblemen, are observed rigorously at first, but they are neglected by degrees *. This Court is commonly supplied with *Procurators* of St. *Mark*, or at least by *Senators* of the Principal Rank.

* *Acribus initiis, in curioso fine.* Ann. 5.

All these *Sopra Proveditori* are named by the *Senat*, as also the *Three* annual *Superintendants* of the *Tenths* of the *Clergy*, who receive the Ecclesiastical Contributions; the *Six Proveditors* sent upon the *Terra firma* in Harvest time, to collect what is due to the Publick. The *Three Proveditors* of the *Arsenal*, whose business is to see it furnished with every thing that is necessary. The *Three Sopra Proveditori l'Armamento*, who give direction for equipping of the *Gallies* and *Galleasses*; and the *Proveditors* of the *Forts*, who have all of them Voices in the *Pregadi*.

The

The three Governadori dell' Entrate

ARE properly the *Sur-Intendans de Finances*, for they have the management of all the Publick Revenue: they lett all the *Farms*, and the *Farmers* are responsible to them. This Magistracy is always executed by ancient *Senators*, eminent for Incorruption and good *Oeconomie*. They have under them three Officers called *Camerlenghi di Commune* or Receivers General, to whom the particular Receivers pay in what they receive.

The ten Sages

ARE like a little *Colledg* that taxes the Estates of particular Persons when the Publick is in distress for Moneys, as happens in time of War very often, the ordinary Revenue of the *State* being unable to defray the whole Charge. The Tax is paid exactly by the Nobles, and if any are in Arrear, they are put *inter Ærarios*, and as such excluded the *Grand Council*, and all other Publick Office till they have paid it.

The

The four Judges della Meſoettaria.

ALL *Notaries* in the *Commonwealth* are obliged under penalty of Impriſonment and a Fine, to give theſe Judges Copies of all Bargains or Contracts paſſing through their hands, and relating to the buying of Houſes, Lands, or Ships (Ships being accounted immovables in *Venice* by reaſon of its ſcituation) that the purchaſers may not be put into poſſeſſion, till they have paid a Duty to the *State* of three or four *per Cent.* otherwiſe the Bargain is void: *Meſſetto* in the Language *of Lombards* ſignifying an interpoſer, from whence this Magiſtrate takes his name, there being no Bargains nor Sales made, but one of theſe four interpoſes.

The three Judges al Foreſtier.

THE Juriſdiction of theſe Judges, like that of the *Prætor Peregrinus* in *Rome*, extends to all Controverſies betwixt their Subjects and Strangers, betwixt Stranger and Stranger:

as alſo to the letting of Houſes, Ships, or Boats to hire.

The three Cattaveri.

THey judg of all goods found either at Land or at Sea, determining to whom they belong. The word *Cattaveri*, is as much as Searcher of the truth, *Cattar* in the *Lombard* Language ſignifying to Search. They appropriate to the Publick, and put it in poſſeſſion of all the Goods of ſuch as dye Inteſtate, or without Heirs. They puniſh ſuch of the *Jews* as wear the *Black Cap* without permiſſion from them; a liberty they ſell for Money, but never for above a Month, that they may have always a way of ſqueezing thoſe People, who would not be diſtinguiſhed by a *Red Cap*.

The three Seigniori alli Banchi.

THeir Juriſdiction extends only to three places where the *Jews* are obliged to lend their Money upon Security; a way the Publick has found out to ſupply the poor People, who had rather pawn their Goods to them, and redeem them again at moderate Intereſt, than to

to sell them for half the worth, as they would be constrained by their necessities. These *Banks* are not unlike those in *Italy* called *Monti di Pieta.*

Not to trouble my Reader with an unnecessary ennumeration of particulars, I pass by an Hundred other *Judges*: But must not (as I conceive) leave *Venice*, and make a visit to the Provincial *Magistrates*, till I have said something of their *Chancellor* and *Secretaries*, as bearing part in the Government: as also of the *Patriarch* of that City, and the *Venetian Cardinals*, a matter that carries great connection with the Subject I intend.

Of the Chancellor *and* Secretaries.

THE *Grand Chancellor* is Head of the second Order, that is of *Citizens*, amongst whom he is a kind of a *Doge*: *Cancellarius Ducem quasi ex populo refert.* He is present at all *Councils* without exception. He is privy to all Intrigues and Secrets of the *Commonwealth*, which writes, nor receives no Letters of which he has not a sight. He has the keeping of the *Seal*, and it cannot be taken from him without deposing him quite. He is as it were a *Chevalier* born, by virtue of his Place, which gives him the title of Excellence, and precedence before all the *Senators* and Magistrates of the City, except the *Councellors* of the *Seigniory*, and the

G. Contarin l. 5. *Resp.* Ven.

Procurators of St. *Mark*. He is chief of all the Secretaries, who with him represent the Body of the *Citizens*, as the *Doge* and *Councellors* of the *Colledg* do the Body of the *Nobles*; and therefore in Latine Instruments he is called *Magnus-Scriba*, *& Scribarum Princeps*. And it is to be observed the Office of *Grand Chancellor* is affected by all the Secretaries, as the end of their hopes and desires, to which when they arrive, they will have no cause to lament any pains they have taken, or any Service they have done to the *Commonwealth*; there being no Nobleman (with proportion) so well recompenced as they, no not the *Doge* himself, nor the *Procurators par merite*. The *Chancellors* Office is for life; he wears *Purple* like the *Duke*, and the *six Councellors* of the *Colledg*; enjoys all the priviledges of a Noblesman, and has some peculiar to himself.

The *State* allows him a Pension of 3000 *Ducats*, besides the common Perquisits of his place, which amount to 9 or 10000 *Ducats* more, without obliging him to any expence. In short, he wants nothing but a deliberative Voice in the *Councils*, where he sits only as an Instrument, and in that he is inferior to the meanest of the Nobility.

When the *Seigniory* marches upon any publick occasion, the *Chancellor* is preceded by the *Secretaries*; the *Doge* by the *Chancellor*, and the *Senat* by the *Doge*; where we may take notice of *two* different Customs, *one* of the *Nobles*, which is preceded by their Chief; the *other* of the *Citadinance*, or Body of *Citizens*, which precedes their Chief; the first to shew that the *Nobility* and the *Citizens* are not to take equal measures; the other to intimate that the *Chancellor* is not the

the Creature of the People, but the Agent and Officer of the *Nobles*, by whom he is choſen, and of whom by conſequence he holds his Charge and Authority: and laſt of all to ſignify the concord and harmony of all parts in the *Government*.

The *Chancellor* after his election, makes a publick entry, and paſſes to the *Colledg* accompanied by ſeveral *Procurators*, the ancienteſt of whom (aſſiſting commonly that day) gives him the upper hand, as the *Senators* and the reſt of the *Nobles* do to the *Citizens*, who in that Ceremony march like *Noblemen* in their *Red* Gowns: ſo that it is not altogether unlike the *Saturnals* of old, where the Servants were attended by their Maſters. In Publick Ceremonies, if it be *Winter* the *Chancellor* appears in a Crimſon-*Velvet* Robe; if *Summer*, in Red *Damask*, with his *Stole* of Gold: but his common habit is Scarlet or Purple Cloth.

In a word, when the *Chancellor* dyes, he has the ſame Honours as the *Doge* when he dies: his Funerals are kept in the Church of St *Mark*; and his Elogy pronounced in preſence of the *Senat*, who upon that occaſion are in Mourning, thereby ſhewing greater regrate for the loſs of their *Chancellor*, than for the loſs of their *Duke*, whoſe Obſequies are Celebrated by them in Scarlet Robes, as I obſerved before.

Having ſo many Priviledges, 'tis no wonder that the *Chancellor Auguſtin Vianole* bought Nobility for his Sons, without mentioning himſelf; the reaſon is plain, not being like to be *Chancellor* and Noble *Venetian* together, (a thing that never happened but once, in favour to *Mark Ottobon* Father to the *Cardinal* of that name) he choſe rather to keep his place, and continue in

the *Populate*, than to quit it, and make himſelf *Noble*.

The *Chancellor Ballarin* was of the ſame mind, and preferred his *Chancellorſhip* before the Honour of being *Noble par Merite*, that is to ſay *gratis*, which the *Seigniory* put to his choice.

The *Chancellor* is choſen by the *Grand Council*, as all the Magiſtrates of the City are.

As to the *Secretaries* there are three ſorts. The firſt are called *Secretaries* of the *Council of Ten*, and are moſt conſiderable becauſe of the Preheminence of that Court. The ſecond are called *Secretaries* of the *Senat*: and the third *Notaries*, or *Ducal Clerks*: from *Ducal Clerks* they riſe to be *Secretaries* of the *Senat*, and from thence they are preferred to the *Firſt*, according to their reſpective Capacities. The *Secretaries* of the *Council of Ten* are but four, and their places are much ſought after, and very hard to be got. The *Secretaries* of the *Senat* are twenty four, of which five or ſix are imployed as Reſidents in *Naples*, *Milan*, *Florence*, and *Zurich* in *Switzerland*, with Penſions of 2000 *Ducats*: five or ſix others are imployed as *Secretaries* to their Embaſſies in the Courts of Kings, where the *Senat* continues them for ſeveral years, that at their leiſure they may imbibe all that is neceſſary for the inſtruction of thoſe who ſucceed them; and therefore they are ſeldom recalled, till they have ſerved under two or three Embaſſadors. And theſe are the *Secretaries* who aſſiſt in the *Colledg* at the Audience of Forreign Embaſſadors, that they may briefly expoſe to the *Seigniory* what are the Propoſals of the ſaid Embaſſadors, which ſometimes are underſtood by none of the ſaid Lords, nor by the *Secretary* himſelf. But this inconvenience is prevented by a

Copy

Copy the Embaſſador gives in of his buſineſs, which is tranſlated and preſented before he be admitted by the *Senat*, to whom it belongs to give an Anſwer.

The *Secretaries* of theſe two formes are privy to all affairs, it being their Office to read in the *Colledg*, and in the *Pregadi*, all the *Letters* writ to that *State*; and to prepare all thoſe which are ſent from the *Senat*.

When they carry an Anſwer to the Embaſſadors, they read it before them, and afterwards they impart it to their *Secretaries*: but if they be from home, the *Secretaries* carry back their Copy, for 'tis death to leave it behind them.

Theſe *Secretaries* have, each of them a Salary of 400 *Ducats per annum*, beſides other Profits and conſiderable Priviledges.

In Ceremonies they are clad in *Violet*-coloured Cloth, with *Velvet* Bonnets of the ſame colour.

The *Secretaries* of the third *Claſſis*, are not any preciſe number, and their Office is like our *Regiſters*: For they enter all Judgments given in the Courts of St. *Mark*, and the *Rialte*, to deliver them to the Parties. They draw up the Contracts of Marriage, and paſs all Wills, and other Acts relating to the *Tabellionage*. So that properly they are no more than *Notaries* or *Regiſters*, without any Cognizance in matters of *Government*.

Theſe three Orders of *Secretaries* depend wholly upon the *Council of Ten*, by whom they are choſen, and when any of them is defective, he is reſponſible to that terrible Court.

Of the Patriarch *of* Venice.

VEnice is Governed *in Spiritualibus* by a *Patriarch* always a *Noble Venetian*, and elected by the *Senat*. In his Decrees and Orders he ſtiles himſelf *Patriarch Divina Miſeratione* only, not adding as the reſt of the Biſhops, *& ſanctæ ſedis Apoſtolicæ Gratia*. He is *Primate* of *Dalmatia*, and *Metropolitan* over the *Archbiſhops* of *Candia* and *Corfu*.

The *Ducal* Church of St. *Mark* acknowledges him not, becauſe it has a private Officer of its own called *Primicirio* who performs all the Epiſcopal Functions, giving Benediction to the People, with Indulgences for forty days: conferring the *Quatre-Mineurs* to all who preſent themſelves. And if at any time the *Patriarch* officiates in his *Pontificalibus* in preſence of the *Seignioria*, 'tis upon requeſt to the *Primicier* who conſents perhaps to do him that Honour, but without making it a Preſident.

When the *Primicier* becomes *Patriarch*, he ceaſes to be *Primicier*, leſt the *Deanery* of St. *Mark* ſhould be reunited to the *Patriarchal*.

The *Patriarch* has the nomination only of two Benefices in the City, the *Theologate* of his own Church, and the Cure of St. *Bartholomews*, whoſe Curate is his Vicar by courſe: for the Pope hath the Collation of the *Archdeaconry*; the *Chapter* diſpoſes of the *Prebendaries*, and the *Pariſhians* Citizens as well as Nobles have the choice of their *Curates*.

But

But that which is ſtrange is the ſmall Authority this *Prelat* has over the *Prieſts* and *Monks*, whoſe lives are very ſcandalous. An effect of the jealouſy of this *Republick*, which is to depreſs the credit of Epiſcopal Juriſdiction, oppoſes it ſelf daily by its Magiſtrates againſt the execution of the Sentences given by the Eccleſiaſtical Judges, and protects the *Prieſts* publickly, though they be convict of moſt abominable crimes *. They are often to implore the interpoſition of the ſecular Magiſtrate, (though the buſineſs nothing concerns them) in hopes they may eſcape without puniſhment. Which occaſioned that common ſaying of *Matthew Zanes*, *That* Venice *was become a ſecond* Babylon.

* *Principe & Senatu autoribus, qui non modo licentiam vitiis permiſerint, ſed vim adhibeant.* Tac. Ann. 14.

A great *Prelat* of *Venice* told me one day in Diſcourſe, *That 'twas impoſſible for the* Venetian *Biſhops to reform the manners of their Clergy, becauſe the ſecular Magiſtrate held their hands, and made their Cenſures contemptible; and to annihilate their whole Eccleſiaſtical Power, hindred the holding of Synods, which are the beſt and moſt effectual means of correcting the enormities of the Prieſts.* At the end of which I remember he added an Elogy upon the Church of *France*, whither, as he ſaid, the ſanctity of the whole Primitive Church was retired, concluding with theſe words, *Piaceſſe a Dio che tutta la Chieſa ſi Governaſſe a Guiſa del Clero* Franceſe. *And would to God our Church was governed according to the* French *model.*

There is another thing alſo, a great diminution to his Authority, and that is, That the Body of the Secular Clergy in *Venice*, which contains 70 Pariſhes, is divided into nine Congregations, each of which has a ſeparate Juriſdiction, where all Cauſes of the *Prieſts* and *Friers* in their ſeveral Wards, are firſt judged; and if there be occaſion

for

for an Appeal, it lies before the *Colledg Plebanal*, compoſed of Deputies from all the Congregations; which Deputies do either Null or Confirm the Sentences the private Judges have given before: and this *Colledg* does it ſo well, that their Affairs are ſeldom or never brought before the *Patriarch*, from whoſe Juriſdiction 'tis their whole care to ſubſtract: if at any time any thing of that nature is brought to him, 'tis *Tanquam ad Judicem Compromiſſarium*, ſays the Statute, *Non vero Ordinarium*. By which it appears that the Secular Clergy in *Venice* is in a manner ſeparate from its *Prelat*, to whom, in other reſpects, great Ceremony is paid when he viſits their Churches; a Canopy being prepared for him, as for the *Doge*, or a *Cardinal*.

Venice anciently was but a ſmall *Biſhoprick*, whoſe *Biſhops* were called only *Sanctæ Olivolenſis Eccleſiæ Epiſcopi*, by reaſon of the ſituation of their Church in the Iſle of *Olivole*; and for their whole Revenue, had only the fees of Burials, wherefore they were ſurnamed *Veſcovi de Morti*.

In the year 1091 *Henry Contarin*, the 23d. Biſhop of *Olivole*, took upon him the Title of Biſhop of *Caſtel*, which is the name of one of the ſix Quarters of the Town; and that continued till the year 1451, when the *Patriarchſhip* laps'd to *B. H. Lawrence Juſtinian* Biſhop of *Caſtil*, according to a Bull of *Nicolas* V, or *Eugenius* IV his Predeceſſor, who to end the Controverſy betwixt the *Biſhops* and the *Patriarchs* of *Grade* their *Metropolitans*, Ordered, that when one of the Competitors died, both Churches ſhould devolve to the Survivor, with all their Titles and Rights; and *Dominick Michieli* the *Patriarch* dying firſt, the Biſhop of *Caſtel* was in the *Patriarchal* Dignity, and left it to his Succeſſors.

A No-

A Noble *Venetian* cannot pretend to any Cure in *Venice*, the *State* chooſing to leave thoſe Benefices to the *Populace* to oblige them; as alſo to prevent the diſorders of Competition, which would probably happen betwixt the *Nobles* and them; for in all likelihood the ſuffrages of the People (which have greateſt ſhare in thoſe Elections) would be more inclinable to the Popular Perſon than to the Nobleman. For the ſame reaſon they have granted the Offices and Governments of their *Monaſteries* to the *Citizens*, who thinking themſelves much honoured thereby, are better affected to the *Government*. In which, the *Nobles* imitated the *Romans*, *Apud quos jus imperii valet, inania tranſmittuntur.* Who having the Dominion in their hands, deſpiſe every thing elſe as ſuperfluous.

The *Commonwealth* of *Venice* has under it another *Patriarch* called the *Patriarch* of *Aquileia*, which Town was anciently the *Metropolis* of the Province of *Venice*, and of all *Iſtria*: but 'tis now much fallen from its priſtine Grandure, and much inferior to the *Patriarchſhip* of *Venice*. However the *Patriarch* of *Aquileia* is ſtill Primate of *Iſtria*, and 'tis ſaid, that in all Councils he pretends to Precedence over all the *Arch-Biſhops* and *Primates* of *Chriſtendom*. He chooſes his own *Coadjutor*, (as is ſaid before) who being afterwards confirmed by the *Senat* with the Title of *Eletto d'Aquileia*, keeps his Reſidence at *Udina* in *Friul*. The Patriarch of *Aquileia*.

The *Commonwealth* and the ancient *Patriarchs* of *Aquileia* had great Conteſts about the *Patriarchs* of *Grade*, whom the *Popes* had inveſted with the ſpoils of the *Patriarchs* of *Aquileia*, (for which reaſon, in Hiſtory, *Grade* is called *Aquileia Nova.*) *Mandy-Thurſday* was made a Feſtival originally by one *Ulrick Patriarch* of *Aquileia*, who coming to

Grade

Grade to ſurprize his Competitor, was himſelf made a Priſoner with 12 *Canons*, and after ſet at liberty, upon condition he ſhould ſend every year to *Venice* one *Bull*, 12 *Hogs*, and 12 *Loaves*.

The *Senat* anciently had, or pretended to have the nomination of all the *Biſhops* and *Abbots* in their Dominions; but they wholly renounced it by their Treaty of Peace in the year 1510 with his *Holineſs* Pope *Julius* 2, to take him off from the League of *Cambray*.

Guiccardin. l. 8.

Under the Papacy of *Urban* VIII there was great Controverſy betwixt the Court of *Rome* and the *Senat*, about the propoſition of the *Biſhopricks* belonging to the *State* of *Venice*, in the Conſiſtory; the *Senat* inſiſting that that Function ſhould be performed by the *Venetian Cardinals*: but it was accommodated at length, and agreed that the propoſition about the ſaid *Biſhopricks* ſhould be made by a *Venetian Cardinal*, but the *Cardinal Patron* was always to be by.

The *Senat* never names any particular Nobleman for a *Cap*, leſt it ſhould give offence to the reſt: but the *Venetian* Embaſſador at *Rome* propoſes to the *Pope* ſeveral who are worthy of that Honour, and they are afterwards recommended by the *Senat*. The Embaſſador may propoſe himſelf if he thinks fit; however he employs all his intereſt with the *Pope* for his friends.

Urban VI was the firſt *Pope* who honoured the Noble *Venetians* with this Cardinalitial Dignity, and he did it, becauſe that *Commonwealth* was the only *State* almoſt that ſtuck to him againſt *Clement* VII *Pope* of *Avignion*. Thoſe *Cardinals* were, *Lewis Donat* General of the *Cordeliers*, and *John Amedeus* Arch-Biſhop of *Corfu*: the firſt with the Title of St. *Mark*, the other of St. *Sabina*; ſince which time there have been always *Venetians* in

in the ſacred *Colledg*, and *three* of them were *Popes*. *Ange Corraro* under the name of *Gregory* XII, who notwithſtanding was but the Depoſitory of the Papacy: *Gabriel Condolmier*, his Nephew called *Eugenius* IV: and *Peter Barbo* Nephew to *Eugenius*, with the name of *Paul* II; to whom we might add *Alexander* V that ſucceeded *Gregory*, who being a *Candiot*, was born in the Territory of the *Venetian*.

Paul V was wont to ſay the *Popes* ought not to admit any of the Noble *Venetians* into the ſacred *Colledg*, becauſe the *Venetians* excluded their Eccleſiaſticks out of all Councils and ſecular Offices in that *State*.

But 'tis now time we proceed to the *Magiſtrates* of the *Provinces*.

The Podeſtats.

THE Name of *Podeſta* anſwers to *Prætor* among the *Romans*, as appears by *Latin* Inſcriptions upon the publick Buildings, where the *Podeſta* is called *Prætor*; and the *Venetian Podeſtats* adminiſter Juſtice in their reſpective Juriſdictions, as the *Prætors* did formerly in *Rome*, and in the Provinces.

When theſe Magiſtrates keep their Court, they are aſſiſted by certain Lawyers choſen by them, to give their advice: which the Lawyers eſteem as a more than ordinary Honour. An Appeal lies from theſe *Podeſtats*, to the *Auditori nuovi*, or to the new *Quarantie*-Civil.

The

The Province of *Venice*, which is called *Il Dogado di Venetia*, contains ſeveral *Podeſtaries* or *Regencies*. The chief is *Chiozza*, an Epiſcopal City built like *Venice* upon piles, in which great ſtore of *Salt* is made. The others are *Malamocco*, the Port of *Venice*; *Murano*, a ſmall Town famous for making of *Glaſſes*; *Torcella*, *Grade*, and *Caorle*.

Their Territory upon the *Terra-firma* comprehends ſeven conſiderable Governments, *viz.* *Trevigiana*, *Padua*, *Vicenza*, *Verona*, *Breſcia*, *Bergamo*, and *Crema*, upon which depends many little *Towns*, *Chaſtellanies*, and *Forts*, of which every one has a Gentleman for its Governor; but all theſe Governments laſt but ſixteen months, that thoſe who are in poſſeſſion might not have time by making an intereſt, to make themſelves Maſters. For the *State* of *Venice* differs much from the judgment of *Tiberius*, who ſeldom changed his Governors, pretending that being ſatiated with the Blood of the People, they would grow honeſter men. In ſhort, the threats of *Lentulus Getulicus* to the ſaid Emperor, to raiſe his whole Province, if he ſent another over his head, is a good arguement how dangerous it is to continue Governors too long, becauſe the People will look upon them as their only Maſters, and 'twill be no little difficulty to reſume an Authority that has been left too long in their hands.

Divites ſatietas in melius mutat. Tac. Ann. 3.

The Cities of *Padua* and *Breſcia* are always governed by ancient *Senators*; *Verona* and *Bergamo* by Noble *Venetians* betwixt 35 and 40 years of age, who before had paſſed thorow many Offices in *Venice*: the reſt are commanded by young Gentlemen of the beſt Families of the Nobility.

Every 4th year is ſent a poor Noble *Venetian* to *Vicenza*, by reaſon of a Preſent of Silver which that

that City makes every fifth year to their Governor before his departure.

The City of *Vicenza* is ſtil'd the *Senat's Eldeſt Daughter*, becauſe ſhe was the firſt upon the *Terra-firma* that ſurrendred to the *Commonwealth* of *Venice* in the year 1404.

Tis a long time ſince the *Podeſtats* were permitted to carry their Wives with them to their Governments, leſt the Governors themſelves ſhould be governed by them. But the *Senat* obſerving the diſorders that hapned in ſeveral Families by the abſence of the Husbands, the Chaſtity of their Wives being many times aſſaulted, and often overcome by ſolicitations of their Gallants, (as hapned to the Wife of the Chevalier *Lewis Molin*, and others of later date) they releaſed the ſeverity of that Law, in compaſſion to thoſe perſons who ſerved abroad. But then it imports the Husband to have an eye over the Conduct of his Wife, that at their return from their Command, they be not reproached as ſeveral *Pro-Conſuls* were at *Rome*, for having under their Adminiſtration *duo Pratoria, duo Tribunalia*; for though the fault may be in the Wife, the ſcandal lies wholly upon the Husband, and 'tis he muſt anſwer for it. In theſe Commands it is that the *Nobles* are allowed to exceed in all manner of magnificence, becauſe thereby they ſignify the extraordinary Grandure of the Publick Majeſty, and imprint love and veneration in the minds of the People.

Sexum natura invalidum deſeri, & exponi ſuo luxu, cupidinibus alienis. Ann. 3.

The

The Captains *at* Arms.

THE Office of a *Captain* at *Arms* upon the *Terra-firma*, anſwers to the Military *Tribune* in *Rome*; and in all Inſcriptions upon publick Buildings, he is called *Præfectus Armorum*, or *Tribunus Militum*.

His Office is to Command the Souldiers of the City, and all the Garriſons under his Juriſdiction: he judges in all differences betwixt Officer and Souldier, without application to the *Podeſta*. All the *Chaſtellains* of the Town, and quite thorow his Territory, receive his Orders, and ſubmit to his Juriſdiction, as well Noble *Venetians* as others: It is his care to look to the reparation of the Walls, Gates, Ports, and Fortifications, as he pleaſes. He has the diſpoſing of all the Revenue and Impoſts in his Government, and in all places belonging to it, the *Camerlingues* who receive it, giving an account to him, and not daring to diſburſe a farthing without his Authority; to the end the publick Money ſhould be diſpoſed to the publick Uſe, and that thoſe who keep it may not have power to purloin. The *Roman Prætors* had the diſpoſing of their Treaſure; but the *Venetians* will not allow that liberty to the *Podeſta's*, that by parting equally they might moderate their Authority, and bring them to ſome balance and proportion with the *Captains* at *Arms*, which are the two Officers that repreſent the Majeſty of their Maſters, and are therefore called by one common

mon name *Rectores*, like the Provincial *Harmoſte* of the *Lacedemonians*, in their ſmaller Towns there is only one *Rector*, who is *Podeſta* and *Captain at Armes* both.

Harmoſtæ ſunt qui ad ſubjectas Civitates e Lacedemoniis mittebantur Magiſtratus.

The *Captains at Armes* at *Padua* and *Breſcia*, are always Illuſtrious *Senators*, who for their Services may challenge the Robe of *Procurator par Merite*, when any of thoſe places are vacant.

The *Captain* of *Bergamo* has a deliberative Voice in the *Pregadi* at his return, as alſo the *Chaſtelaine* of *Breſcia*, by peculiar Privileg above all the reſt of the Governours of Caſtles or Forts.

When great Officers in a Town differ about Juriſdiction, which happens very oft, they are not allowed to defend their Cauſe with any thing but the Pen, that is to ſay, by humble Remonſtrances to the *Senat*; and if they come to Blows, both parties are judged Criminal, as well he that receives, as he that offers the Injury.

In Friul.

THE *Proveditor General* of *Palma Nova* is the chief Officer of the whole *Province*; and this Office (always in the nomination of the *Senat*) is *biennial*, and ſupplied by a *Senator* of the firſt Rank.

The *Governour* or Lieutenant of *Udina* is the ſecond Officer in the ſaid Province, and at his return may be propoſed for admiſſion into the *Council of Ten*. There are under him two Officers, one called the *Marſchal d'Udina*, who is a kind of *Chaſtelaine*; and the other a Treaſurer.

The City of *Udina* in the year 1415, came under the Dominion of the *Venetians*, with the whole Province of *Friul*, which before was under the *Patriarchs* of *Aquileia*, to which the Counts *Savorgnanes* contributed much, and were made Noble *Venetians* for their pains.

In Istria.

CApo d'*Istria* the chief Town in that Province, and a Bishoprick, is Governed by a *Podestat* and three *Councellors* of the poorer sort of the Nobility.

Cita-Nuova, *Parenzo*, and *Pola*, all three Episcopal Towns, have each of them their *Podestats*, as also *Piran*, *Rovigno*, *Cherso*, *Osero*, and *Raspo*, which last has the Priviledg of having a *Senator*, because 'tis a place where much is gained with little expence, and therefore some of the poorer sort of *Senators* are sent thither.

In Dalmatia.

THE *Proveditor General* holds the first Rank, and Commands all the *Governours Proveditors*, and *Chastelanies* of Towns and Fortresses in that *Province*; and therefore that Charge is always executed by an Illustrious *Senator*, or *Procurator*; for besides the Authority, 'tis a place of great Profit.

He has under him a Forreigner who Commands the Forces as General, but can do nothing but by his consent; not so much as gratify a Souldier with a Peny, nor order him a loaf of bread more than his Comerade.

The Cities of *Zara*, and *Spalatra*, two Archbiſhopricks in *Dalmatia*, are Governed each of them by a *Count*, and a *Chamberlaine*, who performs likewiſe the Office of a *Chaſtelaine*. Theſe Officers are two years in Office, as is the *Proveditor* of *Cleſſa*, a Fortreſs upon an inacceſſible Mountain. The *Chaſtelains* of *Traco* and *Zebenigo* are *biennial* likewiſe.

Cattaro, an Epiſcopal Town, has two Magiſtrates, one a *Proveditor*, and the other a *Camertingue*, each of them changed every two years.

Budoa, the laſt place of the *Venetians* upon the Coaſt of *Dalmatia*, has its *Podeſta*, whoſe authority continues but two years. 'Tis not many years ſince *Dolcingo* was under their Dominion, but they loſt it to *Selymus* II.

In the Iſles *upon the* Mediterranean *Sea.*

THE *Commonwealth* has always a *Proveditor*, and two *Councellors* at *Corfeu*, which ſhe has poſſeſſed ever ſince the year 1382, in deſpight of all the efforts of the *Turks*; it being one of the Keys of the *Golf*. *Corfeu* is an Archbiſhoprick worth 4000 *Ducats per annum*, always ſupplied by a Noble *Venetian*, and furniſhes *Venice* with 200000 *Minots* of *Salt* every year; 'tis guarded by *Sant Ange*, a Fort thought to be impregnable.

The *Iſles* of *Zephalonia* and *Zante* are Governed each by a *Proveditor*, and three *Councellors*, renewed every two years.

Theſe

These three *Islands* have a *General* to whom the respective *Proveditors* are subservient and accountable. He is always a Person of eminent Quality, and continues in his Command sixteen Months.

And to the end all these Officers may be kept in their Duty by the fear of a scrutiny, the *Senat* creats every five years three *Syndics* to visit all the *Towns* and *Forts* depending upon the *State*, to hear the Complaints of their Subjects against the *Podestats*, *Captains* and *Proveditors*, and to inspect their several Administrations, like the Inquisitors of *Sparta*, called *Thucydides* κατάσκοποι, and the Persons sent by the *Romans incognito* * into the Provinces, to inquire into the Conduct of their Officers: whereby the poorer sort who are not able to come with their Complaints to *Venice*, have a way open to revenge themselves at their ease, if their Governours have done them any injury.

* *Privati etiam mittebantur, qui Provincias viserent, & quid de cujusque obsequio videretur referrent: trepidabantque gentes de æstimatione singulorum.* Tac. Ann. 15.

It remains now that I speak something of their Principal Military Commands at Sea; all of which are executed by Noble *Venetians*, whereas those at Land are given to Strangers for the reasons above-said

The Generaliſſimo, *or* Captain-General at Sea.

THis *General* is always a Noble *Venetian*, and Created by the *Senat*, in time of War to Command the Fleet of the *Commonwealth*. His Power is ſo abſolute over all other *Generals*, and *Captains*, that he ſeems a *Dictator*, and rather a Sovereign than a Subject, for the three years of his Command. His Authority extends not only to the *Fleet*, but to all the *Ports*, *Iſles*, and *Fortreſſes*, where his Orders are received without diſpute: and if he goes to any of them in perſon, the Clergy are obliged to meet him, and the Keys are preſented him by the *Governours* and *Rectors*, as if all the *Senat* came with him *; and indeed all their Power is in him; ſo that it is no leſs than Treaſon to diſobey him, or conteſt his Orders. Formerly the *Senat* allowed him not to enterpriſe any thing, without advice of them; but the diſtance many times retarding their affairs, and the Reſolution of the *Senat* not arriving till the opportunity was loſt †, it leaves him now to his own liberty to act as he ſees occaſion, only recommending this Caution to him, to manage things ſo that the *Commonwealth* may receive no detriment thereby ‡. And this they do with more Confidence, becauſe he has the poſ-

* *Senatus Nobiſcum eſt.* Tac. Hiſt. 1.

† *Ex diſtantibus terrarum ſpatiis Conſilia poſt res afferebantur.* Hiſt. 3.

‡ *Videat ne Reſp. quid detrimenti capiat.*

ſeſſion

ſeſſion of no *Town* or *Port* to which he may retire if he be falſe, and therefore is obliged to keep always at Sea, expoſed to the mercy of the Wind and the Waves.

Moreover there is no Prince whatever who at their return uſes their *Generals* worſe than the *Venetians*. If any of them have loſt a *Battle* or a *Town*, they are plagued by the Inquiſitors of *State*, or rather by as many Judges as there are Nobles in the City: the *Commonwealth* having given them the Conduct of their Armies, and the Government of their Towns, upon the ſame condition the famous Lady of *Sparta* gave the Buckler to her Son, *Aut in hoc, aut cum hoc*: intending thereby, that he ſhould either dye, or return with what ſhe had given him. If they obtain a Victory, they muſt render an account to thoſe who emulate their ſucceſs, and will be ſure, if not to procure, to encourage their accuſers. In time of Peace they always debaſe them, and the meaneſt Nobleman will not only think himſelf his equal, but beard him in the competition of any new Command, which renders the Yoak of their Obedience very heavy to the Subject. But if a new War be begun, and the timidity and incapacity of the others be compared with the Experience, and Courage of theſe *, then it is that Envy gives place to Deſert, and their Rivals in time of Peace, do Homage to their Valour during the War.

In Pace durius eſt ſervitium.

* *Poſcebatur ore vulgi dux Agricola, comparantibus cunctis vigorem, conſtantiam, & expertum Bellis animum, cum inertia, & formidine eorum.* In Agricola.

When the *Genoeſes* were at *Chiozza*, and thought of nothing but Plundering of *Venice*; the *Senat* was obliged to diſcharge honourably their Gene-

ral *Victor Pisani* who was then in Prison for the loss of *Pola**, a Town in *Istria*, and to joyn him in the Sovereign Command of the Army with *Andreas Contarini*, to the dishonour of all his calumniators. *Antonio Grimani* after he had Conquered the Towns of *Monopoli*, *Mola*, *Pulignan*, *Trani*, *Brundusium*, and *Otranto* in *Pouelle*, was degraded from his Procuratorship, and Banished into *Istria*, for unhappily losing the Battle of *Modon* to the *Turks*. But after he had been Banished ten years, he was called back again upon an exigence, restored to his Dignity, and at last Created *Duke*.

In the year 1670, the difference betwixt them and the *Port* about Confines in *Dalmatia*, having caused the *Venetians* to apprehend a new Rupture, the whole World immediately cast their eyes upon *Francis Morosini*, though he was in disgrace, and at that time actually under a Charge: and not without cause, for there was none but he capable of the Command which he had in *Candia*, and had the War gone on, the *Senat* would have been constrained to have begged him to have taken upon him the *Generalship* again.

The awe the *Captains* have of the *Council of Ten*, does not deter them from applying their utmost industry to raise their own fortunes though to the prejudice of the Publick, not doubting but to find an *Asylum*, if they have wherewithall to purchase it*; providing against the worst, out of an opinion they shall certainly be questioned at their return, how moderately soever they have behaved themselves; and therefore the fear of an inevitable suspition, incourages them the more boldly to pillage, that they may revenge themselves beforehand for such injury as they are like to meet afterwards. And yet they

* *Pecunia, quæ bonis malisque temporibus juxta valet.* Hist. 1.

they uſe all imaginable Artifice to conceal the defects of their Adminiſtration, being deſirous to appear as innocent as *Gracchus* who aſſured the People of *Rome* that he went rich to *Sardena*, but returned poor *.

*Cum Roma *profectus ſum, Zonas quas plenas argenti exulti, eas ex Provincia inanes retuli.* Aul. Gell. l. 15. c. 12.

A *General* of *Candia* would have perſwaded the *Venetians* to the ſame thing by borrowing 4000 *Ducats* of a Merchant to defray the Expence of his entry into his *Procuratorſhip*, though he had brought back ſeveral Barrels of Silver which ſtood him in good ſtead. For there are but few ſuch perſons as the *Procurator Nani*, who imployed all the Money he had received as a Gratuity from the *Senat*, in preſents to the *Commiſſioners* from the *Port*, by which means the Conteſt about Limits was brought to a happy accommodation. Whereas many others would have applied it to their own proper uſe, as their Comerades do at *Conſtantinople*.

The habit of theſe *Generals* is always Scarlet, with a Bonnet of the ſame Colour, like the *Mertier* of the *Preſidents* of *Parliament*. They never lay aſide their long Cloak, made in the faſhion of that which the antients called *Chlamys* no not even in Fight.

The Proveditor-General *at Sea.*

THis Officer, called in their *Ducals Classis Legatus*, as the other is called *Classis Imperator*, is perpetual, not as to person (who never holds the Command above two years) but as to the Office which is constantly supplied, contrary to the former which expires with the War. His Authority extends to the whole *Fleet*, which he manages as he pleases in the absence of the *Captain-General*. He has Power to Cashier, or punish, even with Death, such Officers as are defective in their Duties, as well Noble *Venetians* as others. He disposes of their Commands. He pays the Souldiers and Seamen, disposes of the Money belonging to the *Fleet*, and is accountable to the *Senat* at his return.

The *Generalissimo* and the *Proveditor* having served their time, lay down their *Dictatorship* at *Capo d'Istria*, and return to *Venice*, and their former condition of life, retaining nothing of all their Grandure, but the honour of what is past and the hopes of what is to come.

They are obliged by a certain Law to deliver themselves up into Custody before they give an account of their administration, especially if they have been overcome, which is a great cause of Persecution at *Venice*, where nothing but success is considered. General *Francis Morosini* not complying with the said Law, incensed the

the Nobility exceedingly against him, insomuch that after he had happily withstood one Attack, he was over-powered by a second, and forced to do that dishonourably, and by necessity, that he might have done before with reputation, by giving his enemies an example of Modesty and Obedience.

The *Captain-General* and the *Proveditor* are employed as Spies one upon another, which producing a reciprocal distrust, keeps both to an exactness in their duty; and though the *Proveditor* be inferior, the Power is divided in such sort, that the *second* has Authority without Force, and the *first* Force without Authority. That is to say, one has Power to propose what is to be done, and the other to do or not do it, as he pleases, not much unlike the practice in *Rome*, where the *Senat* proposed, and the *People* resolved. The ordinary Residence of the *Proveditor* is at *Corfeu*.

Autoritas in Senatu, Potestas in Populo.

The General *or* Governor *of the* Golf.

THE *State* of *Venice* keeps constantly in the *Golf* a Squadron of six *Galleys*, and some few *Foists* to defend the Mouth of it against *Pyrats*, and all Men of War; as also to exact the duties upon all Goods that pass that way.

This *General* is the ancientest Officer belonging to this *State*, and in that respect has always the Van upon any Engagement at Sea, with this prerogative, that when-ever it happens there is no

Genera-

Generaliſſimo, he ſupplies the place before any other Officer, till the *Senat* orders another, ſo that neither the indiſpoſition nor death of the *Generaliſſimo* brings any diſtraction or delay to their Naval Affairs.

The Office is perpetual, but the Officer continues but three years, and is always a Gentleman of principal Quality.

The General *of the* Galeaſſes.

THE *Galeaſſes* are a ſort of *Caſtles* and *Fortreſſes* in the *Sea*, in which are commonly 1000 *Men*, and 1000 peeces of *Canon*. The *Captains* are called Governors, always Noble *Venetians*, and Strangers always excluded.

Theſe Governors own no body but their *General*; but their *General* receives orders from the *Generaliſſimo*. And becauſe Victory depends much upon the Conduct and Courage of this Perſon, his Office is always ſupplied by a man of more than ordinary Experience and Valour.

There is alſo a *General* of the *Galions*, who ſuperintends all the Stores and Ammunition of the Fleet. Theſe two *Generals* are created only in time of War, as is a third Stranger *General* called *General da Debarc*, who Commands all Souldiers detach'd from the Fleet to make a deſcent upon Land: and after his Commiſſion is executed, he brings them back again on Board, where nothing remains to him but the Titles of *General* and *Excellence*.

Beſides

Beſides theſe *Generals*, the *Senat* entertains two *Captains*, each of them with the Command of four *Galleys*, one Squadron free, and called *di Buone-Voglie*; the other of Slaves, and called *Condemnati*.

All the *Galleys* are Commanded by young Noblemen of *Venice*, called *Sopra Comiti*, who have full Power over their Souldiers and Seamen, but only of death, diſpoſing of all inferior Places as they pleaſe: and this is allowed them to recompence their Levies of Men, which they do commonly at their own charge; the *Commonwealth* providing nothing but the Hulk of the *Galleys*, and the Proviſions of War, and paying the Souldiers no longer than from their coming on Board.

Theſe are the principal Sea-Officers the *Venetians* have in pay, and they are always choſen out of the Body of their Noblemen: but becauſe the chief Care and Charge of theſe *Generals* is to defend their Dominion in the *Adriatick-Sea*, known by the name of the *Gulf* of *Venice*, the *Venetian* being Maſter there, it will not be amiſs if in this place I ſpeak ſomething of that *Sea*.

Of

Of the Soveraignty of the Venetians *upon the* Adriatick-Sea.

THE *State* of *Venice* has been ſo long Maſters of this *Sea*, it would be ridiculous to queſtion their Title. They have had poſſeſſion of it from the very birth of * their *State*, whoſe very Cradle was in the *Lakes* of this *Sea*, whilſt Fiſhing was their nouriſhment, and the Iſles about them their Demeſnes. Not that the whole *Gulf* belonged to them from their infancy, for they poſſeſſed only a ſmall part of the Sea betwixt *Ravenna* and *Aquileia*; but as they encreaſed in age, and the *Emperors* quitted their propriety in the *Gulf*, the *Venetians* began by little and little to extend their Dominion, and having droven out the *Corſairs* who infeſted it much, and diſturbed their Navigation, the poſſeſſion became entirely theirs, and has belonged to them ever ſince.

* *Si enim Urbs in Mari ſumpſit exordia, & Urbis fuerunt* Veneti *domini,* Veneti *quoq; fuerunt domini ejus in quo erat Urbs, igitur domini Maris.* Anon.

Firſt, by the *Law of Nations*, which gives the propriety of *Derelicts* (that is to ſay, Lands or Goods forſaken, and belonging to no body) to the firſt that can occupy them.

Secondly, by the *Right of War*, which the *State* of *Venice* maintained 170 years together againſt the *Narantins*, who diſputed their Title, and at laſt ſubmitted in the year 996. Againſt the *Normans*, with whom they had ſeveral Battels in the *Ponille*;

Pouille; against the *Genoeſes* and *Piſans*, who were their Competitors for more than 300 years; to which may be added the conſent of the *Greek Emperors*, who were ſo far from complaining at the *Venetians* pretence, that they were very well pleaſed to ſee the *Narantins* (their ancient enemies, who infeſted that *Sea*, and had put it often under Contribution) ſo happily ſubdued by their ancient friends. For by that means the *Emperors* continued in their obedience *Iſtria*, *Dalmatia*, *Albania*, *Pouille*, *Abrazzo*, with part of *Romania*, which places being before expoſed to the pyracies and depredations of the *Narantins*, as lying upon the *Adriatick-Sea*, mutinied, and complained of the weakneſs or negligence of their *Emperors*, remonſtrating that without better protection, they would find out other Maſters, who ſhould be more careful of them: and doubtleſs they had done it, had not the *Venetians* undertaken the Guard of the *Gulf*, and chaſed away the *Corſairs*, who threatned *Italy*, *Hungary*, and ſeveral other Provinces in *Germany* with univerſal ruine: ſo that the juſtice of their poſſeſſion has for ſeveral ages been allowed by all the *Princes* of *Europe*, whoſe Embaſſadors are every year accompanying the *States* at the Ceremony upon *Aſcenſion-day*, when the *Doge* marries the *Sea*, by throwing into it a *Gold-Ring* with theſe words, *Deſponſamus te Mare, in ſignum veri & perpetui Dominii.* Which is never contradicted by any of the Embaſſadors.

Some Hiſtorians will have it that Pope *Alexander* III gave them their firſt Juriſdiction, in recompence of their ſervices done him during the perſecutions of *Frederick Barbarouſſa*, and in memory of the Victory obtained at Sea againſt *Otho* his Son: but it is a vulgar miſtake confounding the Cere-

Ceremony of their marrying the Sea (first instituted by the *Pope*) with the donation of their Dominion: the People taking a solemn declaration of the *Venetian* Right, and a formal recognition of their Title *In re jam de facto possessa*, for an act of Concession, by which the said *Pope* put them into possession of the *Gulf*. Which could not be, for the *Pope* neither having nor pretending to any Right in the *Adriatick-Sea*, could not transfer to another a thing in which he had no interest himself. And this truth is much confirmed by the words of a *Pope* to *Duke Sebastian Ziani*, *Hunc annulum accipe, & me autore, ipsum Mare obnoxium tibi reddito, quod tu, tuiq; successores quotannis statuto die servabitis*, and he goes on in the institution, *Ut omnis posteritas intelligat Maris possessionem Victoriæ jure vestram fuisse.* 'Tis not therefore by Donation from the *Pope*, who himself allows them a precedent Title, (*jure Victoriæ*,) adding, *Atq; uti uxorem viro, ita illud Imperio Reip. Venetæ subjectum.* And therefore it follows the *Pope* can no more take away this Right from the *Venetian*, than he can take away a Wife from her Husband, because the *States* hold not from him, but from the success of their Arms; as is asserted more positively in another Author, reporting the words of *Alexander* to be these, *Ut omnes intelligant Maris possessionem jure belli Vestro deberi Imperio.* And this their Embassador *Jeronimo Donato* intimated to Pope *Julius* II, who in raillery demanding where the Titles and Justifications of their Soveraignty in the *Gulf* were, the Embassador as pleasantly replied, *If your Holiness pleases to produce the Original of* Constantine's *donation to Pope* Silvester, *you will find the Concession of the* Adriatick-Sea *to the* Venetians *indorsed upon the back of it.* For it appears manifestly by this Answer, that *State* of *Venice*

Nemo plus juris in alium transferre potest, quam ipse habeat. Ex. Cod.

Morisot l. 2. c. 25. & Petr. Justinian Hist. Venet.

Cyril. Michael.

nice founded not their Dominion upon any pretended Donation from *Alexander* III: and that their Title was not writ with ink, but with the blood of the *Narantins*, *Normans*, and *Genoeſes*, that they forced out of the *Gulf*; as alſo with the blood of their own *Citizens*, which was freely ſhed in defence of the common Cauſe of all *Italy* againſt the *Barbarians*.

The *Venetians* alledg moreover, *that they poſſeſs the* Adriatick-Sea *upon the ſame account as they poſſeſs* Venice *it ſelf*; *and that the poſſeſſion of the ſaid City having never been diſputed by the Emperors, becauſe the* Venetians *built it in an abandoned place*; *ſo their Dominion in the* Gulf *has never been conteſted, as being forſaken by the Emperors of the Eaſt, the ancient Proprietors of it. And laſt of all, that if their Arguments or Writings be too weak, they have Galleys, and Sea-men, and Cannon enough to prove themſelves lawful and true Lords of that Sea.* And it was anſwered to a *Spaniſh* Embaſſador, who ſignified to the *States* the deſign of the *Infanta Maria* Siſter to the *King* his Maſter, and lately married to *Ferdinand* King of *Hungary*, to paſs with the *Spaniſh*-Fleet that was to attend her thorough the *Gulf* of *Venice* to *Trieſt*, *That the Republick of* Venice *having indiſputably the Dominion in thoſe Seas, could not admit any Men of War but her own. That nevertheleſs, if his Catholick Majeſty would accept the offer they made him of their Galleys, her moſt Serene Highneſs ſhould be received and conducted with ſuch Honour as was due to her Extraction, and to the Grandure of the Houſe of* Auſtria: *but if his Majeſty ſhould refuſe their offer, and chooſe rather to betake himſelf to force, they would defend themſelves and their Juriſdiction to the laſt.* And the *Senat* cauſed it to be told to the *Viceroy* of *Naples* by their Reſident Nani Hiſt.

ſident *Mark Anthony Padavin*, *That if the Court of* Spain *declined the generoſity of their offer, and betook themſelves to Arms, the new Queen muſt be content to run the hazard of a Battel, and expoſe her ſelf to their Cannon before her Nuptials could be celebrated.*

The *Duke* of *Oſſune* had ſome years before experimented their reſiſtance, by the loſs of ſeveral Ships ſent into the *Levant* under his Banner to in-
Nan. l. 3. 4. tercept the *Venetian* Traffick; in which he was aſſiſted by the City of *Raguſa*, that received his ſaid Ships into their Ports of *Calamotte*, and *Sancte Croix*.

The *Popes* every nine years ſend new *Bulls* to the *Senat*, by which they continue to them the *Tenths* of the *Clergy* for the defence of the *Gulf*, which imports the *Popes* very much in reſpect of the *Marche d'Ancona*, where the *Corſairs* made frequent devaſtations, and never landed but with rich plunder, they carried away conſiderable num-
Nan. l. 11. bers of the Inhabitants into ſlavery.

THE

THE THIRD PART.

The Holy Office of the Inquisition *of* Venice.

Such is the coherence and connexion betwixt the *Inquisition*, and *Government* of *Venice*, that one is not well comprehended without the other: wherefore to render my work more compleat, I have made an abridgement of the Treatise of *Fra. Paolo* about the *Inquisition*, in which we may see the Measures the *Senat* took with the Court of *Rome*, and the Ecclesiasticks. But because my design is to give you an extract, not a translation of those passages, it cannot be thought strange that I have not followed the order of the Original, nor pinned my self up to the words of the Author, his sentiments being sufficient. And to give more light to the matter, in two or three places I have added something of his *History* of the *Council of Trent*, and of the Excommunication of the *Venetians*; a method which I suppose will not be displeasing to the Reader.

When the *Inquisition* was first introduced in *Venice*, it was not by Command of the *Pope*, nor

by any *Papal Bull*; seeing the *Bulls* of *Innocent* IV, *Alexander* IV, *Clement* IV, and of seven other *Popes*, could not oblige the *Venetians* to receive it, as the rest of the Principal Towns in *Italy* did: But it was brought in by Decree of the *Grand Council*, to which *Nicholas* IV consented; framing to that end his *Bull* of the 28 of *August* 1289, in which he inserted the Decree of the *Council*, with all its Clauses; one of which ran thus, *That the* Senat *should assign a Fond for the necessary expences of that Sacred Office, and should likewise receive all the Money issuing from Amerciaments, or otherwise, to which end the said* Senat *should name an Officer to be accountable to them.* Which is a thing quite different from the Custom of other *Inquisitions*, where the Money goes to the *Inquisitors*.

The *Inquisition* at *Venice* is mixed, partly of *Ecclesiasticks*, partly of *Seculars*. The *Ecclesiasticks* are Judges, the *Seculars* are *Assistants*, whereas formerly the *Seculars* were *Judges* in Cases of *Heresy*, upon information from the *Ecclesiasticks*, whose Office was only to examine the Opinions of those who were accused of *Heresy*; after which if the *Ecclesiasticks* found them guilty, the *Duke* and the *Council* condemned them to be Burned. And this Secular *Inquisition* continued from the year 1249, (at which time it was established upon occasion of the Wars betwixt *Pope Innocent* IV, and *Frederick* the Emperour) till the year 1289, when the *Ecclesiastical Inquisition* was admitted by the *Senat*. So that there having been in *Venice Secular Inquisitors* against *Heresy*, before the erection of this Sacred Office, occasion was given to take in *Ecclesiasticks* among the *Seculars*; it being unreasonable that the new *Inquisitors* admitted only by favour, should exclude the antient, who in reality were their Masters.

There

There are therefore *three Senators* always assisting in the Prince's name to all Transactions and Decrees of that Court, in which nothing passes whereof the Prince is not thorowly advertised. The *Ecclesiastick* cannot bear Witness, nor Cite, nor Examine a Delinquent, but with the participation and assistance of these *three Senators*: For which reason the Secretary begins all Acts with this form, *Cum assistentia & præsentia Illustriss. & Excellentiss. D. D. N.* according to the agreement of *Pope Julius* III, with the *Republick of Venice*. And if the *Inquisitors* presume to do the least thing without the knowledg of the *Assistants*, 'tis actually void: so that if in their absence, process be framed, it suffices not that the Articles, or particularities, were communicated to them before Judgment, nor that they were present when Sentence was pronounced, for the *Senat* will not trust to the integrity of the *Ecclesiasticks*: but new Process must be made from the beginning to the ending, otherwise they cannot proceed to execution: by which means the *Senat* prevents disputes with the Court of *Rome*, which turnes every thing into President though but once done.

And if the *Inquisitors* should desire of the *Assistants* permission to make any Process without them, it is expresly forbidden them to grant it, because condescension belongs to the Prince, not to the persons who represent him. Besides this permission is not equivalent to the presence of the Magistrate, who knows not afterwards whether the *Inquisitors* have done well or ill: a thing of no little importance to the service of the Publick.

There are also *Assistants* in all places under the Dominion of the *Venetians*, where there are *In-*

quiſitors; it being convenient, if not neceſſary that all inferiour Cities ſhould be ſubject to the Laws and Cuſtoms of the *Metropolis*, with ſafety to their Immunities and particular Priviledges; and therefore the *Rectors* aſſiſt in the Sacred Office, and perform all the Functions of the *Aſſiſtants* in *Venice*. But becauſe the other Duties of their imployments, may ſometimes hinder the *Rectors* from being preſent, the *Vicar* of the *Podeſtat*, or ſome other *Curial Officer*, is permitted to go in their ſtead. And here it may be obſerved that the *Curial Aſſiſtant* is not to ſerve as a *Councellor* to the *Inquiſitor*, though he be ſo to the *Podeſtat*, the Office of a *Councellor* and an *Aſſiſtant* being incompatible; becauſe the *Councellor* is an Officer of the *Inquiſition*, and by conſequence depends upon it, but the *Aſſiſtants* dependance is only upon the Prince whom he repreſents: ſo that if the *Curial* ſhould become a *Councellor*, the *Aſſiſtance*, which is a thing of Superiority, would degenerate into *Counſel*, and render the Perſon ſubject to the *Inquiſitor*; which would be a great prejudice to the *Secular Aſſiſtances* that the Court of *Rome* would willingly aboliſh.

Vicario Prætorio.

This *Aſſiſtance* was an infinite trouble to *Pope Paul* V, who had an inconceivable deſire to increaſe the power of the *Eccleſiaſticks*. For the *Inquiſition* being the principal Nerve, and chief Prerogative of the *Papacy*, as was pretended by *Paul* IV; it was very unpleaſant to *Paul* V (who boaſted, *That God had made him* Pope *to mortify the preſumption of the* Seculars) to ſee the *Venetians* humble the Pride of the *Eccleſiaſticks*, and hold the *Inquiſitor* in dependance upon the *Aſſiſtants*. *Pope Julius* III thought he had gained a great point, when in his agreement with the

Re-

Republick he hedged in this Clauſe, *Cum aſſiſtentia & præſentia*, imagining it would evidently appear that the *three* Deputies from the *Senat* were not Judges in matters relating to the *Inquiſition*, but only *Aſſiſtants*. Nevertheleſs the Court have ſince owned how much that *Aſſiſtance* is prejudicial to their Authority: and that which before they interpreted a Victory upon the *Venetians*, they have ſince found to be a conſiderable loſs. Wherefore they have applied the utmoſt of their endeavours to aboliſh that Cuſtom, as injurious to their Authority; but the *Senat* has ſo well defended it, that the *Popes* have given over all further thoughts of conteſting. The care the *Aſſiſtants* took to ſuffer no Act to paſs without the form *Cum aſſiſtentia*, &c. which pleaſed the *Romans* ſo well, has proved an advantage to the *Venetians*, who have ſince made uſe of that Clauſe, to ſhew the Cuſtom of their *Aſſiſtance*. The *Popes* would willingly deny it, notwithſtanding their Agreement in 1551, pretending that they were ignorant of the nature of an Agreement, which implying the conſent of both parties concerned, could not be revoked or cancelled by one: It being little leſs than a contradiction to affirm, that a thing concluded betwixt two Princes under reciprocal Obligations, ſhould notwithſtanding remain at the diſpoſition of one of them.

Theſe *Aſſiſtants* take no Oath of Fidelity to the *Inquiſitors*, ſeeing they are neither Officers of the *Inquiſition*, nor called thither by the *Eccleſiaſticks*. On the contrary they are ſent thither by the *Doge* to obſerve the proceedings of the *Inquiſitors*, and inform the *Senat* of what paſſes, in perſuance of an Oath they take to conceal nothing from him, nor to do any thing without

his Order. And by this it is the *Inquiſition* at *Venice* ſeems to be mixed, both of *Eccleſiaſticks* and *Seculars*. For where it is purely *Eccleſiaſtical*, all the *Seculars* ſwear Secrecy and Fidelity to the *Inquiſitors*. But here the *Aſſiſtants* have power to ſuſpend the Decrees of the *Inquiſitors*, and to ſtop the Execution of their Sentences, not only when they are contrary to the Laws and Cuſtoms of their Countrey, but when they interfere with their private Inſtructions from the *Senat*, or the particular Rules of their *Government*.

And if anciently the *Dukes* of *Venice* ſwore at their Election to puniſh *Hereticks*, it was to *God* and the *Commonwealth* (as the Kings of *Spain* do at this day) not to the *Inquiſitors*. But there is great difference betwixt ſwearing indefinitely, and ſwearing to another perſon: the *firſt* Oath being an Act that binds him only to himſelf and his own Conſcience, whereas the *other* owns a Subjection and Obligation to him to whom he ſwears. And to prove that the *Doges* never took any ſuch Oath, we need no more than the Declaration of *Duke Peter Gradenique* given in Writing to *Frier Anthony* an *Inquiſitor*, who would have had the ſaid *Duke* ſworn to have preſerved the *Papal* and *Imperial* Conſtitutions againſt *Hereticks*: To which the *Duke* replied, that after the Oath he had taken at his Election, by the Contract betwixt the *State* of *Venice* and *Pope Nicholas* IV, he the ſaid *Duke* was not to take another, or oblige himſelf to other Eccleſiaſtical or Imperial Orders than what were ſpecified in the ſaid Contract. In the mean time the *Inquiſitors* deſpairing to bring the *Aſſiſtants* to any ſuch Oath, they endeavoured to oblige them to Secrecy in ſome things relating to *Cenſures*

ſures and *Excommunications*: but the *Aſſiſtants* were inflexible, being ſatisfied they were under no Obligation to the *Inquiſitors*, becauſe they were none of their Miniſters; and that the *Doge* ought to be acquainted with all paſſages among them, for the convenience of his *Government*; it being more his intereſt to maintain *Religion*, than it is the intereſt of the *Eccleſiaſticks*, who reſpect only the ſervice of God, whereas the Prince does it both for Gods ſake, and the Subjects, whoſe repoſe is alwayes interrupted by *Hereſy*. In ſhort, if the *Senat* meddles in matters of Religion, it only imitates *Conſtantine*, *Theodoſius*, *Charlemain* and others, who did the ſame, and were ſo far from being thought Uſurpers, that they were applauded, and had thanks both from the *Popes* and the *Biſhops*; the *Popes* having many times exhorted them to undertake that Care: And if at this day *Eccleſiaſticks*, are ſole Judges in Caſes of *Hereſy*, 'tis by the Conceſſion of Princes, who are not thereby ſtript or deveſted of their Right, which is inalienable; nor of their Power, for which they are equally reſponſible to God, whether they execute it themſelves or by Deputy. And by conſequence 'tis their Duty to have an eye over the Conduct of thoſe, to whom they commit ſo great a ſhare of their Power, and to remove them if they abuſe it.

Debes incunctanter advertere Regiam Poteſtatem tibi non ſolum ad Mundi Regimen, ſed maxime ad Eccleſiæ præſidium eſſe collatum. Leo I. *ad* Imperat. Leon.

The *Inquiſitors* pretend that at leaſt the *Seculars* have no right to Aſſiſt at the Proceſs of an *Eccleſiaſtick*; ſuppoſing erroneouſly that the *Secular* Aſſiſtance was introduced only for what regarded the *Laity*. The *Venetians* reply, that their *Aſſiſtance* is not appropriate to the Perſon, but to the Crime; and that therefore *Hereſy*

resy being a *Secular*, as well as an *Eccleſiaſtical* Offence (it being on the one ſide an Invaſion of the Faith, and on the other an Invaſion of the Peace of the Publick) it follows that all *Heretical* Cauſes are to be Judged by the *Eccleſiaſticks*, with intervention of *Seculars*, which is contrary to the practice in other Countries, where if the Cauſe be *Spiritual*, the *Secular* perſon is Judged by the *Eceleſiaſtick*; if *Temperal*, the *Eccleſiaſtick* is judged by the *Secular*. Beſides, by a pretenſion of the *Inquiſitors* the Cauſe of a *Prieſt* or *Monk* turned *Heretick*, (though his accomplices are *Secular*) ought to be judged only by *Eccleſiaſticks* as being *Eccleſiaſtick*, which is to open a door for the *Inquiſitors* to drive out the *Aſſiſtants*,

In the year 1610, the *Inquiſitor* of *Breſcia* upon occaſion of a *Capuchin* of that City's being accuſed at *Rome*, made an Eſſay to take from the *Aſſiſtants* the Cognizance of ſuch Proceſſes as were begun at *Rome*: By which the *Secular Aſſiſtance* would have been aboliſhed; for the *Inquiſitors* of the *State* of *Venice* would have found means to have ingaged the Accuſers either by promiſes, or pretences of Religion, to ſend their Depoſitions in Writing to *Rome*: upon which that Court having examined the Information, would have returned their Proceſs to the places where the *Inquiſitors* would have been Maſters. But the Wiſdom of the *Senat* defeated that artifice; and order was ſent to the *Rectors* of all their *Towns* to have a ſtrict eye upon the Conduct of the *Inquiſitors*, and to ſee they exactly obſerved all the Statutes and Formes of the *Venetian Inquiſition*, without receding one jot for any thing the *Monks* could alledge. For the ſame reaſon the *Senat* ordered their *Aſſiſtants* to take care the *Inquiſitors* did not inſert

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in their Proceſſes any Forreign Statute, that the Court of *Rome* (which makes advantage of every thing indulged to them) might not innovate in the *Venetian Inquiſition*, which ought to be regulated by her own, and not by the Cuſtoms of the *Inquiſition* of *Rome*, upon which it had no dependance being not of *Papal* Inſtitution. In effect, if the *Congregation* of *Inquiſitors* General at *Rome* ſhould take the Priviledg to derive Orders to the particular *Inquiſitors* of *Towns* under the Juriſdiction of the *Venetian*, as they do to ſeveral places in *Italy*, it would be the ſame thing, as if the whole Proceſs was perfected at *Rome*, becauſe the other *Tribunals* could act nothing but according to their Inſtructions from thence. Moreover, if the *Acts* made by the *Inquiſitors* without *Aſſiſtants* be Null in *Venice*, *a fortiore*, the *Acts* made out of their Territories, and by conſequence without any participation of the *Aſſiſtants*, are vain and invalid. Not but if the *Congregation* at *Rome* ſend any Directions or Rule that is convenient to be obſerved, and does not claſh with the Temporal Juriſdiction, the *Inquiſitors* ought to receive it with reſpect, and put it in execution; provided it be done according to the Stile and Cuſtom of their Countrey, the form of the new Decree running in the name of the *Inquiſition* of the Place, and paſſing in preſence of the publick *Aſſiſtants*, without mentioning that the Decree came from *Rome*, leſt the *Venetian Inquiſition* ſhould ſeem ſubject to the *Inquiſition* of *Rome*, upon which it has no dependance: for it imports not much though the Direction comes from *Rome*, if in the publication no Authority be acknowledged but the Authority of the *Senat*; for 'tis that Authority which animates the Decree, be-

becauſe if the *Duke* admits it not (as it happens many times in *Venice*) the Decree is void and and of none effect. Again when the *Inquiſitors* execute any Command from *Rome*, they examine not whence it comes, but whether it be uſeful to the Publick, and conformable to the Cuſtom of their Countrey, not enquiring whether it was done by their own motion, or inſtigation from other People, ſo no other name be mentioned in it, than the name of the *Inquiſition* of *Venice*.

The *Aſſiſtants* are likewiſe to hinder the *Inquiſitors* from publiſhing any *Bull* old or new, without permiſſion from the *Duke*; and this is founded upon the following Reaſons.

1. *Firſt*, Becauſe a compact cannot naturally be, but by conſent of the parties contracting, and therefore is not to be changed but by common accord. Thus the *Inquiſition* being eſtabliſhed in *Venice* by Agreement, no new Law ought to be admitted, but by conſent of both parties concerned; and therefore the *Bulls* and *Decrees* of the Court of *Rome* made ſince this Agreement, have no obligation upon the *Commonwealth* of *Venice*.

2. Again, If the *Court* of *Rome* makes Orders and Laws according to their own ſentiments and deſigns, it is not equitable that the *Republick* of *Venice* receive his new Decretals without examining firſt, whether or no they be conſiſtent with their affairs. Every Prince knows the Intereſt of his own *State*, the *Popes* do not concern themſelves for the intereſt of *Secular* Princes, 'tis therefore the *Princes* duty to watch that nothing new, or dangerous to their affairs be foiſted upon them by the *Papal* Order; for that which the *Popes* propoſe of running to them in caſe of diſorder is a remedy worſe than the diſeaſe, ſeeing by that means they would make

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themſelves Arbiters in all Civil Controverſy whatever. Wherefore the *State* of *Venice* has been always very ſhie and cautious in that caſe; no Prince in *Europe* having pried more narrowly, ſeen farther into the deſigns of *Rome*, nor oppoſed them with more vigor and ſucceſs: and her caution is continued to this day, the Publication of no *Bull* being permitted but after long and mature deliberation. And if it ſo happens, his *Holineſs* ſends a Common *Bull* to ſeveral *Princes*, the *Venetians* are always the laſt who receive it; not that they may Regulate by the example of the reſt, but to have time to ſift and diſcover the ſubtilties of that Court, which are always introduced with pretences of Religion. In fine, as the *Popes* apply themſelves induſtriouſly to the augmentation of the *Eccleſiaſtical* Power, and the ſubjection of the *Secular*; the *Senat* on their ſide are as ſolicitous againſt it, uſing all poſſible care at the reception of any *Bull*, that nothing may ſurprize them: and to this end they cannot be preſented to the *Colledg*, till they have been canvaſed and ſubſcribed by two *Doctors*, entertained on purpoſe by the *State* to give the *Doge* notice if they contain any thing of Myſtery or Innovation. And this difficulty in the *Senat* at the reception of their *Bulls*, makes the *Court* of *Rome* as cautious how they offend them.

Thus much for the *Aſſiſtance*; let us now examine how far the Juriſdiction of the *Inquiſitors* in the *State* of *Venice* extends.

Firſt, The *Jews* living in the Territory of this *State*, are not puniſhable by the *Inquiſition* for any Crime they commit; and this Rule is founded upon St. *Paul's* Doctrine *, that *Eccleſiaſtical* Authority

* *Quid mihi de iis qui foris ſunt judicare?* 1 Cor. 15.

rity extends not to thoſe who are not, nor never were of the ſame Church: and by a deciſion of *Pope Innocent* III, it has been Declared, that the *Jews* not being ſubject to the ſame Law, ſhould not be Judged by the Law: and therefore in *Poland* they are judged by *Palatins*, and not by *Eccleſiaſticks*. Moreover, it is well known that *Sixtus* V, and *Clement* VIII, granted Safe-conduct to the *Maranes*, to remain, and traffick in the Town of *Ancona*, without being moleſted or diſturbed by the *Inquiſitors*, contradicting the *Bull* of *Gregory* XIII, of the year 1581, which ſubjected *Jews*, and all other *Infidels* to that Sacred Office. Beſides the *Inquiſition* being erected only againſt Hereticks, *Judaiſme* being no Hereſy, falls not under their Juriſdiction.

If a *Jew* ſpeaks irreverently of our Religion, if he blaſphemes our Myſteries, prophanes our Sacred things, debauches any body to his Religion, the *Eccleſiaſticks*, and other perſons concerned, bring their complaints to the Officer on purpoſe for *Blaſphemy*, who fails not to puniſh him ſeverely according to ancient Cuſtom in the Church, by which the *Eccleſiaſticks* concerned themſelves no farther than to judg whether the Opinion complained of as Hereſy was contrary to our Faith; which having determined, they committed them to the *Secular* to be Judged. And this was the Practice of the Church under the *Roman* Empire, till the Diviſion in the year 800; and in the Eaſtern Empire to the laſt.

2. The *Inquiſition* Judges not the *Greeks*, for theſe following Reaſons.

Firſt, Becauſe 'tis unreaſonable the Miniſters of *Rome* ſhould Judge the *Greeks* in their own proper Cauſe, the *Greeks* inſiſting upon the obſervation of the Canons which ſubmit every Nation

tion to its own proper Prelats; and the *Romans* pretending to be above the Canons, do challenge a right of changing and vacating the ancient Constitutions and Laws of the *Councils* and *Fathers*. This Doctrine has caused the separation of those two Churches, which lived in unity and Christian Charity the space of 800 years before; the *Greeks* acknowledging the *Pope* to be St. *Peters* Successor, and first of all the Catholick Bishops, whilest he contented himself with the Power the Canons allowed him, and kept himself within the bounds of his Primacy, without pretending to Sovereignty over the rest of the Bishops.

Secondly, Because the *Doge* permitting the *Inquisition* to meddle with the *Greeks*, would lessen his own Authority over them, and leave it to such as could not exercise it without great trouble and confusion. The Power of punishing Offences in matters of Religion, has been always invested in the Civil Magistrate quite through the *Grecian* Church, as the *Greeks* of this age do readily confess, as desiring that Custom might be continued: and thus Justice is administred to the *Greeks* by the Civil Power with general satisfaction; whereas if the *Inquisitors* interposed in their affairs, the whole Nation would oppose themselves against their Judgments, and mutiny against their Soveraignty.

Thirdly, Because the *State* of *Venice* receiving the *Greeks* under the *Venetian* Protection, permitted them to live *secondo il Rito loro*: But their Customs and Statutes would subject them to Princes for punishment of all Temporal Crimes, and to Prelates of the Church for Spititual Offences. From whence it follows, that it belongs not to the *Inquisitors*, either to Judg or Examine what

what the *Greeks* do, or believe privately, but only to inform the Civil Magistrate of such as are scandalous, either in their actions or words. Besides, the *Republick* of *Venice* does no prejudice to the Church, by permitting the *Greeks* to live according to the general Custom of their Countrey, because that permission was the principal Condition of their Obedience to that *State*: and for the *Senat* to subject them to the *Inquisition*, would be no less than of good and faithful Subjects, to make them Rebels, and implacable Enemies; from whence no advantage could accrue to the *Inquisition*.

For these Reasons the *Commonwealth* of *Venice* (that Governs its Subjects by peaceable Principles more than any other Prince in *Europe*) have been unwilling to consent that the *Greeks* should be liable to the Judgment of the *Inquisitors*, let the nature of their Charge be what it would.

Thirdly, The *Inquisition* of *Venice* hath no Cognizance of such as have two Wives, though they pretend to it, alledging that Crime to be an abuse of the Sacrament of Marriage. To which it is answered, that the first Marriage (which is good) rendering the second void, there is no abuse of the Sacrament, and by consequence it belongs not to the *Inquisitors* to rectify, but to the Civil Magistrate, who is obliged to punish the injury the Husband does to his Wife; because 'tis an offence against Civil society as much as Adultery, which every body knows is not subject to the *Inquisition*. Bigamy is Judged by the *Lords Criminal of the Night*, as also the *Jews* who live in Adultery with the Wives of Christians.

Fourthly, The *Inquisition* meddles not with Blasphemy, because it belongs to the *Secular* Magistrate according to the Civil and Canon Law, and

and Cuſtom of all Chriſtendom. But if the Blaſphemer gives any ſuſpition of Hereſy againſt the Informer, the *Inquiſition* Judges of the ſuſpition, and with him the Magiſtrate for Blaſphemy, ſo by that means the accuſed perſon is never unpuniſhed, there being two ſentences againſt an Offender, one of the Sacred Office, for Spiritual chaſtiſement, the other of the Civil Magiſtrate, for Corporal correction.

As to what the *Inquiſitors* ſay, that 'tis too great ſeverity for a man to have two Seutences, alledging an old Aphoriſme, *That one Judg is ſufficient for one Offence*; the *Venetians* reply, It is no inconvenience to have two Judges in the ſame Cauſe, when the puniſhments inflicted are of ſeveral kinds, and the ends of thoſe Judgments are different. So in the caſe of Blaſphemy (which ſavours of Hereſy) the natural end of the *Inquiſitor* is to convince the Blaſphemer of the truth, and to abſolve him from the Cenſures incurred by his Blaſphemy; whereas the end of the Civil Magiſtrate is to puniſh the injury to the Divine Majeſty, whoſe Service and Honour all Princes and Magiſtrates are obliged to regard, becauſe it is he who has put the Sword of Juſtice into their hands, to be the Miniſters of his Indignation and Vengeance. *Non enim ſine cauſa Gladium portat; Dei enim Miniſter eſt Vindex in iram ei qui malum agit.* Ep. ad Rom. c. 13.

From whence it muſt be concluded that Princes, being charged with the care of Religion, which God has recommended to them ſo oft both in the Old and New Teſtament, are bound in Conſcience to imploy their Authority againſt Blaſphemers, for whoſe puniſhment the *Inquiſition*

has no Pains ſuitable to the greatneſs of their Offence, becauſe the pains they inflict are Spiritual, and not being ſo ſenſible, the Blaſphemers and Swearers do frequently relapſe into the ſame Impieties; ſo that 'tis abſolutely neceſſary for the ſervice of God, and the good of the *Commonwealth*, that the Secular Maſtiſtrate has Juriſdiction in theſe Caſes, to retain people in their Duties by fear of Corporal puniſhment.

For the ſame Reaſons, Sorcerers, and ſuch kind of Delinquents are not judged at *Venice* by the *Inquiſition*, which notwithſtanding has Cognizance of Hereſy, when indicated by abuſe of the Sacraments.

Fifthly, The *Senat* ſuffers not the *Inquiſition* to take notice of Uſurers, Victuallers, Innekeepers, nor Butchers who ſell fleſh in Lent; The Magiſtrate being qualified for the puniſhment of ſuch offenders when accuſed by the Eccleſiaſticks, becauſe in appearance the exorbitance of thoſe kind of people proceed only from Covetouſneſs: for to imagine a Butcher that ſells Fleſh in Lent does it, becauſe he thinks Abſtinence at that time unneceſſary, is a fancy that may make all ſorts of whimſies Hereſy.

Sixthly, It is not allowed the *Inquiſitors* to make Information againſt either the People or Magiſtrates for any thing relating to the adminiſtration of Juſtice. The reaſon is this, Becauſe Hereſy being a perſonal fault, the people cannot be accuſed of Hereſy, though every one were Hereticks: and by conſequence the *Inquiſition* ought not to proceed but againſt particulars, the Commnoalty being under the Protection and Authority of the Prince. So the Magiſtrate conſidered as a private perſon, may render himſelf ſuſpected of Hereſy by his words or his actions; but

but considered in his Office, he cannot either for the one or the other be subject to the censure of *Inquisitors*, because as such, he is invested with Publick Authority, and can be responsible only to his Prince.

If the Magistrate gives impediment to the proceedings of the *Inquisition*, either by hindering the appearance of a person accused, or summoned in as a Witness, the *Inquisition* is not to proceed but only by remonstrating to the Magistrate or Prince, by means of the *Assistants*.

And forasmuch as the *Inquisitors* have often endeavoured to insert new orders in the Edict of Justice, which by Custom they publish at the entrance into their Office, some of them have reiterated the said publication five or six times, to foist in such Commands and Inhibitions as are suitable to such occasions as they think ought to be favourable to them. To prevent this inconvenience, the *State* has wisely limited the form and ordinary tenor of the said Proclamation to six Heads, to which nothing can be added by the *Inquisitor*.

The First is against such as are Hereticks themselves, or knowing others to be so, do not discover them.

The Second against those who hold meetings or discourses to the prejudice of the true Religion.

The Third, against those who Celebrate Mass, or Confess Sinners, without being Priests.

The Fourth, against Blasphemers, whose Faith is suspected.

The Fifth, against those who obstruct the Office of the *Inquisition*; who offend its Ministers, and threaten to abuse the Informers or Witnesses *per causa del Officio*, that is to say, by reason of

their Office, or out of animosity to the persons concerned. For if it be upon other occasion, he who did the injury to the Officer of the *Inquisition* ought to be Judged by the ordinary Magistrate: otherwise it would be a great abuse, by which the *Ecclesiasticks* would quickly establish a right of punishing all sorts of Offences, and bring all Causes before them, and therefore the *Senat* has wisely added this restriction, *Per opere spectanti ad esso Officio.*

The Sixth against those who have, Print, or cause to be Printed Heretical Books tending to the subversion of Religion. In these cases the *Assistants* have power to stop the proceedings of the *Inquisitors.*

There was a good Law made by the *Council of Ten* in the year 1568, by which the Confiscated Estate of a person condemned for Heresy went to the right Heirs, upon condition no part of it was applied to the use of the Condemned person. So that the Ecclesiasticks were wiped of the advantages they formerly made of those they condemned, the *Seigniory* of *Venice* holding it cruelty to deprive the Son (who perhaps is a good Christian) of his Estate, for the Heresy of his Father. Against this Law the Court of *Rome* continually murmurs, but with little success

As to the Books forbidden by the Court of *Rome*, the *Commonwealth* of *Venice* will not allow the *Inquisitors* to publish in their Dominions any other Catalogue of prohibited Books, than that which they received by agreement with *Clement* VIII, 1596. And as this Catalogue has been Printed several times since, and the *Inquisitors* have used all imaginable Artifice to foist in new prohibited Books, and by that means elude

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the agreement, ſo the *Senat* has doubled their vigilance, and put themſelves in a condition not to be impoſed upon by the Eccleſiaſticks: and when the publication of any new prohibited Book that treats not of Faith, is in queſtion, before the *Senat* conſents, the Tenor and Doctrine of the Book is thoroughly by their Order examined, and the Reaſons ſoberly conſidered that moved the Court of *Rome* to condemn it; after which, if the Book be prohibited, the prohibition runs in the *Doges* name, and not in the name of the *Inquiſitors*.

But becauſe the *Inquiſitors* have cauſed the Catalogue of 1595. to be Printed very oft, all out of oſtentation, and to let the World ſee that the licenſing of Books belongs wholly to the Eccleſiaſticks; the *Senat* has given Order that the ſaid Cata'ogue ſhould not be Printed for the future, but with the Articicles of Agreement at the end of it: by which the Eccleſiaſticks have loſt much of their heat and deſire of Printing the Catalogue again, becauſe they would have no Copies of the Articles, that contain in them many checks and reſtrictions of their Power in thoſe Affairs.

As to defamatory Libels writ againſt the reputation of their Neighbours, though by Eccleſiaſticks themſelves, the *Venetian* affirms that the Inquiſition ought not to take Cognizance of them, becauſe their Office was eſtabliſhed for the extirpation of Hereſy, not the caſtigation of Calumny; that Function belonging more properly to the Civil Magiſtrate, to whom God has recommended it.

If the Eccleſiaſticks be ſufferers in it, they muſt apply themſelves to the Magiſtrate, and he will do them Juſtice. If any man writes againſt their Immunities, the Prince only has Right to puniſh it, becauſe 'tis from his Grace and Liberality they

hold them, and 'tis he only can preſerve them: nor indeed is it agreeable that priviledg'd Perſons ſhould have the defence of their own Priviledges, or be Judges in their own Caſes. But there are few ſuch Libels in *Italy* to be ſeen, though new ones are diſperſed every day by the *Romans* againſt the Power of the Seculars, ſo zealous are they in the diminution of the ſecular Authority, and ſo furious in augmentation of their own.

Moreover the Eccleſiaſticks are not competent Judges of Books relating to Civil *Government*: it belongs to Princes who have *States* to govern, to approve or reject the Maxims contained in ſuch Books, ſeeing ſuch matters fall not under the cognizance of Eccleſiaſticks, to whom God has forbid the medling in ſecular Affairs. Neither are they to be admitted Judges in Cauſes where they concern themſelves with ſo much paſſion, as to call Tyranny and humane Invention the power which God has given to ſecular Magiſtrates, and Hereſy and Blaſphemy that Doctrine which impugns their Opinions. Thus Cardinal *Bellarmin* in one of his Books has the confidence to pronounce thoſe Hereticks who affirm Kings and Soveraign Princes to have no Superior in Temporal things but God. Inſomuch that to follow his Doctrine, and the Doctrine of the *Romans*, we muſt believe there is no Soveraign Power but in the *Pope*.

Again, the *Venetian* ſuffers not the *Inquiſitors* to cenſure Books of Love or Gallantry, though they contain many things of Honour, and good Manners; Firſt, becauſe the *Inquiſitors* are inſtituted to judg of Hereſy, but not to cenſure Manners. Secondly, according to St. *Paul*'s Doctrine, the publick Honour and Tranquility are entruſted with the Civil Magiſtrate. Thirdly, becauſe offences committed either by word or deed againſt the reputa-

reputation of another man, or againſt civil decency or *decorum*, or things indiſputably belonging to the ſecular Judg, and by conſequence the ſame offences in writing belong to the ſame Judges. And here it is worth obſervation, that the Court of *Rome* pretends not to Juriſdiction over Books that treat not of matter of Faith, but ſince the year 1550, and that this Uſurpation is turned into Cuſtom and Right by the negligence of the Princes of *Italy*, and their Miniſters, who ſhifting that care upon the Monks, inſenſibly deveſted themſelves of that part of their Authority, which they never perceived till it was too late to recover.

There has been no State, but the *Republick* of *Venice*, that has always diſcerned the importance of this caution, and by conſequence not ſuffered diminution in their ancient Rights: but the *Venetian Miniſters* continue to peruſe all the Books that are Printed, to the end that nothing may ſlip in of erroneous Doctrine, hindering likewiſe ſuch Books as have been Printed formerly, from being Reprinted or expoſed to ſale, to prevent the increaſe of that miſchief which otherwiſe they might do.

Again, the Cardinal *Baronius* magnifies exceedingly the Enterprizes of Juriſdiction made formerly by the Court of *Rome*, affirming boldly in a Letter of the 13th of *June* 1605 to the King of *Spain*, to complain of his Miniſters for ſtopping the ſale of the Eleventh *Tome* of his *Annals* in the States of *Naples* and *Milan*, *That the* Pope *was the ſole lawful Judg of Books, and that therefore neither Princes nor any of their Miniſters could condemn ſuch Works as his Holineſs had approved.* To which the King replying, not by words, but deeds, and ſuffering the Prohibitions publiſhed by his Miniſters to proceed, the ſaid Cardinal in his 12th

Tome printed 1607, added a Diſcourſe to this purpoſe, *That it was an horrid and impious thing for Kings or their Miniſters to cenſure ſuch Books as had been approved by the* Pope, *or to forbid the Stationers to ſell them. That it was to rob St.* Peter *of one of the Keys that Jeſus Chriſt had given him, that is to ſay, the knowledg that is to diſcern betwixt good and evil. And at length, that the Miniſters of* Spain *had prohibited his Book, becauſe it reprehended the injuſtice of their Maſters.* Which evidently diſcovers the paſſion of the *Romaniſts*, who think it lawful to ſpeak irreverently of Kings, and to decry their *Government* by invectives under the Cloke of Religion, whilſt Princes are not allowed Power to hinder the reading of ſuch Books in their own proper Dominions. What diſorder would it produce in the World, if the approbation that *Popes* for their own intereſt have given to Books written againſt the Secular Power, ſhould oblige all Princes to receive them? What could be more unreaſonable than to require a Book wherein the King is called Tyrant and Uſurper, his Anceſtors defamed, and his Subjects excited to Rebellion, ſhould be printed, read, and ſold publickly even in the Territory of the ſaid Prince? And yet this is no more than *Baronius* pretended to, who after he had ſpake diſhonourably of ſeveral Kings of *Aragon*, and particularly of *Ferdinand* in his Diſcourſe of the *Sicilian Monarchy*, believed that *Philip* III had done him great injury not to permit the ſale of his Book, though full of acrimony, and invective againſt his Predeceſſors and Parents.

Baron. Tome 11. *Ann. Eccl.*

As it is undoubtedly true, a Book treating of matter of Faith, and licenſed by the *Pope*, cannot be condemned by any ſecular Power; ſo 'tis as certain, a Book treating of Hiſtory or Civil Govern-

ment,

ment, may as juſtly be prohibited by Princes, or their Miniſters, though licenſed by all the *Prelats* in *Europe*.

For the Expedient *Baronius* propoſes of repairing with humility to the Biſhops for ſuppreſſion of ſuch Books as the ſecular Magiſtrate ſhall judg pernicious or ſcandalous, I have ſaid already the Remedy is worſe than the Diſeaſe, ſeeing thereby the Eccleſiaſticks would make themſelves in a thouſand things that belong not to their Juriſdiction. Beſides, that *Government* would be very imperfect that had not in it ſelf power to provide what was neceſſary for its ſubſiſtance, but muſt attend till remedy be applied by thoſe whoſe intereſt it is to have the miſchief continued, and who will never addreſs themſelves to reform it, but as their own intereſt prompts them.

And therefore, in my judgment, Princes are not to rely upon the diligence of other People in things that concern the good of their State, God Almighty having given them Authority to ſecure themſelves. In ſhort, 'tis only the Prince underſtands what is proper for his State, and therefore no reaſon he ſhould be beholding to the *Pope* for what he has of his own, which made *John de Monluc* Biſhop of *Valentia* ſay, upon occaſion, *That it would be madneſs to ſee* Paris *on fire, and to expect till water could be fetch'd from the* Tyber *to quench it, when the* Seine *was ſo near*. The *Venetian* Policy is quite contrary to the Policy of the *Pope*: What is good for the Eccleſiaſtical State, is otherwiſe for the Civil: and if it were not, nothing could oblige the Civil State to conform; and therefore a Doctrine may be good at *Rome*, that may be pernicious at *Venice*, *Vienna*, *Madrid*, and every where elſe. Wherefore the *Pope*'s approbation cannot deveſt Princes of their Authority to condemn ſuch Books

Books as are likely (if not intended) to breed disturbance in their States.

But the truth is, ſo far are *Popes* from being lawful Judges of all manner of Books, that they have uſurped upon Seculars in the very power of ſuppreſſing of Heretical Books. In the eight firſt Centuries all Books were examined, and cenſured by the Councils, but prohibited by Princes for reaſon of State. The *Council* of *Nice* declared the Doctrine of *Arius* heretical, and then *Conſtantine* by an Imperial Proclamation prohibited his Books.

The ſecond Council of *Conſtantinople* pronounc'd *Eunomius* an Heretick, and *Arcadius* the Emperor publiſhed an Edict againſt his Works.

The third Council of *Epheſus* condemned *Neſtorius*, and the Emperor *Theodoſius* commanded his Books to be burned.

The fourth Council of *Calcedon* having condemned the *Eutycheans*, the Emperor *Martianus* publiſhed a Decree againſt their Books. Which ſhews that the prohibition even of heretical Books belongs not ſo properly to the Eccleſiaſtical, as to the Secular Power: for though the Eccleſiaſticks may judge whether there be Hereſy in a Book, it follows not but a Secular Prince may, by his Edict, forbid that Book that is cenſured by the Eccleſiaſticks, and they have no reaſon to complain that one of St. *Peter's* Keys is taken from them, ſeeing the prohibition of a Prince gives more force and vigor to their cenſure.

As to the Stationer, the *Senat* conſents that thoſe who keep or ſell Heretical Books, be puniſhed by the *Inquiſition*: but it ſuffers not an Inventory of their Books be taken by the *Inquiſitors*; that they receive permiſſion to ſell them from the *Inquiſitors*, nor that they give them an Oath; which the

the *Inquiſitors* have endeavoured many times to obtain, as alſo to inſert into their Edicts Commands beyond their power, alledging that they pretend not to give an Oath to a Stationer, but for things to which their conſcience obliges them, that is to ſay, not to ſell prohibited Books; and that by their Edicts they only intend them advertiſement of what they ought not to do: but theſe are but cunning pretences, for to give an Oath, and advertiſe by Edict, (though in things that are juſt to be done) are acts of Superiority and Juriſdiction. Beſides, the Edict and Oath are things of that nature, that he who tranſgreſſes either againſt the one or the other, is worthy of puniſhment.

To theſe the *Inquiſitors* add another reaſon, that ſeeing they are Judges of Hereſy, they ought (in conſequence) to judg every thing that relates to it, and therefore they have a right to command the Stationers, becauſe Hereſies are no way more dangerouſly diſſeminated than by Books.

To this the *Venetian* anſwers, That for Books which contain Hereſy, the *Inquiſitors* have right to prohibit them, and puniſh the Stationer who ſells them; but for all other ſort of Books, the Stationer is not accountable to the *Inquiſitors*, nor to bring their Inventories before them. For 'tis but ill Logick to infer the *Inquiſition* may extend its Authority to all Books, becauſe Hereſy is often taught in Books, for all Books treat not of Faith, which is the only ſubject belonging to that ſacred Office, and therefore thoſe that treat not in that way, fall not under the Juriſdiction of that Court. If the *Inquiſitors* were Judges of all that had reference to Hereſy, though never ſo remotely, there would not be any Crime nor Error but might become matter for the *Inquiſition*; there would be no need of Civil Magiſtrates, and by degrees

the

the Eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction would worm out the Secular.

There is but one point in which the *Republick* of *Venice* ſeems to have over-ſhot her ſelf, and that is in having ſuffered the *Popes* to ſend forreign *Inquiſitors* among them, when their own Subjects might execute that Office with as much charity and diſcretion, as they who know nothing of the cuſtoms and practices of their Country. In *Spain* the *Inquiſitors* are all *Spaniards*: in the *Dutchy* of *Milan* the Natives are not excluded; and therefore the *Venetian*, in other things ſo jealous of their Authority, in this ſeems to be in worſe condition than the King of *Spain*.

Nevertheleſs, if it be conſidered that the *Inquiſitors* cannot be received into the Towns to which they are ſent, unleſs they firſt preſent themſelves before the Prince for his Letters Patents directed to the *Rectors* of the place, it will be found the danger is not great, ſeeing that if an *Inquiſitor* be not liked, the Prince has the remedy in his hands, and that is by delaying (if not denying) his Patent, without which, his Patent from the *Pope* is ineffectual. Which is a good way of diſcouraging forreign Monks, by making difficulty to receive them; and this is a true ſecret (when they pleaſe) to oblige the Court of *Rome* to name their *Inquiſitors*, out of the Subjects of that State.

The *Inquiſitors* of *Venice* hold their Court in the Palace of St. *Mark*, where they meet twice a week.

Such of the Aſſiſtants as have buſineſs with the Court of *Rome*, cannot remain in the ſacred Office, their intelligence there rendring their fidelity ſuſpicious to the State, which puts others into their places. So the *Inquiſitors* have no capacity to

corrupt

corrupt any of the Assistants, because the Office of these Gentlemen ceases that very moment in which they address for any favour from the *Pope*.

This is all I have judged necessary to be known relating to the *Inquisition* at *Venice*; I shall pass now to the true Causes of the decay of this Magnificent *Commonwealth*.

A Discourse *containing the Chief Causes of the decay of the* Venetian Common-Wealth.

IT has hapned to the *Common-wealth* of *Venice* as it hapned anciently to the *Commonwealth* of *Sparta*; both the one and the other flourished whilst they contented themselves with the little latitude of their own Countries, and both began to decline when they had acquired more than they could manage.

Sparta was Mistress of all the chief *Provinces* in *Greece*, and no sooner had two *Theban* * *Captains* reseued their Country from the Dominion of the *Lacedemonians*, but all the other Towns they had conquered, followed the Example, and revolted. The *State* of *Venice*, grown to be great and formidable in *Italy* by its prodigious increase, and the detriment of the Princes she had over-reach'd, lost by one single Battel as she had usurped upon the

* *Pelopidas* and *Epaminondas*.

the *Terra-firma*, because her foundations were not sufficient for the weight of so vast an Edifice. Which makes it evident, that as the health of the Body proceeds not so much from the meat it takes in, as from the digestion that is made; so the strength of a State consists not in what it gains, but what it is able to keep. And if it be true that a State can never maintain it self, but by means conformable to its principle, no wonder if the *Republick* of *Venice* conceived in Fear, brought forth in the Waters, brought up in Poverty, and elevated in Peace, began to decline from its greatness, by engaging in a War with the Dukes of *Milan* and *Ferrara*, without considering the nature of their Forces, or the difficulty of maintaining their Conquests *. Had the *Venetians* followed the wise counsel of their *Doge Thomas Moccinegno* which he gave them upon his death-bed, to content themselves with their Conquests at *Sea*, where they had acquired so many fair and rich *Islands*, the delights of the *Terra-firma* would not have debauched them, nor provoked the emulation and jealousy of all the *Princes* of *Italy* who were obliged to unite in a War against them, to curb their extravagant ambition. They might better have resisted the *Turk*, who finding them otherwise employed, began from that time to invade *Greece*, and infest their *Maritime* Provinces. And Politicians have observed, that the recovery of their Lands upon the Continent, was the first cause of the loss of *Cyprus* and *Candia*, places of much more importance than their Towns upon the *Terra-firma*. And therefore *P. Scipio* had reason, when to the Officer who cried about the Streets in *Rome*, *Jupiter auge Rempublicam*, he told him he had much better pray to *Jupiter* to preserve, than to encrease it, *Satis esse auctam, dicens, dummodo conser-*

* *Facilius est quædam vincere quam tueri.* Cart. l. 4.

Valer. Maxim. l. 4. c. 1.

Conservaretur. Though the *Lacedemonians* were all professed Souldiers, they punished not those who lost their *Swords* in the Battel, but those who lost their *Bucklers*, it being then an infamy among them, as since among the *Germans* *: to shew that they esteemed it less Glorious to Conquer than to Defend, the *Sword* serving for Invasion, the *Buckler* for Defence. With much more reason, the *Venetian* being a People of the Robe, and for Councel, ought to have imployed their *Buckler* against their Neighbours, and applied themselves more diligently to their Interest in the *Levant*, where Fortune had been so favorable to them.

* *Scutum reliquisse precipuum flagitium.* Tac. Ger.

A *Second* Cause of their decay is *the slowness of their Councels.* Tis true, this fault is common in all *Commonwealths*, but with them it may be said to be in extremity, their *Senat* seeming sometimes to be asleep, with so much heavines and inactivity it moves upon several occasions. They had seasonable advertisement of the vastness of the *Ottoman* preparation for the Invasion of *Candia*, and yet they thought no more of putting themselves into a posture of defence, than if they had had no former experience of the *Turkish* perfidy, or had been assured by Revelation that that great Force was not intended against them. This Confidence was founded upon the Promises of an Infidel who deceived them, by making them believe that the Designes of the *Port* were against *Malta*, though *Hungary* and *Poland* might have given them wholsom instances of fear, and distrust. And *John Soranze*, their Embassador at *Constantinople* admonished them of their danger, and exhorted them constantly to provide; but apprehending to disgust the *Grand-Seignior* if they should discover any oper. suspition;

and

and fearing to precipitate themſelves by falſe Meaſures, into a War againſt which they thought themſelves ſafe by virtue of their Alliance, which they had lately renewed, they ſaw the Fortreſs of St. *Theodore* ſurprized, and the City of *Canea* beſieged, before they would believe their Countrey was to be the Theatre of the War, and the whole Charges to be defraied by them. Which ſhews there is a certain Fatality that governs all things, and blinds the wiſeſt perſons living when misfortune is at hand *.

* *Adeo obcæcat animos fortuna cum vim ſuam ingruentem refringi non vult.* Liv.

The loſs of *Canea* drew after it the loſs of *Retimo*, and the Field. And when there was nothing remaining to them but the chief *City* and ſome few Villages and Forts, they began to deliberate in deſpair: The greateſt part were for delivering it up freely for Peace; and it had been certainly done, had not *John Peſaro*, ſince *Doge*, bravely Remonſtrated to the *Senat*, *That if they gave up that place to the* Turk, *it would be the way to make him more inſolent; to increaſe his Contempt of them, and raiſe in him an inſatiable deſire to Invade them, by the eaſineſs of his Conqueſts; and therefore it was his Judgment better by a vigorous reſiſtance to diſcourage him. That if he were once maſter of* Canea, *he would quickly demand the three* Iſles, *and the reſt of* Dalmatia. *That to be Conquered and Submit to their Force would be no ſcandal; but to ſubmit for fear would be diſhonourable and baſe; that though an Enemy be never ſo formidable, we are not to publiſh our apprehenſion; That* States *are not maintained by Puſilanimity and Truſting* *. *That if it be almoſt*

* *Non ignavia magna imperia contineri.* Tac. Ann. 15.

im-

mpoſible to preſerve a Countrey already more than half loſt, it would be the more honourable to defend it Courageouſly, the leſs likelihood there was of ſucceſs. That the Commonwealth *of* Venice *like a Corpulent man, had need to Exerciſe to diſſipate the groſs Humours it had contracted by too long repoſe. That the War in* Candia *was like a Wound, to be kept open, to prevent a Gangrene: That the Eyes of all* Chriſtendom *were upon them to obſerve how they followed the ſteps of their Glorious Anceſtors, and what expreſſion they made of their Conſtancy and Courage. And that if their Forces were not ſtrong enough for the* Turks, *yet they were ſtrong enough in ſuch a deſperate juncture, where their Honour and Safety was at ſtake.* This Diſcourſe turned the Scale, and put the *Senat* upon a reſolution to maintain the War to the utmoſt extremity, which they did a long time with prodigious expence.

And here it is to be obſerved, the *Venetians* who are naturally very fearful and ſuperſtitious, were not ſo when they ſhould have been. Some Months before the *Turks* landed in *Candia*, a Nobleman of that Countrey, being preſent at Maſs with the *Senat*, in the Chappel of the *Colledg*, ſtole the *Pax* which is uſually given about to be kiſſed; and not many days after, in the Court of the Palace of St. *Mark*, the word *Pax* out of the Verſe, *Juſtitia & Pax oſculatæ ſunt*, fell down out of the hands of *Juſtice* in the ſight of ſeveral perſons; which was taken as a certain preſage of the War † wherewith that *Republick* was threatned, in the opinion of all People: and the *Omen* was much more intelligible than that whereby *Ceditius* Prognoſticated the coming of the *Gauls* to *Rome*. But the *Senat* made no uſe of theſe Prodigies, either willing to conceal its

† *In Prodigium & Omen imminentem* Claudeum *verebatur.* Hiſt. 1.

its diſtreſs, according to the Cuſtom of Princes ‡, or elſe inſenſible of its danger.

‡ *Triſtiſſima quæque occultantem* Tiberium. Ann. 1.

Thus the *Venetians* loſt the Kingdom of *Cyprus* by their irreſolution, though the *Procurator Hieronimo Zane*, and *Paſcal Cicogne*, their Generals in *Dalmatia* and *Candia*, remonſtrated to the *Senat*, that they were not to expect till *Selymus* declared, but to look upon it as certain, and provide to meet him with a good *Fleet* at *Sea*, to hinder his deſcent in that *Kingdom*. The *Senat* underſtood the importance of their *Councel*, when it was too late to make uſe of it *, for *Selymus* gave them no leiſure to repent †, ſo ill it is to comply too much with an ill Neighbour, or to diſcover a fear.

* *Optima viderentur quorum tempus effugerat.* Hiſt. 1.

† *Sed non* Senatui *libertas ad pœnitendum.* Ann. 3.

By the ſame irreſolution the *State* of *Venice* loſt her intereſt upon the *Terra firma* not many years ſince; becauſe they came not to a determination before the *Confederate* Princes invaded their Territories. They might eaſily have judged their Power too weak to have reſiſted the united ſtrength of the *Pope*, the *Emperour*, the *French*, and the *Spaniard*, and therefore it had been their intereſt to have divided them, as they might eaſily have done by giving up part for the ſafety of the whole: But ambition to graſp what they could not hold, dazled them for diſcerning their true Advantages, and made them loſe what they were unwilling to leave. They gave the Enemy time to joyn their Forces, and never opened their Eyes till they were beaten at *Vaila* by

by the *French*, after which they began to think of Peace, and having ſurrendered to the *Pope*, *Rimini*, *Faienza*, *Ravenna*, and *Cervia*, they begged his Mercy, as if they had been his Rebellious Subjects, promiſing never to intermeddle in Eccleſiaſtick affairs, nor to tax their Lands without permiſſion from the *Pope*: They offered the *Emperour*, *Verona*, *Vicenca*, *Padua*, and ſeveral places in *Friul*, of which they owned themſelves Uſurpers: "They proffered him an Annual "Tribute of 50000 *Ducats*, proteſting that if "he would pitty their Condition, they would "Record him in their *Annals* for their Father, "their Redeemer, their Founder, obey his Com-"mands, and for the future never ſeparate from "his Intereſt. So poor Spirited and abject does Adverſity make many People, and thoſe eſpecially who before the danger are moſt huffy and high, as were the *Venetians* *. Guichard. lib. 8.

Sunt mollia in Calamitate Mortalium animi. Tacitus.

* *Ante diſcrimen feroces in periculo pavidi.* Hiſt. 1.

In ſhort, to the King of *Spain* they reſtored *Frani*, *Otranto*, *Brindes*, *Monopoli*, *Mola*, and *Pulignan*, all which they held in *Pouille*. To the *Duke* of *Ferrara* they delivered up the *Poleſin*; and this they did rather in deſpair and a fright, than upon good deliberation, as is franckly confeſſed by *Andrew Moccinegno* who writ in the heat of the War †. Whereas had they thought in time of ſatisfying the King of *France*, or of dividing the *Pope* from the *League*, they might have been able to have defended againſt the reſt of the *Princes*, as appeared afterward; for *Julius* II. conceiving a jealouſy againſt the *French* (whoſe progreſs he feared) and retiring from the *League*, the

† *Patres turbati animis, trepidabant magis quam Conſulerent.*

the face of the *Venetian* affairs quickly changed, and ſeveral of their Towns returned to their obedience.

1483. The ſame thing almoſt happened before in the *League* that *Pope Sixtus* XII made againſt them with the King of *Naples*, the Duke of *Milan*; and the *Florentines*, for *Ferrara*. For if *Lodowick Sforza* Governour of *Milan* had not left the *League*, the *Venrtians* (who had loſt their *Fleet* upon the *Po*, and all the Territory of *Bergamo*, *Breſcia* and *Verona*, that the Duke of *Calabria* Son to the King of *Naples* had taken from them) had without doubt been deprived of all their poſſeſſions in *Lombardy*. But upon Capitulation with *Sforza*, whoſe Quarrel they Eſpouſed againſt the *Calabrians*, who would turn him out of his Government of *Milan*, all was reſtored, without being obliged reciprocally to the reſtitution of the *Poleſin* to the Marqueſs of *Ferrara*: ſo that they who were vanquiſhed in the Field, were Victors in Council, and recovered all by their management of the Treaty. To which I ſhall add my Reflexions upon one thing the *Senat* of *Venice* did after the loſs of *Candia*; by which the truth of what I have ſaid may be judged.

It was reſolved an extraordinary *Council* ſhould be held every Week for the carrying on of the War, which could hot be obtained at the begining by all the Remonſtrances of the *Chevalier Molin*, who very well underſtood the condition of their affairs; and yet moſt ridiculouſly, at an unſeaſonable time, two Months after the Peace was concluded, this *Council* was ſet up, like a Phiſitian, who preſcribes after the Patient is dead, or like the *Phrygeans*, who aſſembled their *Council* after the miſchief was happened, to conſider how they might have prevented it. The propoſi-

tion

ſion made by the *Senat*, at the ſame time to the *Emperour*, to purchaſe the Towns of *Frieſt Gradiſque*, and *Goretz*, to repair their loſſes in the *Levant*, was as much out of time; *For if they had Money to purchaſe more, it might as well have been laid out to keep what they had.*

The *Third* cauſe of the diſorder of their affairs, is, becauſe the *Senat* conſiſting of ſo great a number, and their Affairs determined by plurality of Voices, ill Councels (provided they be covered with plauſible appearances) are oftner followed than good, which moſt commonly diſpleaſe, either from the difficulty of Execution; or becauſe the good or ill Conſequences are not generally foreſeen by ſeveral of the Members, who diſcern not what is True from what is Falſe, nor what is Convenient from what is Deſtructive: So that it is ſometimes at *Venice*, as *Anacharſis* ſaid it was formerly at *Athens*, where the Wiſe Conſulted, and the Weak Reſolved; for Voices are counted, not Reaſons conſidered *; for the Vote of a Fool is equivalent to the Vote of the wiſeſt, and they being always feweſt, no wonder if their Councel miſcary. Thus did they conclude to League themſelves with *Lewis* XII, againſt *Sforza* Duke of *Milan*, to have in Recompence the Town of *Cremona*, and the Countrey *de la Ghiara d'Adda*, becauſe the advantage was preſent; whereas the Graver of the *Senators* adviſed the contrary, according to Principles of true Policy, not to drive out a Neighbouring Prince, to let in a more Potent into his place: and this occaſioned afterwards the *League* of *Cambrey*, which *Melchior Treviſan* had Prognoſticated before, telling them in full *Senat*, *That the King of the* Romans *would*

* *Numerantur ſententiæ, non ponderantur; nam cum ſit impar Prudentia, par omnium jus eſt.* Plin. l. 2. c. 12.

joyn more readily with the King of France *againſt them, than with them againſt ſo powerful a King; becauſe united with* France *it would be eaſy for him to Conquer the* Venetians, *whereas with them, it would be very hard to prevail againſt* France; *and by conſequence, the* Republick *of* Venice *having already ſo many Enemies upon their hands, they muſt either beat all the Princes of* Europe, *or be beaten by them.*

Beſides, there are thoſe in *Venice*, who to flatter the Genius of the People, and ſhew themſelves zealous for their Countrey, accomodate their Councels to the depraved Palats of others. For Example, If it be in debate to render ſome Town that has been unjuſtly uſurped from ſome great Prince who threatens by force of Arms to revenge himſelf, 'Tis moſt certain, the *Senator* who would perſwade Reſtitution, ſhould not willingly be heard; and he who ſhould adviſe to keep it, would haye a Torrent of voices on his ſide, and be eſteemed a good Citizen, though he betraied his own Conſcience and Countrey by a *Councel* he knows muſt be the detriment of the *State*. In this manner it was that the *Procurator Dominick Treviſan* prevailed againſt the juſt Demands of *Julius* II, who contented himſelf with the reſtitution of *Rimini*, and *Faenza* (Uſurped under his *Papacy*) to refuſe his Ratification of the *League* of *Cambray*. An effect of the feebleneſs and ignorance of the generality of Mankind, who not regarding the future, choſe rather to loſe all afterward, than at preſent to part with any thing, though for the ſafety of the reſt: like the Merchants that periſh in the Sea, becauſe they will not ſuffer any part of their Goods to be thrown over-board. Or like thoſe obſtinate People, who will rather run the hazard of

Guichar. lib. 8.

of a Gangreen, than endure the pain of an inconsiderable Inciſion: ſo that whatever Exprience the *Venetians* have had, they will not change their Method, and thereby verifying the ſaying of the *Italians*, *That the* State *of* Venice *never releaſes any thing willingly, that ſhe has once got into her clutches.*

But we are not to admire ſuch ill Councels are given in the *Pregadi*, ſeeing ill Counſels are moſt acceptable, and good, not only rejected, but heard with indignation. The Councel that *Bartholomew Alviani* gave them to carry on the War into the Enemies Countrey, according to the old Rule of the *Romans*, and to invade the *Dutchy* of *Milan*, before *Lewis* XII. paſſed into *Italy*, was looked upon as raſh, though no more than their affairs required, and in appearance that raſhneſs would have been happy; but it ſeems the *Senat* wanted both Courage and Providence *. Beſides, the wiſeſt of the *Senators* do many times forbear giving their advice, as knowing the danger of expoſing themſelves to the *Capriccio* of the weaker ſort, who are as much their Judges as the greateſt of the *Sages*. For the Propoſers of great Enterpriſes, like thoſe who throw up great Stones into the Air, are in great danger of having them fall upon their heads: and again, if they ſucceed, every one will pretend to the Glory, as *Tiberius* told the *Senat* †: but if they miſcary, the Blame redounds to the Author, though the fault be in the ill management of all. Thoſe who at *Rome* adviſed that the *Conſulary Tribunes* ſhould be indifferently choſen out of the *Nobility* and *People*, were generally blamed both by the *People* and the *Nobility* (though the *People* had Eſpouſed the Intereſt of the *Nobility* againſt the *Senat*) when

Fuit propriam Populi Romani longè á domo Bellare. Cicero.

*Nec auſus eſt ſatis, nec providit. Hiſt. 3.

† *Cum rectè factorum ſibi quiſque gratiam trahet, ubi nius invidia, ab omnibus peccatur.* Ann. 3.

when they underſtood that the firſt Popular *Conſul* who Commanded the Army, was defeated by the Enemy: and almoſt the ſame thing happened at *Venice* during the War; They condemned at laſt what they approved in the beginning, and they judged of the Actions of their Generals only by the ſucceſs of their Arms, which many times is a wrong and irrational Argument. They have another ill Cuſtom likewiſe, and that is, How good ſoever the Reſolution is, that their General takes in any dangerous exigence; how advantageous ſoever the terms they make with the Enemy, they always find fault and account it the worſt*. And therefore after they had received with ſatisfaction and great applauſe the News of the Peace which General *Moroſini* had made in *Candia*, and had ratified it with all expreſſions of extraordinary approbation, in a few Months time they changed their note, and made the deliverer of their Countrey (as they called him before) a Criminal, and a Traitor.

* *Quæ Natura manis timoribus, deterius credebant quodunque evenerat,* Ann. 15.

Moreover, the *State* of *Venice* is much ſubject upon any ill-conjuncture of their Affairs, to take the middle-way, which is commonly the worſt*. That is to ſay, of two Counſels propoſed, one generous and brave, the other poor and puſillanimous; they frame a third out of both, without examining their incompatibility or danger.

Media ſequitur quod inter ancipitia teterrimum eſt. Ibid.

Nor is their parſimony leſs pernicious to the *Venetians*; for the want of keeping a forreign Militia in time of Peace, when-ever War is declared, they are ſure to be ſurprized. No ſooner were they delivered from the War in *Candia*, but they disbanded their Forces, as if they had been ſure never to have had occaſion for them more: and yet within a year they engaging in a new Quarrel about limits in *Dalmatia*, and were in danger

danger of losing that whole Province, before they could have reinforc'd it with 2000 men, had the *Port* been willing, or known how to have made use of the opportunity. The Author of disbanding their Army, was the Procurator *Nani*, and his advice was preferr'd, because it pretended frugality. So that it may be said of this *State*, as it was of *Perseus* King of *Macedon* †, that he knew better how to keep his Money than his Country. The Kingdom of *Cyprus* was lost partly by their Avarice, refusing to pay the 50000 Crowns (owing to *Selymus*, as Successor to the *Sultan* of *Egypt*) according to agreement with the said *Sultan*, and King *James*, whose Heirs they were; which drew upon them the displeasure and Arms of that *Emperor* ‡. Historians have likewise observed that their Avarice was the chief cause of the ruine of their Trade in the *Persian Gulf*; for not willing to allow the *Portugals* should be their companions in so profitable a Commerce, they contented not themselves to excite the *King* of *Calecut*, and the *Sultan* of *Egypt* against them, and to send them Gunners and Engineers to assist them, but they called in the *Hollanders*, who after they had setled their Correspondencies and Magazins, in requital, they supplanted the *Venetians*. In the same manner they were handled by the *Turks* after they had brought them out of the *Black-Sea* into *Europe*, at the rate of 25000 *Crowns*; for those Infidels having invaded *Servia*, *Bulgaria*, and *Bosnia*, advanced at length against *Greece*. God permitting by a just Judgment, that those who for their base interest had sacrificed their Neighbours to those miscreants, should at length in their turn be buried in the common ruine.

† *Pecuniæ quam Regni melior custos.* Liv.

‡ *Zurit. ann. Arragon. Marian.* Hist. Hisp. l. 28. Suavedra Emp. Pol. 75.

And to these may be added another reason of their decay, and that is *the ill-Education of their Youth*

Youth. For in *Venice* 'tis a common thing to see the Father courting his Concubine, and treating the other instruments of his Debauchery in the presence of his Son, who perhaps learns the act, before he understands the evil *; involving himself farther as he advances in years, being corrupted by an example he thinks himself bound to follow: so that these young Gentlemen entring into publick affairs with so wicked dispositions, 'tis impossible but the Administration must be infected. And therefore *Sixtus* V in a Letter to the Archbishop *Matteuzzi* his *Nuntio* at *Venice*, had these words, *Jam venit hora eorum, Their time is coming.* And truly, if we consider the loss this *Commonwealth* has sustained within these hundred years, and what they are like to do more, unless God Almighty prevents it, it is in danger of being reduced to its Primitive Patrimony, that is to say, the bare Dominion of their *Lakes* and their *Marshes*, and which is worse, do Homage to the *Grand Seignior*, as *Raguſa* does at this day.

* *Noſtras amicas, noſtros concabinos vident. Diſcunt hæc antequam ſciant vitia eſſe.* Quin.

Let us now take a Prospect of their *Governours*, I mean, consider the *Manners* and *Maxims* of their *Nobility* †: For as *Tacitus* observes, to discover the Nature and Qualities of a *Government*, we must inform our selves of the genius and humour of the *Prince*, who is the *Soul* that informs it. Which occasioned an ancient Author to say, *That Nature would sooner be defective in her Operations, than a* State *in imitating their* Prince ‡.

† *Ut olim plebe valida, vel cum Patres pollerent noſcenda vulgi natura. Senatúſque & optimatium ingenia, qui maxime perdidicerant, callidi temporum, & ſapientes credebantur,* Ann. 4.

‡ *Facilius errare naturam, quam Principem formare Rempublicam diſſimilem ſui.*

The Manners and general Maxims of the Venetians.

IT being natural to *Republicks* to dread Ambitious and Popular Servants. The *Venetians* are no leſs ſuſpitious than other Nations. They love great Exploits, but many times they hate thoſe that perform them *; believing that thoſe who have been able to preſerve their Country, may be as able to deſtroy it; and that therefore 'tis more danger to advance ſuch, than diſhonourable to debaſe them. For this cauſe it is they often cruſh thoſe perſons who have delivered their *State*; becauſe they fear leſt thoſe tutelar Angels ſhould out of Ambition or Revenge become Domeſtick Enemies, and Carve out their own Recompence with their Swords. thus they rid themſelves of a Gentleman of the Houſe of *Loredano*, who by his preſence had appeaſed a Commotion of the People, when all the Magiſtrates of the Town with their promiſes and their threats could do nothing; ſuppoſing the ſaid *Loredano* might ſome time or other ſet up for the Government, having had ſo great ſucceſs in working upon the People, like *Tiberius* *, who conceived an implacable hatred againſt the Wife of *Germanicus*, for having ſtopped a Sedition which himſelf could not appeaſe.

* *Oderunt merita regnantes, quibus tum unerandis impares exiſtimantur.*

Machiav. lib. 3. diſc. 122.

* *Tac. An. 1.*

In the ſame manner they cauſed the perſon to be

be put to death who discovered the Conspiracy of Duke *Martin Falier*; first making him a Noble *Venetian*, and then taking away his Life when they had done. But 'tis no small part of their care to conceal this procedure to Strangers; whose Assistance they cannot want in their Wars; and to draw whom into their service, they have caused several Statues and Monuments to be erected in their Churches and Publick places in *Venice* and *Padua*, for Strangers that have served the *State*, thereby to allure others with hopes of the same Honour.

They bear a hatred to any that are great with the People; the common inconvenience of an *Aristocracie*, where the *Nobility* living in constant Jealousy and distrust, every man fancies that his Companion designs by insinuating with the People, to enslave the *Commonwealth*; and this imagination has caused the death of many a brave Person. One *Cornaro*, who in time of Famine had distributed Corn among the Poor, was Poisoned for his Charity, upon suspition that it was not innocent; * but that like *Andrew Sforzi* in *Florence*, he aimed to make himself Prince. For in such *States* 'tis the Custom to apprehend those very actions which they admire †, and to make away the Authors of them. How far this was the case of *Antonio Foscarini* the *Senator*, I cannot determine, for the *Senate* afterwards put to death those persons by whom he had been charged with suppositious Letters from the *Spanish Embassador*. By all which we may see how fatal the favour of the People proves to particular Persons ‡, especially in an *Aristocracie*. No wonder then if at *Venice* we see Gentlemen odious to the Commons, for their Extortions, and Excess. Nor is there any thing more safe, than to avoid *Popularity*. Thus was one *Priuli* called *Taglia-braccia* not only tolerated, but

* *Non enim simplicis eas Curas.* Tac. Ann. 1.

† *Manibat admiratio viri, sed Oderant.* Hist. 1.

‡ *Breves & infausto; Populi* Romani *amores.* An. 2.

but preferred to great imployment; becauſe having no intereſt with the People, they thought there could be no danger of his deſigning againſt the *Nobility*. Beſides, theſe kind of Extravagants are uſeful many times in Seditions and Tumults, to aſſwage the fury of the People, who wreaking their indignation upon ſuch hated perſons, all the reſt are left free: whereas thoſe who are Popular cannot be touched, but it increaſes the Flame, and hazards a general Conflagration. Hence it is that ſometimes in *Venice* it may be dangerous to have too great a reputation *, becauſe it may create a man as many Enemies as there are Noble-men whom he excells. And this perhaps was the cauſe of the Baniſhment of *Ange Badoer* the *Senator*, who was by ſome thought more Popular than was convenient for the Government: For ſome ſtick not to make it an Aphoriſm of State, *That great Wits be kept under, leſt elated by the applauſe of the People, they ſhould be encouraged to aſpire.* Moreover, they ſeem not to approve of Perſons above their buſineſs and employment; and therefore they do not much countenance Learning, becauſe they think it fills the mind with Notions, and hinders that gravity of Judgment which ought to be brought to Publick Debates, where good ſenſe with experience ſuffices; whereas your Scholars many times ſpoil all with their Criticiſms and ſubtilties, and rather intangle and perplex *Councils* than clear them. But ‡ though they are not Perſons that do generally apply themſelves to profound Learning, yet they are content that Strangers ſhould think otherwiſe of them. And therefore they were offended at the expreſſion of an *Embaſſador* of theirs, who pretending to give a reaſon why his Superiors had in their Banner put the Book of St. *Mark* open, and not ſhut, which had been more proper, in reſpect of the War, ſaid, *It*

* *Principibus gratum eſt domi aliquem eſſe ei quem odia Dominis debita exonorentur.* Strada.

† *Siniſtra erga imminentes interpretatio, nec minus periculum ex magna fama quam ex mala.* Tac. in Agric.

‡ *Novandis quam Gerendis rebus aptiora illa ingenia.* Curtius.

It was to ſhew that the City of Venice *was recalling good Letters, which had been Baniſhed from them ſo long.* Which expreſſion cauſed ſuch Commotion among the Senators, that ſome of them cried out aloud to have the Book ſhut, and in anger returned to their Houſes.

The knowledg of the *Venetians* lies generally in underſtanding their own affairs: they trouble not their heads much with Books, beyond their own Hiſtories and Cuſtoms, and except ſome few Gentlemen who have been Embaſſadors abroad, or gone along in their Equipage, they are generally very little curious of forreign tranſactions. There goes a Story that a *Senator* finding his Son reading the Hiſtory of *France*, ſnatched it away with this *Reprimend, Balordo, leggi le coſe della ſua Republica, e non altero. You Blockhead, if you muſt be reading, read your own Hiſtory, and no other.*

They believe the *Government of Venice* a Model for all the World, and no Nation under Heaven ſo happy as themſelves, though herhaps they are (as *Tacitus* ſaith) *Magis ſine Domino, quam in libertate; Rather without a Maſter than at Liberty.* The *Florentines* call them *Groſſolani.* And yet they laugh at the *Florentines*, who with all their exactneſs and delicacy of breeding have not been able to keep themſelves in liberty †. So true it is, that the fineſt and ſubtileſt wits are not always fitteſt to Govern, and that men of moderate parts, ſo they be ſetled and ſtayed, are more uſeful than ſublime and exalted heads, which commonly are unquiet and unſteady, and ſubject to ſuddain and temerarius attempts. Which made that Noble *Florentine* * ſay, *The* Venetians *were much more capable of Diſcipline and Reaſon than the* Florentines, *whoſe wit was too ſharp.* In effect

† *Hebetiores quam acutiores ut plurimum melius Remp. adminiſtrant* Thucyd. Hiſt. 3.

* Guid. Ant. Veſpicui.

effect, the *Thebans* who were dull, and the *Spartans* who understood nothing but Obedience, and the Mysteries of War, were better Governours than the *Athenians* with all their Eloquence and Learning: The *Athenians* studied nothing but fine speeches, and plausible Orations, without bringing any thing to Action, as if their *Senat* had been only a School for Orators or Sceptick Philosophers: But the *Thebans* and *Spartans* executed what they debated; and when they had bandied Arguments at home, they went to fight their Enemies abroad: But the *Venetians* are not arrived at this perfection, they are slow in Councel, and slow in in execution; and we see that many times that is taken for wisdom, and great caution, which is nothing but heavinesse or diffidence.

Ut quod segnitia pro erat, sapientia vacaretur. Hist. 1.

And though they are not so fine and polite as the *Romans* and *Florentines*, yet they know their own Interest, and can manage it as well as the best. All Treaties and transactions with them are fair and smooth ar first, but their end is not always so: as the *Comœdian* said of the *Lacedemonians*, *That they did, like Vintners, bring good Wine at first, and then dash it with Vinegar.* And indeed we see men are apt to promise any thing in danger, and to perform nothing when out of it, according to the Proverb of their Countrey, *Scampato 'l pericolo, gabbato il Santo: When the danger's past, the Saint may go whistle.* Possibly *Commonwealths* are the more inclined to equivocate and falsify in Treaties, because every man may hide himself in the throng, and can be no more discovered than the Elements in the Body of a man; a shelter which Princes have not. To which may be added, that the *Venetians* having no Commerce or Conversation with For-

Forreign Embaſſadors, they do not fear diſcovery from their Companions, nor by conſequence the Clamours of *Embaſſadors*, nor the Malice of their Maſters, which is an advantage they have above all other *Commonwealths*; And indeed, if the Hiſtorians of the laſt age do not wrong them, their manner of obſerving Treaties with *Sixtus* IV. the *Piſans*, *Hercules d'Eſte* Duke of *Ferrara*, and ſome other *States*, is not much to the commendation of their fidelity. They are generally very frank and open in their Countenances; gay and complaſant outwardly, but cloſe and reſerved at the heart. This was manifeſt in their Carriage to *Francis Moroſini*; on the day of his entrance into the *Procuratorſhip*, all the Nobility flocked to him in throngs, contending with one another who ſhould Careſs and flatter him moſt *; and three Months after, the ſame perſons who magnified him ſo extravagantly before, cried out bitterly againſt him, upbraiding him for his Conduct as General, and promoted his Proceſs with ſuch fury, that one would not have thought it had been the ſame *Senat* †, or the ſame *Nobility*. And indeed in *Venice* any troubleſom Perſon may raiſe a tempeſt among the *Nobility*, among whom every one waits for an opportunity till his partner declares, for 'tis the Cuſtom there to follow the motion of other People in things where they are unwilling to be reckoned the firſt Author ‡ themſelves.

* *Certant adulationibus cæteri Magiſtratus.*

† *Alium Crederes Senatum, alium populum.* Ib.

‡ *Proximi cujuſque audaciam expectantes, inſita mortalibus natura, propere ſequi quo piget inchoare.* Ibid.

They are accounted Enemies of thoſe whom they have offended, as if there could be no ſuch thing

thing as a hearty reconciliation *; and usually fear of revenge begets perpetual distrust, which is the source of eternal Enmity.

*Proprium est humani ingenii odisse quem læseris. In Agric.

On the contrary, In *Commonwealths* good deeds or benefits make little impression, especially what are received on the publick score, in which to the ordinary Estimate in such Governments Private Persons are but little concerned. Revenge is natural to the Climate of *Italy*, and therefore it is no wonder if this *State* hath afforded Examples of it as well as others; and the less needful to mention any.

I shall only adde by way of advice to those who are concerned with the People of these Parts, That their silence is much to be apprehended when they are offended, because their Anger is the more irreconcilable, as it is more concealed and secret; for they conceal it, to revenge themselves upon occasion with more violence. 'Tis to no purpose to think to mitigate them by submission; their humour perverts all applications, and time it self cannot heal up the Wounds of an Injury, though sometimes it may moderate the smart; for as the Proverb of that Country says, they keep *la Memoria in Cuore*.

Quo obscurior ita, eo irrevocabilior. Tac. in Agricola.

They visit one another but seldom, even those who are related; but they meet every day in the *Broglio*, where they discourse of their affairs publickly before all the World; by which means 'tis hard for any to Cabal, or Plot against the *State*. They suffer themselves to be rarely visited by Strangers, and they think thereby to keep up their Majesty and Grandeur, as also to avoid the expence of their Table; and therefore, if they treat any of their Friends by accident, 'tis always out of their Houses, as if it were to

let them know at what charge they do it, and to oblige them to come no more.

They are ſober, whether out of Conſcience or Frugality let others judg, and do eat well at a good Meal, when it is at another man's coſt. At the *Duke*'s four great Feaſts, not one man invited will be abſent, no more than the *Pregadi* at the Anniverſary Treat of *Cardinal Zell*, and all is becauſe there is a diſtribution of a *Ducat* a Head. So that Embaſſadors would always have * the *Barnabotes* at their Tables if it were lawful to hold Converſation with them. In ſhort, Strangers that keep Tables have always, as in other Places, ſome of the indigent Gentlemen to keep them company, under pretence of ſhewing the curioſity of their Town, and explaining their Antiquities, Feaſts, and the Myſterious Symbols of *Abbot Joachim* to be ſeen in the Church of St. *Mark*, which they ſhew with moſt magnificent Paraphraſes, (moſt of them of their own invention,) to make the things more wonderful. Thus they tell, us the Foundation of their City was laid the ſame day the World was Created, that it might appear more auguſt and venerable to Strangers †. Thus they ſhew Relicks and Monuments of ſeveral Victories, which many people believe they never obtained: among the reſt the *Canal Orphano*, which they call by that name inſtead of *del Arco*, upon pretence of a defeat they gave the *French* there, in which thoſe who were preſent left all their Children Orphans; though all ‡ Hiſtorians Ancient and Modern agree that *Pepin* was Victor, and received Tribute and Homage of the *Venetians* as King of *Italy*.

* See the Remarks.

† *Ut miſcendo humana divinis, primordia Urbis auguſtiora faciat.* Livius.

‡ Aimon. *l.* 4. *c.* 94, 96. Adel. Ann. *Regin.* Ado. Baronius *Tom.* 12.

Leand. Albert. *deſcript.* Ven.

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The account they give likewiſe of their Victory at Sea gained againſt the *Mareſchal Boucicaut* in the *Levant*, is of the ſame nature; as alſo the great advantage that *Melchior Treviſan* got over *Charles* VIII, at the Battle of *Fornoué* *; to which they might have added the defeat of the *French* at the Battle of *Aignadel*, to triumph at leaſt over the Credulity of the ignorant.

* See the Remarks.

They are much given to their pleaſures; and their Miſtreſſes are much more chargeable to them than their Wives, whom they uſe as their Servants. There are a ſort of People among them, who make ſo little reckoning of Marriage, that they ſay, *It is nothing but a civil Ceremony that binds the Opinion, but not the Conſcience; and that a Courteſan that is to be hired for money, is in no worſe condition than a Wife, ſaving for Politick reaſons.* One thing is ſtrange, and peculiar to them, and that is, that they frequently keep Miſtreſſes in common, *viz.* two, three, or four men to a Miſs, and yet agree very well: Nay that which in other places occaſions Quarrels and Murder, is an indearment among them, and makes their intimacy the greater. In their Amours, they talk freely, and will diſcourſe of their Alliances, Deſignes, what Perſons they intend to recommend to ſuch a charge, and who ſhall be excluded, as the † *Germans* did of old in their Feaſts.

† *De jungendis affinitatibus, & ad ſciſcendis Principibus; de Bello ac Pace, in Conviviis conſultant.* Tac. Germ.

But how indifferent ſoever they are for their Wives, they are ſo jealous of them, that in Carneval-time they dog them wherever they go;

ſome have gone ſo far as to ſtab them upon bare ſuſpition, and have been thought brave Gentlemen for their pains. Strangers have felt the Effects of this humour, as *Don Dominick de Guſman*, Brother to the late *Duke de Medina de las Torres* can teſtify, who was Cudgelled by the appointment of *Julius Juſtinianus*, to whoſe Wife he had preſented a *Spaniſh Catholicon*. But they may well be jealous, for as wiſe as they are, or think themſelves to be, there will be ſtealing into their Quarters, and the *Senat* muſt keep Guards upon their Ladies, as the * *Spartans* did upon the Wives of their Kings, unleſs they can be contented with a Contreband Nobility.

* *Regum Uxores ab Ephoris cuſtodiuntur, uti provideatur ne ex alio genere Rex clam fiat, quàm ex Heraclidis.* Plat.

The natural timidity of the Populace is ſuch, and renders them ſo Superſtitious, that they take many things as Judgments from Heaven, that are but Accidents, and perhaps natural effects. A Fire happening in a Magiſtrates Houſe, a Steeple blown down by the Wind, the pittiful Prediction of any trifling Aſtrologer, are Subjects enough to ſet their Brains on work, eſpecially in time of War, when every thing puts them into an apprehenſion, and ſtaggers their Prudence; the † voice of the Vulgar going as far with them, as the judgment of the *Sages*. From whence it happens, that upon any misfortune in their Army, inſtead of ſtopping it's courſe, the Remedy is deferred; and becauſe they will hazard nothing, they many times loſe all: Being of the mind of that *Roman* General, who never thought of Conquering till he had ſecu-

† *In metu conſilia Prudentium, & vulgi Rumor juxta audiuntur.* Tac. Hiſt. 3.

ſecured himſelf againſt being Conquered *; and he who would pleaſe the *Venetians* muſt do the ſame. Upon this ſcore it was, that they had a greater eſteem for *Count Petillan* who was ſlow and cautious, and ſeldom to be drawn to a Battle, than for *Seignior d'Alviano* who was always for fighting, and held it as † Cowardly to decline, as Courageous to attack an Enemy. This conſideration has likewiſe loſt them ſeveral opportunities, of which their Enemies have made good advantage. So when they recovered *Padua* from the Emperour *Maximilian*, they let *Vicenza* and *Verona* eſcape, for not accepting at firſt the offers which theſe two Towns made them to ſurrender *. When, not long after, they reduced *Vicenza*, they let *Verona* ſlip again; which, as *Moccenigo* confeſſes, was ready to have received them. Thus did they ſtand in their own light, when they refuſed to joyn with the King of *Poland*, *Ladiſlaus* IV. againſt the *Grand Seignior*, *Amurath* IV. from whom they had received ſeveral injuries, and were at that time in danger of a War; which War was undertaken and inferred afterwards by *Ibrahim* Brother to the ſaid *Amurath*, in Confidence that the *Poles* being offended that the *Venetians* had refuſed them, would not be tempted to give the *Turks* any diverſion.

'Tis reported of them, that in the choice of their Generals they differ from all other Governments in *Europe*, who generally make choice of Commanders that are Valiant and wiſe; but when any ſuch happens to be choſen, they many times give them ſuch rubs and mortifications, that they are quickly taken down, or elſe renounce their Command, to ſave their reputation. For 'tis ſaid, that the great reaſon why Stran-

* *Satis citò incipi victoriam ratus, ubi proviſus ne vincere-tur.* Hiſt. 2.

† *Cunctatio ſervitii ſtatim exequi, Regium, videtur.* An. 5.

‡ Andr. Moccen. Bell. Camdr. *l.* 2.

gers are entertained in those Commands, is only to bear the blame, and that all miscarriages of the War may be shifted upon them; which made *Count Pettilano* Complain, *That the City of* Venice *was readier to find fault, than to furnish him with necessaries for their service*, &c. To this may be added, That the young Noblemen put upon these Generals as Companions, under the Title of *Proveditors-General*, are so jealous of their Authority, that they do often choose rather to ruin and spoil all by following their own heads, than to succeed never so well by the Wisdom and good Conduct of a Stranger. *Pia tosto* (said one of those Nobles in a *Council of War*) *voglio errare da me, che far bene con il parere de gli alteri:* and where this has been their practice, they have thriven accordingly.

They easily believe whatever they desire, and good News, though false, is always welcom to them; and therefore they gave more credit to the Reports given out by the *Turks*, that they would besiege *Malta*, than to their Advice from *Constantinople*, to look to the defence of *Candia*: Nay the *Senat* forbad the Nobility to speak of that War, under the penalty of Banishment; which Order, and the Imprisonment of some Persons for the same, did but the more frighten the People *, who are easy to believe any thing they apprehend. During the Siege of *Candia* they made them believe sometimes that the *Grand Seignior*, sometimes the *Grand Visior* was dead, and sometimes that *Constantinople* was revolted, *Credula fama inter Gaudentes, & incuriosos.* For they must be flattered in their distresses, and many times the vanity of their hopes make them neglect the application of seasonable Remedies.

* *Facili Civitate ad credenda omnia nova, cum tristia sunt.*

The

The Miniſters of Princes are always ſuſpected by them, eſpecially if they find them wiſe and cloſe, as People harder to be managed or deluded than the reſt. At their firſt coming, the *Senat* cauſes all their Diſcourſe and all their Actions to be ſtrictly obſerved, in order to diſcover their parts and diſpoſitions; and the better to ſucceed in this deſign, they ſound them ſometimes by affronts offered to their Retinue, ſometimes by cunning and inſidious propoſitions; ſometimes one way, ſometimes another, and all to perplex and experiment his Prudence.

Thus they tried the *Count d'Argenſon*, cauſing it to be asked him at his Entry, whether he would be received at the Abby of St. *George* not far from the Town, pretending to ſave him the labour of going to the *Saint Eſprit* *, in reſpect of the badneſs of the Weather that day: But the cunning Embaſſador replied, *That he was not come thither to loſe any of the Rights, or leſſen any thing of the Honours of his Embaſſage; and that if he were to go as far as* Chiozza, *or farther, neither Rain nor Snow ſhould hinder him.* At the beginning of the *Preſident de St. Andrew's* Embaſſy, four of his *Gondolieres* carrying certain Merchants Goods out of the Town in the night, were intercepted by the *Saffs* or Guards at the Town's end, without regard to their Livery, or the name of their Maſter, which they often repeated, though otherwiſe there is no place where Embaſſadors are uſed with more formality than in *Venice:* which makes wiſemen imagine, it was done by private Orders from the *Senat*, to take off the mind of that Miniſter from enquiring after their affairs in *Candia*, (which at that time were in a very ill poſture) by imploying it about repairing

* An Abbey three miles from *Venice*, where the Embaſſadors from Crowned Heads are received.

pairing this affront. And I remember that being in diſcourſe one day with a Gentleman of parts, who had much acceſs to the chief *Senators*, and ſpeaking of that buſineſs, he let fall this Expreſſion, after ſeveral other Reaſons that he had given, *E forſe che l' Senato coſi l'haben voluto? And who knows but the Senat would have it ſo?* And indeed the little regard the *Captain Grand*, and the *Captain* of the *Council of Ten* took of the buſineſs, makes it more than probable; notwithſtanding by Decree of the ſaid *Council* the Offenders were put out of their places *nel ſolo dubbio* (as the Decree ran) that is, only upon ſuſpicion, to Cajole the *French King*, and let him ſee how tender and ſenſible they were of any injury to him, whileſt they themſelves were the Authors of it. But 'tis not only hard, but unlawful to dive too far into the Secrets of Princes *.

* *Abditos Principis ſenſus exquirere, illicitum, anceps.* Ann. 5.

Again, the *Venetians* are apt to be jealous of all Embaſſadors, and to interpret all their Actions as Myſteries tending to Conſpiracy. They deſcant upon his walking abroad upon his ſtaying at home; upon his abſence from Chappel, upon any word that falls ſuddenly from him, and a Thouſand other things, from whence they make great conjectures, and draw mighty conſequences of *State*. One ſingle *Vive la France* by ſome *Italian* Foot-men in the *French* Embaſſador's Equipage, as he was going home from a *Ball* at the Secretary of *Mantua*'s Lodgings, was enough to put the whole Town in an uproar, as if it had been a new Conſpiracy of *la Queva*, when-as it was indeed nothing but the Hectoring of Foot-men in revenge of an affront

affront which they had received during the *Ball*. A little journey of that Embaſſadors to the Lady of *Lauretto*, was interpreted a calling back into *France*, and a ſilent Rupture with that King, though the night before his departure, the ſaid Embaſſador gave notice of it to the *Colledg*. And whileſt he was abſent all the World could not diſabuſe them, though otherwiſe they think themſelves too cunning to be impoſed upon by any other.

They have a great vanity to be thought good Juſticiaries, and to that end, upon Holy-days they give publick Audience in the Galleries of St. *Mark*, whilſt the Courts are ſitting, to ſhew that no day can hinder them from doing Juſtice, and that the Temple thereof is as conſtantly open as that of the *Romans* was of old. But there are two things generally complained of in their Judicature; One is, that few of them are verſed in their Laws, and what they do, is only in a common road that is beaten by every body; The other, that upon any Offence they condemn People to the Galleys, as well for trifles as for the greateſt Crimes, according to their intereſt, that is, to their Neceſſity for Rowers: and this is the reaſon why ſo few People are Executed, neither are they more ſcrupulous for Baniſhment, and Confiſcation of Eſtates. For there needs not much reaſon of *State* againſt thoſe who are rich, eſpecially if of the Nobility upon the *Terra-firma*. And I remember when the *French* Embaſſador viſited the Countrey-Houſes betwixt *Vicenza* and *Verona*, he never enquired for the Maſters of the Houſes, leſt they ſhould have been anſwered, he is Baniſhed, or Proſcribed. Some of them are ſo puffed up with their Nobility, that

that they think themſelves equal with the greateſt Princes: witneſs that Nobleman who at *Paris* had the Confidence to ſay, he was as good a man as *Monſieur* the Kings only Brother. And one of an eminent Family, who thought all People were to give him place, becauſe he was a Nobleman of *Venice*; which made him be treated ſo ill, that he carries the marks thereof to this day: For which reaſon he refuſed an Embaſſy into *France*.

For their better juſtification they make themſelves Princes, and will not think themſelves miſtaken, when they find a deſcent of *Roman Conſuls, Kings,* and *Emperours* in their Pedegrees; for of all the *Italians* they are the moſt carried away with *Chimera's* concerning their Extraction. The *Contarini* deduce themſelves in a direct line from *Cotta* Governour, or *Count Palatin* of the *Rhine*. The *Moroſini* bring their Original out of *Hungary* from a City of that name. The *Juſtiniani* derive them from the Emperour of that name; and diſclaim their relation to the *Juſtiniani* of *Genoa*, who were Popular before the Reformation of that Government. The *Cornari* derive themſelves from the *Cornelii* in *Rome*. The *Quirini* claim deſcent from the Illuſtrious *Roman* Family of the *Sulpitii*, and as ſuch they reckon the Emperour *Galba* for one of their Anceſtors. The *Loredani* bring their deſcent from the *Schevolæ*: the *Piſani* from the *Piſoſi* of *Rome*. The *Venieri*, from *Valerius* Emperour of *Conſtantinople*, *&c.*

Though all their Nobility make but one Body, yet there is no neceſſity they ſhould all have the ſame principle and humour. The ancient Nobility have a ſtrong averſion to the new, whom

whom they deſpiſe, and on the other ſide are as much hated by them in revenge. The firſt deſire War, to have the Honour and Profit of it, becauſe the chief Commands belong ſolely to them: The other are conſequently for Peace, as that which keeps up their Equality, whereas War makes their Companions more haughty and proud. The Ancient Nobility decline all Embaſſies as chargeable and troubleſom; the New are ambitious of them, as a true way to make themſelves known in the World; aſpiring moreover to the *Dogeſhip*, to Illuſtrate their Families by the ſupremacy of that Office, whilſt the Ancient Nobility reject it as a Clog, and a degree of Servitude. The Ancient love to have their reſidence in *Venice*, where they have all the great Offices; the New affect imployment abroad, to rid themſelves of the Contempts and Contradictions of the Ancients, who pervert every thing they do, and turn it into *Ridicule*; For in the *Provinces* where there is nothing but Subjects, the New Nobility are chief, and muſt be honoured as they pleaſe. In a word, whilſt theſe are delighted with Equality. which the Ancients cannot bear, both parties live in animoſity like the *Caſtelans* and *Nicolotes* among the Common People. And perhaps this diviſion contributes to the ſafety of the Government, the Ancient Nobility and the New watching one anothers Actions perpetually, ſo that neither can do amiſs. For which cauſe, whenever the *Inquiſitors of State*, or *Council of ten* are inquiring into the Adminiſtrations of the one, the other will be ſure to put to their Shoulder to tumble them down: and the Faction of the New were very near ruining General *Moroſini* when he was accuſed

accuſed by the *Avogador Corraro*. And upon theſe advantages the Nobility do frequently expreſs their private averſions.

The Nobles of the *Colony* of *Candia* are contemptible to both; their hatred is without any other cauſe than an old animoſity which the *Venetians* have retained againſt the *Greeks*, with whom they have had ſeveral Wars: and therefore it is reckoned a great injury to a Nobleman of *Venice* to ſay he is a *Greek*, and they'l take it more kindly to be called by a worſe name. Upon this ſcore a Gentleman of the Houſe of *Dandolo* thought himſelf highly abuſed in a Health which one of the *Contarini* began to him in *Candian* Wine, with theſe words, *Seignior Dandolo, Brindeſi in Greco*, which the ſaid *Dandolo* took as a reflexion upon the place of his birth. And here I muſt hint by the by, that a Noble *Venetian* does not love Raillery, and that the memory of a Jeſt never goes out of their Heads, eſpecially if it has any thing in it of truth. In my time two of the Illuſtrious *Senators*, looking upon one anothers *Gloves*, one told the other, *Caro Seignior, i voſtri guanti hanno le dita ben corte, Eli mei hanno ben lunge. Sir, the Fingers of your Gloves are very ſhort, and mine are as long.* To which the other replied, *And with good reaſon Sir, becauſe my Nails are not ſo long as your Lordſhips. Mi ſta bene Coſi, per che non ho l'unghie come lei.* Which words as he thought reflecting upon his Extortion, of good Friends before, they became immortal and implacable Enemies.

But 'tis time now we turn our Medal, and in the Revers give you a view of their Virtues and Perfections, as a ballance to their Vices; and this

this I intend as the laſt ſtroke of my Pencil at this time.

The *Venetians* are Grave and Prudent, uniform in their Actions, at leaſt viſibly, conſtant in their Friendſhips, firm in their Reſolutions, becauſe long in their Debates, always quiet without whatever their agitations be within: Patient in difficult and tedious affairs, gentle and tractable to thoſe who know how to manage them, inſomuch that with little Complaiſance they may be made very good Friends, eſpecially if we have their Government in Admiration, and look upon them as Princes. Though at home they live frugally and nearly, in their forreign Imployments they are ſplendid enough, and particularly in their Embaſſies, where they will ſpare nothing that is for the ſervice or honour of their Countrey, whoſe Face and Authority they may be ſaid to carry along with them *. An Elogy of the *Venetians.*

* *Secum peregre affert faciem & authoritatem Reipublicæ.* Cicero.

Tis with marvellous eaſe and facility that they diſcern the Methods of all Courts to which they are ſent; and there are but few People ſo quick and well diſpoſed for Negotiation; there being ſeldom any thing ſo knotty and intricate, but they will find ſome expedient or another to weather it. In *Paris*, they are *French*, at *Madrid*, *Spaniſh*, and Natural *Dutch* at *Vienna*, as if they were born only for that place where their Reſidence is appointed, or had ſtript themſelves of their Countrey-Faſhions, to put on the humour of Strangers: and therefore they ſeldom fail of one thing that is not eaſily learned, and that is of ingratiating with the Prince

to

to whom they are ſent, which a great States-man pronounced to be a great ſign of their Wiſdom who can do it *.

* *Non eſt majus meritum, quam gratiam inveniſſe Regnantium.* Caſſiodor.

Though they are naturally ambitious, yet with great quietneſs they lay down the Command of their Armies, and return as contentedly to their private affairs, as if they never had had the whole Power of their Countrey in their hands, or at leaſt were very glad to be diſcharged of the burthen. So that we may ſay of the *Commonwealth* of *Venice*, as *Theopompus* ſaid of *Sparta*, That the great reaſon why they had laſted ſo long under one Government, was their Citizens knowing ſo well how to obey. They are very ſecret and cloſe, not only in their State-affairs, but in every thing wherewith they are intruſted, which they will never diſcover, though afterwards they fall out and become Enemies. They are People of great Order, Providence, and Judgment, and if compared with the reſt of the *Italians*, they will be conſiderable as well for their own Virtues as for the Vices of their Neighbours. And Laſtly, amongſt their Moral and Civil qualifications, they have much of Chriſtianity. The multitude and Magnificence of their Churches, prove their Piety and Religion, whatever their Calumniators ſay to the contrary, as that they are generally *Marſilians*, and deny the Immortality of the Soul: but 'tis without any reaſon that they aſperſe them, unleſs it be from the defamatory Libels publiſhed againſt them by the Court of *Rome*, whilſt they were under *Paul* V. Excommunication. Their Hoſpi-

Hoſpitals, the beſt endowed in all *Italy*, ſpeak their Liberality and Alms, eſpecially that which they call *La Pieta*, in which all expoſed Children are provided for with great Care, though ſometimes their number has been ſo great as to amount to 6000. In which thing they have expreſſed great Gratitude to God, and Mercy to Mankind, by ſaving or rather giving new life to thouſands of poor innocent Babes, thrown daily by the Courteſans into the *Canals* of the Town, where without this proviſion they would certainly periſh. In a word the *State* of *Venice* having had many Friends, and Hiſtorians that have wirt their Praiſes more Copiouſly, and more Elegantly than I, I ſhall add no more; what I have already ſaid being in my opinion fully ſufficient. *Ex ungue Leonem.*

RE-

REMARKS
UPON
Certain Words
AND
PROPER NAMES
Imployed in this
HISTORY.

I Have not put theſe *Remarks* in the *Margin*, becauſe I muſt have repeated the ſame thing every time the ſame word was mentioned: Beſides the *Margin* would not have contained all the Paſſages and *Remarks*, of which ſome are long, but very neceſſary for the Illuſtration and clearing of ſeveral obſcure places in this Book.

Andre Contarini, Duke of *Venice*. In the Cloiſter of the *Auguſtins* in *Venice*, his Tomb is to be ſeen, with his Epitaph in *Latine* Verſe, and this Inſcription in Proſe, *Me nulla tacebit ætas, cum* Januenſes *profligaverim*, Clodiámque (that is *Chiozza*) *receperim, & a maximis periculis*

Patriam liberaverim. No Age but will mention me, I having defeated the Genoeſes, *reduced* Clodia, (or *Chiozza*) *and delivered my Countrey from very great Dangers.*

Andre Strozzi. This Gentleman had ſo ingratiated with the People of *Florence* by ſelling them Corn at an under-rate, that one day he aſſembled above 4000 men, with whom he marched to force the Gates of the *Senators* Palace, deſigning by ſeizing upon them to have conſtrained them to proclaim him Lord of *Florence. Machiavel, lib.* 2. of his *Hiſtory.*

Theſe Largeſſes from private Perſons have in all Ages and *Commonwealths* been ſuſpected. Witneſs *Ageſilaus,* who was by the *Ephori* condemned in a great fine for having ſent an Ox to every *Senator:* The *State* of *Sparta* apprehending it an artifice to cajole the *Senate,* and debauch them by his Bounty.

Antonio Foſcarini. This Gentleman was of a Gentle, Courteous, and Inſinuating diſpoſition; his life was exemplary, a great diſtributer of Alms, and for that was highly eſteemed by the People, and adored by the *Monks,* who ſelling their Shells to him at a dear rate, cried him up every-where for a Saint: by which means he became odious, and ſuſpected by the *Senate,* who to compleat his Saintſhip thought nothing wanting to him but the Crown of Martyrdom.

Antonio Venieri, Duke of *Venice. Matina* in his Elogy on the ſaid *Duke,* tells us he made an example of his Son. Brutus (ſays he) Manliuſque Romanæ *ſeveritatis exempla, in* Antonio Venerio *revixere. . . . . Totius Domus, quæ unici Filii capite nitebatur, ruinam, ſicco ſpectavit oculo. Qui in Matronæ famam ſe injurium prebuerat, vinculis*

lis mancipatum, publico pudori victimam adolevit. Brutus *and* Manlius, *two great Examples of the* Roman *ſeverity, revived in* Antonio Venieri..... *With dry eyes he beheld the ruin of his whole Family, which depended upon the life of his only Son, who having offended againſt the Honour of a Lady, was by his order clapped in Chains, and made a Sacrifice to the publick diſhonour.*

Ariſtocracy, is when the *Government* reſts in the hands of the *Principal Citizens.* There are two ſorts of *Ariſtocracies*, one where the *Nobility* only Govern by right of their Birth, and ſuch are the *Governments* of *Venice*, *Genoa*, and *Luca*, in all which it is ſufficient to be born a Gentleman to have a ſhare in the Civil Adminiſtration. Whereas in the other kind of *Ariſtocracie*, all is carried by Election and Merit, as in *Lacedemon* where nothing but Virtue was regarded. The *Latine* Hiſtorians ſeem to deſcribe theſe *two Ariſtocracies* by the Words *Primores*, and *Optimates*. *Primores* are the *Nobles*, and in that ſence *Tacitus* tells us, *Cunctas Nationes & Urbes, Populus, aut Primores, aut ſinguli Regunt.* Ann. 4. But *Optimates* implys the Government of Perſons choſen and called to Office upon conſideration of Merit, without reſpect to their Extraction. The *Senate* of *Seleucia* was compoſed of both, as *Tacitus* obſerves, *Trecenti opibus aut ſapientia delecti ut Senatus : Opibus* denoting the Rich or Noble, and *Sapientia* the Worthy, and and men of experience.

Avogador. I do not think fit to call this Officer an *Advocat-General*, becauſe the name of *Avogador* ſounds well enough, as alſo becauſe it has a certain propriety in it, and ought not to be changed: Beſides, thoſe who have been at *Venice*, or have any notion of their Magiſtrates,

ſtrates, will better underſtand the word *Avogador* than *Advocate-General*, which many People would take to be different, nor would the *Avogador* be known to a *Venetian* under any other Name.

Bajamont Tiepole. This Gentleman being unable to ſuffer the election of *Peter Gradenigue*, to the rejection of his Father whom the *Populace* had proclaimed *Duke*, reſolved, with the *Quirins Badoers*, *Baroces*, and other families diſſatisfied with the late Reformation of the *Government*, to kill the *Duke* and the *Senate*. But on the day appointed for execution of their Deſign there aroſe ſo furious a Tempeſt, one would have thought Heaven it ſelf had been angry, and put Nature in Arms againſt ſo horrid a Plot; for the Conſpirators being frighted (as is ordinary in ſuch undertakings) fled and diſperſed as not thinking themſelves ſafe in their own Countrey. In the *Rialto* there is ſtill to be ſeen the Relicks of the Palace belonging to the *Quirins*, which they have now turned into a Shambles. And in St. *Auguſtins* (which is the Pariſh of *Bajamont*,) there is a marble Pillar with an account of the Condemnation of that Nobleman inſcribed, which Stigmatizes the Conſpirators with the brand of perpetual Infamy. The *Senat* every year viſits the Church of St. *Vito* the 15 of *June*, and the *Duke* treats the *Embaſſadors* and *Senat* in memory of their deliverance.

Barnabotes, are the Nobles of the Pariſh of St. *Barnaby*, which for the greateſt part are indigent and poor, ſo that to anger a Nobleman heartily, you need no more than to call him *Barnabote*.

Bartelmi d'Alviane was General of the *Venetian* Infantry at the Battle of *Ghiarra-d'Adda*, where

where he was taken Priſoner by *Monſieur de Vandeneſſe*, Brother to the *Mareſchal de la Palipe:* he was chief cauſe of the loſs of that Battle by his precipitation, fighting contrary to the opinion of the *Count de Petilane* the *Generaliſſimo*, whoſe advice was to protract. *Machiavel* ſpeaking of the ſaid Fight, tells us that the *Venetians, Non harianno perſo la Giornata de* Vaila, *ſe fuſinoti ſecondando i* Franceſi *al manco dieci Giorni, ma il furore* d'Alviano, *trovo un maggior furore. They had not loſt the Battle of* Vaila, *had they followed the perſwaſion of the* French *and protracted but ten days. But* Alviane's *heat was overmatched by a greater.* But afterwards he recovered his Honour at the Battle of *Marignan*, where he did very good ſervice for *Francis* I. who in recompence permitted him to bear in his Eſcutcheon the Armes of *France.*

Battel de Vaila. Hiſtorians call this Battle by ſeveral names: ſome call it the Battle of *Ghiarra d'Adda*, others of *Caravas*, others of *Aignadel*, and others of *Rivolto* or *Ripalto*; but 'tis the ſame Battle called by the names of ſeveral places adjacent in the ſame *Canton. Queſta fu* (ſays *Guichardin lib.* 8.) *la Giornata famoſa di* Ghiarra d'Adda *O come altri la Chiamano, di* Vaila, *fatta il* 14 *di* Maggio, ... *Il Renado il di ſeguente a* Carravagio, *e batte con l'Artiglieria la Fortezza, la quale in ſpatio d'un di ſe dette libramente. This was* (Guichard. l. 8.) *the famous Battle of* Ghiarra d'Adda, *or as ſome others will have it, the Battle of* Vaila, *fought the* 14 *of* May, ... *The next day the King removed to* Caravaggio, *and battered the Caſtle with his Cannon in ſuch manner, that in a days time it ſurrendered.* And this gave occaſion to confound the Battle of *Vaila*, with the taking of *Caravas*, which happened but the day after.

Leander Albertus in his deſcription of *Venice* has theſe words, *Omnes prope modum Orbis Chriſtiani Principes ſocietatem contraxerant adverſus* Venetos, *quos cum* Ludovicus XII. *memorabili apud* Ripaltam *pugna cæcidiſſet, Imperium eorum exuere* Bergamum, Brixia, Cremona, Verona, Vicentia, Patavium, *&c. Moſt of the Chriſtian Princes of the World confederated againſt the* Venetians, *who being beaten by* Lewis XII. *in the memorable Fight at* Ripalta, *the Towns* Bergamo, Breſſia, Cremona, Verona, Vicentia, *and* Padua, *revolted.* Cardinal *Contarini* in his *lib.* 5. of that *Commonwealth* has theſe, *Cum omnes Chriſtiani Principes conſpiraſſent in perniciem & exitium nominis* Veneti, *fuſuſque noſter exercitus fuiſſet a* Ludovico Gallorum *Rege juxta* Caſſanum *oppidum agri* Cremonenſis. *When all the Princes of Chriſtendom conſpired the ruine and deſtruction of the* Venetians, *and our Army was defeated by* Lewis *King of* France, *in the Territory of* Cremona.

Machiavel, lib. 3. of his Diſcourſes *c.* 31. ſays, ſpeaking of the *Venetians, Dipoi che hebbero una miza rotta a* Vaila *dal Re di* Francia, *Perderono tutto lo ſtato loro. After the* Venetians *were defeated at* Vaila, *by the King of* France, *they loſt moſt of their Government.* And again *lib. del Princi. c.* 12. *Come intervenne dipoi a* Vaila, *dove in una Giornata perderono quello che in Otto Cento anni con tante fatiche averano acquiſtatato. As it happened afterwards at* Vaila, *where in one day they loſt what in Eight hundred years they had gained with ſo much difficulty and trouble.*

Monſieur Bayard, c. 29 of his Hiſtory ſpeaks of this Battle, as fought 14 *Maii*, 1509, in the Village of *Aignadel* two days after the taking of the Town of *Rivolto*, by all which it appears that thoſe were not different Battles as ſome People imagine.

Battail

Battail de Fornove. Guichardin lib. 2. of his Hiſtory ſpeaks thus of this Battle, *In modo ſi Forzarono i* Venetiani *d'attribuarſi queſta Gloria, che per Commandemento publico ſine fice per tutto dominio loro, fuochi, & altri ſegni d'allegrezza. Ne ſeguitarono nel tempo avenire piu negligemente l'eſempio Publico, i Privati, per che nel ſepolero di* Marchione Triviſano *nella chieſa de Frati Minori furono ſcritte queſte parole, Che ſu l'fiume del* Taro *Combatte con* Carlo *Re di* Francio *proſperamente.* And in his *Epitaph* are theſe words, Melchior Triviſano, *qui cum* Carolo Franc. *Rege ad* Tarrum *proſpere conflixit. Et Nondimeno,* (ſays the ſame Author) *il Conſentimente Univerſale aggudico la Palma a* Francheſi, *perche ſcacciarono gl'Inimici dal fiume, & per che reſto loro libero il paſſare innani, che era la contentione per la quale procedui era la Combattere. So careful were the* Venetians *to appropriate to themſelves the Honour of that day, that by publick Command Bonefires were made, and other expreſſions of Joy. Nor afterwards were particular perſons leſs diligent in following the Example of the Publick, for on the Tomb of the* Marquiſs Treviſan *in the Chappel of the* Minor Friars, *were written theſe words, Who upon the River* Faro *fought ſucceſfully againſt the King of* France. And upon his *Epitaph,* Melchior Trevilan, *who beat the King of* France's *Army near the* Taro. *Nevertheleſs* (ſays the ſame Author) *Univerſal conſent gave the Victory to the* French, *becauſe they forced the Enemy from the River, and opened their Paſſage, which was the great end of their fighting.* And thus the *Venetians* flatter themſelves by robbing their Enemies of their juſt reputation.

F. Benoiſt General of the *Cordeliers.* Fra. Benetto *andò dal Re di* Ungheria, *e divoteſtamente*

Io ſupplico, ſtando ſempre Zenochiado, che gli piaceſſe in opere di miſericordia per ſua Benignita, voler far pace col Commun di Venetia, *e ſimilmente in dur* Genoveſi, *& il Seignior di* Padoa, *con il Patriarch del* Friul *in Pace con loro, accio che le Sangue de Chriſtiani non ſi ſpandi aggiungendo, Noi ſiamo pronti de far quello che voi volette.* To which the King of *Hungary* Replied, *Cariſſime Domine, Io non intendo di far Pace con* Venetiani, *ſe non prima laſciano quello che devono laſciare de Raiſon.* Frier Bennet *addreſſed himſelf to the King of* Hungary, *and with great devotion upon his Knees begged of him, that in his Princely Benignity and Compaſſion he would pleaſe to be Reconciled to the* Venetians, *and be inſtrumental in making their Peace with the* Genoeſes, *the Patriarch of* Friul, *and the Lord of* Padua, *whereby much Chriſtian Blood would be ſpared*; (adding theſe words) *and we are ready with chearfulneſs to receive your Commands.* The King of *Hungary* replied, *My Reſolution is never to come to Terms with the* Venetians, *till they reſtore what in reaſon they are bound.* This I took out of an old Manuſcript lent me in *Venice.*

Bouches Ouvertes, are the Marble heads about the Galleries of St. *Mark*, whoſe mouths are made open to receive the Billets and Memorials of Accuſers. They call this *Denuncie Secrete*, or the Secret Diſcovery, and there is one for every Crime.

Boucicault. The *Venetians* having advice that the *Mareſchal de Boucicault* Governour of *Genoa* had taken the Town of *Barut* in *Syria*, notwithſtanding by private intelligence they were aſſured he was marched againſt the *Saracens*, they attended till he came back, and gave him

Battle

Battle betwixt the Isles of *Sapienza* and *Modon*, pretending that when they sacked *Barut*, the *French* and the *Genoeses* had plundered the Magazines of the *Venetians*. However he fought them with Eleven pittiful Galleys, though they were more than Thirty: after which *Charles Zen* their General having boasted of this Victory, the *Mareschal* gave him the lye in a Letter, and challenged *Duke Michael Sten*, and the General, but they were too wise to fight with him twice. *Hist. de Mar. de Boucicault.* 1404.

Broglio, is a close Alley in the Palace of St. *Mark* where the Nobles meet to make their Parties, and therefore it is called *Far Broglio.*

Bucentaure, is a kind of *Galion* in which the *Senate* of *Venice* pass when they go to *marry* the *Sea.*

Carmignole. The *Venetians* accused him of Intelligence with the *Duke* of *Milan*, and of betraying the Publick Cause at the Siege of *Cremona*, where-as they pretend he suffered himself to be beaten: but 'twas but a *German* trick, because they had no mind to keep him any longer, and yet feared to dismiss him lest he should take Arms with the Enemy. *Machiavel* in *c* 12. of his *Prince*, speaks of him thus, *Vetutolo Virtuosissimo, battuto che hebbero sotto l'suo Governo il* Duca *di* Milano, *e cognoscendo dall'altera parte come Egli era freddo nella Guerra, giudicorono non potere vincere piu con lui, perche non voleva; ne poteano licentiarto, per non perdere cio che avevano acquistato. Onde che furono necessitati per assicurarsi, d'ammaezarlo. Finding him a great General, under whose conduct they had overcome the* Duke *of* Milan; *but finding him afterwards cool, and not prosecuting the War with his former vigor, they con-*

concluded nothing more was to be done by him, because he himself had no mind to it, nor durst they venture to Cashier him, lest they should lose what they had got: whereupon as the only means to secure themselves, they were forced to make him away. However after they had caused him to be killed, they made a solemn and magnificent Funeral for him, and Buried him in the great Church of the *Cordeliers*

Case Vecchie, are the ancient Families in *Venice*, who if we may believe themselves, flourished before the very foundation of their *State*, whose first Magistracy was executed by them. The Families are the *Badoers*, the *Bragadins*, the *Contarins*, the *Cornari*, the *Dandoles*, the *Faliers*, the *Gradenigues*, the *Justinians*, the *Memmes*, called formerly *Monegares*, the *Michiels*, the *Morosins*, the *Sannutes* or *Candians*, and the *Tiepoles*. There are other Families put in the rank of the *Case Vecchi*, because they follow them next, as the *Belegnies*, the *Delfins*, who reckon themselves a branch of the *Gradenigues*; the *Quirins*, the *Sagredes*, the *Sorances*, and the *Zens*, or *Zenon*.

Chevalier, or as they will have it *Cavalieri*, is a Title proper to such *Noblemen* as have been Embassadors with *Kings*, from whom they receive a *Chain* and this Honour at their Audience of *Congé*. I say with *Kings*, because Embassadors to *Dukes* have not that Prerogative. These *Chevaliers* in the Town wear a Black *Stole* edged with a Gold *Galoon*; they have a Girdle about their Wasts, with gilt Buckles. Upon any great Ceremony their *Stole* is of Cloth of Gold, from whence they are called *Chevalieri della Stolo d'Oro*: and their quality is expressed in all Publick Acts by putting a *K* after their names, as *Andrea Contareno, K.*

Christofle More. In the year 1469, this *Duke* arri-

arriving at *Ancona*, *Pope Pius* II. ſent five *Cardinals* three miles into the Sea to meet and receive him. The *Popes Galleys* ſtrook when they approached the *Venetian* Squadron; and ſaluted them with ſeveral peeces of *Cannon*. The *Duke* was complemented in the name of the *Pope*, and harangued by the Magiſtrates of the Town, where Bonefires were made in all the Publick Places. The ſame Night which was the *12th* of *Auguſt* the *Pope* died, and the *15th* of the ſame Month the *Duke* introduced by two *Cardinals*, and attended by two more, was carried to Audience in the *Sacred Colledg*, where he took his place next to the *Dean* which is the uſual Place for *Kings*. *Relat. M. S. dell' andata del* Doge Chr. Moro, *in* Ancona.

Colonnes de la Palace S. Marc. are two great Pillars of Marble, betwixt which their Criminals are Executed; from hence comes their Proverb, *Guardarti dall' inter Columnio.* The Nobles are ſo ſuperſtitious in this point, that for a World they would not paſs betwixt thoſe Pillars, believing if they did, they ſhould certainly die there; and this Whimſey of theirs is grounded upon what happened in that caſe to *Duke Marin Falier*, who coming to *Venice* after his election becauſe the Waters were high, not being able to paſs under the *Pont du Canal de S. Marc*, he Landed betwixt thoſe *two Columnes*, and came afterwards to be unfortunate; but though it might be a preſage, it could not be the cauſe of his misfortunes.

Corne Ducale, is a Bonnet with a point rounded behind: *Sanſovin* gives the reaſon why the *Duke* pulls it not off, in theſe termes, *La* Republica (ſays he) *Moſtra con queſto, che e l'autorita del* Doge *limitata, e che non puo diſponere del dominio a ſuo piacere.* *The* Commonwealth

inti-

intimates thereby, that the Doges *Authority is limited, and that he cannot diſpoſe of it as he pleaſes.*

Democracie, is a Popular Government, as in *Holland*, and *Swizzerland*. There is a ſort of *Democracie* called *Ochlocratie*, when the meaner ſort of People have more Power than the ſubſtantial Citizens. The *Government* of *Venice* under their *Conſuls* and *Tribunes*, was rather an *Ochlocratie* than a *Democratie*, becauſe the *Populace* had the greateſt ſhare in it: and from thence proceeded all thoſe diſorders and altercations in their Aſſemblies, in which many times after they had baul'd and huffed a good while one againſt another, they fell at length to Cuffs, a common thing among thoſe kind of People; ſo that it might rather have been called *Chirocratie*, all things being managed by Violence and Tumult. But from the Election of *Duke Sebaſtian Ziani*, to the Dukeſhip of *Peter Gradenigue* the *Government* of *Venice* was *Democratical*, with a mixture of *Ochlocratie*; for the Mechanicks had part in it, as appears by the ſpeech of *Marc. Quirin* ſpeaking to *Duke Gradenigue*, where he has theſe words, *Queſto doſe ſpento da Spirito Diabolico, ha vo-gin ſerrar el Mazor Conſiglio, e privar qualunque bon Citadin de poter pervenir alla prerogativa de Nobile* Veneto; *donde che Convien ſeguir un peſſimo fatto, che coſi come tutti li Cittadini, Grandi, Mediocri, & Infimi ſono ſtate ſempre prontiſſimi di metter la vita per la* Republica *noſtra, coſi eſſendo ſtati eſcluſi, ſevedera in loro male contentezza*, &c. *This deviliſh Spirit has prevailed ſo far, as to ſhut up the* Grand Council, *and deprive the ſubſtantial Citizens of capacity to arrive at the Prerogative of Noble* Venetians; *a thing of very ill conſequence, for by this means the Greateſt, the*

the Middle ſort, and the Populace, all of them ready to lay down their lives for our Country, finding themſelves excluded, nothing but diſſatisfaction and diſcontent will be found in them. By *Grandi* he means the *Nobles*, by *Mediocri* the *Citizens*, and by *Inſimi* the *Populace*. In my judgment it is clear, but if any deſires to be ſatisfied further, let them read 5 *Chap. du ſquitinio della liberta* Venetia; out of which I have taken thoſe words.

Doria, General for the *Genoeſes*. The *M. S. Hiſtory* of *Venice* that I quoted before, gives us an Anſwer of this *General's* to a Secretary of *Venice* in theſe terms; *Jo non ſon ſtato mandato qui dal mio Commun per aver di voi ne del voſtro Commun Miſericordia alcuna; Anzi jo ho Commiſſion da Quello, deprivarvi del tutto della voſtra Citta, come ho fatto de queſta* (meaning the Town of *Chiozza*) *e con piu ſtrage, non perdonando ad alcun de voi la vita, di tal modo che mai piu per alcuno tempo queſto nome* Venetian *ſia per alcuna banda viſto ne mentionato. Pero ritornate a* Venetia *con ſi voſtri Prigioni* (for the *Venetian* Envoy had brought him ſix or ſeven Priſoners from the *Senat*) *che jo non li voglio, perche non paſſera troppi Giorni che noi veniremo in* Venetia, *e queſti e d'altri a mal voſtro grado traremo fuor di Prigion, & coſi detto voltoli le ſpalle. I am not ſent hither to have Compaſſion either of you, or your Government: My Commiſſion is rather to diſpoſſeſs you of your own City as I have done of this, and with ſo much ſeverity am I to proceed againſt you, that I am neither to ſpare any of your lives, nor to ſuffer the very name of* Venice *to be mentioned hereafter: Return therefore with your Priſoners* (for the *Senat* of *Venice* had ſent him ſix or ſeven Priſoners) *I will have none of them,*

them, being resolved e're many days pass, to be in Venice *my self, and in spight of your teeth to deliver them, and all the rest that are there; and having said so, he turned his back upon him and departed.* This Answer gives us to understand the greatness of the Animosity betwixt the *Venetians* and *Genoeses*, and the hopes the *Genoeses* had to have been Masters of *Venice* in few days, as doubtless they would have been, had not General *Doria* been slain at the Battle of *Chiozza*, which put a new face upon their Affairs.

The Name of *Doria* has been always fatal to the *Venetians*. In the year 1284, *Hubert Doria* defeated their Fleet, and took their *General Morosini* Prisoner, with all the most considerable *Nobility* of *Pisa*. In the year 1298, *Lamba Doria* having found their Fleet at *Curzole* in *Dalmatia*, burned 67 *Galleys*, took 8, and 7000 Prisoners with their *General Dandolo*. *Pagan Doria* obtained great Victories over them, one 1352, near *Constantinople*, where he took 48 of the 89 *Galleys* that made up their Fleet: and the other defeat he gave them was 1354 near the Island *Sapienza*, in which he took and carried off with him 36 *Galleys*, their *General*, and 5000 Prisoners. In 1379 *Lucian Doria* gained the Battle of *Pola* in *Istria* against *Victor Pisani* the *Venetian General*, taking from him 15 *Galleys* and 2400 Prisoners. Not long after, this Victory was followed by another, that is, by the taking of the Cities of *Carolo*, *Grada*, and *Chiozza* by *Peter Doria*, of whom I have spoken before. And last of all, *Andreas Doria* General of the *Emperours Galleys* made it appear, that he inherited the indignation of his Ancestors and Countrey-men, not being to be perswaded to ingage at *Perveso* in the *Archipelago* against *Barbarossa*, though

though earneſtly tempted by the *Popes General*, and the *Venetian General Vincent Capet* had opened a way to the Victory, by already ſinking ſeveral of the *Turkiſh Galleys*, ſo that the croſneſs and averſion of *Doria* fruſtrated the deſigns of the League, and loſt them a fair opportunity of vanquiſhing thoſe *Infidels*.

Dragon Borgueſe. *Pope Paul* V. being of the Houſe of *Borgueſe*, bore *Azure*, a Dragon *Or*, with an Eagle *Sables* in chief.

Ducales, ſo they call all the *Letters Patents* of the *Senat*, becauſe they always begin with the *Dukes* name in this form, *N*..... *Dei Gratia*, *Dux* Venetiarum, &c. *Univerſis & ſingulis Rectoribus & Repreſentantibus noſtris quibuſcunque dilectis ſalutem & dilectionis affectum*: and then all the reſt is in *Italian* to the *Date*, which is commonly in *Latin*. *Datum in noſtro Ducali, die*, &c. The Superſcription of the *Ducals* directed to the *Provincial Magiſtrates* is likewiſe *Latin*, in theſe words, *Nobili & ſapienti viro N*..... *Prætori Noſtro Cariſſimo*.

Eloge of the *Venetians* in the Royal Hall of the *Vatican*: it runs thus, Alexander Papa III Frederici *Imper. iram & impetum*, *fugiens abdidit ſe* Venetiis. *Cognitum, & a* Senatu *perhonorifice ſuſceptum*, Ottone *Imp. Filio Navali prælio a* Venetis *victo, Captoque*, Fredericus, *Pace facta ſupplex adorat, fidem & obedientiam pollicitus. Ita* Pontifici *ſua dignitas* Venetæ Reip. *beneficio reſtituta*. Pope Alexander *flying from the force and indignation of the Emperour* Frederick III. *abſconded in* Venice; *being diſcovered and treated honorably by the* Senat, *upon a Victory obtained by the* Venetians *at Sea, in which* Otho *the Emperours Son was overcome and taken Priſoner*, Frederick *was not only forced to a Peace, but upon his Knees pro-*

promiſed obedience and fidelity to his Holineſs *for the future, ſo that the* Pope *was reſtored to his dignity, by the Beneficence and Generoſity of the* Venetian Commonwealth. *Anno* 1577. *Cardinal Baronius* in his 12 *Tome* would perſwade us, that the Reſtitution of *Alexander* III. by the *Venetians* was a Fable. *Urban* VIII. was of the ſame opinion, or at leaſt pretended to be ſo, when he cauſed the ſame *Elogy* to be expunged, which expunction was the more offenſive to the *Venetians*, becauſe it was a ſtep towards the removing them out of the ſaid *Sale Royale*, as they had removed the *Elogy*: For if *Alexander* III. had not been reſtored by them, by conſequence it would follow the Title by which the *State* of *Venice* injoyed all its Royal Preheminences was falſe, and the *Pope* might degrade it from the rank it held among the Crowns. The *Procurator Nani* in his Hiſtory of *Venice*, *lib.* 10. ſays, *All' auviſo che ni pervenne in* Venetia, *furono gli animi indicibilmente Commoſſi, e nelle conſulte de* Senatori *ſi ponderava con gravi rifleſſi. . . . Alcuni ſe dolevano che denegaſſe* Urbano *di Riconoſcere quel merito della* Republica *alla quale i ſuoi Predeceſſori non avevano ſdegnato di confeſſarſi tenati . . . . . Confeſſavano tutti non poter piu la* Republica *inviar Ambaſciatori a venerare in quella ſala, vicario di Chriſto, fin tanto che reſtaſſero ſoſpeſe, e ſipuo diri condannate le di Lei piu illuſtre Memorie. Upon the news of it at* Venice *it is not to be expreſſed how much their minds were diſturbed, and in the* Senat *it was highly reſented, ... Some complained very ſharply that* Urban *ſhould refuſe to own that Service, which his Predeceſſors had not diſdained to confeſs. . . . . Others declared the* Commonwealth *could not with honour ſend Embaſſadors to pay their reverence to* Chriſt's Viccar *in that Hall*

Hall, whilſt their merits were ſuſpected, and the memory of them condemned.

E'pee, is the *Sword* carried in their Ceremonies before the *Senat*; the Nobleman who carries it, is always one of thoſe who are named to go as *Rectors* into the *Provinces.*

Francis Carraro was a great Lord, who being brought Priſoner to *Venice,* threw himſelf at the *Doges* Feet, and begged his Pardon in theſe words, *Peccavi Domine, miſerere mei. I have offended, Sir, I beſeech you forgive me.* But the *Venetians* being never excellent at forgiving, the *Duke* returned him this Anſwer, *Voi trovarete da noi quella miſericordia che le tradimenti e ſcelerita voſtre meritano. We will ſhew you ſuch Mercy as your treaſons and wickedneſs deſerves*: and then reproached him by the benefits his Family had received from the *Venetians.* To which *Carraro* only replied, *Non e lecito al ſervo reſpondere al ſuo Seigniore. It is not lawful for a Servant to reply upon his Maſter.* Hiſt. M. S. de *Ven.* The *Venetians* had given to his Father the Seigniory of *Padua* after they had driven out the *Seigniors Albovin,* and *Maſtin de l'Eſcale.* In the year 1404, *Francis* uſurped the *Principality* of *Verona* from *Guillaume de l'Eſcale,* who poiſoned him, of which the *Senat* of *Venice* took advantage, and his Crime having made him odious to all people, they made that a pretence to invade him, and take away his Territories. This Nobleman *Francis Corraro* had put himſelf under the Protection of *France,* and done Homage to that King for the Towns of *Padua* and *Verona,* to the *Mareſchal de Boucicault* at *Genoa,* which extreamly incenſed the *Venetians* againſt him.

Franciſco Foſcaro Duke of *Venice,* his Epitaph deſcribes him ſpeaking in theſe terms, *Accipite*

Cives Franciſci Foſcari *veſtri Ducis imaginem.* .... *Maxima Bella pro veſtra ſalute & dignitate, Terra Marique per annos pluſquam triginta geſſi, ſumma felicitate confeci. Labantem ſuffulſi* Italiæ *libertatem:* Brixiam. Bergamum, Ravennam, Cremam, *Imperio adjunxi veſtro,* &c. *Accept good Citizens, this Monument of the General* Franciſco Foſcari. ... *Great Wars for your ſafety and honour, both at Land and Sea for above thirty years I not only managed, but finiſhed with ſucceſs. Your tottering Liberty I ſuſtained, and added to your Empire* Breſſia, Bergamo, Ravenna, Crema, *&c.* Yet all theſe Services and great Actions did not hinder the *Venetians* from depoſing him, and putting another in his place before he died, of which he was too paſſionatly ſenſible to live many days after: ſo that his Funeral had this extraordinary, to be honoured with the preſence of another *Duke*, a thing ſeldom known in *Venice.*

Franciſco Moroſini was accuſed by the *Avogador Antonio Corraro* of having ſurrendered *Candia* without Order from the *Senat*, and of having made a diſhonourable Peace that he called in his ſpeech *Pace moſtruoſa concluſa ſenz'autorita, ſentita con amarezza, Pace ſenza cantare,* Te Deum. *An abominable Peace, concluded without Authority, and received without Joy: a Peace uncapable of a* Te Deum. By virtue of which the ſaid *Avogador* moved that he might be ſuſpended from the *Procuratorſhip* till he had cleared himſelf of his Charge. But *Moroſini* was defended by the *Chevalier John Sagredi*, and the *Senator Michael Foſcharini. Sagrede* in an Oration in his behalf, ſaid, *That* Corraro *imitated the* Gentiles, *who Sacrificed to their Gods innocent Victims for the Graces they received from them, for being honoured with the Office of an* Avogador, he,

he, in acknowledgment, would Sacrifice an innocent Citizen, who with his Sword in his hand had defended his Country for the ſpace of 26 years. That it was hard to ſuſpend him his Procuratorſhip *now, after he had poſſeſſed it peaceably* 14 *Months. That he ſhould have oppoſed himſelf againſt the reſolution of the* Grand-Council *when it was given him; But having conſented then to his election, it was unjuſt to diſpoſſeſs him now, before he was convicted a Criminal.* Concluding with the Example of the *Jews*, who never medled with the Garment of *Jeſus Chriſt* till after he was Crucified. *Eli Ebrei* (ſaid he) *volſero ſerbare gli ordini della giuſtitia; Lo conduſſero inanzi a Giudici, lo preſentacono a* Caifus *&* *a* Pilato; *e vero che lo ſpoglianno della Veſte, e ſe la diviſero, ma non gliela levarono, ſi non doppo Croceſiſſo. The* Jews *obſerving the due methods of Juſtice, carried him into the* Judgment Hall, *preſented him before* Caiphas *and* Pilat, *and though they ſtripped him, and divided his Garment, they did not do it till after he was Crucified. Corraro* replying in the next *Counſil*, flew out into ſuch invectives againſt *Sagredi*, that he called him Poiſoned-tongue, telling him he was like the *Roman Orator* who was eſteemed more Eloquent than Honeſt, *Proſperiore Eloquentiæ quam Morum fama.* Tac. Ann. 4. which had like to have put all the great Families into Parties, and the whole *Commonwealth* into a flame, had not the *Senat* with great dexterity nipt their Animoſity in the Bud, by Commanding the *Avogador* to deſiſt in his Proſecution. For there is nothing the *Senat* fears more than diſſenſion among the Nobility, as being perſwaded the Neighbouring Princes would propagate it with deſign to oppreſs both parties in the concluſion, as it

happened to the *Seleucians* and the *Rhodians*, *Ubi diſſenſore* (ſays *Tacitus*) *accitus in partem, adverſus omnes valeſcit.* Beſides this, there is an example of the *Veronois*, now ſubject to the *Venetian*, who loſt their liberty by a Quarrel betwixt the *Monticoli*, and the *Creſcences*, who were *Gibilnes*, and againſt *S. Boniface* who was a *Guelfe*.

Ghiarra d'Adda is a Country in *Milan*, betwixt the Rivers *Adda* and *Serio*, and the Mountains of *Bergamo*. *Paul Merula* calls it *Inſula Fulcheria*, becauſe it reſembles an *Iſle*. It was delivered to the *Venetians* upon a League into which they entred againſt *Lewis* XII.

Gradiſque is a place of importance in *Sclavonia*, that was for ſome time in poſſeſſion of the *Venetians*, but ſince returned to the Emperour, the *Venetians* have oft attempted to retake it, upon pretence of driving the *Corſairs* out of the *Gulf*.

Interdicts de Venice. The *Commonwealth* of *Venice* has been five times *Interdicted*. Firſt upon ſcore of the Church of St. *Geminian*, which they had pulled down without the *Popes* permiſſion, to inlarge the Place *Saint Marc*. I could not underſtand the preciſe time, but 'tis certain for that reaſon the *Senat* goes every year the next Sunday after *Eaſter* to viſit the ſaid Church, which they have rebuilt at the end of the Palace, renewing every time their promiſe to rebuild it in the ancient place, but that is only a formality.

Their next *Excommunication* was for Invading *Ferrara*, which *Pope Clement* V. would have had; and to take off this *Excommunication*, *Francis Dandoli* the *Venetian* Embaſſador, threw himſelf at the *Popes* Feet, loaden with Chains and Irons like a Thief and a Slave, by which means he prevailed

prevailed for their Abſolution. This ſhews how much they formerly apprehended the cenſures of the Church. But the *Venetians* now-a-days are not ſo tender, ſince they have conſidered that the *Popes* make uſe of their Spiritual Arms upon Temporal occaſions, a thing that of late years have rendered their cenſures very contemptible. *Hæc pœna, ex quo* Romani *Pontifices dirarum prodigi fuere, minus virium habuit,* Pap. Maſſon. Beſides the *Venetian* is now better inſtructed in the force of the Eccleſiaſtical Laws, and of the independance of the Temporal Power.

Their third *Excommunication* was by *Sixtus* IV. who grown jealous of their proceedings, was forced to *Excommunicate* them, and joyn with the other Princes of *Italy*, to make them give over the Siege of *Ferrara*.

Julius II. *Excommunicated* them the fourth time to compel them to the reſtitution of *Rimini* and *Faenza* to the Church, and it anſwered his deſign.

Their laſt *Excommunication* was by *Paul* V. in the year 1605, upon the Impriſonment of two Eccleſiaſticks, and for ſome *Edicts* of their *Senat*, which he pretended were contrary to the liberty and immunities of the Church; but it was done with ſo little ſucceſs and ſatisfaction, that ſince that time the *Popes* have been very cautious of renewing thoſe kind of quarrels, as ſerving only to inſenſe the Princes againſt them, and leſſen their Veneration for the Court of *Rome*.

Lion Venetien, Venice bears *Azure*, a *Lion ſedant aile d'Or*, holding an open Book *Argent* in his Foot, the Lion is *Sedant*, to ſhew the

Venetians are peaceable and deliberative, ſitting being the poſture of Men in *Council*, as alſo to ſignify they know how to prevail by addreſs and cunning, as well as Fighting, like the *Romans*, of whom it was ſaid, *Romanus ſedendo vincit.* It has Wings, to imitate its promptitude and readineſs to execute what is maturely deliberated. Upon diſcourſe about the Wings of the Lion, an Embaſſador from the *Emperour* asked *Where thoſe Winged-Lions were to be found?* The *Doge* replied, *In the ſame Countrey where the Eagle with two heads is to be found.* The Lion has in its Paw an open Book, with this Inſcription, *Pax tibi* Marce *Evangeliſta meus*, to declare that the *State* of *Venice* prefers Peace before War, and, according to the *Emperour Juſtinian*'s Precept, is armed with good Laws, which are the true Arms of Peace. But in time of War the Book is ſhut, becauſe then the Laws are without Authority, and ſilent, *Inter Arma ſilent Leges.* And the Lion in the other Paw holds a naked Sword, as the Simbole of War.

Maria de Gonzague. The *Chevalier Ange Corraro* in his *M. S.* of *France*, ſpeaks thus of this Princeſs. *Tengono per indubitabile tutti i miniſtri che la Principeſſa fiſſa nell' impreſſione che 'l Duchino non debba vivere lungamente habbi procurato dall Imperatore il nome di Ducheſſa, per far paſſo all Conſeguimento dell inveſtitura in ſe de' feudi, etiandio ad Eſcluſione di* Guaſtalla, *ma con ſegreta promiſſa, venendo il caſo della morte del* Duca, *d'accaſarſi coll'* Infante Ferdinando. *Negotio, che ſe traveſſe effetto, all'* Italia *tutta, ma piu alla ſerenita voſtra riuſcerebbe di pregiudicio ben grave per li ſtati di eſſa trala* Germania *e* Mantoua *interpoſte. Onde ſara effetto della prudenza in-*

ſeperabile

ſeperabile di queſto Auguſtiſſimo Senat *l'applicar, ben fiſſo l'occhio, e col rifleſſo, il remedio alle novita che potiſſero andar inſurgendo. It is unqueſtionably believed by all the Miniſters, that the Princeſs taking a fancy the young* Duke *could not live long, had obtained of the* Emperour *the Title of* Dutcheſs, *in order to inveſtiture afterwards, even to the Excluſion of* Guaſtalo, *but with private ingagement if the ſaid* Duke *died, to marry the* Infante Ferdinando: *A thing of great conſequence to all* Italy *if it had ſucceeded, but of more than ordinary prejudice to your ſerenity, in reſpect of your Territories betwixt* Germany *and* Mantua: *wherefore it will be an effect of the Wiſdom inſeparable from this Auguſt* Senat, *to apply ſuch ſolemn remedy as may prevent the ill Conſequences which are like to enſue.*

Marin Falier. This *Duke* being unable to obtain Juſtice againſt *Michael Sten* who had Debauched his Wife, or at leaſt one of his Daughters, reſolved to revenge himſelf by Murdering the Principal *Nobles*, and oppreſſing the *Common Liberty.* But one of the Conſpirators named *Bertrand Pelizare* diſcovered his deſign to the *Inquiſitors* of *State*, who the ſame day cauſed his Head to be chopt off in the very firſt year of his Regency. Every year there is a General Proceſſion made about the *Place Saint Mark*, the 16 of *April* being St. *Iſidor*'s-day, in memory of their deliverance. In the Hall of the *Grand Council*, where hang all the Pictures of the *Dukes*, with their Names, there is only a Black Board for this *Duke* with theſe four words, *Locus* Marini Falieri *Decapitati.* He was the third *Duke* of his Family: the other two were *Vital* and *Ordelaſe*, the firſt of which received Inveſture of

the *Provinces* of *Dalmatia* and *Croatia* from *Alexis* the Emperour of *Conſtantinople*: the other was killed with a Lance in a Fight at *Zara* in *Dalmatia*. Since the ſaid *Marin*, they have alvvays depreſſed that Family vvhich before vvas one of the moſt Illuſtrious, not only in *Venice*, but in all *Italy*, where it was allied to moſt of the Princes.

Monarchy is a *Government* by a ſingle Perſon, as in *France*, *Spain*, *Portugal*, &c.

Oligarchy is a Form of *Government* in the poſſeſſion of a few: The *Commonwealth* of *Sparta* vvas *Oligarchick*, becauſe the *Senat* conſiſted but of thirty men, *viz. two Kings* and *twenty eight Senators*, to whom afterwards were added *five Ephori*. *Ariſtotle*, *Iſocrates*, and *Plutarch* confound often times the names of *Ariſtocracy* and *Oligarchy*. *Iſocrates ad Nicod.* calls the *Lacedemonians Oligarchical*, whereas *Ariſtotle* and *Plutarch* ſay they were *Ariſtocratical*, and *Plato* ſays, *Negare eam eſſe Optimatum adminiſtrationem, omnino abſurdum.* lib. 4. de leg. But in ſtrictneſs an *Oligarchy* is an imperfect *Ariſtocracy*; ſo that when an *Ariſtocracy* is reduced to a ſmall number, 'tis a ſign of its corruption and defect, and is a ſtep to *Monarchy*, as *Tacitus* obſerves, *Ann.* 5. *Paucorum dominatio Regiæ libidini proprior eſt.*

Orſo participatio, Grand Eſcuier of *Conſtantinople*. This Office has been injoyed by five *Dukes* of *Venice*, who in that quality were the ſecond Perſons in the *Eaſtern Empire*. *Peter Gradenigue* the twelfth *Duke*, was the firſt of them who received that Honour from the *Emperour Michel*. *Claſſe* 60 *triremium* (ſays *Leander Albertus* in his deſcription of *Venice*) Michaelem Imp. Conſtantinop. *adverſus* Saracenos Apuleam *infeſtan-*

tes

tes juvit, eoque Proto-ſpatarius *ab eo dictus, qui tum temporis ſecundus ab* Imperatore Grecæ *cenſebatur honor. With a Fleet of* 60 Galleys (ſays *Leander*) *he aſſiſted* Michael Emperour *of* Conſtantinople *againſt the* Saracens *who infeſted* Apulia, *and was therefore by the ſaid* Emperour *called* Proto-ſpatharcus, *which in thoſe days was eſteemed the next Honour to the* Emperour *of* Greece. His Succeſſor *Orſo Participatio* was continued in his place by the *Emperour Baſil*, as the ſame Author reports. The three other *Dukes* honoured with this Dignity were *Peter Tribun*, *Urſe Badoer*, and *Peter Candien*, the ſecond of that name.

Parte. The *Venetians* call *Parte* the *Arreſts* and *Decrees* of their *Councils.* Thus they ſay *Parte del Gran Conſiglio*; *Parte del Senato*; *Parte del Conſiglio Dieci.* And to ſay a thing was reſolved in *Council*, we muſt ſay *Fu preſa la Parte.*

Pipin King of *Italy.* *Pope Leo* in his *Elogies* of the *Dukes* of *Venice*, ingeniouſly acknowledges the Victory King *Pipin* had over the *Venetians*, how partial ſoever he be for their Glory; ſpeaking of *Obelere Duke* of *Venice*, and his Brothers, *Ab his* Caroli, Pipiniq; *agmina ad Patriæ ſunt vocata excidia.....* Heraclea *obruta*, Matamancum & Albiola *dedita, populata* Clodia, *& niſi Mumina obſtitiſſent, ipſa foret deleta Civitas,* (that is *Venice*) *Acerrimæ pugnæ locum* Orphanum *appellant Rivum, quaſi patre ſe liberiſque viduatam tunc Patria. By theſe were the Troops of* Charles *and of* Pipin *called in, even to the deſtruction of their own Country.....* Heraclea *was demoliſhed*, Matamancum *and* Albiola *loſt*, Clodia *plundered*, *and had not the Gods oppoſed*, Venice *it ſelf had*

been

been ruined. The place of this unhappy Battle was upon the River Orphanus, *called ſo, becauſe the* Venetians *ſeemed at that time to be left like Orphans, without either Parents or Children.* By which it appears that *Venice* remained as an Orphan after the great loſſes it ſuſtained in that War, which the People revenged afterwards upon the *Duke* and his Family. *Sabellicus* has not ſpoke his opinion thereupon, leſt he ſhould have diſpleaſed the *Venetians* had he ſaid what he knew. His words are *Adeo varie res traditur a* Venetarum *ſcriptoribus, ut quid potiſſimum ſequar difficile ſe diſcernere. So variouſly is this Action imparted by the* Venetian *Writers, 'tis not eaſy to be deſided whom I am to believe.* The Author of the *Squitinio della liberta Veneta* has found out the true cauſe why the *Venetians* would rob King *Pipin* of ſo famous a Victory, *Accorteſi* (ſays he) *che attribuendo la Vittoria a* Pipino, *la Liberta ſempre perpetuata andava di male: ſi accordarono poco a poco di dire tutti ad una voce che loro furono Vittorioſi, e* Pipino *perdente. When they conſidered,* (ſays he) *that by attributing the Victory to King* Pipin, *it would reflect upon their Liberty, which as they pretended had been perpetual without interruption, they unanimouſly agreed with one voice to affirm the Victory was theirs, and* Pipin *defeated.*

Podeſta is a *Lombard* word taken from the *Latin*, and is as much as *Poteſtatem habens.*

Proveditor. In *French* he would be called *Proviſeur*, but becauſe the *Italian* word is eaſily underſtood, and to be found every day in the *Gazette*, I have not thought fit to change it any more than the *Sopra-Proveditor*, who is the ſame with a *Sur-Intendant.*

Quarantie. I know it is no *French* word, and 'tis

'tis poſſible to call it *Quarantine* might be better; I ſay poſſibly, becauſe 'tis an equivocal word, and ſignifies *forty men*, or *forty days*. But that which gave me moſt confidence to call it ſo, was becauſe I heard it called *Quarantie* by perſons who underſtood all thedelicacies of the *French Tongue*.

Rectori is a name common to a *Podeſtat*, or *Captain at Arms*. They are promiſcuouſly called *Rettori*, becauſe they govern the Cities under the dominion of that *State*, together, but each with ſeparate Juriſdiction: and 'tis in this ſence they ſay *Andar in Reggimento*.

Regates, are the Courſes or Combats of their Boats upon the *Grand Canal* for a Prize, not unlike the *Carrouſels*. Theſe Conteſts were inſtituted firſt by *Duke John Surance* to accuſtom the Common People to fight at Sea. *Ut Cives doceret Maritimis aſſueſcere Bellis, ludicras inſtituit Naumachias.* Matina.

Rois de Sparta. There were always two Kings in *Sparta*, *one*, of the elder Branch of *Euriſtenides* or *Agides*: The *other* of the Branch of *Proclides*, or *Euripontides* who were of the younger Houſe. *Mos eſt*, (*ſais Probus in* Ageſilao) *a majoribus* Lacedemoniis *traditus, ut duos haberent ſemper Reges ex duabus Familiis* Proclis, *&* Euriſtinis.... *Harum ex altera in alterius locum fieri non licebat. Itaque uterque ſuum retinebat Ordinem. It was a cuſtom derived to them from their Anceſtors to have at the ſame time two Kings, of two particular Families, the* Proclis, *and the* Euriſtinis..... *And it being unlawful to tranſpoſe one into anothers place, each retained his own proper order.* The Emulation betwixt theſe two Kings kept them conſtantly within the bounds of their Duty, as is obſerved by *Plato* 3. *de Legib. Deus* (ſays he) *opinos*

nos aliquis de vobis curam gerens, geminam vobis Regum Progericem ex una ſtirpe producens ad moderationem eorum poteſtatem retraxit. Some God (ſays he) *having more than ordinary care of you, provided you a double Race of Kings out of one Stock, and thereby reduced their Power to moderation.*

Sebaſtian Ziani. To this *Doge* it was *Pope Alexander* III. gave the *Silver Trumpets*, the *Paraſol*, the *Folding-Chair*, the *Cuſhions*, the *Banners*, and the *White-Wax* carried before the *Senat* in their Publick Ceremonies; as alſo he gave him permiſſion to Seal his *Ducals* with Lead, as the Court of *Rome* does, *Ut* Veneti Senatus *gravitatem prædicaret*, ſays *Matina*, *in Seb. Ciano.*

Serenita is a Title the *Venetians* give their *Doge* to diſtinguiſh him from other *Noble men*, and they think that a greater Title than Highneſs.

Superſcription of Letters from the *Senat* of *Venice*, to the *Duke* of *Savoy*, is always *Latin*, and in theſe Terms, *Illuſtriſſimo & Excellentiſſimo Principi* N..... *ſabaudiæ Duci digniſſimo, filio noſtro Cariſſimo.* But the *Duke* of *Savoy* pretends they ſhould give him the Title of *Sereniſſimo*, as they do the Title of *Altezza* in the middle of their Letters. And for this reaſon the *Duke* of *Venice* never himſelf receives the *Credentials* of the *Venetian* Embaſſadors, but cauſes them to be received and opened by the *Secretary*, without looking upon the *Superſcription*,

Title of Moſt Chriſtian given by the *Popes* to the *Republick* of *Venice*. Honorius, *digniſſimo titulo & merito quidem*, Venetam Rempublicam Chriſtianiſſimam *nominat, utpote que relictis Schiſmaticis*, Romanæ Eccleſiæ *adhæſiſſet. Quo ampleſ-*

ſimo

ſimo titulo glorioſa, Terra Mariq; feliciter dominium propagavit. Honorius *juſtly calls the* Republick *of* Venice *by the Honourable title of* Moſt Chriſtian, *becauſe renouncing the Schiſmaticks, She ſtuck cloſe to the* Church *of* Rome: *under which honourable Compellation, She performed many brave things, and inlarged his Dominion both at Land and Sea.* Baron. Tom. 8. Ann. 630. *Pius* II. confirmed it to them, by this *Benediction* in a full *Conſiſtory. Benedicti ſint Filii noſtri* Veneti, *Benedicat Deus* Chriſtianiſſimam Rempubl. *&* Senatum *eorum adjuvet, eiſque adverſus* Turkas *præſtet Victoriam. God Bleſs our good Sons the* Venetians, *God bleſs their* Moſt Chriſtian Commonwealth, *God bleſs their* Senat, *and give them Victory againſt the* Turks.

Thomas Moccineguo. This *Duke* before his death called into his Chamber the principal *Senators* of *Venice*, and deſired each of them to tell him upon whom they pitched for his Succeſſor. The greateſt part named *Francis Foſcaro*, the Perſon of all, to whom the ſaid *Thomas* had moſt averſion, becauſe he knew him ſtrongly inclined to make War upon the Continent. Upon which Conſideration he told them, *Sapete Seigniori quanto odio glorioſo, per amor della Patria jo habbi conceputo contro di queſto ſoggetto circa l'interprender la Guerra. Vi tornerible piu a conto d'attendere alla Conſervatione di cio che avete conquiſtato nel Mar, che procurar di piantare in Terra le Palme. Ma prego Seignior Iddio ſia propitio ed a voi edalla voſtra* Republica. *Know Gentlemen, my Love to my Countrey has made me always averſe to enterprizes of War at Land, It will turn better to account if you apply to the conſervation of what you have gained at Sea, and not think of*

planting

planting Lawrels on Shore: but I beſeech God to be Propitious both to you and your Government. And theſe were his laſt words. But the *Venetians* interpreted this grave advice to be only jealouſy againſt *Foſcaro*, as the *Romans* did of *Auguſtus* when he adviſed them not to think of extending the Bounds of their Dominion. *Tac. Ann.* 1.

Turks. The *Venetians* began their firſt War with the *Turks* about the year 1340, and their firſt Captain General that Commanded againſt them, was *Peter Zen*, Created under the *Dogeſhip* of *Francis Dandole*, Surnamed the *Dogg*; and he defeated them in the *Syrian* Sea. Since then they have had ſeveral Wars, but three more unfortunate to the *Venetians* than the reſt; for they loſt three ſeveral Kingdoms by them.

The firſt was the War of *Negropont*, under *Duke Chriſtopher Morus*, and their General *Nicholas Canal*; upon whom the loſs of that *Iſland* was charged, becauſe he brought no Succour to *Paul Erizze* in time. This *Paul Erizze*, the Governor of the ſaid *Iſle*, was the Perſon whom *Mahomet* cauſed to be ſawed a-pieces in the middle; with this pretence, *That though he promiſed not to meddle with his Head, he did not promiſe not to meddle with his Waſt.* This War laſted ſixteen years.

The ſecond was the War with *Cyprus*, under the *Dukes Peter Loredan*, and *Lewis Moccenigue*. This whole *Iſland* was taken by *Muſtapha Baſſa* General to *Selymus*, who cauſed the Valiant *Marc-Antonio Bragadin* to be flea'd alive, and the Head of *Seignior Aſtor de Baillon* to be cut off.

The third War was that of *Candia*, the moſt Famous of all that ever the *Venetians* maintain'd.

It

It continued from the year 1645 to 1669, when the Capital City was ſurrendred by General *Franciſcus Moroſini*, under the *Dogeſhip* of *Dominick Contarino*.

Victor Amedee. The Procurator *Nani* in his 9*th.* Book, ſpeaks of him thus, *Il* Duca Vittorio Amedeo *di* Savoia *per non condeſcendere nelle forme di freſco introdotte co' Cardinali, aſſunſe titolo di Redi* Cipro *con poca approvatione del Mondo; Ch' Egli doppo ceduto con* Pignarolo *il decoro,* (which words ſhew how much the ſurrendting of *Pignerolo* went to their heart,) *che gli portava la Cura di cuſtodire l' Porta d'* Italia, *ſi fregiaſſe di titoli di quel Regno, con grave diſguſto de* Venetiani, *che l'avevano per molti anni legitamente goduto, e che porlandone querele alle Corti de Principi dell' Europa, ſi di chiarono diſobligati da qualcunq; corriſpondenza co* Savoiardi. Victor Amedeus Duke of Savoy, *not to condeſcend in certain forms lately introduced with the Cardinals, took upon him the Title of King of* Cyprus, *with little approbation of the World: That having loſt with the Town of* Pignerol, *the Honour he bore by having the Key of all* Italy *in his cuſtody; to reprize himſelf, he aſſumed the Title of that Kingdom, to the great diſguſt and prejudice of the* Venetians, *who had for many years peaceably enjoyed it; and carrying their Complaints to the Courts of moſt Princes of* Europe, *the* Venetian *declared themſelves free, and diſobliig'd from all further Correſpondence with the ſaid* Duke. Upon which occaſion, it will not be amiſs if we a little conſider the Title of both Parties to the Kingdom of *Cyprus.*

The *Venetian* derives his Title from a Conceſſion and Renunciation made to him by *Katherine Cornaro* Wife to King *James*, and Heir to *James* his

his Son. And again, from an inveſtiture obtained by the *Senat* from the *Sultan* of *Egypt*; and they held it from the year 1510 when *Katherine* died, to rhe year 1570 when the *Turk* took it from them.

The *Duke* of *Savoy* on the other ſide grounds his Title from the donation of *Charlot* only Daughter of *John* King of *Cyprus*, to the Nephew *Charles Duke* of *Savoy*, alledging *That* Lewis *of* Savoy, *Husband to* Charlot, *had been owned as Heir apparent to the Crown; and in that capacity had received an Oath of Fidelity from all the great Officers of that Kingdom at the Celebration of his Marriage. That the Uſurpation of* James *(who was a Baſtard) could not prejudice the Title of* Charlot *the lawful Heir, and that by Conſequence the Title of the* Venetian *ſubſiſting upon a violent Uſurpation, and, which is worſe, a Parricide, (*it being certain the ſaid Baſtard poiſoned his Father,*) they could not, nor ought not to be in better condition than the Uſurper from whom they pretended.* But when the *Duke* of *Savoy* publiſhed his *Manifeſto*, the *Venetians* Sword being the longer, they returned only this Verſe of Scripture in anſwer, *Cœlum Cœli Domino, Terram autem dedit filiis hominum.* By which Argument all Uſurpations would ſtand good, and the weakeſt be always oppreſſed. In a word, 'tis one of their old Tenents, That God has left the Earth in ſuch manner to the Sons of Men, that all Countreys belong to him vvho can catch them; *Sicut Cœlum diis, ita Terras Generi mortalium datas*, Tac. Ann. 13. And that all Princes ought to accommodate their Juſtice to their povver. *Id in ſumma fortuna, æquius, quod validius*, Tac. Ann. 15. A Leſſon vvhich the *Turk* has taken out, at the [illegible]

courſe they took to inveſt themſelves vvith the Kingdom of *Cyprus*, vvas ſingular, and odd. The *Senat* firſt Adopted *James* Son of Queen *Katherine*, making him a Noble *Venetian*; and after his death, they cauſed themſelves to be reciprocally Adopted by Queen *Katherine*, to qualify them to inherit from both, from the one as a Son of St. *Marc*, and from the other as a Daughter and Mother of their State; Daughter by Birth, and Mother by Adopting the *Senat* her Son. A neat invention to entitle themſelves to a Kingdom. But to return to *Victor Amedeus*.

Mal conſigliato (ſays *Catarin Belegne* in a *M. S.* of his Embaſſy into *Savoy*) *ne ſuoi conſigli* Vittorio Amadeo *in rilapar* Pinarolo *alla* Francia, *in fingere clandeſtinamente l'accordo di Chieraſco, & imporre a ſe ſteſſo, & all'* Italia *tutta nuove catene*. Vittor Amedeus *was very ill-adviſed to deliver* Pignerol *to the* French; *to make that Clandeſtine Capitulation at* Chieraſca; *and to put new Chains upon all* Italy *and himſelf*. And a fevv leaves after: *In Concambio di* Pinarolo *e ſuo finaggio, del paſſaggio libero della Riviera di* Cluſon, *aſſiene con tutti le valli che danno mano alla Provincia di Delfinato, & impongono all'* Italia *un duriſſimo giogo*. From vvhence it may eaſily be gathered hovv glad the *Venetians* are of the Neighbourhood of the *French*; *who* (as the *Venetians* themſelves ſay) *will either be Maſters or Enemies to every body that is near them*.

Vital Michaeli II. *Duke* of *Venice*, vvas aſſaſſinated in his paſſage to St. *Zechariah*, a Monaſtery of *Venetian* Gentlevvomen, in viſiting of vvhich Monaſtery *Peter Gradenigue* I. vvas killed before. *Jannot* ſpeaks of the aſſaſſination of *Vital*, in theſe vvords. *Publicum erarium ob aſſidua*

bella gesta contra Græcorum *Imp.* Emanuelem *cum exhaustum esset, ea quæ dicuntur a nobis* Impræstita *primus excogitavit..... Quæ res tantam invidiam Duci apud multos conflavit, ut ipso resurrectionis Dominicæ die confossus fuerit in itinere ad D.* Zachariæ. *The Publick Treasury, by reason of their long Wars against* Emanuel *Emperor of* Greece, *being utterly exhaust; to supply it, he was the first who invented the way of Loans, which Created him so much envy, that even on an* Easter-day *he was slain as he was going to the Monastery of St.* Zecharies. From vvhence some people conclude the Sovereignty of the said *Duke*, as the same Author observes. *Ipse* (says he) *totam invidiam Culpamq; sustinuit, ex commodatis pecuniis uni sibi conflatam, propterea quod omnia virsabantur in sua potestate. All the odium contracted by borrowing of Money, was laid upon him, because he had the whole management of Affairs. Matina* in his Elogy of *Sebastian Ziani*, vvho immediately succeeded *Vital*, acknovvledges the Sovereignty of the precedent *Dukes*, in these vvords: *Sebastianus potentiæ solem, in plura Magistratum sydera est partitus.* For if he vvere the first vvho divided the povver of the Government, vvith his Magistrates; it follovvs clearly, that before that division, the said Povver vvas intirely in the hands of the *Duke*.

It remains now that to these Remarks *I add only one Article touching the Reception of* Royal Embaſſadors *at* Venice, *to ſerve as an Explication to what I have already ſaid in the* Chapter *of the* Colledg.

WHen an *Embaſſador* has ſet the day for his publick Entry, the *Senat* to receive him, appoints a *Chevalier* of the *Golden Stole*, who commonly has been himſelf *Embaſſador* in the Court of the ſaid *Embaſſador's Maſter*.

This *Chevalier* attended by 60 *Senators* goes to meet the ſaid *Embaſſador* at the Church of the *Abbey de S. Eſprit*, where he Complements him in the name of the *Senat*. After which, he puts the *Embaſſador* into a *Gondolo* richly furniſhed, and conducts him to his Palace, followed by all the *Noble-men*, who in their ſeveral *Gondolo's* give precedence to the ſeveral Attendants of the *Embaſſador*, though they be even in Liveries.

Entring into the Palace the *Chevalier* keeps himſelf on the Left-hand of the *Embaſſador*, who at his going out gives him the Right, as all Servants do to the *Senator's*. The next morning the ſame Company come again to his Palace, and he receives them on the middle of the Stairs, giving the Right-hand to the *Chevalier*, as all

his Officers do to the reſt of the *Senators*. But when the *Embaſſadors* goes out, he takes the the Right-hand again, and his Equipage of the *Senators*, and in that Order marches to his Audience in the *Colledg*.

When he enters, he Salutes the Aſſembly three times. The firſt when he comes in the Door, the Second in the middle of the Hall, and the third when he comes up to the Seat where the *Senators* are ſet. Every Salutation conſiſts of three Bows, one to the *Duke* and *Councellors*, and two to the *Sages* of the two ſides; that is to ſay, to the *Sages-Grans* on the Right-hand, and the *Sages de Terra & des Orders* on the Left-hand. After this he takes his place on the Right-hand of the *Doge*, to whom he Preſents his *Credentials*, which are read aloud afterwards by one of the *Secretaries*. His *Credentials* being read, the *Embaſſador* delivers his Meſſage with the Doors open, to which having received the *Doges* Anſwer, he returns to his Palace in the ſame Order he came, and when the *Chevalier* and his *Senators* have paid him their laſt Complement, he conducts them back to their Boats, and gives him the upper hand.

The *Popes Nuntio* is received in the ſame manner as the *Royal Embaſſadors*, but with this difference, that the *Patriarch* of *Venice*, and the *Primicier* of *St. Mark* viſit him at the *S. Eſprit*, and the *Primicier* attends him with his *Canons* at the Ceremony of his Entry: Beſides the *Nuntio* never gives the hand to the *Chevalier* neither coming in nor going out.

The *Patriarch* makes his firſt and laſt viſit to *Embaſſadors* in his *Hood* and *Rochet*, with the *Patri-*

Patriarchal Croſs carried before him by his chief *Almoner.*

The *Popes Nuntio* does the ſame. *Monſieur Trotti* who was *Nuntio* in my time at *Venice*, would have brought in a new Cuſtom, by waving in his laſt Viſit to the *French Embaſſador* his habit of Ceremony, *per non dar* (as his *Secretary* ſaid) *diſguſti a Niſſuno: That he might diſguſt no body*, which in plain *Engliſh* was, that he might not own the Rights of *France*, to the prejudice of *Spain* where he was born. But *Monſieur de St. André* ſpoiled the Plot of that *Triumvirat*, that is to ſay of the *Nuntio*, the Marqueſs *de la Fuente Embaſſador* of *Spain*, and the Abbot *Federici Secretary* to the *Emperour*, who joyntly imployed all their Skill to impoſe upon his Prudence, and if poſſible, revenge themſelves for the honourable advantage he gained upon them in the *Jeſuits Church.*

FINIS.